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This dissertation examines political behavior in Sierra Leone and Liberia
following the end of their civil wars. Dominant theories on politics in African societies
suggest that ethnic interests underpin political behavior and elections are mere censuses
of ethnic support for co-ethnic party elites. Yet, while using a proportional
representation electoral system that is expected to result in splintered vote shares for
multiple political parties, Sierra Leone's elections in 2002 concentrated votes around
one presidential candidate and political party. Conversely Liberia's elections in 2005,
held using a first-past-the-post electoral system that expectedly discourages multiple
vote shares, diffused votes among several political parties and candidates. Given this
variation the study examines the general question of what role ethnicity plays in the two
elections by investigating why and how voters in Sierra Leone concentrate their votes
around one political party whereas voters in Liberia diffuse their votes around several.
The research has two focal points: 1) understanding the ways political elites recruit
party membership in the post-conflict environment and 2) understanding how
electorates respond to parties' and candidates' messages in addition to other cues and
ultimately decide which to support. Data for the study was collected and analyzed using
a triangulated range of qualitative and quantitative methods including survey research,

elite interviews, content analysis, logistic regressions with logged odds and King et al.'s
CLARIFY. The study finds that there is an important distinction between ethnic identity
and ethnic interests; the latter reveals motivation but it is not a deterministic explanatory
variable of vote choice. There is consistent evidence that ethnic identity shows how
Sierra Leoneans and Liberians voted given geographic settlements but not why they
voted. The study contributes to the scholarship on post-conflict political behavior and
elections; ethnicity and politics; and democratization.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Most of the political science literature devoted to the continent is full of
predominant paradigms and reductionist stereotypes, not only of African
politicians but also of African people's behavior in politics - or more
precisely, their lack of political behavior. And these paradigms and
stereotypes are used to explain the economic misery and democratic ineptitude
that characterize the continent in the eyes of the average Western citizen.
(Monga 1996, viii)1
Exploring Political Behavior and Political Mobilization in Post-Conflict Liberia and
Sierra Leone
This dissertation examines political behavior and mobilization in Sierra Leone
and Liberia following the end of their civil wars. The research for this study focused
particularly on exploring how elites of political parties mobilized the mass electorates and
how the latter, in turn, decided whom to support as they participated in the respective
electoral processes during the time of the first post-conflict elections in each country,
Sierra Leone in 2002 and Liberia in 2005.
The body of scholarly work on political behavior in Africa accords much
credence to the salience of ethnicity as a rallying point during electoral processes. Yet at
the country level, we still understand very little about the interactions between ethnicity
and voting behavior and what demographic groups are more likely or less likely to be
susceptible to the effects of ethnic cues, if at all, when voting or expressing support in

1

See Celestin Monga, The Anthropology ofAnger: Civil Society and Democracy in Africa (Boulder: Lynne

Rienner Publishers, 1996), viii.

1

other ways for political parties. Several aspects of the voting patterns that emerged in
Sierra Leone and Liberia following the elections in question do not conform to what the
dominant theories on political behavior in African societies would lead us to expect from
multiparty elections. The ultimate goal of this study is to contribute to the scholarly
literature on ethnicity and political behavior in Africa, especially in the unique context of
countries emerging from conflict.
Throughout the nineties, Liberia and Sierra Leone made news headlines across the
world for the brutality of their civil wars. Insurgent groups in both countries fought heavy
battles with government or international intervention forces on a daily basis and, in the
case of Liberia, sometimes against each other. Wanton murder, rape, amputation, looting
and arson were constant descriptors of the violence in both conflicts.2 For a while, it
seemed as if there would be no end to the hostilities as peace negotiation after peace
negotiation aimed at bringing the conflicts to an end failed.3 Rather miraculously, starting
with Sierra Leone in 2002, both countries emerged from what are arguably the bleakest
periods in their histories, signed peace agreements and held multiparty elections that all
international elections observers ruled free and fair. These were dramatic developments

2

See Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism, and

Disease are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet," Atlantic Monthly 273, (February 1994):
44-81. In his analysis, Kaplan discounted all hopes of redeeming countries such as Sierra Leone and
Liberia from the violence that engulfed them at the time. He may yet be proven right by future events but
both countries did not succumb to the picture painted of a pending doomsday future for the West African
region that Kaplan predicted.
3

Agreements such as the Abidjan Peace Accord of 1996 and the Lome Peace Accord of 1999 all failed to

end the violence in Sierra Leone. In the case of Liberia, the Akosombo Agreement of 1994 and the Abuja
Agreement of 1995 are just two examples of the over 10 peace agreements that failed to bring the civil war
to an end.

2

given the record of prolonged violence and the difficulty of resolving conflicts in subSaharan Africa.4
While Sierra Leone had a brief experience with open and free multiparty elections
before one-party rule and the subsequent chaos of civil war set in, Liberia arguably had
no such historical experience before the elections of 2005 because its politics were
dominated by various forms of one-party dictatorships for most of its history as an
independent nation. So, even as they made the transition from war to peace, the citizens
of both countries also made a transition, this one from virtual disenfranchisement to
participating in multiparty elections with no restrictions on their choices. Truly, the
processes of multiple transitions in both countries were dizzying times for the citizenry
who had to learn anew the art of peaceful mobilization as they participated freely in their
political systems, most for the very first time.6 One of the aims of this study was to use

4

Rarely had countries in Africa emerged directly from civil war to hold elections that are acceptable to all

parties. To put the dramatic nature of these transitions from war to holding multiparty elections into
perspective, consider the prolonged civil wars in the Sudan, Somalia, Chad and the Democratic Republic of
Congo, for example. Similar elections following what was supposed to be the end of civil in Angola in
1992 plunged that country straight back into war when the former guerilla leader Jonas Savimbi reneged on
accepting the validity of those elections.
5

Liberia became a republic in 1847 under the True Whig Party but remained a virtual one-party state under

that party until Samuel Doe overthrew the government of William Tolbert in 1980 and instituted his own
brand of dictatorship, first as the head of a military junta and then as a civilian dictator. Doe was ousted
and killed in 1990 following the commencement of the civil war and the country essentially descended into
chaos following his death. Doe organized multiparty elections in 1985 that he won but that facade was
nowhere near the free elections of 2005 that was overseen by credible external observers and judged free
and fair by all.
6

In the case of Sierra Leone it is more appropriate to say that citizens rediscovered the art of free and fair

multiparty competition following years of one-party rule under the All People's Congress party. From
independence in 1961 to 1977, Sierra Leoneans had the opportunity to take part in multiparty elections. The
3

social science research methodology to discover the most important influences that
guided the decision-making of mass electorates as well as the political elites during these
processes.
A great deal of the scholarly analyses of sub-Saharan Africa concerned with
political behavior suggests that ethnicity is the major influence guiding African elites and
mass electorates during such periods in question. The pervasive argument in this
literature is that because African societies are characterized by what that scholarship
claims are constraining factors such as low levels of education, minimal inter-ethnic
group mobility and undeveloped infrastructures, the most employable heuristic for
collective actions like voting are the ethnic groups to which citizens belong. These
constraints, the arguments continue, are compounded by low levels of access to the media
further strengthening ethnic cues and also making narrow ties of kinship, family or region
the major influences on citizens as they mobilize to participate in politics (Melson and
Wolpe 1970; Horowitz 1985; Palmberg 1999; Bekker, Dodds and Khosa 2001; Daddieh
and Fair 2002; Van de Walle 2003; Forrest 2004; Posner 2004, 2005; and others).
According to some of this scholarship, the hindrances caused by subsistence
livelihoods that are largely based on farming around the home community restrict social
and geographic mobility so that citizens never really move far from the "pack" of the
communities into which they are born. Thus, the groupthink of communal existence
remains resistant to external influences, and this groupthink is often partly articulated in
terms of expectations of disproportionate shares of state resources such as roads and other

last freely contested elections were in 1996. For younger generations in both countries, it is clear that these
were the first opportunities to freely take part in multiparty elections.

4

development projects in the locality. Other factors such as the shortage of formal
education resulting in low levels of literacy strongly root cues of political mobilization in
local communities through the primary ties of kinship, ethnicity and long-standing
cultural bonds, it is further argued.
Often, the preceding description of political behavior on the continent is
contrasted with that in Western societies such as the United States where higher levels of
literacy, geographic mobility, access to the media and other factors associated with
human development and societal modernization lay the foundations for greater ethnic,
regional and even partisan dealignment leading to issue voting by a sophisticated
electorate (Mattes and Norris 2003; Norris 2004).
One conclusion from such analyses suggests that the interactions and
disagreements between ethnic groups as they participate in politics on the continent
eventually results in violence as similarly mobilized groups clash in competition for
scarce resources, which they perceive are only obtainable through access to the holders of
public offices under what are best known as patronage systems of distribution (Bayart
1993; Berman, Eyoh and Kymlicka 2004; Horowitz 1985; Nnoli 1998; Joseph 1999;
Berkeley 2001; Udogu 2001). Jimmy Kandeh, a Sierra Leonean scholar, paints a picture
of politics in Sierra Leone that is a characteristic example of how numerous other
scholars and analysts have perceived and described politics on the continent.
The individual [or politician] is seen as an embodiment of the tribe, consequently
his [or her] fortunes are strongly identified with the fortune of the tribe. If he or
she succeeds it is the tribe that has progressed, and if he or she fails it is the tribe
that has suffered a setback... [thus], each time a high office or post goes to
someone in the community his or her tribesmen jubilate openly, culminating
finally in a delegation to the Head of state [with special kola nuts and other forms
of gifts] to thank him for the appointment of their son or daughter to the high
office.. .such jubilation could be taunting to the neighboring ethnic groups, who
watch from the sideline because they are not so blessed with a similar fortune.
5

Indeed, what this does is encourage ethnic competition as it whets the political
appetite and sharpen the desire for ethnic solidarity in the next democratic
competition. This is so because the newly appointed minister or high government
appointee is likely to bring political goodies to his or her ethnic group at the
seeming expense of the contiguous ethnic groups. This scenario brings into
limelight the quest for political solidarity and active participation along ethnic
lines in future political contestation to elect the 'big man' or 'big madam' who
would bring home the bacon. Such political behavior pattern, in effect nourishes
the theory of ethnic boundaries, which if not handled adequately, could result in
ethnic political clashes. (Udogu 2001, 26-27)
Besides such suggestions for the mobilizing potential of ethnicity leading to
dangerous conflict, we still understand little else about how the ethnic influences on
political behavior and mobilization into politics in Africa unfolds and what potential
impacts this may have on interethnic existence, especially in the unique context of
countries emerging from war.
Developments in Sierra Leone such as the results of its first post-conflict elections
visibly challenge Kandeh's analysis and similar explanations regarding the effects of
ethnicity on politics in African countries. The way the Sierra Leone civil war was fought
and, more important for the current analysis, the results of the presidential and
parliamentary elections of 2002 do not reflect mobilization and participation of the
people along ethnic lines.
Following the conclusion of its civil war in 2001, Sierra Leone successfully held
free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections in May 2002. The results of these
post-conflict elections do not conform to what we should come to expect given the
various accounts of ethnic mobilization in Africa. While political parties of diverse
dispensations formed to take advantage of the political space, the electorates largely
ignored those parties to concentrate their voting preference around one party, the Sierra
Leone People's Party (SLPP).
6

In 2002, Sierra Leone had roughly five million people distributed among 17
ethnic groups. Eleven political parties registered to take part in the elections. The
electoral system that was employed for those elections was a variant of the proportional
representation voting system called the "district block voting system" which required
political parties to only submit general constituency-based lists of candidates for approval
by the electorate in the respective constituencies (International Foundation of Election
Systems 2004; Kandeh 2003). All these factors provided an ideal recipe for mobilization
along ethnic lines or what Donald Horowitz refers to as "census-type" or polarizing
elections in which the various ethnic groups cast their ballots overwhelmingly for parties
led by elites from their ethnic groups.7 But the final results of the parliamentary elections
registered a convincing victory for one party, the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP),
which gained nearly 70 percent for a total of 83 seats in a 112 chamber legislature
(International Foundation for Election Systems, 2005).8
Ostensibly, the SLPP draws most of its support from the Mende ethnic group that
populates the south and east of Sierra Leone. In fact, some claim that the SLPP is a
"Mende-based" party because in elections past, the party gained a majority of its votes

According to Horowitz, in "census-type" or polarizing elections, voting is largely indicative of a census of
the different groups in the electorate providing little or no change in the vote patterns thus giving the largest
group a lock on power. For this conceptualization, see Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict,
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985).
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seventy percent of the total votes against the main challenger and runner-up from the All People's Congress
Party, Ernest Koroma, who won about twenty-three percent of the votes.
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from those two regions (Kandeh 1992, 93; Hayward 1987; Conteh-Morgan and DixonFyle 1999).9
Yet in the elections of 2002, it won significant portions of votes from all regions
of the country, even in regions dominated by other ethnic groups and considered political
strongholds of parties with ties to those other ethnic groups. The puzzle that the SLPP
win presents is that, as an ethnic group the Mendes comprise less than thirty-four percent
of the population (Levinson 1998). Thus, to win by the margin it did, the SLPP had to
have secured the votes of other ethnic groups across the country. Why did the members
of other ethnic groups cast their vote for the SLPP given that there were other political
parties on the ballot that could be considered more considerate of the interests of their
ethnic group?
Turning to Liberia, hostilities in its civil war eventually came to an end in 2003,
one year after the elections in Sierra Leone, allowing that country to hold its first
completely free and fair multiparty elections in October 2005. The results of the first
round of elections showed, unlike Sierra Leone, that support for the twenty-two political
parties that contested the elections was diffused throughout the country with the Congress
for Democratic Change (CDC), led by George Weah, holding a slim lead over other
political parties. In the legislative elections, the CDC carried seven counties out of 15
gaining over 29 percent of the total votes casts in the first round. Since no clear winner
emerged in the first round of the presidential elections held on October 11, a run-off
9
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election was held on November 8, 2005 between the two frontrunners from the first
round, Weah of the CDC and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf of the Unity Party. Johnson-Sirleaf
won the run-off election with close to 60 percent of the votes defeating Weah who was
the frontrunner in the presidential elections during the first round of the elections.10
Thus, the study seeks to examine the general question of what role ethnicity plays
in the political behavior and mobilization of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans in the postconflict environment with the question about why voters in Sierra Leone concentrated
their votes around one political party whereas voters in Liberia diffused their votes
around several.11
In the case of Liberia, a corollary development that demanded explanation was to
understand why support shifted from Weah to Johnson-Sirleaf during the runoff election.
Ethnicity, after all, is a static identity. If ethnic groups have fixed preferences for those
they elect to represent them, why did Weah fail to win the second round of the elections
given that he was the frontrunner in the first round?

An important caveat here is to point out that initial post-conflict elections took place at different times in
Liberia and Sierra Leone. All parties to the conflict in Sierra Leone laid down their arms in late 2001 and
the country held its elections in May 2002 whereas the war in Liberia only drew to a close during the fall of
2003 allowing that country to hold its initial elections in 2005.
11

The contrast between the two vote outcomes is even more striking when considering the electoral

systems used by each country. Liberia used the single-member district system whereas Sierra Leone used
the proportional representation system. The tendency of PR systems to increase the number of parties
represented in legislatures is well noted (Duverger 1954, 1986). Out of the 11 parties that went to the polls,
only three received enough votes to gain seats in the parliament of Sierra Leone. On the other hand, the
tendency of single-member districts to discourage third party representation in democracies is also well
documented. In the case of Liberia, several parties gained seats on the Liberian legislature following their
initial election.
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Sierra Leone and Liberia: Comparing the Two Cases
One of the most important considerations in undertaking a meaningful
comparative exercise in comparative politics is to ensure that the objects, cases, or
policies being compared are alike in significant ways so that the basic logic of
comparison is not violated and the results of the exercise are not rendered meaningless
(Sartori 1970, Dogan and Kazancigil 1994). In what ways does Sierra Leone provide a
meaningful comparison to Liberia for a comparative exercise aimed at unearthing the
essential elements of political behavior following civil war?
I will argue that several factors make Sierra Leone a meaningful comparison to
Liberia. First, both are neighboring countries located in the Mano-River sub-region of the
West African region of Africa. Both are signatories to the same regional and sub-regional
accords: the Mano-River Union with Guinea; and the Economic Community of West
African States with fourteen other states in West Africa. Also, both countries divide
ethnic groups such as the Kru, Vai, Kissi, and the Mende across their common borders
and both countries share similar socio-cultural traditions and historical linkages dating
back to the pre-colonial era.12 More importantly, scholars and analysts are unanimous in
agreement that the war that rived Sierra Leone for over ten years was an offshoot of the
civil war that erupted in Liberia in 1989 (Richards 1996; Abdullah 2004; Gberie 2005).
Thus, from a most similar systems design perspective, the two countries provide
interesting contrasts that form useful foundations for comparative analysis since they are
similar in most regards but the concentration of votes around the SLPP in Sierra Leone's

For a detailed explanation of this colonial linkage see Christopher Clapham, Liberia and Sierra Leone:
An Essay in Comparative Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
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election contrasts with the diffusion of votes in Liberia's election. By highlighting the
most important variables that affected political behavior and mobilization in the two
countries, this dissertation will help explain the differing electoral outcomes and how and
why both electorates made the decisions that they did.
Rationale of this Study: Why Liberia and Sierra Leone?
According to Sisk and Reynolds (1998), elections can either help reduce tensions
following major conflicts by reconstituting legitimate government and political order or
they can exacerbate such tensions as exist by further polarizing highly conflictual
societies.13 Perhaps, no two countries fit their description of "conflictual societies" better
than Sierra Leone and Liberia during their civil wars. Given a predominant argument
about ethnicity and political behavior and mobilization in Africa, scholars and analysts
interested in seeing both countries emerge permanently from conflict must have held their
collective breaths in anticipation of the voting outcomes in each since those outcomes
were, arguably, proxy indicators of an acceptable peace or of residual animosities
following the wars. The precariousness of the two situations was underlined further since
the two countries were making a transition from visibly polarized situations of civil war
to, almost directly, holding multiparty elections where there was a need for consensus of
some kind in electing representatives that will oversee the processes of post-conflict
democratization and institutionalization of the peace.
Indeed, the outcome of Liberia's legislative elections and the first round of its
presidential election might have been a cause for alarm. But the puzzling contradiction

Several other contributors to the same volume make the same point.

11

described earlier with regard to the elections in Sierra Leone was also apparent in the
second round of the presidential election in Liberia. So instead of a mere "census" at the
polling booths by the various ethnic groups as it appeared during the legislative elections,
there were crossovers in voting during the second round of presidential elections in
Liberia.
Certainly, the explanations of political behavior and mobilization in sub-Sahara
Africa are wide-ranging. But I argue that the evidence offered in support of such
explanations is sometimes narrow and efforts to describe politics in African societies lean
heavily towards support for conflictual relations between ethnic groups engaged in zerosum competitions for the scarce resources available at the center of the state (Rabushka
and Shepsle 1972; Enloe 1973, 1980; Bates 1983; Bienen and Herbst 1996; Horowitz
1985; Lake and Rothchild 1998; Berman and Lonsdale 1992; Glickman 1995). Rarely do
such studies focus on explaining cooperative interactions between different ethnic
groups, and rarely have studies offered explanations for the conditions under which
ethnic cues of voting are adopted or discarded for comparatively more pragmatic
decisions.14
Given the diversity of their ethnic populations, and given the potentially ethnicsensitive post-conflict environment, the probabilities of governing majorities to emerge
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analysis, they suggest that most interethnic interactions in Africa are characterized by cooperation rather
than by conflict. See James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation."
American Political Science Review 90, no. 4 (1990): 715-735. Daniel Posner's (2005) analysis is another
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were severely precluded according to the predictions of the ethnic mobilization theses.
But we can assume, from the fact that winners and majorities emerged in such
challenging circumstances, different ethnic and other demographic groups, whether
collectively or individually, identified some candidates or parties that may not necessarily
belong to their own ethnic groups as the most reliable depositories of their different
aspirations and elected those candidates or parties into national offices. What remains is
for scholars to shift analytic focus and devote attention to understanding and accounting
for such differences in voting behavior. This study sheds new light in this direction.
Literature Review: Towards Conceptual. Theoretical and Methodological Frameworks
for This Study
The research concerns of this study situate it in a broad literature on elections and
voting behavior in Africa, which have their foundation in research into voting behavior of
the American and European electorates. It also draws from the budding literature on postconflict elections. Studies of voting behavior have their foundations in seminal studies
and advancements in survey research methodology that were pioneered in the 20th
century by the Columbia University and University of Michigan studies beginning
around the early 1940s.
For the longest time in their histories, the majority of African countries were
colonies of European countries and indigenous peoples were denied the right to vote and
to participate in other aspects of political decision-making (Cowen and Laakso 2004).
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Ultimately, these countries were granted independence resulting in enfranchisement and
political participation beginning around the latel950s.15
As scholars began to pay attention to the political behavior of the newly
independent countries, they argued that existing explanations of political behavior
borrowed from Western societies did not adequately explain the evolving political
behavior in these societies. Thus, even though the emergent explanations of political
behavior in the new societies in Africa borrowed heavily from the theoretical and
conceptual frameworks of the existing works, they adapted such frameworks to the
context of politics in African societies.16
In doing so they argued, for the most part, that the political behavior emerging in
the newly independent colonies was driven by the desire of competing elites to occupy
the political and administrative spaces left by departing Europeans using the support of
their ethnic communities. Here, I trace the emergence of this literature starting with a
discussion of the major trends along which the study of voting behavior emerged in the
United States followed by a discussion of the most influential works that have resonated
within the analyses of political behavior in Africa.
The study of voting behavior in Africa has seminal roots in the studies and
analyses of voting behavior that were conducted in the United States (Lazarsfeld,
Berelson and Gaudet 1948; Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954; Downs 1957;
Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1960; Schattschneider 1960; Key 1966; Lipset
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and Rokkan 1967).17 Beginning around the 1940s, these studies flowed through three
dominant paradigms, so to speak. First, there was the Colombia University study which
emphasized socioeconomic factors like income and education as important influences on
the vote choice; next, followed the socio-psychological model advanced by the
University of Michigan which emphasized parties, issues and the candidates and
introduced the "funnel of causality" model to explain the voting decision; and a third
paradigm, the rational voter model based on the rational choice theories and models of
voter decision-making introduced by Anthony Downs. Both the Michigan School and the
rational models of decision-making that came later emphasized the "issues" as important
influences on voter decision-making; a caveat being that the latter emphasized it more
than the former.
A comparable replication of the extensive efforts to understand political behavior
of the American electorate is yet to be undertaken at the country level in African
societies. The Afrobarometer Studies launched in 1999 could potentially fill this void in
the years to come. In the meantime the scholarship has explained very little of the
preferences shown for different political parties by electorates in Africa.
The Study of Voting Behavior in Africa
Arguably, Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) work on party systems and voter
alignments in Western Europe had one of the most influential impacts on the structural
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theories of voting behavior that emerged on Africa. Their theories provided the baseline
for comparison of the structural foundations that resulted in issue-based voting in the
established Western democracies and what the earliest scholars of voting behavior in
Africa found wanting in the societies of Africa. Regarding states in Western Europe,
Lipset and Rokkan observed that social identities formed the basic building blocks of
party support in these societies. These social identities included "regional cleavages of
center-periphery," "the class inequalities between workers and owners," and "sectarian
cleavages over church and state." The class inequalities between workers and owners
locked the preferences of political parties and voters into left-right dimensions based on
views on a strong role for the state through egalitarian welfare policies preferred by the
left versus the free market, limited government preferences of the right.
Lipset and Rokkan's work established another framework on which scholars built
the earliest analyses of electoral politics and voting behavior in African societies during
and following the independence era of the late-fifties to early seventies. However,
scholars did not fail to observe the remarkable differences between the structural
conditions underlying political behavior in Western Europe that were observed by Lipset
and Rokkan and those characterizing the societies of Africa (Melson and Wolpe 1970).
For example, African societies emerging from years of colonial domination lacked the
class inequalities between workers and owners of the means of production which
structured voters into left/right preferences for the appropriate role of government in
society (Sklar 1979). Instead, the societies were relatively underdeveloped with low
levels of education and without the income levels that reinforced the cleavages between
parties and voters in the West. The search for the unique structural conditions underlying
voting behavior in Africa was fully underway by the early seventies as scholars sought to
16

provide answers to the question of what guided Africans in their political decisionmaking (Cowen and Laakso 2002).18
Initial explanations, with varying degrees, focused on cues of ethnicity, cultural
bonds, regional loyalties and family ties following observations of the initial postcolonial mobilizations, as Africans moved to occupy the political spaces left by departing
Europeans (Mackenzie and Robinson 1960; Hodgkin 1960; Coleman 1958; Coleman and
Rosberg 1964; Fisher 1969; Carter 1966; Melson and Wolpe 1970; Lemarchand 1972;
Oluronsola 1972; Hayward 1987). According to most of these theories, sociological
variables served as the major influences that guided voter mobilizations following
independence. Fred Hayward (1987) concluded from a study of elections in Africa that
political parties were basically ethnic or regional parties.. .political mobilization
in these circumstances goes beyond seeking support for a particular position,
becoming a matter of ethnic loyalty and solidarity... competition often leads to
ethnic violence. (Hayward 1987, 279)
Humphrey Fisher (1969, 40) writing on the cycle of coups that gripped Sierra
Leone following the elections of 1967 opined, as somebody who was present during the
events, that "Sierra Leone had deeply rooted tribal divisions and religious differences of
great antiquity" which formed the basis of political parties and voting cues. Interestingly,
Fisher's analysis also conceded that some elements of issue-based voting did take place
in Sierra Leone in the immediate post-independence era as voters showed their
preferences for what political party was best able to articulate an acceptable vision of
foreign relations for the young country.
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According to some of these scholars, ethno-regional factionalism of sub-Saharan
Africa was much in evidence early on in spite of the desires by some immediate postcolonial leaders to mesh various ethnicities within their inherited boundaries and forge a
sense of nationhood (Lawson 1999). The new developments of ethnic mobilization for
political participation and the inter-ethnic conflicts that sometimes ensued from such
efforts also flew in the face of optimistic modernization theories that had predicted the
decreasing relevance of ethnic ties as these societies evolved and set aside ethnic
identities in favor of Western-style industrial and cultural practices. Melson and Wolpe
(1970) pointed this out to the scholarship in a quite influential analysis. Drawing
evidence from the Nigerian experience, they argued "technological and economic
developments" had not done much to "undercut the organizational bases upon which
communal politics rested. By "communal politics" they meant racial, ethnic, religious, or
tribal politics (1973, 1112). Among several other propositions, Nelson and Wolpe
advanced that competition engendered by social mobilization in culturally plural societies
will tend to be defined in communal terms.
What is more important is that personal fortunes of individuals are generally
believed to depend on their communal origins and connections. This being the
case, individuals plan and organize accordingly. Thus, the aspirant Nigerian
politician seeks to mobilize his "tribal union" behind his candidacy; at the same
time, his towns-people -those resident in the home community as well as those
residents in the alien city -view his candidacy as an expression of their group
aspirations and his elections as an indicator of group recognition and power.
Conversely, the members of other communal groups view his candidacy as a
threat to their own group aspirations and vested interests. (Melson and Wolpe,
1973 1114-1115)
Borrowing from William Riker, Robert Bates (1983, 164) contributed to the
analysis of political behavior in Africa by arguing that the interactions between ethnicity
and politics on the continent revolved around the formation of "minimum winning
18

coalitions" wherein the mobilized ethnic group was large enough to secure the benefits of
political competition for the resources of the state but small enough to maximize the
value of those benefits for each individual.
In another contribution, Donald Rothchild (1985) described an aspect of political
behavior in African societies as "hegemonial exchanges" in which members of an ethnic
group in control of the state apparatus, aware of their incapability to impose their
hegemony over other ethno-regional groups, resort to exchanges of state resources in
return for legitimacy from those groups. The insights provided by Bates and Rothschild
into the nature of political behavior and mobilization within African societies firmly
place ethnic identity at the center of political behavior in Africa. Bates' analysis raises
interesting questions about the extent to which groups in Liberia and Sierra Leone were
forms of minimum winning coalitions, regulating inclusion in order to maximize benefits.
The application of Rothchild's conceptual framework is more useful for understanding
political mobilization within stable societies that are yet to disintegrate into conflict than
it is for understanding the post-conflict environment in the two cases.
Donald Horowitz's (1985) analysis that followed almost a decade and a half after
the earliest studies of political behavior in the post-colonial societies of Africa reinforced
the claims made by the earlier group of scholars and has remained the most influential
among published works on ethnicity and political behavior anywhere. Using evidence
accumulated from various multiethnic societies across the world and that from Africa in
support of his arguments, Horowitz argued that a direct relationship existed between
ethnicity, party systems and voting behavior in developing societies. Elections, according
to him, where like an ethnic census in African societies and other societies across the
world divided by race, language and religion. Horowitz pointed out what he saw as an
19

observed tendency of the "segments" of such societies to give large proportions of their
votes to "ethnic parties" associated with those segments. He defined "ethnic parties" as
political parties that draw support largely from an identifiable ethnic group and serve the
interests of that group. Ethnic parties and the party systems in which they operated
exacerbate ethnic divisions in African countries leading to a zero-sum competition for
state resources.
An application of Horowitz's propositions to the cases of Liberia and Sierra
Leone exposes several shortcomings. For example, there is a gap between his
explanations and the events that transpired in Liberia and Sierra Leone where the voting
outcomes suggested evidence of pragmatic voting calculi by members of different ethnic
groups instead of mere ethnic censuses. Thus, one of the key concerns of this study is to
bridge such gaps in evidence by determining the salient variables that affected vote
choice and support for the various political parties during the initial post-conflict
elections as well as to determine the most preferable cues employed by elites of political
parties in both countries to attract voters to their parties.
Other scholars have raised a number of conceptual and methodological issues
with Horowitz's analysis. Mattes and Gouws (1998, 122) raised doubts about his findings
and questioned the clarity of Horowitz's definition of an "ethnic party."20 For example,
what percentage of votes does a group have to give to a party for that party to be referred
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to as an ethnic party, they asked? But the biggest concern they raised with Horowitz's
analysis is his use of district level aggregate data to make inferences about individual
behavior, which, they argued, resulted in ecological fallacy.21 Using data from the South
African elections of 1994, Mattes and Gouws found little evidence of "ethnic parties"
among the political parties in South Africa or voting approaching an ethnic census.
Parties such as the Inkatha Freedom Party, the Freedom Front and the Pan-Africanist
Congress that had elements of ethnicity as a criteria for joining them, were the few
exceptions. Rather, they argued that the great majority of voting behavior in South Africa
could be explained by "utilizing the usual theories of voter behavior developed in
apparently 'more normal' democracies" (1998, 140).
However, they neglected to acknowledge the relative modernization of South
African society when compared to most African societies. But the methodological
concerns they expressed with Horowitz's analysis regarding his employment of aggregate
data significantly influenced the approach in this study in opting to employ survey data
for an analysis of voting behavior in the two countries instead of looking merely at
aggregated elections returns from polling stations.
But for a few exceptions such as Fred Hayward's (1987) edited volume, there is a
noticeable lull in the analysis of elections and voting behavior during the late seventies to
eighties. Not the least of reasons for this lull was the absence of competitive, free and fair
elections in much of the continent during the decades of "suspended constitutions,"
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military rules and dictatorships. As Hayward points out "the interest in and enthusiasm
for elections became less frequent, the one-party state or military regime became the
norm, and the utility of the electoral process itself was called into question" (Hayward
1987, 1). Other scholars similarly acknowledge the facade of elections that one-man
dictatorships and personal rulers set up during the period in question (Chazan 1979, 1982;
Barkan and Okumu 1978; Cowen and Laakso 2002).
Following the end of the Cold War and the trend towards democratization on the
continent that commenced with elections in Benin and Zambia where the incumbents
lost, a flurry of studies examining elections and voting behavior on the continent
reemerged trying to offer explanations for the new developments (Glickman 1995;
Bratton and Van de Walle 1997; Huntington 1996; Conteh-Morgan 1997; Salih and
Markakis 1998; Sisk and Reynolds 1998; Joseph 1999; Palmberg 1999; Udogu 2001;
Bekker, Dodds and Khosa 2001; Daddieh and Fair 2002 and others).
Much of this second wave of analyses reached the same conclusions as the early
scholars that the major influences on political behavior and mobilization were structural
ties of ethnicity, kinship, or region, instead of the socioeconomic factors influencing
voters and "issue voting" that was largely argued, influenced political behavior in more
established Western democracies.23 One might have hoped for a finding of the waning of
ethnicity as an influence on voting behavior given the years that had elapsed since
independence in most African countries and given their relative technological and
22
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infrastructural advancement. It seemed that modernization had not, after all, resulted in
greater ethnic dealignment in political behavior and mobilization.
Building on the earlier studies, the new studies pointed out that the absence of
authoritarian governments, which they argued kept such narrow loyalties in check for
much of the decades following independence, now gave free reign for such divisions to
rise to the fore during the democratization processes. For example, Marina Ottaway
pointed out the failure of previous systems of co-opting ethnic leaders because in the new
political dispensations of democracy, "people became free to choose their own
representative and they did so using ethnicity." As a consequence, ethnic conflict became
much more visible and, in some cases, much more acute and destructive" (1999, 311).24
In his analysis of the democratization processes that were taking place around this
time, Samuel Huntington struck a sobering note of caution about potential problems of
democratization in order to tamper the euphoria of the times with the reality of what he
thought were challenges that lay ahead.
The initiation of elections forces political leaders to compete for votes. In many
situations, the easiest way to win votes is to appeal to tribal, ethnic, and religious
constituencies. Democratization does promote communalism and ethnic conflict,
and relatively few new democracies have structured their institutions to minimize
the incentives to make such appeals. (Huntington 1996, 6)
His argument summarizes the emphasis that the scholarship has placed on the
potential for elites to employ narrow cues of ethnicity and other structural cues as a
mobilization tool and reinforces the need to study the situation in Liberia and Sierra
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Leone in order to determine the veracity of such theories given the fragility of the postwar environment and the need for democratization.
Indeed, not all observations of voting behavior in Africa have stressed
mobilizations based on ethnicity. For example, Richard Joseph (1991) observed that
groups mobilized against authoritarian regimes to pursue democratization following the
end of the Cold War were broadly based and transethnic. Bratton (1992), Gerkie (1993),
and Oyediran and Agbaje (1991) also observed instances of nonethnic voting and
transethnic coalitions to face authoritarian regimes in Zambia, Kenya and Nigeria,
respectively.
Patrimonialism and Patron-Client Networks: The Nexus of Political Behavior in
Africa?
Yet another vein of analyses explaining political behavior in Africa has focused
on factors such as patron-client networks and the realities of patrimonial rule on the
continent (Zolberg 1969; Hyden and Leys 1972; Lemarchand 1972; Clapham 1982;
Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Bayart 1993; Reno 1998; 1995; Orvis 2001 and others). This
strand argues that patrimonial rule, found where all decision-making power within the
state is concentrated in the hands of one leader, explains much of the voting behavior of
electorates in Africa as loyal subjects reward a patron at the ballot box for roads and other
benefits to the locality either directly or by voting for representatives from those localities
anointed by the patron in the central state structure. Closely related to this phenomenon is
clientelism, which Thomson (2004) described as a
mutually beneficial association between the powerful and the weak.. .a patron
extends public office (a salary and access to the state), security (something akin to
freedom from arbitrary violence), and resources (such as wells, roads and medical
24

centers) to his or her clients. In return, the client offers support and deference that
helps legitimize the patron's elevated position. (Thomson 2004, 119)
In a similar vein, Orvis (2001) pointed out that patron-client networks were
pervasive in Africa "because they provided crucial resources to all involved." According
to him,
the ethnic and clan-based voting in many parts of Africa attests to patron-client
networks' ability to act collectively; patrons can mobilize clients for political
purposes. The networks, however, also serve as means of political participation
for clients. (Orvis 2001, 27)25
To what extent did voters in each country cast their votes for the representatives
of their respective clientele networks? Lemarchand (1972) and Bayart (1993) similarly
argue that there are interconnections between ethnicity, clientele networks and political
behavior in African societies. Bayart described politics and corruption in Cameroon as
"one of the belly," suggesting that political support and ethnicity went hand in hand as
politicians looked out for the interests of their respective constituencies/clients while
those constituencies looked to those public officials from their clan, village, town, church
or mosque as the legitimate depositories of their hopes and aspirations even as sources of
livelihood, in reciprocal relationships that were determinative of political support.
While agreeing with some of the analyses that have focused on patron-client
networks and patrimonial relationships in describing political behavior in African
societies, I suggest that we can refine their arguments in important ways to describe some
of the benefits of the exchange described earlier by Thomson (2004) - roads, medical
centers, security - as legitimate concerns that are similar to the issues with which voters

" See Stephen Orvis, "Civil-Society in Africa or African Civil Society?" In Stephen N. Ndegwa, Ed, A
Decade of Democracy in Africa (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 17-38.
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in advanced western democracies are concerned, for example ideological and policy
positions on taxation, welfare, immigration, death penalty, abortion and so forth.
Possibly, a difference between the way the electorate in America, for example, and those
in Africa process their preferences for benefits could be that voters in America do not
explicitly evaluate candidates based solely on their ability to bring what are referred to as
"pork barrel" projects to the congressional district. But bringing such benefits, in fact,
enhances the candidate's potential for reelection.26 Whereas, for voters in the electorates
in Africa, we can suggest that such benefits are the main issues and they go to the polls
with the intention of voting for individuals who they think will bring those benefits
directly to their communities. Certainly this notion is as worthy of empirical verification
as is the task of determining the important influences on political behavior from among
the multitude of explanations advanced by the scholarship over the years.
Typically, as Mattes and Gouws (1998) point out, the older established theories of
political behavior and mobilization in Africa, for example Horowitz's "ethnic-census"
theory, drew their evidence from experiences with aggregation of polling data from
district or regional voting returns. However, these studies suffered from several important
methodological problems. For example, to the extent that political behavior and the
mobilization of electorates into the political process in the decades immediately
following the end of colonialism was largely along communal lines, these studies failed
to adequately account for both the heterogeneity of group identity and the effects of the
electoral system on the strategies employed by political elites. More importantly, as they
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In fact, some voters in urban communities in America, especially tough inner city neighborhoods,

sometimes evaluate candidates based on their ability to deliver a form of security to their communities in
the form of fighting and reducing crime.
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point out "the census theory committed a significant ecological fallacy by using grouplevel voting patterns to infer individual-level motivations." (1998, 122-123)
In addition to this point, most of the recent scholarship neglected to discuss the
evolution of African electorates over the years through several identifiable phases of
electoral decision-making beginning with the introduction and demise of one-party
systems through the reintroduction of multiparty elections (for example Ottaway 1999).
Even after accounting for and acknowledging how institutional changes in the postauthoritarian state have led to shifts in electoral patterns and strategies employed by
communal groups, most analyses have invariably reduced their explanations to ethnic
identity as the most important denominator of electoral choice (for example Posner
2005).
What emerges from this survey of the literature is the recognition that in addition
to sociological and socio-psychological factors such as ethnicity, religion, income, place
of residence and class, identified by the Colombia and Michigan Schools, issue-based
voting does take place but is usually associated with sophisticated, rational individuals in
advanced democracies. In contrast, the dominant picture painted of political behavior in
Africa is that the programs of political parties lack any meaningful ideological content.
The electorates in Africa are also incapable of sophisticated voting based on ideological
issues and party programs and while they might share similar voting cues as those of
electorates in the long-established democracies, the pervasive cues remain those narrow
ties of ethnicity, kinship and region that root candidates and electorates to communities.

See Celestin Monga, "Eight Problems with African Politics," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner,
eds. Democratization in Africa, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), p.49.
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Studies of Post-Conflict Elections in Africa
Studies of post-conflict elections in Africa and other societies that have tried to
democratize following civil conflict such as East Timor provide an additional but
different framework for the research concerns of this study. Such analyses focus on the
legitimating and healing potential of elections that follow periods of strife balanced with
concerns for their divisive potential especially in multiethnic societies. Abbink and
Hesseling (2000), Sisk and Reynolds (1998), Jarstad and Sisk (2008), Reilly (2001,
2008), Kumar (1998), and Lyons (1999) are influential examples of such studies.28
Beyond empirically investigating voting cues and political behavior following initial
elections in both countries, it is also important to apply insights provided by the postconflict literature to exploring the potential for the outcomes to hold among all the
stakeholders in the conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia.
Post-conflict studies have variously examined issues such as whether the votes
cast following the end of civil wars are indicative of "votes for peace" or mere
continuations of war by other means among the various factions; whether the elections
are free and fair and the outcomes are acceptable to all parties (Abbink and Hesselling
2000); whether the electoral system agreed upon is the most appropriate for such divided
societies (Reilly 2002, 2001), or whether international assistance has provided a strong
anchor in the form of monetary and moral support, for the elections to be conducted
smoothly and the results considered binding on all parties (Kumar 1998).

28

A useful summary of some of the most critical concerns in holding post-war elections is found in

Benjamin Reilly's work. See Benjamin Reilly, "Uncertain Turning Points of Transition," in Anna K.
Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk, eds. From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 157.
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Terry Lyons contributed to this body of scholarship with his examination of the
mid-conflict elections of 1997 in Liberia. Following the elections in which Liberians
voted overwhelmingly for Charles Taylor with over 70 percent of the votes, he concluded
that "the July 19, 1997, elections in Liberia represented an impressive demonstration of
the Liberian People's desire for peace." Liberians had turned out in large numbers and
voted for peace "in the belief that Taylor would return to war if not elected." (Lyon 1999,
61)
Lyons' conclusion contradicts the ethnic census thesis. By proposing that the vote
of Liberians was a vote for peace rather than of ethnicity, he pointed out a significant
instance where other cues are more influential than the narrow cues of ethnicity, even if it
was under unique circumstances. If, in fact, Lyons' claim is true, then to what extent was
the concentration of votes around the SLPP in Sierra Leone during the 2002 elections
also indicative of a vote for peace? Following the same logic, can we inversely infer that
the diffused pattern of voting in Liberia after the 2005 elections indicated that the
electorate in Liberia was not ready for peace? Such questions give rise to testable
hypotheses and the need to investigate the probability that mass electorates cut across
ethnic boundaries in search of the same goal that they may have perceived in the
candidacy of one candidate who was not necessarily from their ethnic group.29

It is important to further clarify that testing whether Sierra Leoneans ignored ethnicity to "vote for peace"
is a testable proposition that is unique to the context of African countries emerging from war. This variable
has no relevance in examinations of political behavior of countries that have not been afflicted by war.
Even in the cases of countries emerging from war, such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, it could well be the
case that ten years removed from the war, the electorate in such countries will not make "voting for peace"
an issue since the traumatic memories of the war that prompted such concerns could have receded with
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A direct application of Lyons' thesis is undermined by the case of Sierra Leone
because the SLPP won the post-conflict elections. The Revolutionary United Front Party
(RUFP), the political party of the rebel group that had carried out much of the violence
and intimidation during the civil war, with the support of Charles Taylor, did not win a
single seat in the legislative elections and its presidential candidate did not receive even
five percent of the total votes cast. If there was to be a vote for peace in Sierra Leone,
according to Lyon's suggestion (Lyons 1999), it should have been for the political party
that the rebel movement formed to take part in the elections, not the SLPP.
A vast number of testable assumptions that concern a study of this kind could be
identified from the arguments and findings in the literature that have been summarized
here. Thus, a useful conclusion to this section is to reiterate some of the most important
of these assumptions and findings as identified from the literature on the nexus between
ethnicity and political behavior in Africa that potentially applies to an understanding of
the outcomes of the post-conflict elections of 2002 in Sierra Leone and 2005 in Liberia.
These will be consequently examined in detail in the empirical chapters that follow on
each case country. Some of the assumptions and findings identified in the pertinent
literature are:
1. African societies are infrastructurally underdeveloped and elites of political
parties lack the means of effective dissemination of their campaign messages as
obtains in Western democracies creating an atmosphere of low information about

time. Events following the 1997 elections showed that peace did not exactly follow Charles Taylor's
electoral victory as Liberia disintegrated into one of the worst stages of the violence of its civil war.
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their platforms and policy initiatives (Basedau et al 2007, Cowen and Laakso
2002, Horowitz 1985, Olukoshi 1998, Salih 2003 and others).
2. To complement the above, most voters are illiterate and lack the means to turn
themselves into informed decision makers. In the prevailing atmosphere of low
information with little or no access to the media, voters resort to group identity as
a useful heuristic in making the voting decision.
3. Africans are inherently communal people and relations are characterized by
groupthink, individualism is eschewed. Important decision making such as the
voting decision is carried out in the collective (Vail 1989, Young 1994).
4. Politics in Africa is different from politics in Western democracies. Electorates in
Western societies are more informed about various political parties, candidates
and their stances on policy issues, and thus make sophisticated decisions than the
simplistic decision of ethnic voting in Africa.
5. Voters have fixed preferences. Electoral choice will rarely change from one
election to the next.
6. As the bases of most political organizations, ethnic groups in Africa are
homogenous and group membership is restricted by communal identity; political
parties formed thus become forms of 'minimum winning coalitions, large enough
to secure benefits in the competition for spoils but also small enough to maximize
the per-capita value of these benefits.' Bates (1983).
7. Ethnic groups lack hegemony over one another so various 'ethnic brokers' are
necessary in order to facilitate 'hegemonial exchanges' between the state and
ethnic groups (Rothschild 1985, Fatton 1988).
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8. Elections in Africa represent an ethnic census because various ethnic groups come
out in full support of only the political parties, elites and candidates from their
ethnic groups (sons and daughters of the soil) who represent their ethnic interests
Horowitz (1985).
9. Patron-client relationships in Africa are underpinned by ethnic identity with elites
from various ethnic groups acting as patrons on behalf of their communal groups
in return for electoral support for the regime. A probable extension of hegemonial
exchanges above (Chazan, Lewis Mortimer, Rothchild and Stedman 1999).
10. Violence and confrontations during elections in Africa are extensions of ethnic
group rivalry from yet unresolved historical differences (Basedau et al 2007,
Berman et al 2004, Rothchild 1985).
For analytical convenience, I divide these assumptions and findings in two broad
categories.30 The first category (consists of one through four ) represents a focus by some
scholars on attributing what they consider to be the unsophisticated nature of political
behavior and mobilization in African societies to the technological backwardness of such
societies when compared to advanced societies in the West. Inherent in such explanations
is the view that the modernizing effects of technological advancement, increased number
of educational facilities leading to higher levels of literacy and other such developments
will have a withering effect on communal attachments as electorates become more
exposed to competing cues from the campaign messages of political parties and elites
other than the ones hailing directly from their communities.

Both categories are not mutually exclusive as items belonging to both sets can be found in the works of
some scholars.
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The rest collectively constitute a second category of explanations that have
focused on ethnic identity as a profound but intangible influence on political behavior
and mobilization in African societies. Inherent in such explanations is the view that as the
bases of political competition, ethnic identity is not amenable to the modernizing
influences of technological advancements and elections will continue to provide an arena
for zero-sum competitions between ethnic groups for the resources of the state.
Theoretical Argument and Hypotheses
What is the role for ethnicity in the political behavior and mobilization of elites
and mass electorates in post-conflict Sierra Leone and Liberia? From the preceding
survey of the literature, much of the scholarship suggests that ethnicity is the most
profound influence on political behavior and the major rallying point around which elites
and the mass electorates mobilized going into both elections. But as already pointed out,
the prima facie evidence suggests that ethnicity could not have been the most important
influence on voters in Sierra Leone given the pattern of the distribution of the votes
among political parties and presidential candidates that took part in the elections.
This gap between the theories and the evidence is a motivating factor in
undertaking this study of the political behavior of Sierra Leoneans and Liberians
following their respective post-conflict elections. The task is to comparatively evaluate
such existing explanations of political behavior using the evidence from the two cases in
order to fully understand the lines along which the electorates mobilized to support
political parties. I will argue that the gap in evidence stems in part from interrelated
theoretical, methodological and conceptual shortcomings in the existing empirical
research. Theoretically, the emphases on the intangible influence of ethnic identity on
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voting behavior in African societies have required that diverse scholars first agree on an
acceptable conceptual definition of ethnic identity. In the absence of such a standardized
and acceptable concept, the explanations have been copious and ranging but most have
lacked precision about the exact elements of ethnic identity. Some have stressed regional
co-habitation, others a common language or religion and some all three together. Closely
related to this is the methodological challenge of what type of data to use in the analyses
of these issues.
Furthermore, following the popular trend to cast African societies as undeveloped
and the voters as relatively unsophisticated, scholars have put too much emphasis on
intangible cues of social identity, particularly ethnicity, as the most important variable
affecting vote choice. I question and test such conclusions in my research for this
dissertation and argue that if they ever followed ethnic cues into the polling booth or if
they were ever mobilized primarily by elites of political parties from their ethnic groups,
then in the instances of their post-conflict elections, voters in Sierra Leone and Liberia
paid little attention to such cues because their votes did not reflect an abiding adherence
to ethnic loyalties.
Beyond ethnicity, I suggest that a factor that has received less attention in the
scholarship but could, potentially, better explain the unexpected patterns of vote diffusion
and concentration in the two countries are the other identified issues unrelated to identity
cues. For presidential candidates, such issues included the perception of each candidate's
capability to unite the country and solidify the peace, and also their perceived ability to
bring tangible economic development in the forms of roads, hospitals, schools, jobs and
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other issues of human security. For candidates running for legislative seats, it was more
so the case of the second set of issues than the first one. Most analyses that focused on
casting African societies as undeveloped and voters as unsophisticated (Ottaway 1999)
arrived at such conclusions using the standards of technological advancement in
television advertisements, radio and newspaper pitches and how campaigns are typically
conducted in Western societies for their assessments. This approach reduces the
possibility of appreciating the "unconventional" means through which voters have
evaluated candidates in African societies and arrived at their voting decisions such as
their own versions of "bush radio" which, albeit unconventional, are quite effective in
evaluating candidates before voting for them.
To support the arguments, the alternative analytic models I propose and employ in
this study take into account ethnicity as well as other non-identity and non-communal
variables as potential influences on vote choice and support for political parties. They
also differentiate between ethnicity as an "issue" variable and an "identity" variable. I
discuss this implication for political behavior in both countries. In the simplest version of
the alternative analytic model I suggest, ethnic groups might consider their communal
and ethnic interests in their voting decision but seeking to secure such interests is not the
major reason why they vote for the candidates for which they vote. Rather, ethnic groups
may actually make Sociotropic calculations by prioritizing those issues that are beneficial
to the country as a whole rather than their communities alone. Under this model, it is
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1 refer to "issues" as a latent variable that could possibly explain political behavior of the African

electorate, because scholars have not explored the utility of this variable to explain political behavior in
Africa in recent years. In the immediate post-independence period, Humphrey Fisher (1969) suggested that
some issue-based voting did take place in Sierra Leone when voters chose political parties based on their
preferences for the foreign policy positions that the parties proposed.
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easier to see why voters from different ethnic groups will produce a voting outcome
representative of a consensus than the splintered voting one would expect given the
extant theories in the literature in which communal and identity interests alone are argued
to influence the vote choice.
The argument suggests that ethnicity plays a role during political mobilization and
the interactions between different groups in the two countries, but this role is at best
ambiguous instead of manifest as suggested in much of the existing scholarship. If, as I
claim, political behavior and mobilization in post-conflict Liberia and Sierra Leone was
not entirely about ethnicity as conventional wisdom would lead us to expect, then
analyses of the survey data should establish the relative insignificance of the ethnic
identity variable when introduced into the same analytic model with other non-identity
and non-communal variables.
To reiterate, the need in this study is to determine the salient variables that
affected vote choice and support for the various political parties during the initial postconflict elections; the corollary need is to identify the most preferable cues employed by
elites of political parties in both countries to attract voters to their parties. The goal is to
understand why voters in Sierra Leone concentrated around one political party during
their initial elections while voters in Liberia diffused their votes among several parties.
Hypotheses
Theories about political outcomes in African societies argue that self-seeking
calculations such as considerations for the exclusive interests of the ethnic group, a local
community, a religious identity, region or loyalty to local patrons factor heavily in the
decision-making of African electorates more than other variables such as loyalty to the
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greater political community of the state. Ethnic census theories, for example, argue that
elections are like an ethnic census because ethnic identities help voters to distinguish
promises that are credible from others that are not (Posner 2005, 1305). The inherent
assumption is that only elites of specific ethnic communities can convince electorates
from their communities to vote for them. Such claims give ground to a number of
hypotheses about the nature of the relationships between the explanatory variables I
examine in this study and vote choice for political parties as the dependent variable
during the respective elections in Sierra Leone and Liberia. I list and describe each
hypothesis below before proceeding to examine them in the empirical chapters.
1. Ethnicity and Vote Choice: Following Horowitz (1985), Ottaway (1999), Van
de Walle (2003) and other scholars who argue that ethnic groups in Africa tend to vote
only for political parties which are led or supported by elites from their ethnic groups and
local communities, it is expected that ethnic identity is a major predictor of the political
parties or candidates for which electorates in African societies vote, thus I will test the
hypothesis that:
Ethnic groups are less likely to vote for political parties that are founded or led
by elites from other ethnic groups.
Specifically, given ethnic census theories, we should expect to find that members of
different ethnic groups in Sierra Leone and Liberia came out in support of or to vote only
for candidates and political parties who purported to represent the interests of the various
ethnic groups and local communities to which they belonged or who are explicitly
identified with such interests.
2. Regionalism and Vote Choice: Next, following scholarship (for example
Posner 2004, 2005, Van de Walle 2003) that argues that voters in African societies seek
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to vote for candidates and political parties from the same regions or parts of the country
because they believe only these candidates or political parties will secure the interests of
their regions by bringing development projects and other benefits to the region, I test the
hypothesis that:
Regions or counties will not vote for political parties of presidential candidates
that are not from their regions or counties.
Here, the expectation is that voters from various regions will cast their ballots only for
candidates or political parties that purported to represent their regional interests or with
which they can identify as a party representing the interests of their home region or
county.
3. Religion and Vote Choice: Another hypothesis concerns the influence of
religion on politics in Africa. Some scholars argue that religious influences have been a
factor determining support for various political parties especially with regards to politics
in Nigeria and the Sudan. In Nigeria, violent clashes between differing factions in various
parts of the country have been often attributed to religious differences between Muslims
from the north of the country and Christians from other parts of the country. Based on
such arguments, I will test that the hypothesis:
Respondents identifying with a religious identity are less likely to vote for the
political party of a presidential candidate that does not share their religious
interest.
Here, the expectation is that if theories regarding the influence of religion on politics in
African societies have any traction, then we can expect that the evidence provided by the
two countries will show that Sierra Leoneans and Liberians voted in their respective post-
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conflict elections with the intent to cast their ballots for political parties or candidates
who shared their religious beliefs and interests.
4. The "big man" 32 and Vote Choice: Yet another strand of the literature
examined earlier argued that political behavior in Africa is influenced by attachments or
memberships to various clientele networks of patronage (Young 1994, Chazan et al 1999;
for example). Under such systems voters, it is argued, cast their ballots for the big man or
big woman from their communities in the belief that only these sons or daughters of the
soil could deliver the resources they expect from the state. One consequence of such
outcomes it is further argued is inefficiencies in resource-distribution as benefits are
distributed to various regions not on the basis of need, but upon the influences of the big
person or patron from different localities. Given such arguments, I will test the
hypothesis that:
Ethnic groups are less likely to vote for the political party of a big
person/political elite who is not from their ethnic group or region of the country.
The alternative hypothesis here is that ethnic groups are more likely to vote for
the political parties of presidential candidates from their ethnic locale.
The expectation is that if in fact theories about the influence of big men on the politics of
African societies have any traction, then the evidence from the two cases will show that
Sierra Leoneans and Liberians voted during the post-conflict elections of 2002 and 2005
respectively, with the intent to cast their ballots only for those political parties to which
the big men from their communities belonged.

'From here on, I will use the gender-neutral term of "big person" to refer to this variable.
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5. Finally, I tested two more hypotheses concerning the expected relationships
between the votes for peace and development and the vote choices of Sierra Leoneans
and Liberians during their respective post-conflict elections. These last two variables
represent a more pragmatic calculation by the voters of Liberia and Sierra Leone, as
scholars such as Kandeh (2003) and Lyons (1999) have argued in the case of the peace
vote. Here, I tested the hypothesis that:
If peace was the paramount concern superseding other concerns on the minds of
voters in the two postwar countries, then positive values of the peace vote
variable will produce the largest coefficients in models predicting vote choices for
political parties.
Here, it is expected that a positive relationship exists between the peace vote and the vote
choice for political parties.
A sixth hypothesis also explored a more pragmatic calculation by voters desiring
the rebuilding of their war-torn countries as an overarching concern above the more
narrow pursuits of exclusive benefits to the local community. Thus, a testable hypothesis
based on this consideration is that if considerations for the rebuilding of the war town
countries superseded other concerns on the minds of voters going into the respective
elections, then:
Positive values of the vote for development and reconstruction will produce
relatively greater coefficients in models predicting vote choice for political
parties than other explanatory variables employed in the same model.
Where, the expectation is that Sierra Leoneans and Liberians voted during their
respective post-conflict elections with the intent to cast their ballot only for those political
parties and presidential candidates that they deemed most capable of maintaining the
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new-found peace as well as undertaking development projects to rebuild the country
following their civil wars. As evident, the last two variables are at odds with the
preceding four which represent the narrower considerations for exclusive communal
benefits that are popular in most explanations of politics in Africa.
Conceptualization
Up to this point, the discussion floats a number of terms such as ethnicity,
political mobilization, political participation, and political or politicized ethnicity. What
do I mean by these terms and how do I intend to use them within the context of this
study? Precising the meanings of terms and concepts is a problematic subject in political
science, especially in the sub-discipline of comparative politics (Sartori 1970).33 The
problem is even more pressing in African studies where it is often the case that one needs
to employ concepts that have been framed in other contexts. Such concepts can
sometimes travel well from those external contexts into the African situation without
losing any of their meaning; however, it is sometimes the case that concepts have to be
adjusted and explained in order to more meaningfully extend their use. This tends to load
such concepts with further meanings making painstaking clarification an absolute
necessity in order to be confident about measurement as well as communicating to the
reader exactly what is meant by a particular term. I have selected some of the most
controversial concepts here for clarification; others will be clarified in subsequent
sections of the dissertation.

For a discussion on the rigors of concept formation in political science, see Giovanni Sartori, "Concept
Misinformation in Political Science," American Political Science Review 64 (1970): 1033-1053.
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Ethnicity. Horowitz (1985, 53) defined the concept as "a real or imagined shared
ancestry, the centrality of kinship metaphors, a minimum size, and sense of
distinctiveness, whether or not this distinctiveness rests on unique cultural attributes."
The "real or imagined shared ancestry" component of this definition has become one of
the more accepted descriptors of ethnicity in the literature sin Horowitz's seminal
analysis.34
In one of the most comprehensive treatments of defining ethnicity, Chandra and
Wilkerson (2008) advanced the concept as an umbrella term under which scholars
included
identity categories associated with one or more of the following types: religion,
sect, language, dialect, tribe, clan, race, physical differences, nationalities and
caste. (Chandra and Wilkerson 2008, 519)*5
Indeed, much of the debate in the literature regarding what exactly consists of an
ethnic group has revolved around the terms thrown under this "ethnic umbrella" by
Chandra and Wilkerson. In addition to "shared ancestry," some scholars have identified
ethnic groups as groups using the distinctive features of language, religion, physical
features or even habitation of a distinct geographical boundary (Hutchinson and Smith,
1996). There are particular challenges in applying these terms to the cases of Sierra
Leone and Liberia. Distinctions such as religion are not "givens" of an ethnic group in
both countries since it is possible to find members of the same ethnic group, indeed even
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Even this descriptor is also violated by cases where two or more groups consider the same community or

village as the source of their ancestral lineage. This is the case with some Mandingos and Limbas in Sierra
Leone who hail from the chiefdom of Tonko in the Bombali District, the Yalunka and Korankos from the
deep north of Sierra Leone or the Mendes and Kissi from the town of Kailahun in Eastern Sierra Leone.
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See Kanchan Chandra and Steven Wilkerson, "Measuring the Effect of 'Ethnicity," Comparative

Political Studies 41 (April/May 2008): 515-563.

42

members of the same family, that belong to different religions. So, for example, in Sierra
Leone there are members of the Creole, Mende, Temne and other ethnic groups who are
Muslims and others who are Christians and the same goes for various ethnic groups in
Liberia.
Drawing from the scholarship, one of the more useful determinants of ethnic
identity consists of the ability of one claiming membership in an ethnic group to trace
their ancestral lineages to a specific locality that is considered a common ancestral home
with others who identify with that locality. Language is an important factor of this
identification with the group but even language is less of a distinguishing factor of
ethnicity when one considers that most Sierra Leoneans and Liberians speak several local
languages. Young (1993, 5) struck a note of caution that "ethnic identity does not always
require a distinct language." He pointed to examples from Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia where, respectively, Hutus and Tutsi speak the same language and Serbs and
Croats do likewise, even though both sets of groups are distinctly polarized ethnic
groupings. Arguably, more important is the ability to trace lineage to an ancestral
locality. Some individuals who claimed to be Temne, Mende or another ethnic group
could not speak the language associated with that ethnic group yet self-identified as such
because they could trace their lineage to the ancestral home.
Intermarriages between members from different ethnic groups also complicate
further the task of conceptualizing ethnic identity in a study of Sierra Leone and Liberia
because both countries experience a high rate of intermarriages such that lineage is not an
effective determinant of ethnic identity.
Given these issues with using language, religion and lineage as descriptors of
ethnic identity, what then makes a useful conceptual descriptor of ethnic identity for this
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study? Rather than applying identity labels to subjects during the study, I accept selfreported identifications as the most suitable approach for each individual respondent to
the surveys. In any case, the important logic behind the emphasis on ethnic identity in
explanations of politics in Africa is its patterning effect on group politics. Thus, it is more
important to accept what group an individual self-identifies with in expressing their vote
choice than thrusting an identity upon them from externalities drawn from the literature.
Political Mobilization. Following Rosenstone and Hansen (1993, 26), I define
political mobilization as "doing something to increase the likelihood of.. .someone's
participation." However, their examples of indirect and direct mobilization by a
candidate, a political party, or some other political activist or group describe efforts in the
Western contexts that cannot be directly applied to the African context. Their examples
of direct mobilization include efforts by a candidate, a political party, or some other
political activist or group to include "door-to-door canvasses...direct mail solicitations,
televised appeals... grass-roots letter drives" and indirect mobilization by politically
active organizations or individuals when "contact is made through mutual associates, for
example when a candidate talks to an employer to contribute to the candidate's campaign
or volunteer in other ways." Leighley (2001) also offers useful insight into the nature of
political mobilization in the American context, dealing with what factors influence
blacks, whites and Latinos, for example to mobilize. Distinguishing between mass and
elite mobilization, she argues that race, class and ethnicity provide individual and
contextual influences on elite mobilization and mass participation.3
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See Jan E. Leighley, Strength in Numbers? The Political Mobilization of Racial and Ethnic Minorities,

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) for an extensive discussion of how participation and
mobilization patterns differ among whites, blacks and Latinos in America.
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Since some of these activities, such as direct mail solicitations and televised
appeals, are unlikely to (as yet) occur in the African context, I refine the definition of
political mobilization to include efforts made by heads of political parties and other elites
to recruit voters and memberships of political parties through door-to-door canvasses,
direct appeals through scheduled speeches, meetings with traditional elders, offering
money to voters for votes, and advertisements on radio and in newspapers.37
Political Participation. I settle upon Conway's (2000) definition of political
participation as "those activities of citizens that attempt to influence the structures of
government, the selection of government officials, or the policies of government." In
Africa, the mass electorate specifically carries out such activities when they are
mobilized to demonstrate, rally, make financial contributions to a political party and most
importantly, come out to vote in support of one party or the other.
Political or Politicized Ethnicity. I define political ethnicity, politicized ethnicity
or ethnopolitics as the manipulation of an ethnic identity for political purposes and gains.
Such purposes range from the mobilization of the membership of an ethnic group in a
manner that intimidates the membership of another ethnic group or reorganization of
identity structures for administrative convenience, like the Belgians did in Rwanda during
colonial rule when they created, virtually, ethnic groups out of Rwanda society to make it
easier to administer the territory (Prunier 1995). Gains are benefits of having the ethnic
group as a support base for use as bargaining chips during competition with other ethnic

Sierra Leone and Liberia both have one television station each. The TV stations are government property
in each case and in order to avoid the suggestion of bias on the side of the party in government, like the
SLPP in the case of Sierra Leone, the TV stations are usually neutral and do not carry any campaign
advertisement for any particular candidate or party.
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groups. Indigenous elites, following colonial rule, were the main culprits of this form of
exploitation of ethnic identity (Ottaway 1999, Joseph 1999, Edie 2003).
Research Design
Data Collection
Undertaking a study of political behavior in two societies that are still recovering
from the traumas of war is quite challenging. Several important concerns needed to be
addressed regarding the evidence to be collected. For example, how could it be trusted to
yield valid measures? Neither one source of data, nor one method of analysis is likely to
produce sufficient data to address the research concerns dealing with a sensitive concept
such as ethnicity. Therefore, I-settled upon multiple methods for both data collection and
analysis as important precautions in order to produce the most reliable findings. Thus, the
research process employs both qualitative and quantitative methods for data collection
and the analysis that follows. The data were gathered through a triangulated method of
surveys and focus group interviews, elite interviews, document analysis and a long period
of "soaking and poking" from over 20 months in the field.38 The units of analysis for both

As a research method, the American political scientist and congressional scholar Richard Fenno who
utilized the methodology for his many works on the United States Congress popularized "soaking and
poking". Fenno described the method "as just hanging around and observing." He followed members of
Congress to their districts observing and recording their daily activities such as meetings with constituents,
campaign staff and even friends and family. I employed this methodology during my time in the field and
similarly followed a number of political parties on campaign trips to the countryside of Sierra Leone during
the campaigns for the 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections in order to get a first hand grasp of
how they conducted their campaigns. I was also fortunate to obtain employment as a policy analyst in the
Office of the President of Sierra Leone during my time in the field. The appointment gave me access to a
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cases were elites of political parties who occupied executive memberships within the
political parties during or following the respective elections. The inclusion of individual
Liberians and Sierra Leoneans as representative samples of the electorates justified the
use of surveys for collecting data nationwide (Johnson and Joslyn 1995, 63-66; Mattes
andGouws 1998).
I developed questionnaires in the summer of 2006 and pretested both of them
using small samples of Sierra Leonean and Liberian immigrants living in the
Indianapolis, Indiana area in late July before departing for Sierra Leone in the fall of
2006 to commence fieldwork. Some of the questions on the questionnaires were
employed by the Afro Barometer Studies to study political behavior in other African
39

countries.
Data collection during the research project progressed in two phases. The first
phase consisted of conducting national surveys of randomly sampled respondents among
the populations in both countries. The surveys targeted 1,200 randomly sampled
respondents drawn from the mass electorates in each country.40 The surveys generated
data about the motivations of the electorate as they participated in the processes leading
up to and immediately following the respective post-conflict elections.
I contracted the services of two reputable organizations, the Campaign for Good
Governance (CGG) in Sierra Leone and Center for Transparency and Accountability
(CENTAL) in Liberia, to undertake the surveys nationwide in each country using their
number of state documents pertinent to my research as well as access to key political figures including
President Kabbah, whom I would not have otherwise had easy access to.
39

See www.afrobarometer.org for samples of the questionnaires employed by the organization.

40

Copies of the questionnaires employed in each country are available in the appendix.
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respective databases of randomly sampled Liberians and Sierra Leoneans.

Both

organizations maintain well-established systems for conducting national surveys. Table
B.l and Table B.2, provided in the Appendix, present descriptive profiles of the samples
from both countries.42
During the first phase of the field research, I also collected data on all the political
parties in Sierra Leone and Liberia using interviews with selected party executives and by
examining historical and current records such as party programs and campaign
manifestoes. My travels took me to the offices of 11 of the 16 political parties that
functioned in Sierra Leone around the time of the 2002 elections and 14 of the political
parties that functioned in Liberia during the time of the 2005 elections. In all, I conducted
83 elite interviews in Sierra Leone and 64 elite interviews in Liberia between October
2006 and December 2007. These numbers also include elites who did not occupy
administrative or senior positions within political parties such as heads of civil society
movements, senior civil servants, members of the security forces, journalists, Liberian
and Sierra Leonean scholars and expatriate workers stationed in both countries who had
observed the events surrounding the elections. The data that was gathered from the latter
provided evidence of how elites of political parties mobilized electorates for the
elections, the processes of recruitment for party membership, and also what factors were
most responsible for the electoral outcomes from the perspective of the unaffiliated elites.

Records of previous works by both organizations could be found on their respective websites. The
website for Campaign for Good Governance Sierra Leone can be accessed using the following link:
http://www.slcgg.org/home.htm. That for the Center for Accountability and Transparency in Liberia can be
accessed through the following link: http://www.liberiantransparency.org/index.htm.
42

Both tables are available in Appendix A.
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Working with questionnaires consisting of close-ended and open-ended questions,
I interviewed executives or party elites at the level of the national executive committees.
This list included founders, presidents, chairpersons, secretaries-general of the parties and
regional or local equivalents of the executive levels of each party. I compared some
aspects of the information I gathered from the interviews with the party executives
against the information gathered from others within their party and elites who did not
hold senior membership positions in any political party for neutrality, validation and
consistency.
The interviews with elites of political parties were geared towards generating
discussion around the preferable cues that were sent out to the electorates and the
historical origins of each political party. I asked party elites the following: their reasons
for forming or joining their parties; what their functions were within their parties; the
rewards derived from party membership, their views of multiparty competition; postconflict rebuilding; relations between ethnic groups; their visions of the political futures
of their countries; and most importantly their favorite messages or other tools of choice
for attracting voters in the period leading up to the elections.
The third data gathering exercise during the first phase of the field research
consisted of analysis of secondary documents from the archives of the University of
Sierra Leone library and perusal of the personal collections of some influential citizens in
both countries. I was not successful in finding a useful library or similar archive of public
records in Liberia and had to rely on the personal libraries of some Liberian scholars and
elites. During this phase, I also examined the transcripts of political speeches at rallies,
party documents, newspapers and radio transcripts of campaign activities by the
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candidates and political parties in each country around the time of the elections in
question.
The second phase of the research consisted of conducting focus group discussions
in the two countries. The group discussion sessions were geared primarily at comparing
and testing some of the preliminary findings of the national surveys. In all, I conducted
four focus group sessions in different locations across Sierra Leone and four focus group
sessions in different locations across Liberia. For each session, I selected a dozen
persons—six females and six males. The groups varied in age, income and level of
education in the selected areas in each country. All group discussions were held
following a preliminary analysis of the data and were directed towards discussions and
examination of the patterns of voting behavior that were captured by the survey data. The
results of these sessions are reported in Chapter V.
Operationalization and Measurement
The Dependent Variables
The dependent variables for this study are vote choice and support for the
political parties in the two countries. Vote choice is conceptualized as a vote for one of
the eleven political parties that took part in the first post-conflict elections in Sierra
Leone, and in the case of Liberia, for the twenty-two political parties that took part in the
post-conflict elections of 2005. Support for political parties is much more varied, ranging
from supporting a political party to the emotional and psychological attachment for a
political party without doing anything such as making financial donations or engaging in
a street demonstration in support of the party. Respondents were asked if they had
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engaged in any of these activities in support of the cause of a party after they have
confirmed that they support one political party or the other.43
Support for political parties included all of the admitted psychological affections
and physical demonstrations of support for one political party or another even if the
individual did not vote in the elections in question. The assumption here is that vote
choice itself is a show of support for a party but one can support a political party without
being able to vote for it because of unforeseen encumbrances.
The Independent Variables
The independent variables represent the potential influences of ethnicity, region,
religion, big person, the peace vote and the vote for development. Each independent
variable is described below. Some of the variables, such as ethnicity and ethnic interest,
region and regional interest and others were measured both as variables describing
identity and also as variables capturing the reason why a respondent voted for the
political party for which they voted.
Ethnicity and Ethnic Interest. This study benefits from the fact that it did not
impose an ethnic identity on respondents. Rather, respondents self-reported their ethnic
identity during interviews. The ethnicity variable was measured on a nominal scale
reflective of all ethnic groups in both countries whereas the variable for ethnic interest
was measured as a response to the statement "you voted for this particular party
because.. .they are the party representing the interests of my ethnic group."

See appendix for questions capturing these variables.
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The important distinction between the two is that one captures intent whereas the
other one is mostly descriptive. As an identity variable, ethnicity is mostly descriptive. It
points to a structural variable that identifies how members of the electorate voted for a
particular political party from a given area given geographical cohabitation of the
members of that ethnic group within a specified area. As an issue variable, ethnic interest
captures intent and represents the choice voters made in voting for a particular political
party because they believed that only coethnics within that party could fulfill electoral
promises to bring benefits to their locality. The latter captured those who made a
conscious decision intending their vote to pursue a benefit that was restricted to the
interests of their ethnic group whereas the former is more descriptive.
Religion and Religious Interest. The research incorporated religious influence on
vote choice and support for the political parties in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The variable
for religious interest was measured as a response to the statement "you voted for this
particular party because.. .they are the party representing the interests of my religion."
Region and Regional Interest. It is particularly important to understand how
district or county of residence affected vote choice and support for political parties
because there is a high correlation between administrative districts, counties and the
settlement patterns of ethnic groups in both countries. In Sierra Leone, the two largest
groups, the Mende and Temne, who constitute slightly over 30 percent each of the
population, dominate demarcated geographical regions of the country. Members of all
ethnic groups are found in the capital, Freetown where the Creoles form a slight majority.
Similar geographic and demographic demarcations characterize the spread of ethnic
groups in Liberia where some counties are almost exclusively populated by one ethnic
group or another. This county-ethnic group correlation is especially high in Liberia. This
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variable was measured on a scale indicative of all administrative regions in both
countries. The variable for regional interest was measured as a response to the statement
"you voted for this particular party because.. .they are the party representing the interests
of my region."
The Big Person. This variable captured the influences of elites from local
communities on vote choice. It was measured as a response to why respondents chose to
vote or not vote for particular parties associated with elites from their local communities.
The Issue of Peace. This variable captured evidence of a more pragmatic
decision-making by the electorates such as their perception of the candidate or the party's
capacity to reinforce the peace and unite the country following the conclusion of the civil
wars. Respondents were asked during the surveys the reason why they voted for the
political party for which they voted and the response options included the two issues of
peace and development.
The Vote for Reconstruction and Development. This variable captured the
perception of the candidate's capacity to economically manage the country in order to
bring about tangible developments such as new roads and hospitals following conflict. It
was measured as a response to the statement "you voted for this particular party
because.. .they are the party that are most likely to develop the country by building roads,
clinics and bringing electricity to the whole country."
In the case of the peace vote, the variable was measured as a response to the
statement "you voted for this particular party because.. .they are the party that will best
unite the country and bring peace."
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Data Analysis - Methods
After gathering data, the next goal was to use appropriate methodology that has
been applied to the understanding of voting behavior in advanced democracies such as
the United States to explore the voting behavior in the two post-conflict countries. The
reality is, in spite of the desire of scholarship to understand emergent patterns of political
behavior in budding democracies such as Sierra Leone and Liberia, and in spite of
advances in social science methodology for such undertakings, we still know little about
this particular characteristic of research interest in African societies. Until the relatively
recent studies of voting behavior undertaken by the Afro Barometer Studies at Michigan
State University, much scholarship on voting behavior in Africa had been conjectural and
speculative, underpinned by personal opinions gathered from sources such as exaggerated
media reports of ethnic conflicts.44
Where effort was made to undertake such an effort that approached scientific
rigor, as pointed out earlier, the evidence assessed was gathered from an aggregation of
data from various polling returns, which masked individual preferences and the nuances
in patterns of political behavior and mobilization between and among diverse
communities (Mattes and Gouws 1998).
I employed both qualitative and quantitative methods for analyses of the data.
Using the quantitative method allowed me the advantage of working with a large-N
sample of respondents to statistically explore multiple relationships between the variables
in my survey data. It also aided my quest to evaluate the existing theoretical explanations

For this criticism see Kenneth Ingham, Politics in Africa: the Uneven Tribal Dimension (London and
New York: Routledge, 1990), 1.
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using only two cases. The qualitative method, on the other hand, allowed me the
opportunity to examine the contextual differences that helped to explain the strategies
employed by political elites in seeking to mobilize the electorates in the two countries.
The smaller sample of elites of political parties and non-political party elites that I
interviewed precluded the use of the quantitative method employed in my analysis of the
survey data. Settling on the use of both kinds of methods complemented my analytic
efforts and has resulted in a more comprehensive picture of political behavior than is
typically available from studies of political behavior in African societies.
To analyze the survey data, I coded and entered the responses to all the questions
on the questionnaires administered in both countries into the statistical programs STATA
9.0 and SPSS 16.0.1 created two separate data sets, one for the Liberia case and another
one for the Sierra Leone case.451 then used Chi-square tests of association as the initial
tests of the hypothesized relationships between the dependent and independent variables
described earlier. To facilitate the analysis, I recoded several variables including the
responses to the independent variables measuring agreement or disagreement with the
reasons why a respondent would vote for a particular political party.
There was hardly any variation in the original response options especially with
regard to the votes for peace as voters appeared to have, at least verbally, prioritized
peace in the two societies above all other issues. I collapsed the response options into two
categories of "strongly agree," and "not strongly agree" and ran a model to test for
differences across categories of the peace variable. The tests revealed that respondents
who "strongly agreed" with the statement were different from all the other categories of

45

The datasets are available on request; please send all requests to fibattvfSivahoo.com
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respondents in relation to the dependent variable of vote choice whereas those who
"agreed" were no different from those who fell into the opposite categories of "disagree"
and "strongly disagree" in relation to the dependent variable. Thus, the recode into the
two categories helped to maximize variability in preparation for additional tests without
negatively impacting the explanatory direction and intent of the original coding scheme.
The wording process may seem counterintuitive, but the logic is not. As an
example, consider the variable for reconstruction and development. For this item, 82
percent indicated strong agreement, 15 percent agreed, one percent disagreed and about
another one percent strongly disagreed. Empirically, the first category is distinct from
the last three. Conceptually, those who do not answer "strongly agree" are willing to put
some other value ahead of reconstruction and development.46
Following tests of association, I developed several explanatory models of vote
choice in each country and employed hierarchical logistic regression methods to test the
effects and the likelihood of voting for a political party if the respondent agreed or a
disagreed with the reasons that were suggested to them for why they would vote for one
political party or another. I settled upon using logistic regression with logged odds for
this portion of my analysis because of the nonlinear categories that captured the response
options of the respondents following the recode. The dependent variable for vote choice
was recoded into a binary option such that a respondent either voted for a particular

In the American politics literature, similar results occur with a commonly used survey item on an equal
role for women in society. An overwhelming majority of respondents strongly support women's equality.
Among those who do not, there is little difference between those with a weak commitment to equality and
those who are clearly opposed.
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political party or did not vote for that political party. Additional models included controls
for each variable and these are explained further in the empirical chapters to follow.
Several caveats are in order. For analytical convenience, I included only the votes
for the two major political parties in Sierra Leone, the SLPP and the APC, as dependent
variables in the models. These are the two most antagonistic forces in Sierra Leonean
politics and no other political party has been able break their stranglehold on political
power or to exercise the kind of influence that these two parties have had since
independence. Following the initial test of the models, I next used CLARIFY to identify
within-group differences in the voting behavior of members of the two largest ethnic
groups in Sierra Leone, the Mendes and the Temnes. Together these ethnic groups
comprise over 60 percent of the population and most observers have identified them as
the two most antagonistic forces in Sierra Leone. While the rest of the ethnic groups
combined total roughly 38 percent of the population, they have never attempted to
articulate a collective voting interest and most have voted along similar lines as Mendes
or Temnes over the years.
Another caveat that is in order is my focus on administrative counties in Liberia
but regionalism in Sierra Leone. The rationale is that there is no identifiable regional
consciousness in Liberia as is the case in Sierra Leone where northerners, it has been
argued, are distinctly opposed to regional interests expressed by south-easterners. Rather,
the politics akin to the regional politics in Sierra Leone transpires at the county level in
Liberia with several identifiable competitive episodes between members hailing from
different counties. For example, according to folklore in Liberia, the Gios and the Manos
of Nimba County are traditional enemies of the Krahn in neighboring Grand Gedeh
County and the antagonism between the two counties came to a head when former
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Liberian President Samuel Doe had one of his associates and former close friends
Thomas Quiwonkpa, a descendant from Nimba County, executed for an attempted coup
attempt. When Charles Taylor started his rebellion in 1989 against the Doe regime, Gios
and Manos from Nimba County were at the forefront of this rebellion, probably in
retaliation for Quiwonkpa's death, the folklores point out (Berkeley 2001).
I employed qualitative methods for analysis of the rest of the data I collected
during my research. I content-analyzed the party programs and materials, campaign
manifestoes and other documents obtained from political parties for references that
potentially tie a political party to (an) expression(s) of securing an ethnic or communal
interest as the extant scholarship claims. In the same vein, I analyzed the contents of the
interviews with elites of political parties and other non-political party elites for references
that a particular political party had sought, in its campaign messages or other efforts, to
mobilize the membership of an ethnic group or groups using cues of a distinctly exclusive
nature -such as the "us" versus "them" terms that were said to be behind the messages
that drove Hutus to committing genocide against Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994 (Straus 2004).
As well, the transcripts of the interviews with political party elites were analyzed in order
to trace the historical development of the political party and whether this had any
identifiable links with motivating a particular ethnic voting bloc into politics. In a similar
vein, the transcripts were analyzed in order to identify the most preferable cues employed
by political parties for mobilizing the mass electorates into politics.
Finally, I analyzed the contents of some local newspapers in each country (five in
Sierra Leone and three in Liberia) for references to historical events describing situations
where communities, ethnic groups, or elites of political parties have attempted to
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mobilize or mobilized others in the past to take action intended to benefit such narrow
interests only.
The Limitations of this Study
This is a cross-sectional study that offers a snapshot into a period in the political
histories of two countries that were characterized by extraordinary events. It is possible
that the actions and behavior of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans during the periods in
question were conditioned by the tense post-war environment and not likely to be
replicated. Like other cross-sectional studies, this limits the explanatory or predictive
power of the findings especially in terms of establishing bases of comparison with
political behavior in more stable societies from which the study draws its overall
theoretical and conceptual frameworks.
Given the preceding, it is also important to point out the limitations on the
generalizibility of this study. While some lessons we learn about political behavior in the
two multiethnic, post-conflict societies may be invaluable for understanding
democratization elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, the unique circumstances of the two
cases places limits on the generalizibility of the findings for other societies. Even though
most civil conflicts are characterized by a singular destructive will by all parties to such
conflicts, the background conditions may be inimitable. Thus what lessons we may learn
from political behavior in Liberia and Sierra Leone may not be applicable to all other
societies in or emerging from conflict given such unique conditions.
There is also the problem of human memory. First, the surveys were administered
in both countries some years after the elections, in the case of Sierra Leone four years
following its post-conflict elections in 2002, and in the case of Liberia two years
59

following its post-conflict elections in 2005; this caused important constraints on the
study. It may well have been the case that some respondents had forgotten what issues
factored most in their decision to cast their vote for one party or candidate or the other or
even for whom they cast their ballots. The study attempted to control for this potential
problem through several means. First, some questions on the questionnaire were repeated
with slight modifications in order to gauge if a respondent varied their answers to the
question. The interviewers were instructed to check for these "response traps" as they
conducted the interviews. During the coding phase, questionnaires were disqualified if
they contained contradictory responses to these special questions. Also, during the
training sessions before commencing the national surveys, the interviewers were trained
and instructed to take all diligent care to ensure that respondents who claimed to
competently recall the events surrounding the respective post-conflict elections were
prioritized when targeting the samples.
However, in order not to cause a selection bias by including in the sample only
those who may have uncharacteristic memory of the events due to, perhaps, a role in the
proceedings that were atypical of the rest of the population, interviewers were instructed
to try to establish the potential respondent's standing with respect to these considerations
and those who were judged to be such were not interviewed.
Interestingly, perhaps given the sensitivity of events surrounding those elections,
most among the populations still recalled with a great amount of detail the events as they
unfolded. In both countries, there was some kind of perception that one was not a
responsible citizen if they forgot the details of the events as they had transpired a few
years earlier. This aided my research greatly, especially in my informal conversations
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with people, as it enabled me to gather information with greater ease than would have
been the case if people claimed that they had forgotten the details of what transpired.
Despite its limitations, the study is useful for several purposes. In one sense it
establishes a comparative historical basis, from a path-dependent perspective, against
which future trajectories in Liberian and Sierra Leonean politics could be measured.
Secondly, the primary goal of the study is to explain political behavior, for which it is
entirely appropriate. Understanding what happened around the post-conflict elections in
both countries, and more importantly why, is equally important from a comparative sense
with similar situations that could possibly emerge in post-conflict countries elsewhere. In
one way, this already happened with the two cases. The peace agreement in Liberia and
other developments leading to the elections of 2005 drew heavily from the blueprint
established by institutional designers and conflict mediators from experience with Sierra
Leone. As a matter of fact, some United Nations staff and troops stationed in Sierra
Leone were moved across the border to assist with the task of replicating the successful
peace program in Liberia.
Organization of the Dissertation
The introduction to this dissertation has developed the foundation that orients the
rest of the analysis to follow in this study. Chapter II will present a historical overview of
political competition in Sierra Leone and Liberia; the purpose of this chapter is to trace
political competition that preceded the civil wars to the present in order to establish a
background and throw light on the post-conflict political behavior that was the focus of
the study. Further, the chapter helps to determine if the emergent patterns following the
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two elections were really anomalies in political behavior and mobilization or largely
continuous of the way both societies had mobilized in the past prior to the civil conflicts.
Chapter III reports the results of the analysis of the data from the mass survey in
Sierra Leone and reports the results of the elite interviews. The focus is on unraveling the
puzzle that was a prime motivator for the study - in an eleven-political party race, why
did more than 70 percent of the electorate cast their votes for the SLPP, which is believed
to be the party of "the Mendes" who constitute only 30 percent of the population? Since
the majority of the electorate did not appear to cast their ballots along ethnic lines, in this
chapter I concentrate on identifying the most salient determinants of vote choice and
support for the various political parties that took part in the elections in Sierra Leone.
Chapter IV analyzes the data on Liberia and reports the results of the elite
interviews. Here, the foci are also to demonstrate the most salient variables that explain
the diffusion of votes and to identify factors that explain the vote shift from Weah, who
was the front-runner in the first round of elections to Johnson-Sirleaf who emerged as the
winner of the run-off elections. The strategic shifts in alliances and support for both
candidates going into the run-off elections suggests that there are some ethnic groups that
saw the need to cooperate and agree on one candidate, which, again raises questions
about the ethnic thesis regarding political behavior and mobilization and demands
analysis to explain the most important determinants of vote choice in that second round
of elections.
Chapter V reports the results of the focus group discussions that were conducted
in both countries and also establishes the first direct comparison of the two cases. The
goal is to compare the aggregated results of the focus group sessions to the individual
results obtained from each country. This strengthens the comparative foundation of the
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study and provides what additional evidence there are in support of the main theoretical
arguments.
The concluding chapter discusses the implications of my findings, describes the
emergent pattern of political behavior and mobilization in the two countries, speculates
on the sustainability of the peace in both countries and again spells out the limitations of
the study offering suggestions for incremental analysis in the future.
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CHAPTER II
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO POLITICS IN SIERRA LEONE
AND LIBERIA

Introduction
This section provides a historical background to politics in Liberia and Sierra
Leone with two goals in mind. First, the discussion serves to trace the major events in the
evolution of political competition in the two countries. Second, the discussion highlights
historical events and major decisions taken by political leaders in the past that provide
useful insight to help understand and explain the emergent patterns of political
mobilization and political behavior in both countries following the conclusion of their
civil wars.
Liberia is sub-Saharan Africa's first republic and its political history as an
independent state, which commenced with the election of Joseph Jenkins Roberts as its
first president in 1848, far outdates that of its neighbor, Sierra Leone, to the southeast.
Both countries share the similar historical fact that they were founded as settlements for
freed slaves in West Africa during the 19th century. But quite early, we can point out a
major contrast in the history of the two countries. Prior to the military coup of 1980, the
politics of Liberia were characterized by a major concentration and monopolization of
power by the coastal elite from the Americo-Liberian population. Through a series of
elite-sanctioned discriminatory practices, indigenous ethnic groups were excluded,
virtually, from participating in important political decision-making (Liebenow 1987;
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Clapham 1976; Berkeley 2001). During the military coup of 1980, indigenous noncommissioned soldiers succeeded in seizing power from the elite Americo-Liberians after
assassinating President Tolbert and replacing his administration with a military junta of
young officers.47 The situation was reversed with the indigenous population, from
thereon, exercising a monopoly of political power.
On the other hand, since independence from Britain in 1961, Sierra Leonean
politics was not characterized by elite-sanctioned exclusion of the deliberate kind seen in
Liberia where identifiable portions of its citizenry were kept out of political decisionmaking. This and other similarities and contrasts in the political histories of the two
countries will be documented at the end of this chapter. Liberia is discussed first since its
political development as an independent state predates that of Sierra Leone.
Liberia
Liberia is located on the West Coast of Africa, bordering the North Atlantic
Ocean, nestled between the Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone and taking up a land area
slightly larger than Tennessee (CIA World Factbook 2006).48 The country occupies a
unique status in sub-Saharan Africa because it was the only state that did not experience
colonialism and because of this, did not have to endure a protracted struggle for
liberation, like most states in Africa, before achieving independence. In fact, until the

To make a cautionary note; president William V.S. Tubman, began to liberalize the political system
beginning around 1944 through the Open Door Policy and the Unification Policy which broke down some
of the barriers for the participation of indigenous people in Liberian politics and the attempted "unification"
of the coastal and hinterlands of the country.
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CIA World Factbook 2006 www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html. Accessed on

03/14/2006 at 9pm.
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civil war broke out in December 1989, Liberia was widely acknowledged as a bastion of
relative peace, progress and prosperity in an otherwise troubled part of the world
(Clapham 1976; Dunn and Tarr 1988; Pham 2004; Liebenow 1987).
The history of Liberia as a state in that area off the coast of West Africa began
with the arrival in 1821 of the first boatload of American Negro settlers followed by the
establishment of what would become the first permanent settlement on Cape Mesurado.
The initial settlement was named after the American President James Monroe (Fraenkel
1964). Various accounts explain the motivation behind the arrival of the new settlers
from North America with most of these accounts centering on the explanation that the
founding of what later became Liberia owed its origin to the American Colonization
Society that was founded in 1816 with the intention of "solving the awkward social
problems involved in the presence of numbers of free Negroes among the slave-owning
communities of the Southern States of the U.S.A. by sponsoring a scheme of emigration
to Africa." (Fage 1969, 120).
Following the Emancipation Proclamation by President Abraham Lincoln in 1863
that set free all black people in slavery in the slave-owning states of America, a large
number of ex-slaves were found roaming the streets of southern cities with nothing to do
leading to friction and frequent altercations with the white population. The American
Colonization Society stepped-in with the proposal to repatriate the newly-freed slaves to
Africa with the dual purpose of solving the problem of what to about the newly-freed
slaves at home in America, and providing an instrument for promoting
Protestant Christianity and Western civilization, not only spreading the Gospel to
the "dark continent" but also implementing some of the fuzzy nineteenth-century
ideas regarding pacificism, alcoholic prohibition and other novel experiments in
morality and social relationships. (Liebenow 1987, 13)
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From their arrival in the colony in 1821, the American Colonization Society,
through its appointed agents, ran the affairs of the new territory until 1847 when
Liberians proclaimed their new country a republic and elected its first president, Joseph
Jenkins Roberts. The focus of this background to the political history of Liberia covers
three historical periods: the "First Republic," which ran from the election of Roberts, in
1848, through the first part of the rule of Samuel K. Doe -from 1980-1986 after he seized
power in a military coup; the "Second Republic," which covers the second period of
Doe's rule after winning the heavily rigged elections of 1986 and transforming himself
into a civilian president; and what is currently a "Third Republic" commencing with the
inauguration of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf as the first post-civil war president in January
2006 49
Political Competition in Liberia During the First Republic (1848-1980)
The significant characteristic of political competition during the First Republic in
Liberia was the exclusionary nature of political decision-making carried out at the
detriment of the local indigenous population. Through the True Whig Party that was
founded in 1878, the settler population of Americo-Liberians rallied behind a single-party
state and systematically organized to deny voting rights to the larger indigenous
populations.50 Furthermore, The True Whig Party endorsed forced labor upon the local
population and often cooperated with Masonic orders to throw a veil of secrecy and
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(NPFL) won elections and was in office until his removal from power in 2003 under heavy pressure from
the United States. This period can be argued as a "third republic" in the history of Liberia but the civil war
in the country and threats to its sovereignty and cohesion continued throughout the administration of
Taylor, making the claim of a "republic" a tenuous one.

67

repression over the state (Clapham 1978). It is important to point this out because this
development had an enduring impact on the political developments of Liberia and
consequently contributed to the civil war that occurred about a century later.
So, from 1848 to 1980, the descendants of Americo-Liberians alternated the
transfer of political power within their group largely keeping the indigenous population
out. The limited political competition was restricted within the membership of the True
Whig Party and the settler community. Christopher Clapham explained the exclusionary
nature of Liberian politics during the First Republic thus
all the usual mechanisms for advancements within a well-institutionalized,
political community -reasonable diligence, a decent respect for social norms
prudent attachment to leading men already well-placed in the system -apply also
in Liberia. So, President Tubman's son Shad Tubman Jr. becomes senator of
Maryland County. President Tolbert's brother Stephen becomes Minister of
Finance. Stephen Tolbert's legal adviser Cecil Dennis becomes Minister of
Foreign Affairs. Cecil Dennis' cousin William Dennis becomes Minister of
Commerce. When Stephen Tolbert is killed in an air crash, his place is taken by
Deputy Minister of Finance Edwin Williams, son of the Defence Minister, Allen
Williams. It is quite an intimate affair. (Dunn 1978, 120-121)
The picture, painted above by Christopher Clapham, of the exclusionary nature of politics
in Liberia during the years of the First Republic can be buttressed by looking at the list of
executive presidents of Liberia during the same time.
From its inception as a Republic in 1847 until 1980, Liberia had twenty presidents
and all of them were descendants of the Americo-Liberian settlers. The only alternation
of power was within the same group. For example, Joseph J. Roberts, the first president
was voted out of office in 1856 but made a comeback inl872. James S. Payne, another
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national affairs weakened, somewhat, during the Tolbert administration as gradual economic decline
encouraged various dissident groups to challenge the monopoly of the party. This gradual decline
culminated in the military coup of 1980 that resulted in the banning of the party.
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president also lost office and regained it on two separate occasions during the same
period. Strikingly, William V.S. Tubman became president in 1944 and ruled Liberia for
twenty-seven years until his death in 1971 (Liebenow 1987; Lyon 1999).
The fact of political exclusion of the indigenous population of Liberia by the
settler elites during the First Republic is even more remarkable against the background
that since its inception as a state, the population of Americo-Liberians in Liberia had
never exceeded five percent of the total population. Thus, the incredible feat of holding
on to power that Americo-Liberians achieved during the years of the First Republic could
only have been pulled-off by the most exclusionary of measures that kept the greater
percentage of the indigenous population from supplying at least one president. In the
absence of universal participation, the ability of the Americo-Liberian population to
monopolize power was left largely unchecked.
But the caveat should be made here that during the First Republic, presidents
William V.S. Tubman and his successor, William Tolbert, tried to liberalize the political
system and grant some level of access to the indigenous population even if only on a
token basis. Beginning around 1944, President William V.S. Tubman made several
commitments, under a Unification Policy, towards opening up the political system to
allow the inclusion of indigenous peoples into the political system. This offered the
opportunity to selected "hinterlanders" to participate in "politics on terms approaching though not entirely equaling -those available to the immigrant core." (Clapham 1976, 12)
In further pursuit of his Unification Policy, which he saw as a way to broaden the
political base of his regime, Tubman held Executive Councils for the redress of
grievances throughout the hinterland, thus for the first time acting like "a president of all
Liberia" rather than just a leader of the coastal communities (Clapham 1976). More
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barriers to inclusion of indigenous into the political system were taken in 1963-64 when
the provincial system of hinterland administration was abolished and replaced by four
new Counties with administrative structures similar to those of the five long-established
Counties on the coast. The changes were a little more than mere symbolism because they
afforded the hinterlanders representation in the Liberian legislature even though they
were outnumbered there by the representation from the comparatively much smaller
coastal regions. Furthermore, the changes resulted in the increase of jobs available for the
hinterlanders in their home areas (Clapham 1976).
Notwithstanding the liberalization program undertaken by Tubman during his
administration, the opportunities that became available to indigenous Liberians under his
Unification Policy, and for that matter to all Liberians, did not include or tolerate political
opposition to the True Whig Party and entrenched system of political patronage that
emanated from him. Christopher Clapham notes that in 1951 a Kru, Didwo Twe,
challenged Tubman's re-election bid but was intimidated into exile to keep him from
taking part in the polls. Other splinter groups that attempted to break away from the True
Whig Party hegemony where outlawed and their activities were deemed treasonable and
suppressed. Until his death in 1971, this was the political situation in Liberia under
Tubman. He opened up the political system by faintly cracking the door open and leaving
it tight enough to discourage or do away with any challenges to his and the authority of
the True Whig Party.
Tubman's successor, William Tolbert, assumed office in 1972 and continued with
the implementation of some of the policies of his predecessor. Disdainful of pomp and
ceremony, unlike earlier presidents of Liberia before him, Tolbert continued Tubman's
unification policy and invited many indigenous Liberians to join him in his
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administration. He allowed for more liberalization of the political system including
giving more rights for freedom of speech and political expression. The latter could have,
ironically, hurt his chances of ruling Liberia beyond 1980. For during that year, he was
overthrown by soldiers who were partly motivated by rice riots and demonstrations that
had occurred a year before during which people took the streets to denounce his
administration's handling of the shortage of rice supplies in stores on the local markets.
The First Republic of Liberia came to a sad end with the assassination of William Tolbert
in 1980. Throughout the First Republic, the remarkable feature of political competition in
Liberia was the exclusionary nature of politics that kept the natives out of power and
resulted into the restriction, and alternations, of power within the settler population and
the True Whig Party they had founded.
The Second Republic of Liberia - 1986-1990
On the night of April 12, 1980, Samuel K. Doe stormed the executive mansion of
the president of Liberia with other junior officers and assassinated President William
Tolbert. In the days following their storming of the executive mansion, the coup plotters,
comprised of young, uneducated and, most importantly, indigenous junior officers of the
Liberian military brutally executed all former senior members of the Tolbert
administration, including cabinet ministers. Most of the executions were carried out in
public in broad daylight on the beaches of Monrovia. The young officers formed the
People's Redemption Council with Doe as their chairman, which effectively made him
the head of state.
Doe was from the minority Krahn ethnic group from Grand Gedeh County.
Slightly over a year after assuming office, he started turning on his co-conspirators,
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whom he increasingly distrusted in moves that many people saw as efforts to consolidate
his hold on power. In August 1981 Doe arrested his former friend Thomas Weh Syen and
four other members of the ruling military junta, the PRC, on accusations of plotting to
overthrow his regime and assassinate him. Four days later, all five former members of the
council were executed. In the years following the first putsch of his regime, Doe
proceeded to systematically eliminate other members of his group that stormed the
executive mansion with him on that night of April 12, 1980 (Berkeley 2001; Liebenow
1987).
During the early years of his administration Doe developed ties with the United
States that were closer, and more financially rewarding to his rule, than any head of state
of Liberia that preceded him. He developed a special affinity with President Ronald
Reagan and was a fervent supporter of United States foreign policy during the Cold War.
In 1984, Doe supported a referendum that changed the constitution of Liberia paving the
way for him to run in presidential elections that were scheduled for October 1985. He
won the elections amidst widespread allegations of vote rigging and intimidation of other
presidential candidates emerging with fifty-one percent of the votes cast at the head of his
political party and effectively civilianizing his military regime.
Thus began the Second Republic in the political history of Liberia. From 1986 to
1990, Doe consolidated his rule around his ethnic group the Krahn (Berkeley 2001).
Through measures that were very similar to what the True Whig hegemony had used to
consolidate their hold on power several decades earlier, Doe appointed members of his
Krahn ethnic group to key positions around the country and continued to eliminate
members of other ethnic groups that were in senior positions of government. In
November 1985, he fell out with the widely popular Thomas Quiwonkpa, one of the last
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remaining original co-conspirators of the 1980 coup. Quiwonkpa was executed in
fighting around Monrovia and his disfigured body was displayed in public. Most analysts
point to Quiwonkpa's death as a key incident that precipitated the country's slide into
civil war four years later because members of Quiwonkpa's ethnic group perceived his
death as a personal blow to their ethnic interests in the government.
In 1989 Charles Taylor, a former civil servant during the Doe government, who
had been accused of embezzling public funds and had escaped to the United States to
avoid trial, where he also sprang a Massachusetts jail while in federal detention, led an
invasion into Liberia aimed at toppling the administration of Samuel Doe. Exploiting the
death of Thomas Quiwonkpa as a persecution of his ethnic group by Doe, Taylor
managed to draw a lot of followers to his rebellion and thus gained enough recruits to
start a full-scale civil war. This was the beginning of the end of the Doe regime and the
end of the Second Republic of Liberia.
Less than a year into Taylor's rebellion, his National Patriotic Front of Liberia
had succeeded in capturing over eighty percent of the territory of Liberia including some
portions of the capital, Monrovia. Doe was virtually isolated in the executive mansion in
Monrovia together with the last remaining, mostly Krahn, members of the Armed Forces
of Liberia that were still loyal to him. On September 9, 1990, Doe was tricked out of the
executive mansion, captured and killed by Prince Johnson who had earlier broken away
from Charles Taylor's NPFL and formed his own Independent National Patriotic Front of
Liberia (INPFL). Thus, the Second Republic came to an end and the civil war escalated
and gained international attention for the brutality and factional dimension to the conflict.
The Second Republic was characterized by the brutality of the Doe administration
with frequent summary executions of real or imagined enemies. Furthermore, just like the
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settler population and the True Whig Party had done before him, Doe consolidated his
hold on power by concentrating authority within his Krahn ethnic group while isolating
members of other ethnic groups from key positions in his government.
The Third Republic of Liberia - 2005
After Doe was captured, at the headquarters of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) regional intervention force that had been hastily assembled to
intervene in the conflict, and subsequently killed, the regional body strengthened its
efforts to find peace for Liberia. The intervention force was strengthened with support
from the international community outside Africa and regional negotiators put pressure on
the different factions to the fighting that had emerged in the civil war to agree on a ceasefire agreement and to form a government of national unity. That goal was achieved in late
1990 when the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) was formed with a
renowned Liberian intellectual, Amos Sawyer, as president. The largely ineffectual
Sawyer-led Interim Government of National Unity of Liberia lasted for about four years
until March 7, 1994. The IGNU period witnessed increased tensions in the civil war in
Liberia and the administration is largely remembered today for its ineffectiveness.
Lacking any enforcement mechanism and largely crippled by an absence of operational
funds, the government could not carry out the most basic functions expected of a central
government. It could not penetrate territories under rebel control and its authority was
virtually limited to those small portions of Monrovia under the control of the ECOWAS
forces.
Amos Sawyer's presidency of Liberia came to an end on March 7, 1994 and was
replaced by a looser governing arrangement headed by David D. Kpormakpor, as the
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chairman of a Council of State that had been agreed upon by all the major factions to the
fighting in Liberia. Wilton G.S. Sankawulo succeeded Kpormakpor as chairman of the
Council of State in September 1995 and one year later, in September 1996, he turned
over power to Ruth Perry. Ruth Perry, as chairwoman of the Council of State, oversaw
the general elections of 1997 that had been negotiated by the international community in
order to bring peace to Liberia. Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Party of Liberia
won the general elections of 1997.
Unfortunately, the civil war did not end with Charles Taylor's election as head of
state in 1997. If anything, it led to an escalation in factional fighting and just a few short
months after he assumed office, Liberia was embroiled in renewed fighting with a
viciousness that was unparalleled. The other factional leaders of the conflict accused
Charles Taylor of murder and intimidation and the international community frequently
censored him for his alleged role in the civil war that was raging in neighboring Sierra
Leone. Fighting in Liberia escalated and the capital, Monrovia, came under furious attack
in the summer of 2003 with the all other factions to the civil war united under one goal to
force Charles Taylor to resign his office. Finally, under pressure from the United States,
Charles Taylor resigned his position as head of state of Liberia in August 2003 and went
into exile in Nigeria. His vice president Moses Blah succeeded Charles Taylor for a
period of about two months before a United Nations appointed transitional government
was sworn in headed by Gyude Bryant.
The transitional government headed by Bryant oversaw the general elections of
2005 in which twenty candidates ran for president and eleven political parties
participated. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf emerged victorious, 59.4 percent of the total votes
cast, after the conclusion of run-off elections with her closest challenger, George Weah.
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She was sworn in as the first female president of Liberia, and a first as a democratically
elected female president of Africa, giving birth to the Third Republic of Liberia. The
international community certified the 2005 elections as free and fair and Johnson-Sirleaf
was inaugurated in January 2006 to head the Third Republic of Liberia.
Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone lies to the Southeast of Liberia bordering the North Atlantic Ocean
with a land area slightly smaller than the state of South Carolina (CIA World Factbook
2005). Like Liberia, it was founded as a settlement for freed slaves with one important
difference being that the freed slaves that were resettled in Sierra Leone came from
England instead of America. Slavery was abolished in England in 1772 by Lord
Mansfield's judgment leaving about 15,000 former slaves with nowhere to go and
aimlessly roaming the streets of London (Fage 1969).51 Faced with problems that were
similar to what Southern society in America will face almost a century later after the
Emancipation Proclamation, a group of anti-slavery activists led by the abolitionist
Granville Sharp proposed the resettlement of the newly freed slaves in Africa and agreed
upon the coastal area of present-day Sierra Leone as a suitable choice. The first group of
freed slaves was shipped from England to Sierra Leone in 1787 under ill-advised
circumstances to a small piece of land along the coast bought from a local king called
King Tom (Fage 1969). The freed slaves arrived in their new settlement during the harsh
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England was considered a free man. This resulted in an influx of blacks to England causing a new problem
of overpopulation in the streets of London that the Abolitionists like Granville Sharpe sought to solve
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rainy season to which they were no longer accustomed. Most of them perished and the
first settlement was almost abandoned in its initial stages.
Sharpe and his colleagues persevered in their intentions to relocate the freed
slaves back to the continent of Africa. Eventually, they convinced the British government
to assume some responsibility for the new territory, first by an Act of Parliament passed
in 1791 incorporating the Sierra Leone Company to organize trade in the territory and,
finally, as crown colony in 1808, which brought the new territory under direct control of
the British government as a colonial possession. The British ruled Sierra Leone for 153
years until they granted the territory its independence in 1961.
As an independent state, Sierra Leone has a comparatively shorter, but rather
eventful, political history than Liberia because even though the country only achieved its
independence from Britain in 1961, political participation in the country has never been
restricted to one group in the country making political competition a fiercely competitive
one from the very beginning. In contrast to Liberia, the settler population of Freetown,
the Creoles, soon became a marginalized group with no influential political base when
compared to the indigenous elites (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999).
We can also identify several distinct periods in the political chronology of Sierra
Leone: from 1961 to 1967, when two brothers from the SLPP Party held power in quick
succession following independence; 1967 tol992 when the All People's Congress Party
(APC) held office with several punctuations by military coups. The last coup that
dropped the curtain on APC rule in the country came in 1992 when the National
Provisional Ruling Council seized power and ruled until they organized elections in
1996. And finally, from 1996-1997 when a short-lived civilian administration was rudely
punctuated by another military coup organized by the Armed Forces Ruling Council. The
77

AFRC lasted a year before they were kicked out by regional military forces of the
ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) led by Nigeria. The current phase began with
the conclusion of the civil war and the holding of the first post-civil war presidential and
general elections that the SLPP won in 2002.
This historical background to political competition in Sierra Leone begins at the
period immediately following the conclusion of the World War II when the British, in
preparing the country for eventual independence, began to open up the political system to
the indigenous African population through various local and other elections to the
legislative council of the colony.
The 1951 Constitution of Sierra Leone paved the way for the beginning of the
eventual transfer of power from the British to the African population. The constitution
"provided a majority of seats in the legislature for Africans, and -more importantly in
local terms -gave the hinterland enough seats to outvote the Freetown peninsula"
(Clapham 1978, 13). This was the genesis of indigenous political competition in Sierra
Leone. Initially, it was one between the Creoles of the peninsular who were the
descendants of freed slaves and the educated elites and traditional chiefs of the hinterland
who gained most of the seats in this election. The first political parties in Sierra Leone
were formed along these divisional lines of interest. The National Council of the Colony
of Sierra Leone (NCCSL) representing the Creoles, and the Sierra Leone People's Party
(SLPP) representing the hinterland. According to Christopher Clapham, the NCCSL was
doomed from the start by the smallness of its electoral base thus paving the way for the
emergence of the SLPP as the dominant political party in the country.
The SLPP, led by Sir Milton Margai, a medical doctor, drew largely on the
support of traditional leaders, chiefs and educated elites from the hinterland to form the
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political base of the new party throughout the country. This fact provoked grounds for
later claims that the party was elitist in orientation. In the elections of 1957 which here
held under universal suffrage, for the first time in the country, the SLPP retained its
dominant position in the country and emerged victorious from those elections as well but
it came under increasing criticisms for the conduct of the traditional chiefs within the
ranks of the party. The chiefs were accused of corruption and heavy handedness resulting
in widespread riots in the country, in 1955-6, against their rule by the more youthful
population (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999).
On the eve of independence in April 1961, the initial rivalry between the Creoles
and the elites of the protectorate had faded away with the realization on the part of the
Creoles that their small numbers confined them to perpetual minority status and any
meaningful political contribution on their part would remain elusive unless they joined
ranks with other political parties that had broader political bases in the interior (Clapham
1978). Thus, the political influence of the Creole during the rivalry that had played out in
the 1950s between them and Sir Milton Margai faded away to be replaced by a new
political rivalry that was fiercer in its intensity and, which arguably played a major role in
the future political rivalries that were to eventually lead the country to civil war. This
rivalry was between the SLPP, still led by Sir Milton Margai, and a new political party,
the All People's Congress formed by Siaka Stevens, a fiery trade union organizer who
had broken away from the ranks of the SLPP with Sir Albert Margai, the younger brother
of Sir Milton.
The SLPP/APC rivalry has remained the enduring political rivalry in Sierra
Leone. The APC drew most of its initial support from the north and western areas of the
country whereas; the SLPP retained its political support from the south and central
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regions of the country. The iconoclastic figures in each party were Sir Milton Margai and
later followed by Sir Albert Margai for the SLPP and in the case of the APC; Siaka
Stevens was the principal identifying figure of that party. Furthermore, while the SLPP
had a conservative, elitist tinge to its membership, the APC's appeal was to mostly to the
masses in labor unions, blue-collar workers and the vast numbers of unemployed in the
capital Freetown.
After the SLPP victory in the independence elections of 1961, Sir Milton Margai
assumed office as the first prime minister of independent Sierra Leone but he died in
office in 1964 and was succeeded by his brother Albert Margai whose period in office
coincided with a series of upheavals, some of which were caused by him, that
precipitated a cycle of military interventions towards the end of the decade. The events
that led to the first cycle of military coups in Sierra Leone towards the end of the decade
started with Albert Margai's handling of the general elections of 1967. Here is how
Christopher Clapham described the tumultuous years of political rivalry under Albert
Margai.
Firstly, Albert's defeat of the leading northern contender for the premiership, Dr.
John Karefa-Smart, intensified ethnic and regional conflict and led most
northerners to look to the APC. Secondly, Albert's attempt to increase his power
at the expense both of the opposition, and of other politicians in the loosely-knit
SLPP, alienated a great deal of support and led eventually to his defeat in the
election of March 1967. His proposals for a single-party state, for the declaration
of a republic, and for strengthening the SLPP's central machinery were all seen as
attempts to improve his own position, and were widely opposed and eventually
dropped. Likewise he tampered with the electoral machinery, but lacked the nerve
to do so enough to ensure his return. (Clapham 1976, 14-15).
Albert Margai's political ineptitude in handling the rivalry that he faced from the
northern challenge resulted in his ill-advised move to tamper with the elections of 1967.
When the final results of the elections were announced, his SLPP manage to win only 28
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seats compared to the 32 won by the APC, with about six seats going to independents that
were strategically opposed to Albert Margai. The SLPP victories came mostly in the
Southern and Eastern Provinces of the country while the APC won important victories in
the Northern Province and Western Area registering two victories in Kono district. The
country was witnessing its first major political fault line. Because the APC had emerged
with the most votes, Siaka Stevens, as leader of the part, was duly invited by the
Governor-General to form the next government. He was sworn into office but two days
later was prevented from exercising any authority by a military coup led by the Army
Commander Brigadier Lansana who was, incidentally, Mende acting on the alleged
encouragement of Albert Margai. Siaka Stevens went into exile in Guinea.
Brigadier Lansana's coup was the precipitating event to a series of coups and
counter coups that finally ended with the reinstallation of Siaka Stevens in 1968
following another military coup. First, Lansana was ousted by a counter coup led by
middle-ranking officers who invited a popular officer in the military, Lt Col Andrew
Juxon-Smith to head a new government of national reformation. This was short-lived.
Less than a year after Juxon-Smith was invited to head the national reformation
government, he was ousted in yet another coup, this one led by non-commissioned
officers hailing mostly from the north. The young officers invited Siaka Stevens back
from exile to reassume office.
Siaka Stevens was never ousted in another military coup despite several real or
imagined attempts that were made against his administration during his 18 years in office.
He moved to consolidate his hold on power by quickly reintroducing the measures of
one-party rule and the declaration of a republic that Albert Margai, who by this time had
gone into exile in London, had so unsuccessfully tried to introduce. He declared a
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republic in 1971 and executed several army or civilian officers who were associated with
past coup attempts against him (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999).
As Siaka Stevens and the APC consolidated their hold on power, the SLPP started
to decline as a national party. The next elections in 1973 intensified the political
competition between the SLPP and the APC. The SLPP was hopeful of making a
comeback following its poor showing in the 1967 elections and it was hoping to win seats
especially in the Southern regions of the country where it had maintained a traditional
dominance. But the APC was ready for the SLPP challenge. The party resorted to
intimidation to prevent all non-APC candidates from registering their nominations
leading to the elections. Such measures and threats of violence against opposition
candidates cowed all but the most foolhardy from taking part in the elections. The APC
won the elections of 1973 but the tone of future political rivalries between it and the
SLPP had been magnified. The instability surrounding the elections ofl973 was followed
in 1975 by the executions of another group of politicians in the country accused of taking
part in a plot to kill Siaka Stevens's vice-president C.A. Kamara-Taylor and taking over
the government.
The next elections came in 1977 and they were marred by violence on a scale that
was unprecedented in the country. SLPP candidates and other non-APC candidates were
harassed and beaten up during campaign trips across the country or even jailed without
trial in some cases (Kandeh 2003). All across the country, thugs acting on behalf of the
APC sought political rivals and beat them up, or in some cases even killed them. There
were clashes between SLPP and APC supporters in towns across the country and the
provincial town of Bo experienced the most violence with reports of over 100 people
killed. When the results were turned in, the APC had secured yet another election victory
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through violence and intimidation. But it did not stop at that. Siaka Stevens referred to
the violence of the last elections and proposed that the time was now ripe to eliminate
such violence by introducing a one-party state. The bill to make Sierra Leone a one-party
state was introduced into the APC-dominated parliament and quickly passed. Sierra
Leone, officially, became a one-party state in 1979 with the APC as the sole political
party.
Thus, Siaka Stevens consolidated his and the APC's hold on power sending the
SLPP into a political wilderness from which it will not come back until the
democratization wind of change that blew across the continent of Africa in the early
1990s caused the ban on political activity to be lifted and the one-party amendment
dropped from the constitution. In 1985, an ailing Siaka Stevens turned power over to
another northerner, Force Commander of the military, Joseph Saidu Momoh, who hailed
from his Limba tribe. Momoh remained in office until the civil war started in 1991. He
was ousted in a military coup a year later when disgruntled junior officers from the
warfront, in the capital to complain about poor conditions at the front, changed their
minds and decided to overthrow the government once and for all. Thus, ended twentyfours of APC rule to be replaced by a military junta that the young soldiers christened the
National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC).
The NPRC stayed in power for slightly over four years and eventually, under
pressure from the West, organized general elections for the transfer of power to a civilian
administration in 1996. Fifteen political parties participated in those elections including a
resurgent SLPP and the APC. But a three-way competition soon opened up with the
reemergence on the political scene of John Karefa-Smart of the United National Patriotic
Party (UNPP). The UNPP drew most of its support from the areas that the APC had
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originally drawn their support from -the Northern and Western areas of the country.
After the votes count in the presidential elections, no one party emerged with a clear lead
and according to the provisions of the constitution, a run-off election was called for in
order to elect a clear winner. The two frontrunners from the first round of the elections
were Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the SLPP and John Karefa-Smart of the UNPP. The other
political parties maneuvered behind the two contenders in the runoff elections. Kabbah
and his SLPP won the runoff and formed the next government but their rule was not to
last long. On the evening of May 25, 1997, the city of Freetown awoke to the sign of
rapid gunfire and to the dreary announcement that there had been a coup d'etat that has
toppled the government and that Kabbah had fled into exile (Conteh-Morgan and DixonFyle 1999).
The new military junta christened itself the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council,
headed by Major Johnny Paul Koroma. It remained in power for about nine months
before action by Western African regional forces, Ecowas Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG), ousted them from power in February 1998. The AFRC and their RUF
partners retreated into the bush and continued their attacks against innocent civilians and
government forces. The short, brief period of AFRC rule is notable for two things: first,
for the level of brutality that the junta and their supporters indiscriminately perpetrated
against the civilian population; and secondly, for inviting the Revolutionary United Front
(RUF) Rebels, who up to that point had been unsuccessfully fighting three successive
governments of Sierra Leone in the six-year civil war, into the capital to form a ruling
coalition. The chaos and mayhem that followed was unparallel. When Freetown fell to
ECOMOG forces in February 1998, thousands of civilians had already been murdered
across the country and the city lay in ruins.
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The government of Kabbah was reinstated in March 1998 with full support from
the United Nations and other regional leaders in West Africa. But the last was not yet
heard from the AFRC/RUF coalition. On January 6, 1999, forces loyal to the coalition,
who had been threatening to breach the capital for weeks finally entered the city and
stormed the maximum security prison freeing dangerous criminal and other prisoners to
join the violence they were about to unleash anew on the city. In the two weeks following
their invasion of the city, the AFRC/RUF forces burnt down major government buildings
and other infrastructure and killed over five thousand civilians. Eventually, they were
again pushed out of the city by ECOMOG. They beat a retreat to their bases in the bush
but they had succeeded in creating a realization among international and regional leaders
that the civil war in the country was a militarily stalemate with civilians as the major
losers of the conflict who bore the brunt of all attacks.
First, the Togolese leader Gyannisingbe Eyadema offered to mediate the conflict
and invited the government and officials of the AFRC/RUF coalition over to the
Togolese capital, Lome to negotiate in 1999. The negotiations lasted over two sessions,
Lome I and Lome II, and ultimately resulted in a power-sharing arrangement for a
government of national unity and an agreement by the SLPP government of Kabbah to
hold general elections as soon as they could raise the funds to do so. By this time, the
conflict had finally captured the attention of the world. The United Nations also approved
a resolution authorizing the deployment of UN troops to the country in what will,
ultimately, become the largest UN peacekeeping mission ever organized.
With the ECOMOG and UN presence in the country, the security situation improved a
little for talks about holding elections to start and political maneuverings between the
different groups intensified.
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The leader of the RUF, Foday Sankoh, who had gained the status of a vicepresident as an outcome of the negotiations in Lome, was accused of trying to overthrow
the government and destabilize the country afresh. Demonstrators marched on to his
official residence on the morning of February 20, 2000 allegedly hoping to register their
grievances at the accusations regarding his intentions. Sankoh's bodyguards opened fire
on the demonstrators as they approached his residence killing some of them. Chaos broke
out and in the confusion Sankoh left his residence and allegedly fled into the hills
surrounding Freetown. His house was ransacked by the mob and some of his bodyguards
were killed. Sankoh became a wanted man on the run and the incidence effectively
signaled the end to any role he had in the politics of Sierra Leone.
Sankoh was captured a couple of weeks after the incident at his residence and
turned over to government and United Nations forces by soldiers loyal to no other person
than his former AFRC ally, Johnny Paul Koroma. Koroma gained the status of a hero
from the incident and also acquired the appearance of a possible contender in the
elections that were planned for 2002. The war had effectively come to an end with the
capture and detention of Sankoh. With Sankoh in detention facing trial, plans were set
afoot for general elections to be held in May 2002. Sixteen political parties took part in
what were Sierra Leone's first post-conflict elections of 2002. The SLPP won those
elections with over eighty percent of the votes cast. The competition this time was
between the SLPP and a resurgent APC but the APC comeback, ultimately, did not
appear to be strong enough. In what is a serious test of ethnic theories of politics in
Africa, the SLPP garnered votes from all regions of the country, even in those regions
that were considered to be strongholds of the APC or other political parties. It remains to
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be determined what the near-unanimity of votes for the SLPP means for Sierra Leone or
the future of peace in the country.
Contrasts and Similarities
From the preceding discussion of the major political developments in the history
of Liberia and Sierra Leone, we can point out several similarities and striking contrasts
that set the groundwork for the comparison that will follow. Earlier on, we had pointed
out that the politics of Liberia, since its inception as an independent republic, was one of
exclusion of the much larger indigenous population in the non-coastal regions of the
country by the settler population that had arrived from America as resettled slaves.
Through formal and informal networks regulated by the Americo-Liberians and the
political party that they formed, the True Whig Party, the indigenous populations were
prevented from full participation in the political system. Large segments could not vote
and only the most token of appointments in senior government positions went to the
indigenous population.
From 1847 until the military coup of 1980, elite Americo-Liberian families
monopolized power through the linkages they had created, sometimes letting a few
indigenous elites who had demonstrated loyalty and commitment to the group through
association with the freemasonry system established by the Americo-Liberians and the
True Whig Party, or through intermarriage or friendship (Clapham 1976). The military
coup of 1980 revolutionized the political system of Liberia by turning the tables around
from an elite monopoly of power to an indigenous monopoly of power led by Samuel
Doe.
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Politics in Sierra Leone was not characterized by such deliberate exclusion. The
settler population of Sierra Leone, also living in the coastal areas of Freetown was highly
favored for senior administrative positions by the British colonial authorities because of
their comparatively higher levels of education. But this favor shown by the British
towards them was never transformed into a political capital that could be used to
monopolize the reigns of government and control of the country when once the British
left. From the moment the British opened up the political system to all of the African
population in the early 1950s, all segments of the indigenous population were allowed to
participate and they did so by forming and joining several political parties of their choice
unlike the one political party that had been in operation for most of the history of Liberia.
The Creoles formed the NCCSL with their much smaller political base in the coastal
areas and the indigenous elites allied with local chiefs to form the SLPP.
Another important contrast between the two countries is the length of time that
their various systems have been open to universal political participation and open
electoral competition. Liberia became the first republic in sub-Saharan Africa in 1847 but
restrictions in access to the political system prevented any open electoral competition. In
contrast, Siaka Stevens and the APC party eventually declared one-party rule in Sierra
Leone in 1979 but for the first eighteen years following independence, Sierra Leone had a
multiparty political system in operation. Furthermore, the nature of one-party rule in
Sierra Leone was such that all other ethnic groups in the country were allowed to
participate within the one-party system unlike the case in Liberia.
Besides these contrasts, Liberia and Sierra Leone also have much in common
beginning with the historical fact that both began as settlements for freed slaves. This
development alone accounts for a different kind of class system than what is typically
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found among other West African countries. Regarding electoral competition, the two
groups -indigenous groups and settler groups -soon found out that their interests
diverged. In Liberia, the settler group had the upper hand much earlier and thus moved to
consolidate their hold on power by marginalizing the indigenous population. This could
have set the example for political competition and for what the indigenous groups tried to
do in the 1980s during the regime of Samuel Doe.
According to scholars (Clapham 1973; Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999), the
settler population in Sierra Leone never had the upper hand in electoral competition
partly because of their small numbers and smaller political base given the non-ideological
basis of party competition. After losing the first two elections organized in the country by
the British, they were forced to develop a pragmatic political strategy wherein they
sought representation within one or more of the more favorable indigenous political
parties. Following the war, did other Sierra Leoneans make similar pragmatic decisions?
The next chapter examines post-conflict political behavior in Sierra Leone.
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CHAPTER III
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR AND MOBILIZATION IN
POST-CONFLICT SIERRA LEONE
The People of Yardaji Have No Regard For Any Political Party Whatsoever.
We are Tired of Hearing Idle Talk. Whoever Ignores This Advice Will Regret It.
Listen Well: Don't Come Here. This is Not a Matter of One Person Alone. We
Don't Want It. This Concerns Everyone. Forewarned is Forearmed. (Miles
1988).52
The stronger link between political elites and the citizenry is through the less
tangible bonds of ethnic identity. Even in the absence of tangible benefits, citizens
will choose to vote for individuals of their own ethnic group, particularly in
ethnically divided societies. Less than the expectation that they will benefit
directly from the vote, citizens may feel that only a member of their own ethnic
group may end up defending the interests of the ethnic group as a whole, and that
voting for a member of another ethnic group will certainly not do so. (Van de
Walle 2003) 53
Introduction

The 2002 post-conflict parliamentary and presidential elections in Sierra Leone
provide an invaluable opportunity to apply insights provided by existing scholarship to
the understanding of a critical real world event. The scholarship in question is the body of
work, surveyed earlier, on political behavior and mobilization that emerged on African
societies following the end of the colonial period (Cowen and Laakso 2002). 54
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Reproduced verbatim from a sign outside Yardaji Village, Hausaland, Northern Nigeria. William F.S.

Miles, Elections in Nigeria: A Grassroots Perspective, (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
1988), 65.
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Nicholas Van de Walle, "Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa's Emerging Party Systems," Journal

of Modern African Studies 41 (February 2003): 313.
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European colonial powers permitted the first elections for seats in the legislatures of West African

countries in the late 1940s. However, it is the pattern of political behavior and mobilization into politics
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Specifically, an empirical examination of the results of the 2002 elections allow
us to test the relative strength of explanations which suggested that ethnic and communal
identities were, and remain, the dominant and efficient bases of political mobilization
within the post-colonial state structure in Africa (Bates 1983, Horowitz 1985, Rothchild
1985, Young 1994, Glickman 1995, Welsh 1996, Ottaway 1999 and others) versus
comparatively more recent explanations that have suggested evolving individualistic
orientations predicated on such appeals as a preference for party programs or the issue
positions of competing candidates in a given election (for example, Harris 1999, Lyons
1998, Daniel, Southall and Szeftel 1999 and Kandeh 2003).55 Most importantly, such an
undertaking potentially reveals the emerging patterns of political behavior in the postconflict environment that, in the long run, hold important implications for the durability
of the hard won peace in the country following its civil war and the efforts at postconflict democratization.
Thus, in this chapter I explored the various factors that the scholarship has
suggested influence the outcomes of elections in Africa, factors such as ethnic identity
during multiparty elections leading up to independence and immediately following it that first formed the
characteristics of interest for the scholarship. For a neat chronology of this scholarship, see Michael Cowen
and Liisa Laakso, eds. Multi-Party Elections in Africa (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 3-4.
55

Throughout the discussions I use "ethnicity," "ethnic identity," "identity politics," "communal identity"

or "ethnic politics" interchangeably to refer to what scholars have implied is the mobilization of voting
groups into the political process in multiethnic societies along lines of the cultural identity that defines
those groups as people. However, more clarification is in order. Communal identity, understood further,
may involve more than one identity and may, more appropriately, refer to a locality that mobilizes into
politics using the attributes of that locality as the locus of such mobilization. Thus, some ethnic groups may
not even be found in the same locality even though most scholarship on the politics of Africa has implied
this homogeneity of local existence. For a useful discussion of these distinctions see John Cartwright,
Political Leadership in Sierra Leone (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), 159. See also Daniel
Posner, The Institutional Origins ofEthnic Politics: Regime Change and Ethnic Cleavages in Africa
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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and regional interests. I found that the various factors are far more intricate than has been
previously suggested leading me to argue that political behavior in the country during the
post-conflict period was more complex than previously assumed under identity-based
voting theses. I conclude that the results of the post-conflict elections of 2002 are
suggestive of a critical break from the theoretical expectations of elections in Africa. This
argument will be developed and elaborated as I proceed with the analysis of the empirical
evidence at hand.
To the extent that ethnicity still plays a role in the electoral politics of Sierra
Leone, its most important utility, I will suggest, is its communication function not its
identity function. Ethnicity, understood in this context as speaking the same language as
targeted constituents, facilitates direct communication of party programs, messages from
candidates, and other campaign content and materials to uneducated citizens in rural
communities who are mostly mono-lingual. To cite an example, one advantage Kabbah
was said to have over other presidential candidates was the fact that he was multilingual
in several indigenous Sierra Leonean languages, which allowed him to directly convey
his message and relate to members of the electorate in various parts of the country.
However, I will caution that listening to campaign material should not be construed to
automatically predict candidate or party preference for targeted constituents. Following
an analysis of the data, I place less emphasis on the cues of ethnic identity as predictive
of political behavior and mobilization during the post-conflict electoral dynamics in
Sierra Leone.
Primarily, the evidence provides less support for an electoral ethnic census of the
kind posited by Horowitz (1985) and points more to an earnest desire by the Sierra
Leonean electorate, in the post-war environment, to elect the political parties and
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individuals whose candidatures were more likely than others to provide a warranty for the
peace, as argued by Kandeh (2003) and others. The evidence shows further that even
Sierra Leoneans from the same ethnic groups were divided on a broad range of
preferences in vote choice for the various political parties that contested the 2002 postconflict elections. In the ensuing analysis, I demonstrate that beyond a concern for
ecological fallacy, the extant scholarship has largely neglected to account for incomplete
correlations between ethnic settlement patterns or localities and electoral constituencies
or district boundary lines that had precluded electoral choice for legislative seats in most
areas of Sierra Leone from being one of a race between members of different ethnic
groups. This factor alone, may account for a large percentage of the apparent
homogeneity in voting preferences for the two main political parties, the SLPP and the
APC, in elections preceding the 2002 post-conflict elections.
Regarding the elections of 2002, Kandeh (2003, 189) submitted that the outcomes
were due to a "perception among a plurality of voters that President Kabbah and the
ruling Sierra Leone People's Party delivered on their promise to end the war and
therefore deserved re-election" but he neglected to show how the process of perception
among the electorate occurred that resulted in their resolve to cast a majority of their
ballots for one candidate, Kabbah, who did not belong to their ethnic group in the true
sense of 'ethnic belongingness' in the hopes of attaining peace. Neither does he explain
the related process of identification of one candidate by multifarious groups of ethnic
communities. Invariably, he concurrently credits ethnic identity as having played a role in
producing the outcomes in the 2002 elections in Sierra Leone.
Even though the arguments for the strong influence of ethnic identities on the
voting decision in African elections tend to be persuasive, they still do not explain why
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Sierra Leoneans of various ethnic and other socio-political backgrounds crossed barriers
to vote for the SLPP, which is perceived as a predominantly "Mende-party" with roots in
the south-east region of the country.
The observations and explanations that follow are based on evidence derived from
the following sources: a) a national survey of a randomly sampled segment of the
population of Sierra Leone, N=905, b) interviews with political party elites at the
national, regional and local levels; c) interviews with senior government officials
especially those dealing with elections administration at the national, regional and local
levels; d) interviews with chiefs and other traditional elders that are widely acknowledged
in Sierra Leone as repositories of knowledge on the history and collective identity of
local communities; e) analyses of published materials including archival records of the
Sierra Leone Archives at Fourah Bay College, University of Sierra Leone, university
theses and newspaper reports; f) interviews with members of civil society movements and
staff of international and local non-governmental organizations across the country; g) and
finally, insight gained both from a long period of 'soaking and poking' around the
country during my stay in the field.
The 2002 Post-Conflict Elections
The 2002 elections in Sierra Leone were the first attempt to directly incorporate
multiparty contested elections into a comprehensive peace program in the West Africa
sub-region as a mechanism to definitively resolve a conflict. Scholars, analysts, observers
and those generally interested in the politics of Africa were curious to see how the
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process played out. The outcome of the elections had clear implications for not only
subsequent post-conflict elections elsewhere, but also the unique experiment of a new
strategy of robust peace enforcement that the United Nations had undertaken by
assembling the largest peace force ever of over 17,000 troops in a single country.
Sierra Leoneans went to the polls on a clear Tuesday morning on the 14th of May
2002, less than one year after the cessation of hostilities and less than six months
following the ceremonial disarmament of the last armed combatant in the country's civil
war by the UN force. The day itself was unlike any other that most Sierra Leoneans had
experienced -some report that the day had a strange and surreal feel to it. Many did not
believe that what they were witnessing on that day could actually happen given the
extremities of the violence that had occurred in the country for over a decade. The voting
process was very peaceful and orderly with minor logistical problems in conveying
sufficient ballot boxes to some polling centers, which the National Election Commission
(NEC) largely attributed to insufficient funds to secure transportation of polling materials
across the country. Voting was officially scheduled to commence at 7 AM but voters
enthusiastically began lining up to vote as early as 1 AM in some parts of the country
(Kandeh 2003, Commonwealth Observer Group 2006).57
The polling process was observed by a contingent of over 2,000 elections
monitors and observers from domestic and international organizations including
delegations from the Carter Center, the European Union, the Commonwealth Observer
56
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See Jimmy Kandeh, "Sierra Leone's Post-Conflict Elections of 2002," Journal of Modern African

Studies 41 (February 2003): 189-216, for a comprehensive discussion of events on and around the elections
of 2002 in Sierra Leone. Also see The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group, "Sierra Leone
Presidential and Parliamentary Elections: 14 May 2002." (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2006).
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Group, ECOWAS, and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone. In the end it was the
most peaceful and freest elections Sierra Leoneans had experienced since the elections of
1967, over thirty years previously. With few reservations regarding the logistical
inadequacies and relatively minor concerns about incumbency advantage enjoyed in
media representation by the ruling Sierra Leone Peoples Party, all the observer missions
gave the election a clean bill of health and considered it a legitimate opportunity for a
genuine expression of the electoral preferences of Sierra Leoneans.58
The elections were conducted using a system designed by international
institutional designers and mediators of the conflict with a view to guaranteeing
representation of any shade of opinion present in the supposedly fractious country while
minimizing the likelihood of a repetition of violence at the local constituency level that
had characterized elections past. Therefore, the preferred electoral rule was called the
District Block System, a variant of the Proportional Representation electoral system
under which political parties nominated and presented lists of preferred candidates for
parliamentary seats at the constituency level in the 14 districts that were demarcated in
the country for the purpose of the elections. To win a seat, a political party needed to win
at least 12.5 percent of the votes cast in an electoral district. In the case of the presidential
elections, the electoral rule stemming from the Electoral Laws Act 2002 of Sierra Leone
stipulated that for a candidate to be declared the winner in the presidential elections, he or
she had to win, outright, 55 percent of the total electoral votes cast in the first round or

For an independent assessment of the legitimacy and genuineness of the 2002 elections, see the Carter
Center Report, "Observing the 2002 Sierra Leone Elections: Waging Peace. Fighting Disease. Building
Hope, (Atlanta, Georgia: The Carter Center, 2002).
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face a run-off in a second round of elections with the runner-up candidate polling the
second highest number of votes in the first round of the elections.59
In all, eleven political parties managed to navigate a lengthy process of electoral
rules to be placed on the ballot. Among the various stipulations, political parties were
required to sign a Code of Conduct under Section 19 of the Electoral Laws Act 2002 of
Sierra Leone, which among other things bound all parties to a pledge to renounce
violence and intimidation and to conduct their campaign in a manner that posed no threat
to the interests of other political parties in the campaign. Table 3.1 below provides
information on the political parties that were on the ballot for the elections including their
flag bearers for the presidential elections and the ethnic group or groups to which the flag
bearer belonged.
Among other things, Table 3.1 shows the uneven representation of ethnic identity
in the leadership of political parties that contested the parliamentary and presidential
elections. Of the 17 ethnic groups in Sierra Leone, only six are represented in the
leadership of the political parties. An important question here is why other ethnic groups
did not seek the means to represent themselves in the leadership of the political parties
that sprang up to contest the elections given an electoral system that was specifically
designed to facilitate the representation of a diversity of interests around the country. We
also note from the table that Temnes alone accounted for the leadership of five different
political parties.
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parliamentary elections in the 2007 elections.
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Table 3.1
Political Parties on the Presidential and Parliamentary Ballot in 2002
Political Party

Presidential Flag Bearer

1. All People Congress
Party
2. Citizens United for
Peace and Progress
3. Grand Allianc e Party

Ernest Bai Koroma
Raymond Kamara
Raymond Bamidele
Thompson
Zainab Bangura
Johnny Paul Koroma

4. Movement for Progress
5. Peace and Liberation
Party
6. Revolutionary United
Alimamy Pallo Bangura
Front Party
7. United National Peoples John Karefa Smart
Party
8. Sierra Leone People's
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah
Party
9. Young People's Party
Andrew Turay
Osman Kamara
10. Peoples Democratic
Party
Alhaji Amadu Jalloh
11. National Democratic
Alliance

Ethnic Group Of
Presidential F/Bearer
Temne mother and Limba
father
Temne
Krio
Temne
Limba
Temne
Temne or Loko*
Mandingo father and
Mende mother
Limba
Temne**
Fullah**

* Karefa Smart's ethnicity has always been the subject of much speculation in Sierra
Leone despite his long presence in the politics of the country. There is no public record of
him clarifying the issue of his ethnic identity.
** Did not contest the presidential elections but political party was on the ballot in the
parliamentary elections.
Interestingly, the largest and arguably one of the most influential ethnic groups in
the country, the Mendes, were only half represented, so to speak, in the leadership of the
SLPP by the candidacy of the incumbent Kabbah whose mother is a Mende. Kabbah's
claims to being a Mende were tenuous given that his paternal ancestry was unequivocally
Mandingo hailing from Kambia in the north of the country. Some press reports in the
country even claimed later that Kabbah's direct lineage could be traced to neighboring
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Guinea. Karefa-Smart of the UNPP, the sole octogenarian on the ballot, and Ernest
Koroma of the APC also have questionable ties to the ethnic groups to which they claim
to belong. While Koroma claims to hail from the Temne ethnic group because his mother
is Temne, most observers claim that he is actually of Limba heritage, the third largest
ethnic group who constitute about ten percent of the population of Sierra Leone but
comparatively much smaller in size to Mendes and Temnes.
The major issues of the campaigns included sustaining the still fragile peace; the
rule of law and law and order; economic development and reconstruction of the heavily
damaged infrastructure; jobs and corruption.
The incumbent SLPP campaigned as the architects of the peace and also as the
party most competent, in terms of capacity, to staff the administrative needs of the
country. Tejan Kabbah projected himself as a centripetal figure in the politics of Sierra
Leone from his experience as a former international civil servant in the UN system with
roots in two of the most politically polarized regions of the country -the north and the
east. His major opponents, Koroma of the APC and Karefa-Smart of the UNPP, accused
the incumbent government of rampant corruption, mismanagement of state resources and
a failure to create jobs for the thousands of the country's unemployed youth especially
following the civil war. Karefa-Smart cited his over 50 years of experience in
government and international jobs as qualifications to better manage the affairs of the
country. At 52, Koroma claimed relative youth and a deeper understanding of the
problems of the majority of the youthful population of Sierra Leone; an understanding he
accused the 70 year old Kabbah and the 87 year Karefa-Smart of lacking. Moreover, he
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claimed that he would bring accountability to governance and reform the structures of the
state to be more responsive to the needs of the people. In reality, all the political parties
contesting the elections presented similar proposals for programs to the people with no
major ideological or philosophical differences separating one party from the others.
When the ballots cast in the elections were tallied and officially reported by the
Chairman of the National Elections Commission five days later on May 19, 2002, the
results showed an overwhelming victory for the SLPP. The party polled over 67 percent
of the votes to guarantee it 83 seats in the 112-seat national parliament. Kabbah, its
incumbent presidential candidate, polled over 70 percent of the votes cast. More
importantly, Kabbah polled over 50 percent of the votes in three of the four provinces in
the country. In the Northern Province, which is considered an opposition stronghold, he
still managed to poll over 30 percent of the votes besting several candidates on the ballot
with more direct lineages to that region of the country.
All of the other political parties on the ballot had poor showings in districts that
where supposed to be their political strongholds given their ethnic linkages to those
districts. Neither the Revolutionary Front Party, the main instigator of the civil war who
had terrorized the people for over a decade, and whom some feared could revert to war if
they lost the elections, nor the People's Liberation Party of Johnny Paul Koroma, a more
recent source of terror during the 1997 interregnum, managed to garner any votes
significant enough to affect the political landscape. The PLP managed to win enough
votes to gain two seats in the national parliament while the RUFP did not win a single
seat.
The real competition, as it were, emerged between the SLPP and the APC party,
both of which had alternated governance of the country in the past. The APC was in
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power for over 24 years and their excesses while in office where blamed for the country's
descent into civil war. Koroma of the APC, campaigning under the theme of a repentant
political party, managed to win 22 percent of the votes cast nationwide. His party
managed improved showings in the parliamentary elections than their previous outing in
1996 winning about 22 percent of the votes for a total of 27 seats in the national
parliament. Perhaps a sign of the once unpopular party's future resurgence, Koroma won
over 33 percent of the votes for the Western Area, which includes the national capital
Freetown, once a hotbed of opposition to APC rule. Table 3.2 provides the results of the
parliamentary and presidential elections.
Table 3.2
Results of the 2002 Elections in Sierra Leone
Political
Party
SLPP
APC
PLP
RUFP
GAP
UNPP
PDP
MOP
NDA
YPP
Totals

Total
Votes
1,293,401
409,313
69,765
41,997
25, 436
24,907
19,941
15,036
6,467
5,083
1,911,346

% of Popular
Vote
67.6
21.4
3.6
2.1
1.3
1.3
1.0
0.7
0.3
0.2

% of Popular
vote for President
70.06
22.35
3.00
1.73
0.59
1.04

Parliamentary
Seats
83
27
2

-

0.55
-

0.20
112

Source: Adapted from Jimmy Kandeh. 2003. "Sierra Leone's Post-Conflict Elections of
2002." Journal of Modern African Studies. 41(2), pp. 189-216.
The results show the extent of the SLPP victory in the elections of 2002. Even
when some opposition candidates claimed that the results could have been flawed by
some voting irregularities around the country, international observer groups were
convinced that the margin of victory was so decisive as to leave no doubts about the
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intentions of voters in the elections (Carter Report 2002). Given the pervasiveness of
explanations of communal voting during elections in Africa, why did voters from all
across this multiethnic country of over five million people cross those various barriers of
ethnic and regional cues to cast their votes for the SLPP and Kabbah?
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 present the results of the presidential and parliamentary
elections by region, respectively.
Table 3.3
The 2002 Presidential Election by Region
Western
Area
Candidate
N (%)
A.T. Kabbah 166,194
(54.8)
E.B. Koroma 101,613
(33.5)
J.P. Koroma 24,651
(8.1)
A.P. Bangura 2,429
(0.8)
J.K-Smart
2,357
(0.7)
R. Kamara
1,432
(0.4)
Z. Bangura 2,371
(0.7)
R.B. Thompson 1,085
(0.3)
A. Turay
815
(0.2)
Totals
302,947

Northern
Province
N (%)
179,634
(32.7)
289, 086
(52.7)
25,813
(4.7)
17,305
(3.1)
13,125
(2.3)
8,046
(1.4)
5,490
(1.0)
7,014
(1.2)
2,409
(0.4)
547,922

Southern
Province
N (%)
532,220
(95.4)
17,244
(3.0)
1,622
(0.2)
1,506
(0.2)
2,329
(0.4)
916
(0.1)
948
(0.1)
363
(0.06)
205
(0.03)
557,353

Eastern
Province
N (%)
458,375
(91.8)
18,462
(3.6)
5,147
(1.0)
11,834
(2.3)
2,036
(0-4)
787
(0.1)
1597
(0-3)
566
(0.1)
430
(0.08)
499,234

Source: Source: Jimmy Kandeh. 2003. "Sierra Leone's Post-Conflict Elections of 2002."
Journal of Modern African Studies. 41(2), pp. 189-216. Reproduced with permission of
the copyright owner.
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Table 3.4
The 2002 Parliamentary Election Results by Region

Political
Party
SLPP
APC
PLP
UNPP
RUFP
GAP
MOP
PDP
NDA
YPP
Totals

Western
Area
N (%)

Northern
Province
N (%)

Southern
Province
N (%)

136,469
(45.8)
89,360
(30.0)
33,778
(11.3)
3,972
(1.3)
4,994
(1.6)
4,628
(1.5)
9,421
(3.1)
9,046
(3.0)
4,218
(1.4)
1,792
(0.6)
297,678

171,159
(30.8)
282,064
(50.8)
28,314
(5.1)
16,012
(2.8)
22,423
(4.0)
17,785
(3-2)
3,257
(0.5)
8,286
(1.4)
2,249
(0.4)
2,620
(0.4)
554,169

527,009
(93.2)
17,789
(3.1)
2,031
(0.3)
2,550
(0.4)
10,899
(1.9)
1,564
(0.2)
1,754
(0.3)
1,471
(0-2)

Eastern
Province
N (%)
458,506
(91.)
20,100
(3.9)
5,641
(1.1)
2,373
(0-4)
12,728
(2.5)
1,459
(0.2)
604
(0.1)
1,138
(0.2)

-

-

213
(0.03)
565,280

458
(0.09)
503,007

Source: Jimmy Kandeh. 2003. "Sierra Leone's Post-Conflict Elections of 2002." Journal
of Modern African Studies. 41(2), pp. 189-216. Reproduced with permission of the
copyright owner.
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate the regional disparities in voting from the elections of
2002. The SLPP, as it appears drew the greater portion of its votes from the south and the
east of the country where the Mende ethnic group, who are said to be the most loyal
supporters of the SLPP, are the predominant ethnic group. The APC also appears to draw
most of its support, in their case, about 50 percent of their votes from the Northern
Province from where the presidential candidate of that party, Koroma, hails. However,
when compared to Table 3.2 earlier, the regional pattern to the vote pales into
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insignificance against the broader national support for the SLPP. The Mendes, the most
loyal supporters of the SLPP party and other ethnic groups allied to them constitute less
than the percentage of the electoral votes the Party garnered in the elections. For such a
decisive win to emerge, it was necessary that other ethnic groups not allied to the Mende
cross lines to cast votes in support of the SLPP. This includes the Temnes who, most
observers on Sierra Leone argue are the most loyal followers of the opposition APC
Party. This voting pattern from an election conducted using the proportional
representation system, which is argued to favor the emergence of small groups, is one of
the gaps between the evidence and explanations of political behavior in African societies
such as Van de Walle's (2003), quoted in the opening to this chapter.
Mass Political Behavior in Sierra Leone: Support for Political Parties and Vote Choice
During the 2002 Elections
In contradiction to the theoretical expectations drawn from observations of
electoral behavior in America, voter turnouts in multiparty elections in Africa have been
encouragingly high with turnouts regularly extending over 60 percent of the voting
eligible population since the Third Wave of democratization commenced on the continent
in the early 1990s (Bratton 1999: 24; Harris 2006: 381; Pintor, Gratschew et al. 2002).61
Sierra Leone has not been an exception to this trend. Beginning with the elections in
1996, over 72 percent of the registered electorates have turned out in each election to cast
their ballot. The turnout for the 2002 post conflict elections in question was also over 70

61

An important caveat here is the distinction drawn by Cowen and Laakso (2002, 14-15) between several

types of elections namely, relatively competitive elections, landslide elections, elections with marked voter
apathy. Voter turnout varies in all three types with voters turning out to vote less in countries where there is
no reasonable chance of changing a government.
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percent. This makes Sierra Leone a deviant case of voting behavior given expectations
about voting behavior in low-information societies such as Africa.
The country consistently occupies the basement of all human development indices
as one of the poorest countries in the world. It has one of the highest rates of illiteracy
with barely 36 percent of the population able to read and write. To compound these two
characteristics, the population of Sierra Leone is an extremely youthful one where young
people between the ages of 18-35 make up over 40 percent of the voting eligible
population (World Bank 2008). Since theorists have maintained that the young, the poor
and the uneducated tend to participate less in elections with regard to the American
electorate, one question this fact raises is why Sierra Leoneans, among the most illiterate
and poorest populations in the world, have shown such keen interests in elections and
voted in such high numbers over several elections.
In the main, studies of political behavior on African societies, which borrowed
heavily from the theoretical conceptualizations in studies of political behavior in
America, failed to account for several discrepancies in their evidence. In exception, Fred
Hayward (1987) discussed at length the high level of political knowledge and
sophistication in voter decision-making he found among rural voters in a study of Ghana.
I was struck by the level of political knowledge and sophistication of the rural
people I was interviewing, often in contrast to the students I had been teaching the
day before. Conventional wisdom at that time maintained that rural masses in
Africa were ignorant; that they did not know much about government, the
political process, who represented them, or how the political system operated.
That was patently not the case in Ghana. In fact, my own research indicated that
their level of political knowledge was slightly higher than that in the United
States. (Hayward 1987, p xv)
Hayward also pointed out, in the same vein, that his experiences in Ghana reminded him
of an earlier experience in Sierra Leone during the 1967 elections when he recalled
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being struck by the commitment of rural and urban voters to democratic norms,
their opposition to the idea of a one-party state, and their expression of
disenchantment with the regime in power -disenchantment they soon expressed
by voting them out of office. (Hayward 1987, p. xv)
The descriptions provided by Hayward contrast with the dominant
characterization of rural African societies as low-information environments where
various forms of communal identity serve as the engines of political mobilization both for
opportunistic elites and for gullible masses. Why would the electorates turn out to vote in
large numbers during elections if the outcome is never in doubt given inflexible
communal preferences? I need not speculate further on these issues as they relate to
larger research questions of this dissertation; I proceeded to examine the data at hand
using different kinds of analytical methods.
I began with an examination of the relationship between ethnic identity and the
vote choice; seeking to verify whether any statistically significance relationships existed
between variables measuring ethnic identity and vote choice in my survey sample that
could lead me to make the same inferences about the general population.
As pointed out before, Horowitz's seminal study of political behavior in
multiethnic societies such as Sierra Leone is faulted for making inferences about
individual voter preferences from data that was collected at the aggregate level. In the
design and collection of the data for this study, there was a keen sensitivity to avoiding
this critical limitation of Horowitz's otherwise influential work. As designed, key items
on the survey such as the respondent's ethnic identity, preferences for political parties or
presidential candidates were gathered only from the self-reported answers respondents
gave to the interviewers during the surveys.
The most important variable, ethnic identity was measured by asking the
respondents "What tribe or ethnic group do you consider yourself to be a part of?" While
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this may seem like a question that required a straightforward answer, the reality is much
different because in most African societies, identifying with one ethnic identity or group
is not a given from mere birth in the geographical area inhabited by that group. Thus, for
example, among ethnic groups like the Mende, lineage identification is primarily along
patriarchal lines.62 To illustrate this point, a child born to a Temne father and a Mende
mother growing up in Mendeland is not simply a Mende because he or she is growing up
in Mendeland and has a Mende mother. Rather, for all intents and purposes of societal
reckoning, that child is a Temne even if he or she speaks the Mende language better than
Mendes who are resident outside the geographical proximities of Mendeland. Such
nuances in the determination of ethnic identification have been largely lost in most
studies.
The political parties and the presidential candidates for whom they voted
measured the dependent variable, the vote choices of Sierra Leoneans. These variables
were less complex to measure and involved only a listing of the 11 political parties that
took part in the elections as well as the nine candidates that were on the ballot for the
presidential election. Since both items resulted in variables measured at the nominal
level, the appropriate test of association for both the relationships between the ethnic
identities of the individuals and their preference for political parties as well as that
between them and their preferences for presidential candidates is the Pearson Chi-Square
measure of association with accompanying P-values for statistical significance and the
Cramer's V measure of the strength of the association between the variables. If the ethnic

Joe A.D. Alie, A New History of Sierra Leone (Oxford: Macmillan, 1990). Provides a useful account of
these rights of inheritance of cultural identity among different ethnic groups across Sierra Leone.
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thesis is valid, the expectation here is that the variable for ethnicity will maintain a
statistically significant relationship with the vote choices of the respondents.
Table 3.5 reports the relationship observed between ethnic identity and vote
choice. Table 3.5 reports the results of the test of the Chi-Square measure of association
between respondents belonging to different ethnic groups and the political parties for
which they voted. The table reveals that the modal vote choice for respondents of the
Temne and the Mende groups are with the APC and the SLPP, the political parties with
which both groups have, respectively, been identified over time. The table also shows
that about 30 percent of Temnes broke ranks with their ethnic group to vote for the SLPP
whereas only three percent of Mendes voted for the APC. A somewhat surprising
revelation is the fact that of the ten Fullahs in the sample, none of them cast a ballot for
the NDA, which was founded and led by a member of the Fullah elite from their ethnic
group, Amadu Jalloh. Another interesting revelation is the fact that no Lokos cast their
ballot for the UNPP in the 2002 elections, a party they had supported heavily six years
earlier during the 1996 elections. Members of other ethnic groups such as the Krios,
Limbas and the Sosos diffused their votes among several political parties with no clearly
discernable modal category revealing the preference of members of each of those groups.
In the case of the Krios, this point is underscored with the case of the Grand Alliance
Party (GAP), which was led by a Krio in the person of Raymond Bamidele Thompson. In
spite of this fact, the party received only ten percent of the Krio vote.
Moving over to the statistical implications of the results above, the large Chisquare value and the accompanying p-value shows that the relationship identified here
between ethnic identity and vote choice in the parliamentary elections is statistically
significant and not likely to have occurred by chance. Thus, we find evidence that there is
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Table 3.5
Survey Result: Ethnic Identity and the Vote Choice in the 2002 Parliamentary Elections

APC

GAP

Ethnic
Group

MOP

NDA

Political Party
PDP PLP RUFP SLPP UNPP YPP

Total

Raw Vote Counts Reported by Respondents from Each Ethnic Group

Fullah 1

-

-

-

-

-

9

-

-

10

Gains -

-

-

-

-

-

1

-

-

1

Gola

-

-

-

1

1

1

-

-

3

Kissi

-

-

-

-

-

7

2

-

9

Kono 7

1

1

-

5

1

57

13

-

85

Krnko 3

-

-

-

2

-

9

-

-

14

Krio

1

5

-

1

-

11

6

-

32

Limba 24

-

3

-

7

-

13

2

-

49

Loko

-

-

1

-

1

-

3

-

-

5

Mndgo 4

-

1

-

-

-

10

-

1

16

Mende 10

3

4

1

1

3

260

8

1

293

Shrbro 2

-

1

-

-

1

53

1

-

58

Soso

-

1

-

-

-

4

1

-

10

Temne 137

1

12

3

2

-

68

6

-

229

Vai

-

-

-

-

-

3

-

-

3

Ylunka 1

-

-

-

-

-

2

-

-

3

Other -

-

-

-

-

-

1

-

-

1

Just/SL 26

-

2

-

7

-

41

3

-

80

27

7

553

42

2

902

-

8

4

2

1

Total 227
4
6
31
3
Pearson Chi-Square (153) = 515.194***
Cramer's V = .252
N=902

Lambda =.230

Note: ***Significant at P < 0.001
Galns= Gallinas; Krnko = Koranko; Mndgo=Mandingo; Shrbro=Sherbro; Ylunka=Yalunka
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a statistically significant relationship between ethnic groups in Sierra Leone and the
political parties for which they voted. But what is the nature of this support? The finding
provides support for those who argue that communal identities influence voting
preferences in African societies. Even though there are visible variations in the voting
patterns among some of the smaller ethnic groups such as the Krios, the Sosos and the
Limbas and even among the Temnes; the respective modal categories for the Mendes and
the Temnes, the two groups that together make up more than 60 percent of the population
of Sierra Leone lie visibly with the APC and the SLPP. The SLPP gained most of the
votes in the Southeastern portion of the country where the Mendes have their homelands
while the APC gained most of its votes from the Northern portions of the country where
Temnes have their homeland.
Next I turn to the relationship between ethnic groups and the presidential
candidates for whom they voted during the elections of 2002. Table 3.6 below reports
the preferences of the respondents from different ethnic groups for the presidential
candidates, including Kabbah, running in the 2002 elections. Again, the Chi-Square test
of association is utilized to test for the relationship between the choice of presidential
candidate as a dependent variable and the ethnic groups that the respondents belonged to
as the independent variable.
Table 3.6 shows that respondents from other ethnic groups crossed such lines to
cast their ballot for Kabbah. He received almost 32 percent of the vote cast by Temnes;
an ethnic group many observers of Sierra Leone would argue is not likely to vote for a
presidential candidate from the SLPP Party. Perhaps even more striking is the fact that
with a Krio running for president in the candidacy of Raymond Bamidele Thompson,
Krios cast more votes not only for Kabbah but also for Ernest Koroma, Zainab Bangura
110
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and Karefa-Smart, than their so-called "Krio brother" on the ballot. In the 1996 elections,
Karefa-Smart received over 80 percent of the votes cast by Lokos who came out in large
numbers to demonstrate support for his candidacy. However, in the 2002 elections, more
Lokos cast their ballot not for Karefa-Smart but for Kabbah, a Mandingo-Mende. Other
groups who diffused their votes among several presidential candidates include the Golas,
the Konos, the Yalunkas and the Sosos, although in the case of the two latter groups, less
so than with other groups.
The value of Chi-Square and the accompanying p-value (0.001) suggest that the
association between respondents from different ethnic groups and their choices of
presidential candidates are statistically significant and not likely to have occurred by
chance in this sample. Given that the modal category of respondents from the two major
ethnic groups, the Mendes and the Temnes, lies with the presidential candidates of the
two political parties that are respectively associated with their ethnic groups, the SLPP
and the APC, the challenge still remains to explain what resulted in this voting outcome
given the theoretical position that I have maintained thus far. I next turn to the
examination of the reasons why Sierra Leoneans voted for the parties that they voted for
during the elections.
As described earlier in the methodology section, in order to examine these
questions, the survey instrument asked respondents a series of questions why they voted
for their respective political parties. The major question was phrased thus: "why did you
vote for this particular political party in the parliamentary elections of 2002?"
Respondents were then given eight response options and asked to indicate a level of
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agreement with each response option. The answer choices included variables that are
indicative or representative of a theoretical explanation or assumption that has been
employed to explain political behavior in the literature on African politics:
1. Ethnic identity: This has been explored fully in Chapter I.
2. Regionalism: Most scholars argue that regionalism is another important
variable that explains electoral outcomes in African societies. For example, Monga
(1999, 49) points out "African parties also often fall short of the mark on the second
count. Not many of the continent's countries have political organizations with broad
national bases. Very often, parties are tied to the home regions of their leaders."64 Thus,
regionalism is said to closely correlate with communal identity and ethnic preferences
since most ethnic groups have home regions that, most scholars argue, are the electoral
bases of most political parties. In one of the definitive discussions of this regional
influence on the politics of Africa, Donald Rothchild introduced the concept of
"hegemonial exchanges" in reference to attempts by central governments to co-opt
regional interests into state coalitions using facilitators or ethnic intermediaries. As he
puts it
an ideal type, hegemonial exchange is a form of state-facilitated co-ordination in
which a somewhat autonomous central state and a number of considerably less
autonomous ethnoregional (and other) interests engage in a process of mutual
accommodation on the basis of commonly accepted procedural norms, rules or
understandings. (1985, 15)

63

1 excluded two variables from the discussions, youths and no reason at all, in order to make the analysis

manageable.
64

The "second count" in reference here is the point made by Celestin Monga that political parties in Africa

lack national organization. See Celestin Monga, "Eight Problems with African Politics," in Larry Diamond
and Marc F. Plattner, eds. Democratization in Africa (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1999), 48-62.
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Part of these "rules and understandings" it is further argued, is the expectation that
regional leaders, as part of these coalitions, will deliver their people enmasse during
electoral contests. In a more disconcerting reference, regional interests, irredentist
conflicts and secessionist actions like the enduring one in the Cassamance region of
Senegal, or the bloody one that took place in Biafra Nigeria from the late-sixties to the
early seventies are, it is often claimed, the outcome of regional politics at its worst when
a party or political faction fails to secure or know they cannot secure meaningful dialogue
at the ballot box, on issues they hold sacred to the interests of their region and thus resort
to the extreme measure of civil war as means of seeking such interests.
To the extent that the argument for regionalism provides a useful explanation of
the voting patterns that emerged in Sierra Leone following the 2002 elections, then it is
expected that this variable will maintain a statistically significant relationship with the
dependent variable of vote choice. The polarity in vested regional interests in Sierra
Leone has been that between the northern part of the country, dominated by the Temne
ethnic group and the southeast portion of the country that is the geographical area of the
country inhabited by the Mendes. Various scholars of Sierra Leone (Kandeh 1998, 2003,
Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999, Hayward and Kandeh 1987, Hayward and
Dumbuya 1983 and others) argue that the Southeast is the stronghold of the SLPP, which
draws the majority of its support from the Mende ethnic group while the APC maintains
its regional stronghold in the north and on some occasions the western region of the
country which includes the capital. It is often less-clearly explained how and why these
regional patterns in electoral outcomes have emerged following independence in 1961.
According to Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle, the earliest trends towards the
maximization of ethnoregional identities in the politics of Sierra Leone was the attempt
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made by Albert Margai, the second Prime Minister of Sierra Leone, to consolidate his
rule in 1966 with the purging of the national military of officers of non-Mende descent
and "the increase in authoritarian rule, often along ethnoregional lines" (1999, 77).
3. Religion: In recent years, scholars of African politics have argued that religious
differences have also emerged as important influences on political behavior and
mobilization into politics on the continent (Haynes 1996). The pro-democracy
movements of the early 1990s were a particularly remarkable period in the expression of
religious influence on the political behavior of Africans because during that time, some
churches and mosques served as hotbeds of political opposition to regimes, condemning
outright from the pulpit and in some cases in point, emboldening civil society groups to
take steps to counter authoritarian regimes.
However, in a disconcerting development, religion also became another fault line
along which some people on the continent came to be divided. This point is particularly
highlighted with reference to Nigeria where efforts to impose Sharia law in some states
met with violent opposition from Christians resident in those states. Sudan has also seen
its share of the negative influence of religion on politics as that country is still divided
along the lines of a predominantly Muslim north and a Christian and mostly animist
south. Sierra Leone has not been as deeply divided along religious lines as other
countries. While there are some reports that Tejan Kabbah was preferred among all the
candidates running for President in Sierra Leone in 2002 because of his Muslim faith, it
should be pointed out that most Sierra Leoneans I met in the field where quick to point
out their reservation about such a view. The tests to follow will show whether indeed
there were any statistically significant relationships between religious interests and the
way the electorates voted during the elections in Sierra Leone.
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4. The "big person" from the respondent's area of the country: Much is made of
the clienteslistic nature of African politics where according to the situation described by
scholars, voters cast their vote as a sign of loyalty to the most influential patron from
their part of the country who brings home the "pork" in the forms of roads, rural clinics,
market centers and so forth in return for votes and political support during elections
(Clapham 1982, Coleman and Rosberg 1964, Fatton 1992, Sandbrook and Barker 1985,
Reno 1995, and others). This argument is also closely related to that of the influence of
communal and regional identities on the conduct of politics in Africa. The "big person"
in question are the ethnic entrepreneurs referred to in Rothchild's explanation of
hegemonial exchanges. According to Christopher Clapham, the relationship is a
mutually beneficial association between the powerful and the weak, a form of political
contract where in exchange for protections from arbitrary violence, for example, a client
offers the patron their political loyalty and allegiance; the weak, in this instance, include
rural dwellers and the vast majority of the urban poor.
One of the enduring contradictions in the scholarship on African politics remains
the relative underdevelopment of rural areas and vast areas of the urban ghettoes that are
argued to be the major recipients of clientelistic benefits in exchange for political support.
If the gifts of politicians in return for support at the ballot box have continued to flow
over time, why do vast areas of the countryside where "big persons" come from still
remain so poor and undeveloped? The variable for "big person" assessed the extent to
which respondents reported that they cast their ballot for a political party because that
party represented the "big person" from their area of the country.
5. Peace: I added two variables to the preceding in the forms of a variable
representing the "peace vote" and another representing economic development. The
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peace vote argument is a relatively recent phenomenon that emerged following the end of
civil conflicts in countries such as Sierra Leone and Liberia. Scholars have discerned a
tendency among voters to identify a candidate or political party that they perceive could
best handle the management of the post-conflict environment in terms of either keeping
other volatile groups in check or being able to negotiate and maintain a sustainable
strategy for peace for the whole country (Harris 1999, Kandeh 2003). The peace vote is
argued to transcend all forms of narrow communal interests and its empirical verification
should be welcome news, indeed, for institutional designers, peace negotiators and others
interested in conflict resolution around the world because one of the challenges of
designing institutions suitable for the post conflict environment is the perceived diversity
of interests among various ethnic groups that have a stake in the process. The peace vote
indicates a shared interest and a willingness to cooperate.
If indeed a "peace vote" exists during post-conflict elections as argued, then we
should expect to see a statistically significant relationship between this variable as a
reason why the respondents cast their ballots for the political party that they voted for as
opposed to other narrower communal interests such as seeking the interests of their ethnic
group, or seeking benefits for their region.
6. Economic Development and Reconstruction: This variable assessed the extent
to which voters cast their ballot for a particular political party with the expectation that
this party was the one most likely and most competent to bring about the change,
progress and development for which they yearned following years of debilitating civil
war.
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The peace and economic development/reconstruction variables test the thesis that
Sierra Leonean and Liberian voters are more pragmatic and less ascriptive than the
literature usually suggests.
The answer options to the questions about the variables ranged on a 4-scale
continuum from "agree strongly" with each response option to "disagree strongly." Each
variable was then recoded into a two-scale continuum of "strongly agree" or "not
strongly agree" in order to facilitate interpretation. The recoded variable collapsed
categories of "agree," "disagree," and "strongly disagree" into the "not strongly agree"
category.65 The main goal of the analyses is to determine whether statistical tests of these
variables show statistically significant relationships with the dependent variable of choice
of political party for which respondents voted.
Ethnic Identity and the Vote Choice
Table 3.7 reports the results of Chi-Square tests of association between the
political parties for which respondents voted, as the dependent variable; the independent
variable is the respondent's submission that they voted for a political party because it
represented the interests of their ethnic group.
Table 3.7 shows that 89 percent of the respondents did not strongly agree with the
statement that they voted for a political party because it represented the interests of their
ethnic group. Only 11 percent of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement. The

65

1 ran several models to test for differences across categories of the continuum ("strongly agree," "agree,"

"disagree," and "strongly disagree") measuring the variables. The "disagree/strongly disagree" category
was no different from the "agree" category with regard to the dependent variable, but the "strongly agree"
was different.
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modal response category lies with those who did not strongly agree with the suggestion
that they voted for a political party because they believed it was the party most likely to
secure the interests of their ethnic group. The value of the Pearson Chi-Square and the
accompanying p-value shows that the relationship between the two variables as revealed
here is statistically significant and therefore not likely to have occurred by chance.
Table 3.7
Parliamentary Elections: Ethnic Identity and Vote Choice
"I voted for them because they represent the interests of my
Ethnic group" (%)
What political party did you
vote for in the parliamentary
elections?
All People's Congress
Grand Alliance Party
Movement for Progress
National Democratic Alliance
People's Democratic Party
Peace and Liberation Party
Revolutionary United Front Party
Sierra Leone People's Party
United National People's Party
Young People's Party
Total
Pearson Chi-Square (9) =24.179***
N=903

Not Strongly Agree
94
100
97
100
50
89
86
86
98
100
89

Strongly Agree
6
0
3
0
50
11
14
14
2
0
11

Cramer's V =164***
Note: ***Significant at p <0.001
Regional Interests and the Vote Choice
Next, I examined the relationship between region and the vote choice. As I
mentioned earlier, Sierra Leone is broadly divided into 14 districts for administrative
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purposes. These fourteen administrative districts are rather unevenly spread out among
the four geographic regions of the country. The map of Sierra Leone in Figure 3.1
illustrates the administrative division of Sierra Leone into the 14 districts.
Figure 3.1
Map of Sierra Leone Showing Administrative Districts

Koinadugu
Bombali
J<ambta

P o r t Loko c ^ — / r
Tonkolili,

Moyamba

y

Kono

Kailahun,
Bo
Kenemai

JBonthe
Pujehun
1 - Western Area Urban
2 - Western Area Rural

Source: http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/s/sierraleone/sierraleonemap.shtml
(Accessed 12/04/2008)
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Koinadugu, Bombali, Kambia, Port Loko and Tonkolili Districts are in the
Northern Province of the country. Moyamba, Bo, Bonthe and Pujehun Districts are in the
Southern Province and Kenema, Kailahun and Kono Districts are in the Eastern Province.
The Western Urban Area consists of the capital Freetown and the Western Area Rural is
the suburbs surrounding Freetown.
Going back to the voting patterns that emerged following the results of the
General Elections of 1967, scholars had come to assume that the country was neatly
divided into two zones of control under the two major political parties, the SLPP and the
APC due to the interconnectivities which existed, they argued, between ethnic groups
inhabiting those regions and support for the political parties following those elections
(Cartwright 1978, Hayward and Dumbuya 1983, Kandeh 1992, 2003; Conteh-Morgan
and Dixon-Fyle 1999). The APC, it was argued, was a northern-based party because
Siaka Stevens, a Limba from the north and the electoral coalition that he formed were
comprised mostly of his northern kindred and a small number of Krios resident in the
western area of the country. Such explanations are often propounded ignoring the fact
that Stevens was born in the southern town of Moyamba and did not display much
affinity with the north throughout his presence on the political scene of Sierra Leone.
Also, Stevens was a founding member of the SLPP and first ran for elections in 1957 on
the SLPP ticket for Port Loko East Constituency.66

66

Some scholars often explain how Siaka Stevens managed to forge an electoral coalition including

northerners as a product of the efforts of one of his able-lieutenants and vice-presidents Sorie Ibrahim
Koroma who was considered an ethnic Temne. An interesting irony is that SI Koroma confessed towards
the twilight of his political career that he did not actually belong to the Temne ethnic group but was in fact
a Mandingo. How he managed to fool members of the Temne ethnic group who he identified with for
obvious political gain throughout his political career is yet to be comprehensively explained by scholars.
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On the other hand, according to most of this scholarship, the southeast regions of
the country are the ethnic strongholds of the SLPP because most of the support for the
party in previous elections, it is argued, has come from the Mende ethnic group who hail
from those two regions. In subsequent elections since the 1967 elections, each electoral
outcome has come to be explained, erroneously or not, in terms of an adherence to this
regional pattern of ethnic support for the two major political parties.
There are several problems inherent in such explanations. The founding histories
of both the SLPP and the APC show that the SLPP was founded as political party during
meetings that were held in the northern town of Kambia that was attended by a cross
section of elites from all ethnic groups in the Protectorate (Kilson 1970, Collier 1970,
Hayward and Kandeh 1987, Kandeh 1992, Allie 1990). The initial guiding motivation at
the founding the SLPP was to counter Krio domination of the political space following
the phased withdrawal of colonial Britain that led to independence in 1961.
I shall return to a more comprehensive discussion of the founding histories of
these two political parties later on in the chapter. For now, let me proceed to examine the
influence of region on voters as an independent variable affecting their choices of
political parties. The results are reported in Table 3.8.
Table 3.8 shows that 93 percent of respondents did not strongly agree with the
suggestion that seeking regional interests was the reason why they cast their ballots the
way they did. Of all the votes for the different political parties, the only noticeable
variations from are those who cast their ballot for the National Democratic Alliance and

The fact speaks however, to the tenuous claim of communal identity as an important factor of political
behavior in African societies when groups are not homogenous in most senses of the word.
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Table 3.8
Parliamentary Elections: Regionalism and Vote Choice
"I voted for them because they represent the interests of my region'
What political party did
(%)
you vote for in the
parliamentary elections?
Not Strongly Agree
Strongly Agree
All People's Congress
89
11
Grand Alliance Party
100
0
Movement for Progress
96
4
National Democratic Alliance
67
33
People's Democratic Party
75
25
Peace and Liberation Party
100
0
Revolutionary United Front Party
100
0
Sierra Leone People's Party
93
7
United National People's Party
93
7
Young People's Party
100
0
Total
92
8
N=887
Pearson Chi-Square (9) =13.948
Cramer's V = . 125
the People's Democratic Party as 33 percent and 25 percent, respectively, seem to have
cast such ballots intending to vote for the political party deemed most likely to secure the
interests of their region. In the case of the PDP, this fact itself could be attributed more to
response error than much else because by the time of the 2002 elections, the PDP was a
spent force as a political party. The once influential leader of the party, Thaimu Bangura
had passed away in London from a heart condition and the interim leader of the party,
Osman Kamara was not quite the force that Bangura was. Also, the PDP is supposedly
one of the northern-based political parties but since its founding, the PDP's influence in
the north had never reached the level of influence the APC exerts in that part of the
country. Thus, a voter intending to cast a ballot for a political party that will secure the
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interests of the Northern Region is arguably better served by casting that ballot for the
APC during the elections than for the PDP.
While 11 percent of respondents who cast their ballots for the APC and only
seven percent of those who did for the SLPP strongly agreeing with the statement, these
numbers are not close to those who did not strongly agree with the statement. The modal
category is clearly with those who disagreed with the statement. Statistically, the Pearson
Chi-Square values and the accompanying P-values tell us that the observed relationship
between the two variables is not statistically significant and is likely to have occurred by
chance. Thus, we cannot reject the null that there is no difference across voting for parties
in terms of regional interests.
Religion and Vote Choice
Next, I examined the relationship between the political parties for which
respondents voted in the 2002 elections and their desire for their vote to go to a political
party that represented the interests of their religion. In Sierra Leone, around the time of
the 2002 elections, there was much speculation about how Muslim voters, who make up
over half the population of the country, would vote. According to some sources, Muslim
voters were yearning for a Muslim candidate following years of Christian domination of
the major positions of political leadership in the country. According to the opinion of a
top party executive of the PDP whom I interviewed, voters mostly voted for Kabbah and
his SLPP Party because he was a Muslim. I investigated religion as an influence on the
voting behavior of Sierra Leoneans with the response option on the survey instrument
that asked respondents why they voted for a particular political party, and if they did so
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because the deemed the party to represent the interests of their religion. The results are
reported below in Table 3.9.
Table 3.9
Parliamentary Elections: Religion and Vote Choice
"I voted for them because they represented the interests of my religion"
What political party
(%)
did you vote for in the
parliamentary elections?
Not Strongly Agree
Strongly Agree
All People's Congress
97
3
Grand Alliance Party

100

0

Movement for Progress

96

4

National Democratic Alliance

100

0

People's Democratic Party

100

0

Peace and Liberation Party

89

11

Revolutionary United Front Party

86

14

Sierra Leone People's Party

97

3

United National People's Party

98

2

Young People's Party

100

0

Total

97

3

N=878
Pearson Chi-Square (9) = 9.070
Cramer' sV = . 102

Table 3.9 shows that over 97 percent of the respondents did not strongly agree
with the suggestion that religion was a factor in their decision to vote for one political
party or the other. Potentially, we can explore this relationship further by controlling for
religious denomination and trying to determine which religious faith, say among
Christians and Muslims for example, in Sierra Leone is more likely than others to vote
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for a candidate or political party based on their preference for the candidate or political
party's position on their religious faith. There are no political parties in Sierra Leone with
clearly identified religious agendas and none is expected to thrive given the demography
of the country.67 The rate of intermarriages between Christians and Muslims in the
country is high and most Sierra Leoneans join faiths other than their own in celebrating
special religious occasions such as Christmas or the end of the Muslim holy month of
Ramadan. The value of Chi Square and the accompanying p-value suggest that the
relationship between the two variables is likely to have occurred by chance alone rather
than a representative pattern within the population.
The "Big Person" and Vote Choice
Next, I examined the relationship between vote choice of political party and the
"big person" variable. If indeed big men and big women are the influential figures in
politics that most scholarship has argued they are, then we should expect to see a
statistically significant relationship between the variable measuring this response option
and the political parties for which respondents voted. Table 3.10 below reports the results
of the Chi-Square test of association assessing this relationship.
Table 3.10 shows that only two percent of voters strongly agreed with the
suggestion that they voted for a political party because it was the party to which the big
person from their region or area of the country belonged. Ninety-eight percent disagreed
with the suggestion that they had cast their ballot for the big man from their area.
Statistically, the Pearson Chi-Square values and the accompanying P-values tell us that

I will explore this point further in a subsequent section of this chapter.
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the observed relationship between the two variables is not statistically significant and is
likely to have occurred by chance. Thus, we cannot reject the null that there is no
difference between the two variables.
Table 3.10
Parliamentary Election: The "Big Person" and Vote Choice
"I voted for them because they are the party that represents the "big man"
from our area of the county"
What political party did you
(%)
vote for in the parliamentary
elections?
Not Strongly Agree
Strongly Agree
All People's Congress Party
99
1
Grand Alliance Party

100

0

Movement for Progress

100

0

National Democratic Alliance

100

0

People's Democratic Party

75

25

Peace and Liberation Party

100

0

Revolutionary United Front Party

100

0

Sierra Leone People's Party

97

3

United National People's Party

100

0

Young People's Party

100

0

Total

98

2

N=877
Pearson Chi-Square (9) =13.705
Cramer's V =.125

The Peace Vote and Vote Choice
The next variable I examined is the peace vote. Table 3.11 reports the results of a
Chi-Square test of association between the peace vote and vote choice.
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Table 3.11
Parliamentary Election: Peace and Vote Choice
"I voted for them because they are the party most
likely to bring peace and unite the country"
What political party did you vote
for in the parliamentary elections?
All People's Congress Party

Not Strongly Agree
23

Grand Alliance Party

33

67

Movement for Progress

10

90

National Democratic Alliance

67

33

People's Democratic Party

25

75

Peace and Liberation Party

15

85

Revolutionary United Front Party

14

86

Sierra Leone People's Party

13

87

United National People's Party

17

83

Young People's Party

0

100

Total

16

84

(%)

Strongly Agree
77

N=903
Pearson Chi-Square (9) =21.255**
Cramer's V=. 153
Note: **Statistically significant at p <0.010

Table 3.11 shows that 84 percent of respondents voted for the political party of
their choice believing that it was the party most likely to bring peace to the country and
unite it following the civil war. This finding suggests support for Kandeh's contention of
a "peace vote" among Sierra Leoneans during the 2002 elections. The value of ChiSquare and the accompanying p-value suggests that the relationship observed here is
statistically significant and not likely to have occurred purely by chance.
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Economic Development/Reconstruction and Vote Choice
Next, I report the result of one more test of association, that between economic
development/reconstruction and vote choice. Table 3.12 reports the results.
Table 3.12
Parliamentary Elections: Economic Development/Reconstruction and Vote Choice
"1[ voted for them because theyare the: party most likely
to develop the country by building:roads, clinics and
bringing electricity to the whole country"
What political party did you vote
For in the parliamentary elections?
All People's Congress Party
Grand Alliance Party
Movement for Progress
National Democratic Alliance
People's Democratic Party
Peace and Liberation Party
Revolutionary United Front Party
Sierra Leone People's Party
United National People's Party
Young People's Party
Total
N=896
Pearson Chi-Square (9) = 5.121
Cramer's V =.076

(%)

Not Strongly Agree
16
17
13
33
50
22
14
18
14
0
17

Strongly Agree
84
83
87
67
50
78
86
82
86
100
83

The table shows that most respondents, 83 percent, strongly agreed with the
statement that they voted for a political party because they believe it was the party most
likely to develop the country by building roads, clinics, schools and bringing electricity to
the whole country. Among votes cast for all political parties, the modal category lies with
those who strongly agreed with the statement to those who did not strongly agree with the
statement. However, the Pearson Chi-Square statistic and its accompanying p-level shows
that the relationship observed here is not statistically significant and is likely to have
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occurred by chance within the population. This finding does not support the hypothesis
for a statistically significant relationship between the vote for development and the
political parties for which respondents voted during the post-conflict elections of 2002.
In summary, the tests reported here show the nature of the relationships between
the dependent variable vote choice for political parties and six independent variables
indicative of reasons that were suggested to voters for why they would have cast their
vote for the political party for which they voted. Four of the six reasons (ethnic identity,
regionalism, religion, and the "big person") were derived from the established literature
on politics in African societies that had argued that these factors exerted the strongest
influences on voting behavior in African societies. The remaining two variables, the
peace vote and economic development/reconstruction tested the extent to which voters in
Sierra Leone preferred a political party because they believed that it was the one most
likely to bring real gains not only for their welfare but also to the entire country.
However, I realize that this analysis alone may not put to rest the notion that
voters in Sierra Leoneans, like voters in most African societies have been portrayed, are
prone to vote along ethnic lines than any other way. So, to explore these relationships
further, I developed and tested several models of the voting patterns using ordinary
logistic regression to evaluate the influences of the independent variables examined here
on the dependent variable of vote choice for a political party. Below, I describe the
models and report the results from these tests.
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Explaining the Vote Choice of Sierra Leoneans in the 2002 Elections
I developed several logistic regression models to estimate the odds, using a
calculation of the percentage change in the odds ratio,68 that a respondent, therefore a
randomly selected voter in the general population, voted for a political party given their
responses to the suggestions, examined above, that were offered to them on the survey
instruments as reasons why they voted for that political party instead of others. I recoded
two variables into a binary dummy variable for this purpose.
The variable "Party Vote" was recoded out of the variable that originally reported
the political parties for which respondents voted. The original variable was coded into 11
nominal categories for all the political parties that were on the ballot during the 2002
elections in Sierra Leone. The new variable was recoded out of this variable to represent:
0=Voted for the APC and l=Voted for the SLPP.
The justification for creating a dependent variable consisting of only the two
political parties is the fact that both have been the most antagonistic forces in Sierra
Leone politics since independence. In fact, most observers are quick to blame the
problems of Sierra Leone on the debris emanating from the fallout between these two
political parties in their struggle for control of the political landscape of the country since
the 1960s. Thus, a respondent representing a random voter who cast a ballot for the SLPP
or the APC during the elections is also more likely to have made the decision to vote for a
political party because it represented their communal interests or not, since both parties
are argued to be affiliated with the two major ethnic groups that make up over 60 percent

The percentage change in the odds ratio is calculated using the formula (b-1) *100. Where b is the
coefficient of the odds ratio. See Pollock HI (2006).
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of the population and arguably the architects of any patronage networks that may exist
within the political system.
The independent variables in the model include the six variables that have been
described and tested previously. For this purpose, as I have explained previously, each
independent variable was recoded from the four-scale categories of "agree strongly,"
"agree" "disagree" and "disagree strongly" into the two categories described previously
where: 1= Strongly Agree with the statement and consisted of the "agree strongly"
category and 0=Not Strongly Agree with the statement, consisting of the "agree,"
"disagree," and "strongly disagree" categories.69 Lastly, out of the variable for ethnic
groups, I created five separate dummy variables to represent the five largest ethnic groups
in the country (Mende, Temne, Krio, Kono, and Limba) to serve as variables denoting
ethnic identity. In the case of each of the variables, " 1 " represented the ethnic group of
the respondent and "0" represented all other ethnic groups.
If the ethnic thesis is valid, such that considerations for the protection of the
interests of their ethnic group influenced voters during the elections of 2002 more than
any other factors, then we can expect that the independent variable for ethnic identity
which I label "ethnchc" will show itself to be statistically significant both by itself and
when controlling for other factors such as those for development and peace in the various
tests. Furthermore, we can expect that this variable will have a positive effect on the
dependent variables for both the likelihood that the voter voted for the SLPP or APC or
just the SLPP alone, as the party that won the elections.

69

Similar tests across the recoded independent variables showed that the "disagree/strongly disagree"

category was no different from the "agree" category with regard to the dependent variable, but the
"strongly agree" category was different
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Conversely, if considerations for securing the interests of their ethnic group
mattered less for voters than choosing the political party they deemed most likely to
maintain the peace and undertake much needed development and reconstruction, then we
can expect to see that those variables for the peace vote and development are statistically
significant and maintain positive relationships with the dependent variable by themselves
in any model or when controlling for the ethnic interest variable, suggesting that when a
voter cast their ballot either for one of the political parties or the SLPP by itself,
considerations of voting into office the political party that will secure the best interests of
their ethnic group mattered less to them.
Ethnic Identities/Group Interests and the Vote Choice - Results of Logistic
Regression with Logged Odds
I begin by reporting the test of the model demonstrating the likelihood that a
respondent voted for the SLPP or APC if the respondent indicated agreement with the
statement that they voted for a political party because it represented the interests of their
ethnic group while controlling for being a Mende or Temne - in other words, when a
respondent belonged to one of the two largest ethnic groups.
Table 3.13 reports the results of the models predicting vote choice for a political
party if the respondent was Mende or Temne and when controlling for the respondent's
agreement with the statement that the political party for which they cast their ballot was
the party most likely to secure the interests of their ethnic group. The table shows that
being Mende is a statistically significant predictor of the vote for the SLPP whereas
ethnic interests and being Temne are not. The odds of voting for the SLPP drops to -83 if
the respondent were a Temne. The result shows that the likelihood that a respondent
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voted for the SLPP dropped to -58 percent if they agreed with the statement that the
political party for which they cast their ballot was the party most likely to secure the
interests of their ethnic group suggesting that even though it was highly likely that
Mendes voted for the SLPP, they did so not because they felt it was the party most likely
to secure the interests of their ethnic group alone. Overall, the value of R2 at .27 suggests
the moderate strength of the model in explaining the variances in vote choice.
Table 3.13
Predicted Votes for the SLPP or APC: Ethnic Identities and Ethnic Interests

Variable
Ethnic Interest

Party Vote
-.87***

% Change in Odds
^58

(.28)
Mende

2.5***

1,068

(.37)
Temne

-1.8***

-83

(.20)
Constant

1.19***
(.14)

N=

765

LRchi2(3)

250***

Log Likelihood

-334.09

Pseudo R2

.27

Note: ***Significant at p <0.001; Standard errors in parentheses.

Next, I included the peace vote as an additional control variable in order to test if
its inclusion makes a difference to the likelihood that a respondent voted for the APC or
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SLPP if they were Temne or Mende when controlling for their response to the ethnic
identity/voting question (Table 3.14).
Table 3.14
Predicted Votes for the SLPP or APC: Including the Vote for Peace
Variable
Peace Vote
Ethnic Interest
Mende
Temne
Constant
N=
LR chi2 (4)
Log Likelihood
Pseudo R2

Party Vote
.60*
(.26)
_ 75***
(•29)
2 3***
(.37)
-1.86***
(.21)
12***
(.24)
765
255***
-331.47
.28

% Change in Odds
81
-53
948
-84

Note: ***Significant at p <0.001; * Significant at p <. 05. Standard errors in parentheses.
The result shows that the peace vote variable has a positive relationship with the
dependent variable of vote choice when controlling for ethnic interests and the identity
variables for being Temne or Mende. When compared to the previous model, the odds
that a respondent voted for the SLPP dropped from 1,068 percent in the previous model
to 948 percent in this model, a change of 120 percent if the respondent is Mende. The
resulting effect is still a relatively strong one even when controlling for ethnic interests,
which shows that Mendes were still more likely to vote for the SLPP, an ail-too
predictable observation given that Mendes are traditionally associated with voting for the
SLPP (Hayward and Dumbuya 1983, Hayward and Kandeh 1987, Kandeh 2003 and
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others). The other explanatory variables retain the direction of their relationships with the
dependent variable suggested that the observed values are not spurious effects on the
dependent variable.
The result suggest that voters were still more likely to vote for the SLPP when
they agreed with the statement that it was the political party most likely to secure the
peace and when controlling for the ethnic group to which they belonged. The negligible
difference in R2 between the two models suggests that the second model, with controls
for the peace vote, was not an improvement on the first model.
I developed one more model to test the dependent variable of voting for the SLPP
or APC to which I added the explanatory variables for development/reconstruction,
regionalism, the "big man," and regional controls for three regions of the country (East,
South, and North),70 in addition to the variables for peace and ethnic identity that I tested
earlier. The model tested the likelihood that a respondent voted for one of the two major
political parties when controlling for the structural and identity variables that scholars
have frequently argued predict voting behavior in African societies. I report the results of
these tests in Table 3.15.

I established the Western area as the category of exclusion because it contains the capital city of
Freetown, the most cosmopolitan area of the country. No political party has been able to lay claim to
Freetown as a political stronghold over several elections. The pattern, which is not unusual over the course
of several elections in African countries, is that the opposition always wins the greater share of the votes in
the capital cities. See Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) for a discussion of electoral trends in African
societies following the end of the Cold War and the accompanying liberalization of political regimes that
resulted in several multiparty elections across the sub-continent.
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Table 3.15
Vote Choice in the 2002 Post-Conflict Elections in Sierra Leone with Logged Odds
Variables
Ethnic Interest
Peace Vote
Region
Development
Big Man
Mendes
Temnes

Party Vote
-.86*
(.38)
.46
(.32)
-.62*
(.32)
-.66*
(.31)
1.33*
(.58)
1.55***
(.42)

N=
LRchi2(10)
Log Likelihood
Pseudo R2

-280.08
.38

Southern S/Leone
Northern S/Leone
Constant

.58
58
-46
-48
278
372

_ Q4***

(•28)
2.16***
(.44)
I 7g***
(.41)
-.46
(.33)
.83*
(.42)
753
337

Eastern S/Leone

% Change in Odds

-61
771
495
-37

Note: ***Significant at p < .001; * Significant at p <. 05. Standard errors in parentheses.
The table shows that the coefficients for the explanatory variables of the big
person, being Mende and coming from the East or South of the country maintained
positive relationships with the dependent variable of vote choice. The likelihood of
voting for the SLPP by respondents who identified themselves as Mende drops in
comparison to the preceding model but the variable is still statistically significant. One of
137

the strongest effects on the dependent variable is that of the coefficients of the variable
for those who inhabit the Eastern regions of Sierra Leone. There are other differences in
the model that need to be reported together with their implications for the understanding
of voting behavior. For instance, agreeing with the statement that they were voting for the
political party more likely to secure the interests of their ethnic group made a respondent
less likely to vote for the SLPP. We notice a similar tendency for the regional interest
variable and development.
An important implication of the results of the models on the course of this thesis,
however, are the comparatively strong influences that identity and structural variables
such as being Mende, or coming from the Eastern provinces of Sierra Leone retained on
the dependent variable. This outcome appears to provide support for claims that
communal identity and regional ties exert the strongest influence on voting behavior in
multiethnic African societies such as Sierra Leone. On the surface, it also appears to
provide support for the claims made in various observations in the country that the APC
is a Northern political party while the SLPP is a Southeastern political party. However,
we note also from the table that the issue variable of ethnic interest showed a negative
relationship with the dependent variable and tended to influence why people voted for
one or the other party such that we are not in error if we claim that while identity and
structural variables appear to nominally show how people voted, they do not adequately
explain why people voted the way they did.
When respondents were asked to indicate reasons why they voted for the political
party for which they voted, as reported earlier from Table 3.7, nearly 83 percent of them
disagreed with the ethnic identity thesis. The effect of this explanatory variable on the
outcome variable in the test reported above suggest that ethnic groups do not hold
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singular views of the political parties for which they voted. Hence, those who voted for
the SLPP were less likely to think of it as the party most likely to secure the interests of
their region whereas others saw it as the party of the big person from their part of the
country and, thus, deserving of their votes.
Since no definitive conclusions could be drawn from several tests of the model of
vote choice reported above, I resorted to additional tests in order to enable a more
definitive conclusion as to whether the voting patterns that emerged were indicative of an
ethnic census or the outcome of a much different calculation by voters.
Exploring the Vote Choices of Sierra Leoneans: Results of Logistic Regression with
CLARIFY
To explore these angles further, I specified several smaller models that included
only the two largest ethnic groups in Sierra Leone, the Mendes and the Temnes, and the
two political parties, the APC and the SLPP. I then ran several tests of these models using
CLARIFY, a program developed by Gary King and others that amplify tests of discrete
binary variables and maximizes the reporting of the results to highlight within and
between group differences in the models (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000).71 One
objective of this additional exercise was to highlight within group differences between
voters from the same ethnic groups. However, this time, for succinctness and efficiency I
only include four explanatory variables of interest (ethnic interest, peace vote,
development and region) to test the likelihood of vote choice if the respondent was a
Mende or Temne and strongly agreed or did not strongly agree with the statement

71

1 would like to express my gratitude here to Dr. Kevin Corder for introducing me to CLARIFY and

encouraging me to use it.
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suggesting a reason why they would have voted for the political party for which they
voted.72 CLARIFY reports the outcome variable as the quantity of interest with mean
values of the effects of the independent variable on the dependent variable while
controlling for interaction terms between the independent variables.
Each model tested the within-group probabilities of vote choice given the
individual's preference on the issue variables that were suggested to them. The first
model tested the probability of voting for the SLPP or APC if the respondent was Mende
or Temne and given their response to the question about the ethnic identity thesis. The
second model tested the probability of voting for the SLPP or APC if the respondent was
Temne or Mende and given their response to the question about the peace vote.

The

third model tested the probability of voting for the SLPP or APC if the respondent was
Mende or Temne and given their response to the economic development/reconstruction
question. The fourth model tested the probability of voting for the SLPP or APC if the
respondent was Mende or Temne and given their response to the question about seeking
regional interests.
In addition, I included several interactions into each model in order to more
effectively control for the interaction between the identity of different ethnic groups and
their particular preferences on these variables. So for example, one interaction term
controlled for the relationship between Mendes alone and their preferences on the peace
vote when the variables for Mende, Temne and that for the peace vote are included in the
model at the same time.

72

Of the four variables two, ethnic interest and regional interest, represent the traditional explanations of

the vote in African societies while the other two, the peace vote and development, represent the more
pragmatic considerations of voters in recent times, for which I have argued.
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In all of the tests, the expectation is that there would be no difference between
all Mendes and all Temnes in their respective votes given suggestions in the literature
that ethnic groups tend to display homogenous preferences in vote choice (Horowitz,
1985). Each table of the results of these tests is followed by another table summarizing
the computed effects of the probability of vote choice given the reported preference of the
respondent. Table 3.16 below reports the results of the first model.
Table 3.16
Ethnic Interests and Vote Choice
Explanatory Variables
Ethnic Interest
Mendes
Temnes
EthnMen
EthnTem
Constant
N
LRchi2(5)
Pseudo R2

Vote Choice
-.82*
(.38)
2.2***
(.44)
-1.74***
(.21)
.59
(.08)
-.87
(.84
1.2***
(.15)
765
252.18***
.27

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at p< .001.* Significant at
p<.05. Models are results of binary logit regressions using CLARIFY in STATA.
EthnMen and EthnTem are interaction terms.
With the inclusion of interaction terms in the model, the table above shows that
when controlling for the respondent's ethnic group, the coefficients retain their
relationships with the outcome variable as in previous tests. For example, "ethnic
interest" retains its negative relationship with vote choice as in previous models just as
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being Temne does for the SLPP vote. Next, I report the calculated effects of the
probability of vote choice (Table 3.17) given the results from the model above.

Table 3.17
Effects on the Probability of Vote Choice: Ethnic Interest by Ethnic Group
Probability of Vote Choice
Strongly Agree
Not Strongly Agree
Mende

Temne

~35

M

(.02)

(.02)

.12

.36

(.08)

(.03)

Standard errors are in parentheses; P< .001

The result shows differences in vote choice between Temnes and Mendes and
among Temnes given their answers to the statement that the party for which they voted
was the party most likely to secure the interests of their ethnic group. However, there was
no difference among Mendes who strongly agreed with the statement or who did not
strongly agree with the statement and their vote choice. As expected, the result
demonstrates that Mendes were more likely to vote for the SLPP. The noticeable gap is
that evident in the voting preferences of Temnes. Among this ethnic group, there was 24
percent difference in the probability of voting between those strongly agreed with the
statement and those who did not agree strongly with the statement. This portion of the
result is contrary to previous assumptions about ethnic group homogeneity in voting
preferences. Next, I report the results of the second model (Table 3.18).
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Table 3.18
Peace and Vote Choice
Explanatory Variables
Peace Vote
Mendes
Temnes
PcvtMen
PcvtTem
Constant
N
LR chi2 (5)
Pseudo R2

Vote Choice
.60*
(.30)
1.12
(.60)
-2.10***
(.56)
1.38
(.74)
.33
(.60)
.58*
(.25)
780
258.28***
.27

Notes: Standard error in parentheses. ***Significant at P< .001, *Significant at p <. 05.
PcvtMen and PcvtTem are interaction terms. Models are results of binary logit
regressions using CLARIFY in STATA.
The result shows that the peace vote is statistically significant in predicting vote
choice. However, the variable for Mende is no longer statistically significant when
controlling for the peace vote and the interaction terms that have been added to the
model. The variable for Temne retains the negative relationship with the dependent
variable suggesting that Temnes are no more likely to have voted for the SLPP when
controlling for the peace vote. Next I report the calculated effects of the probability of
vote choice given the respondent's preference on the peace vote.
Table 3.19 shows the differences within the ethnic groups, as they voted given
their preference for which political party they believed was most likely to secure the
peace. Unlike the results in the model that preceded this one, a significant gap is found
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between the vote choices of Mendes who strongly agreed with the statement that the
political party for which they voted was the party that was most likely to unite the
country and secure the peace and those who did not strongly agree with the same
statement. A similar gap exists between the calculated probabilities of vote choice for
Temnes who strongly agreed with the statement and those that did not strongly agree with
the statement.
Table 3.19
Effects on the Probability of Vote Choice: Peace Vote by Ethnic Group
Probability of Vote Choice

Mende
Temne

Strongly Agree

Not Strongly Agree

37

1J3

(.01)

(.07)

.36

.19

(.04)

(.07)

Standard errors are in parentheses; P< 0.001
One suggestion from the current result, when compared to the preceding, is that
the peace vote was a more important factor in the deciding vote choice among the two
groups whereas it mattered less where they stood on the other explanatory variable as it
did not make a great difference in their vote choice. Next, I report the results of the test
of Mendes and Temnes who voted for the SLPP or APC and who agreed or disagreed
with the statement that the political party for which they voted was more likely to
undertake development projects in the country following the civil war (Table 3.20).
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Table 3.20
Development/Reconstruction and Vote Choice
Explanatory Variables
Develop
Mendes
Temnes
DevMen
DevTem
Constant
N
LRChi2(5)
Pseudo R2

Vote Choice
-.27
(.32)
1.0
(.67)
-1.86***
(.50)
1.5
(.79)
.12
(.55)
1.29***
(.28)
774
247.10***
.27

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at P< .001, DevMen and DevTem
are interaction terms. Models are results of binary logit regressions using CLARIFY in
STATA.
The results indicate that belonging to the Mende ethnic group is not a significant
predictor of vote choice when controlling for those who agreed with the statement that
the political party for which they voted was the party most likely to develop the country
by rebuilding the infrastructure including roads, bridges and schools (or the vote for
development and reconstruction). The negative sign of the coefficient for "develop" in
the model suggests that when agreeing with the statement, the respondent is less likely to
vote for the SLPP. This finding conforms to the common belief in Sierra Leone that even
though the SLPP was largely perceived as corrupt; people chose to vote for the party
because there was the perception that no other political party possessed the capacity to
rebuild the country.
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I moved on next to explore the differences within groups by looking at the
calculated probabilities of vote choice for respondents who strongly agreed with the
statement and those who did not strongly agree with the same statement that the political
party for which they voted was the party most likely to develop the country by rebuilding
its infrastructure. Table 3.21 reports the results of these calculated probabilities of voting.
Table 3.21
Effects on the Probability of Vote Choice: Develop by Ethnic Group

Mende
Temne

Probability of Vote Choice
Strongly Agree
Not Strongly Agree
!97
!90
(.01)
(.06)
.33
C£4)

.37
_C09)

Standard errors are in parentheses; P <. 001
Although it is not as large as the difference in the preceding table, the result here
shows within group differences for Mendes and vote choice. Mendes who strongly
agreed with the statement that the political party for which they voted was the party most
likely to develop the country by rebuilding its infrastructure were more likely to vote for
the SLPP. The result shows that Temnes, on the other hand, were more likely to vote
similarly if they did not strongly agree with the same statement. One suggestion here is
that Temnes that voted for the party did so for other reasons not because they expected it
to develop the country and rebuild its infrastructure following the devastating civil war.
Next, I present the results of the fourth model.
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Table 3.22
Regional Interests and Vote Choice
Explanatory Variables
Regional Interests
Mendes
Temnes
RegMen
RegTem
Constant
N
LRchi2(5)
Pseudo R2

Vote Choice
-1.1***
(.30)
2.07***
(.42)
-1.85***
(.22)
.54
(.77)
.04
(.60)
1.3***
(.16)
767
254.19***
.28

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at P< .001, RegMen and RegTem
are interaction terms. Models are results of binary logit regressions using CLARIFY in
STATA.
The table shows that regional interests has a negative effect on vote choice and is
statistically significant. The suggestion here is that if respondents strongly agreed with
the statement, it was not likely that they voted for the SLPP. Thus, region was not a part
of the voting calculus when controlling for the ethnic identity of the respondent and the
interaction terms inserted into the model. Below are the results of the calculated
probabilities of vote choice given a respondent's preference on the regional interest
variable.
Table 3.23 shows within group differences between Temnes, Mendes and vote
choice given responses to the statement that the political party for which they voted was
the party most likely to secure the interests of their region. In the case of Temnes, there is
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a 19-percentage point difference between those who strongly agreed and did not strongly
agree with the statement and their vote choice. There is less difference between Mendes
w h o strongly agreed and those w h o did not strongly with the same statement and their
vote choice. The result here supports the earlier of a negative relationship between the
variable for regional interests and vote choice. A m o n g both groups, the probability of
vote choice was higher for those did not strongly agree with the statement.
Table 3.23
Effects on the Probability of Vote Choice: Region by Ethnic Group
Probability of SLPP Vote
Strongly Agree
Not Strongly Agree
Mende

Temne

S>3

97

(.04)

(01)

.18

.37

(.07)

(.04)

Standard errors are in parentheses; P <. 001
In summary, the results from the tests of all four models suggest that there are
differences within groups following the election. The differences are visible both between
and among the two groups examined here and the vote choices that they made. The
results do not provide support for the claims that voting in African societies is largely a
predetermined outcome contingent on group identity rather than a conscious
consideration of party programs and the options that come with those programs.
So why do explanations abound that voting behavior in African societies is,
primarily, an outcome of ethnic identity? One answer could lie in the suggestion by
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Mattes and Gouws (1998) that existing studies relied on aggregate data to make
inferences about individual motivations and, thus, failed to guard against ecological
fallacy.73 Overreliance on aggregate data is one limitation on the methodology employed
in previous works. In the next section, I discuss how even when guarding against
ecological fallacy, existing explanations may still fail to account for the voting pattern in
cases such as Sierra Leone. In order to gain a fuller understanding of why communities in
Sierra Leone show similar preferences in vote choice and thus, why they have come to be
identified with support mainly for one political party or the other, we need to look beyond
explanations that focus on individuals as our units of analyses and towards the
examination of structural variables such as electoral districts within which individuals
exercise their choices.
Beyond Ecological Inference: Ethnicity as an "Identity Variable" and an "Issue Variable"
in Sierra Leone
An interesting point about the literature on political behavior in African countries
is that this scholarship built largely upon the bases, concepts and accompanying
theoretical constructs of work carried out by the pioneers of survey research methodology
in the United States such as the Columbia University and Michigan Studies without
employing much of the methodological rigor that characterized those studies of voting
behavior in America. Some scholars have advanced reasons for this shortcoming. Cowen
and Laakso (2002, 9) point out that part of the problem in the early days of the
scholarship on electoral behavior in African societies were cost concerns and the assumed

Timothy D. Sisk and Andrew Reynolds, Elections and Conflict Management in Africa (Washington, DC:
United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 119-142.
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complexity of organizing the sample survey in such societies. Other scholars, Nohlen,
Krennerich and Thibaut (1999) cite the inaccessibility of the geographical areas of
interest as a limitation in studying elections in Africa, while some scholars were often in
disagreement over the right approach to be adopted in studying the emergent countries.
These problems were only partially overcome by enlisting the use of the data that was
easily available for analysis, which came in the forms of aggregated returns over several
elections. With little to work with, it is no surprise that the analyses and insight provided
by such scholarship was severely constricted by a limitation to group level inference.
For example, emanating from these analyses, Yorubas of Southwestern Nigeria it
was argued, voted overwhelmingly for the Action Group party of immediate postindependence Nigeria because Obafemi Awolowo a prominent Yoruba politician formed
that party. Ibos, on the other hand, during that same time overwhelmingly supported the
National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) because Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe,
an Ibo politician from Eastern Nigeria and a major rival of Obafemi Awolowo, founded
that political party (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1988, 61-62).
In the current case of Sierra Leone, the SLPP was, historically, a "Mende man's
party" because the party drew heavy support from the Mendes and Sir Milton Margai,
one of the founders of the party was a Mende man while the APC was founded to
counteract the Mende hegemony of the SLPP and the majority of Northerners voted for
the APC in the 1967 elections (Hayward and Kandeh 1987; Cartwright 1978 and others).
These are all examples of ecological inferences about individual behavior (Yorubas, Ibos)
in the Nigerian example and (Mendes, Temnes) in the Sierra Leone example.
Following the 1967 elections in the Sierra Leone case, one fallacy of such
arguments consisted in concluding that heavy polling for the APC in electoral precincts
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located in Northern Sierra Leone or for the SLPP in Southeastern Sierra Leone
constituted a pattern of ethnic voting (Salih 2001). If Northern Sierra Leone was the
traditional homeland of Temnes and the region voted overwhelmingly for the APC, or
vice versa for the case of the SLPP and Mendes in Southeastern Sierra Leone, then
Temnes and Mendes, respectively, rejected the SLPP and the APC and were culpable of
ethnic voting because the polling returns showed that the opposition party did not do as
well in each of the opposing regions.
Subsequently, the inevitable conclusion reached was that ethnic identity was the
major predictor of political behavior and vote choice in Sierra Leone and similar societies
emerging from colonialism. Such claims were based on assumptions similar to that
inherent in the opening quote attributed to Van de Walle (2003).
In view of such assumptions, the requisite empirical confirmation require
observation of the outcomes of head-to-head electoral contests between Temnes and
Mendes in Sierra Leone in order to ascertain this fact such that if in a given election a
Temne candidate ran against a Mende candidate and the Mendes came out in uniform
support for the Mende candidate while the Temnes came out in similar fashion for the
Temne candidate then we have an actual ethnic census and a mere headcount of the
ethnic identity of voters in the given electoral constituency should be sufficient in
revealing the winner of the contest, and for that matter the winner of similar contests for
the foreseeable future as long as the demographics of such locality held constant.
However, the demarcation of electoral constituencies along lines of ethnic settlement,
since colonial times, as a means of diffusing ethnic tensions preclude such electoral
scenario for legislative elections in most of Sierra Leone. Additionally, former President
Momoh, on assuming power in 1986, ensured that district lines were redrawn to reflect
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the ethnic composition of the country (Hayward and Kandeh 1987, 36). As they point
out, the action that Momoh took to redraw district lines was done primarily to forestall
tensions in the more ethnically heterogeneous North.74
Thus, in any given election in Sierra Leone since the first multiparty elections for
the legislative council in 1957, a typical electoral constituency in most of the 12
administrative districts of Sierra Leone ran several candidates from the same ethnic group
but who represented different political parties; the choice for voters during most of the
elections lie not between different ethnic groups but different political parties. Some
examples of electoral constituencies from the 2007 elections underscore this point.75
Table 3.24 shows candidates for each of the two major political parties in the
electoral constituencies were drawn from the same ethnic group. This pattern could be
found across the country where the two parties fielded candidates. It is also consistent
with the pattern in previous elections starting with the first competitive multiparty
legislative elections of 1962 in which the APC and the SLPP first fielded candidates for
seats in the legislature. Sometimes, the SLPP and the APC ran candidates from the same
family in an electoral constituency as was the case during the 2002 elections in Port Loko
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The electoral constituency of Koinadugu North is an exceptional case in point. During the general

elections of 1982, electoral violence in this constituency, said to emanate from the competition between
Fullahs and Yalunkas reached such brutish depths as to warrant cancellation of the elections in this district
and their rescheduling. For a useful description of events within this district see Hassan G. Kamara.
"Tribalism as an Obstacle to Nation Building. The 1982 General Elections in Koinadugu North
Constituency and the Fullah/Yalunka Tribal Conflict" (Undergraduate thesis, Department of History,
Fourah Bay College, University of Sierra Leone, 1991).
75

1 have employed information from the elections of 2007 here because it was available in national gazettes

in the country during my field research. Complete constituency data for previous elections is much harder
to access.
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District when Ousman Kami was on the SLPP ticket while his cousin Alpha B.S. Kanu
was on the APC ticket.76 Both emerged victorious and were elected to parliament since
the elections were held using the proportional representation system. A similar case
occurred during the 2007 elections in the Western Area Urban District of Constituency
112 when Hariatu Turay and her cousin Salamatu Turay, both Temnes were on separate
tickets for the APC and the SLPP in a head-to-head contest for that electoral seat. It is
difficult, thus, to justify claims of ethnic voting given the composition of most electoral
districts and the candidate slates offered by the two major political parties.
Table 3.24
Select Electoral Constituencies and Candidates During the
Parliamentary Elections of 2007

Electoral Constituency
Candidates
Kailahun 1
Alice M. Foyah
Joseph B.S. Jusu

Political Party
SLPP
APC

Ethnic Group
Mende
Mende

Kenema 13

Jeremiah Gendemeh
Bernadette Lahai

APC
SLPP

Mende
Mende

Bombali 28

Abu-Abu A. Koroma
Abdul F. Serry Kamal

SLPP
APC

Temne
Temne

Port Loko 54

Ahmed Kalokoh
Mohamed K. Kanu

SLPP
APC

Temne
Temne

Pujehun 87

Ansumana J. KaiKai
Mustapha A. Swaray

SLPP
APC

Mende
Mende

Bo 77

Mohamed E. Jalloh
Victor Mbawah

SLPP
APC

Fulla/Mende
Mende

Source: Adapted from the Sierra Leone Gazette Extraordinary. 2007. Vol. CXXXVIII,
No. 37.
In my interview with Alpha Kanu, he cited this as an example of political tolerance in Sierra Leone.
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Political parties everywhere are about winning elections. In the famous words of
Downs (1957, 28) "parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win
elections in order to formulate policies," the emphasis being on 'winning elections.'
Before seeking to formulate policies that will benefit members of their ethnic groups,
parties must first win elections and to do so partly involves adopting the right strategies
that will maximize its vote share among the electorate. Rationally, the APC and the SLPP
will not seek to run candidates in electoral constituencies where their chances of winning
are minimized by the perception that they are not true sons or daughters of the soil that
will protect the welfare of those constituencies. Thus, in the case of Sierra Leone,
assuming it is an open, free and fair election; no political party will transplant a candidate
from a foreign locality and allow them to run on their party ticket in a new location. All
politics is local and every political party heeds this axiom by recruiting locally in order to
be competitive. Thus, given the correlations between regions, electoral constituencies
and ethnic groups, the basic support underlying previous assumptions of ethnic voting is
violated by the very nature of electoral constituencies in Sierra Leone. To put this into
visual perspective, let us take a look at the ethnic map of Sierra Leone in Figure 3.2.
Indeed, notwithstanding advances in technology and refined methodology to
undertake the empirical understanding of voting trends, the tendency to characterize
political behavior in African societies along conventional conceptions of ethnically and
regionally divided entities, with much disregard for the complexities inherent within such
societies, has persisted. The analysis demonstrate some of the inadequacies inherent in
such tendency by revealing the marked within group differences among the Mendes and
Temnes, where, largely, none was assumed to exist, and their voting preferences for the
APC or the SLPP during the 2002 elections.
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Figure 3.2
Map Showing Ethnic Distribution in Sierra Leone
ETHNIC GROUPS
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Source: Perry Castaneda Library Map Collection, University of Texas at Austin.
Available online at <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/sierra_leone_ethnic_1969.jpg
However, even when the appropriate approach is employed with the use of survey
data to draw conclusions about individual behavior in African societies such as Sierra
Leone, there could still remain the unanticipated probability of erroneously attributing
individual preferences to group choice. As an "identity variable" ethnicity could largely
be interpreted as an "issue variable" when describing political behavior in African
societies.
In the Sierra Leone case, ethnicity becomes an identity variable when it is what
defines the patterns by which the people of a particular district, region, town, or other
locality voted given correlations between such district, region, town or locality and their
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ethnic identity and pattern of settlement. On the other hand, ethnicity is an issue variable
if considerations for the preservation of the interests of any given ethnic group are the
admitted and compelling reasons as to why electorates voted the way they did. If we go
back to the examples of electoral constituencies I have referred to earlier, an analysis of
survey data out of those areas asking the electorate how they voted is likely to reveal a
largely skewed pattern of voting regardless of how the people voted. The results, if they
turn out to be polling returns from Southern Sierra Leone would most likely reveal an
SLPP victory showing Mende support for that political party as is likely to be the case for
the APC in the North.
As an identity variable, ethnicity shows how people vote given their geographical
distribution over an electoral constituency and their support for political parties within
that geographical spread. Whereas as an issue variable, ethnicity shows why as a
collective, electorates may have voted the way they did. The former could be determined
by an assessment of aggregate data, which accordingly has resulted in charges of
ecological fallacy leveled by scholars such as Mattes and Gouws against the works of
Horowitz and others who largely saw ethnic groups in conflict following such
assessments. A determination of the latter entails going beyond that outward appearance
of mass support for political parties within the geographical areas and exploring more
deeply, the linkages between the elected representatives and those whom they represent.
Thus, we must look beyond concerns for ecological inference by making
necessary distinctions between how electorates may have voted and why they voted for
the political party or candidate for which they voted. Next, I turn to an analysis of the role
of elites in the electoral outcomes of 2002.
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Elite Political Behavior: Getting out the Vote - Who Does What, Where and Why?
In 2007 I interviewed an executive committee member of the APC Party in the
capital Freetown who was running for a parliamentary seat. He was very gracious with
his time and paid a great deal of attention to my questions taking time to give his
opinions and in the process shedding light on the political dynamics of the country
around the time of the 2002 elections. But he was also evidently looking forward to
leaving at the end of the one-hour interview time he had agreed to grant me. Towards the
close of the interview, he intimated to me that he had a campaign engagement for his
parliamentary bid that he could not afford to miss and given the long drive out of town,
he needed to leave in good time so as to make the meeting. Since we were almost done
and I did not have much more to ask him, I turned to the reason for his trip and asked
why he was campaigning for a parliamentary seat; shouldn't his people automatically
support his parliamentary bid as a prominent son from the area?" He paused for a couple
of seconds as if the question I had asked did not make sense but being the politician, he
calmly replied, "my son, this is politics, if you do not campaign for votes by reminding
the people what you have done for them or telling them what you are going to do for
them, you will lose elections. It's that simple."77
I considered his response to my question telling for several reasons. Firstly, here
was a representative who was aware that the constituents he represents hold him
accountable. In the framework of liberal democratic theory, what more could one wish
for in a fragile democracy such as Sierra Leone than a governor who is answerable to the
governed? But much more important for the focus of my research, the encounter
77

2-3pm, February 7th 2007.

157

increased my curiosity to explore the boundaries that previous scholarship had placed
around our understanding of the connections that have been argued exist between elites
and the communities that support them in multiethnic African societies. Given the
emphasis on explaining the communal and ethnic bases of party support in African
politics (Van de Walle 2003, Berman Eyoh and Kymlicka 2004, Horowitz 1985, Salih
2001, 2003, Cartwright 1978 and others), I wondered why the elite I was interviewing
could prioritize a campaign trip to his local community when their support for his
candidacy should be a foregone conclusion as theoretically assumed. Following that
interview, I included the question "why campaign?" as one of my key questions to elites
of political parties during interviews and sought, on each occasion to understand why
they mounted such vigorous political campaigns for elected office in communities where
they are expected to receive unequivocal support.
Quite frequently, the answers I received from officials revealed their sensitivity to
the fact that the expectations of the masses they represented were different and much
higher than commonly assumed by the scholarship. One official told me that a year
earlier, a delegation from one of the towns in his constituency had come to ask him to
provide a generator to electrify their town because another member of parliament from
another constituency bordering his had done the same for a town in his constituency.
Another politician told me, rather boastfully, that he had constructed more wells for his
constituency than any other member of parliament in the country but yet still his
constituents were not satisfied and had been recently favoring one of his opponents. He
referred to most of his constituents as ungrateful but then wistfully reminded me about
the fluid nature of politics. A female aspirant for a parliamentary seat confided in me that
a paramount chief in one of the chiefdoms in her constituency was against her candidacy
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simply because she was a woman. The chief, she said, was holding meetings around his
chiefdom on behalf of one of her opponents. She reassured me, however, that she was
going to win the elections hands down because she was running the better campaign and
the people of the constituency appreciate what her husband and her had done for them
over the years by providing scholarships for numerous school children, paying hospital
fees for those who could not afford to seek medical attention and a long list of other good
deeds and benefits she had brought to the district. Also, she told me another reason why
she will win the elections was because her main opponent in the elections was perceived
as one of the most corrupt people in the country and everyone in the constituency knew
of his dishonest dealings and record while in government. The aspirant in question was
Mende and her husband that she was referring to was from another ethnic group. Other
aspirants from urban areas cited unemployment and the demands from constituents to
help them find jobs as the major pressure for constituency service.
These brief responses constitute a concise summary of the kinds of issues that
typically engaged the attention of electorates and aspirants running up to the elections of
2007. More importantly, they reveal a political system predicated on elites that are
accountable to their people and issue-demands that are similar to those typically pursued
by the governed in advanced democracies. If concerns for the maximization of benefits to
various communities were couched in ethnic terms as parts of the national discourse
during this time, such concerns were never overtly stated in the way these other issues
were set on the national plate.78 In most ways, these issues and concerns were similar to
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"Ethnicity, what ethnicity?" was the rhetorical response one political party elite gave me when I

suggested to him what the scholarship has posited that ethnic identity was the primary bases of communal
support for candidates. He told me that food and survival were much more important to the people than
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what Hayward and Dumbuya claim occupied the minds of voters around the time of the
elections in 1982, twenty-five years earlier.
In most constituencies, the major issue was what the various candidates could do
for the people of the area. The answer to that question depended on many things
including experience, past record, expectations that they might be appointed to a
ministerial position (with increased resources to help the constituency), ties to the
top leadership, education, and the candidate's reputation and respect in the area.
(1985,75)
This portrayal conflicts with traditional explanations, which, in addition, reflected
an elite bias in the relationships, described between elites and their local communities
(Miles 1988, Post and Vickers 1973, Chazan et al 1999). Previous scholarship
maintained, for the most part, that the political processes in African societies are elite-led.
Peil (1976) lamented this tendency pointing out that this elite bias resulted in an
incomplete understanding of the politics of the area and potentially masked the ingenuity
of ordinary citizens to "pick and choose their way through the alternatives" given to them
by different political parties.
In this section of the chapter, I illustrate the political behavior of the political
elites of Sierra Leone by describing the processes through which they mobilized the
masses into following them around the time of the 2002 elections, the issues that they
campaigned on and how these contributed to produce the outcomes of those elections.
Political elites are the executive officers and officials who help organize support for the
party at all levels including the local communities, villages and towns. Inclusion into the
category of political elite is a factor of the individual's rank of membership within the
political party, which is usually determined by the amount of contribution made to the

ethnic identity and they will give their ballot to anyone who could guarantee that he or she will provide
food security regardless of ethnicity.
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party. Those who donate the highest amount of money to the party, in the case of the
SLPP are the grand chief patrons followed and these are followed in party hierarchy by
chief patrons, patrons. Simply buying a party card and paying monthly dues determine
party membership.
To use the APC as an example, the executive of the party is organized into a
national executive, regional board and a national advisory council. The highest level of
party hierarchy within the APC is the national executive. The presidential candidate,
national secretary general of the party and national chairman of the party, who is usually
the presidential candidate all belong to the national executive. The next level down from
the national executive is the regional board. Each board member on the regional board
represents a region of the country such that there are four individuals on the board
representing the North, South, East and West of the country. The national advisory
council is next, below the regional board. All offices are filled through open election. The
national executive wields the strongest influence within the APC party and serves as the
party's executive secretariat. In the case of the SLPP, there is an executive committee
membership that is responsible for the day-to-day running of the party. Most, if not all,
political parties in Sierra Leone similarly follows this hierarchically organized system
such that administrative authority within the party flows downwards from the party
secretariat to the lowest level of local organization found at the chiefdom level. All
political parties are headquartered in the capital Freetown, which is regionally considered
a neutral ground. A Constitutional requirement in 1991 mandating all registered political
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parties to maintain a presence in all 13 administrative districts of the country ensures that
political parties have offices in all districts of the country.79
Political parties make a conscious effort to diversify not only their support bases
within the general membership, but also their executive memberships. The executive
membership rolls of all the political parties reflect some diversity. For example, even
though the APC is considered a party of the Temnes, a Mende man, Victor Foh occupied
one of the most influential positions within that Party as its secretary general leading up
to the 2007 elections. Beyond tokenism, you can identify a deliberate effort by parties to
broaden the bases of their support through the diversification of both their executive
board and their mass membership. This statement implies, erroneously, that the parties
had never maintained such broad bases of support in the past and had instead restricted
both executive and general membership mainly to their ethnic constituencies.
Nevertheless, an analysis of the historical roots of the political parties in Sierra Leone
will reveal that Siaka Stevens, the founder and longtime leader of the APC that is alleged
to be a party of Temnes was a founding member of the SLPP, which is alleged to be a
party of Mendes. Further, Stevens' initial desertion of the SLPP in 1958 was to form the
People's National Party in collaboration with Albert Margai, who was not only Mende,
but was also the brother of the Prime Minister and leader of the SLPP at the time, Sir
Milton Margai. Following the resolution of differences between the Margai brothers,

As further proof of evolving trends, most political parties now maintain a virtual presence on the World
Wide Web. It is little more challenging for parties to try to reach out to a global audiences while at the
same time maintaining potentially exclusive messages of securing ethnic interests among a diverse
electorate. Some party websites include: SLPP http://www.slpp.ws/: APC http://www.apcpartvsl.org/; and
the PMDC http://www.pmdcsl.net/
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Albert Margai returned to the SLPP fold while Stevens continued on to found the first
post-independence opposition political party of significance, the APC.
One of the interesting ironies in the picture of party formation in the 1960s was
that Stevens was a Limba who was born and raised in Mendeland. He had never lived in
Temne country before, yet the political party that he founded came to be permanently
identified with the protection of Temne interests. With the exception of Dixon-Fyle and
Conteh-Morgan (1999) most commentators fail to point out the major falling out between
Stevens and some Temne elite in 1973 that led to the execution of Ibrahim Taqi and
others, most of who were emerging young elites from the Temne ethnic group (ContehMorgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999,81).
It is important to point out that there are distinctions between how campaigns are
conducted for the presidency and for seats in the country's parliament, although the
differences in both kinds of campaigns did not appear to have a major effect on the
behavior of voters during the elections of 2002.80 In addition, there are also differences

The differences in campaign strategy and message between presidential and parliamentary campaigns
appeared to have varying effect on the behavior of the electorate as well as the electoral fates of political
parties taking part in the elections. Voters, it appeared, made a distinction between the heads of the smaller
political parties and the parties they led whereas it appears that no similar evaluation was made of the larger
parties. To cite a few examples, it appears that voters who voted for Ernest Koroma and his APC party did
not make a distinction between his presidential candidacy and the party that he led in the elections as the
APC won 20 percent of the national votes and Koroma won 22 percent of the votes. Tejan Kabbah won 70
percent of the national votes and his SLPP party also won about 70 percent of the votes. In the case of the
smaller parties, Raymond Kamara of the Grand Alliance Party came in sixth among the presidential
candidates while his political party polled the fourth highest number of votes from the electorate.
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between how campaigns are conducted for primary elections for parliamentary seats and
general elections for those same seats. Typically, the broader national constituency in
presidential elections necessitates the tailoring of strategy and a campaign message that is
different both in substance and focus from the more localized messages of parliamentary
elections. The strategy adopted by former President Kabbah during the 2002 elections
that I will describe subsequently for illustration is a good example. In parliamentary
elections, quite similar messages from all political parties are localized to fit the
aspirations of the people within the district. The discussion will also examine
assumptions about the bases of political party support and the relationships between elites
of political parties and the masses they are said to mobilize into politics, sometimes
dangerously.
In Sierra Leone the process through which political elites are elected for
legislative office typically begins with campaigns for primary elections that generally
take place within a localized context of electoral constituencies modally consisting of no
more than five paramount chiefdoms spread out over a radius of about 50 miles or less.
Political parties recruit candidates locally to run on party tickets within each
constituency.81 Often, an important consideration of such recruitment is the popularity
and affinity of the candidate with each electoral constituency, which could, in turn, be

This statement should not be taken to imply that all candidates are recruited primarily within the
communities that they represent. Quite often, candidates return home from studies overseas to become
representatives of their people. During the one-party era of Siaka Stevens, it was not uncommon for him to
court the support of young, well-educated politicians by encouraging them to run in their districts of origin.
The former Minister of Agriculture, Aloysius Joe-Jackson and others like Dr. Shekou Sesay all got their
start through such mentorship from President Stevens.
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dependent on factors such as the candidate's ties to ruling houses, successful
entrepreneurship within their community or sometimes, their record of academic
excellence.
All political parties conduct a process of primary elections where candidates make
their first pitch to the party members within their electoral constituency. Just like in the
United States, the successful candidate at the primary stage is one the party members
from within the electoral constituency believe has the best chance of winning in the
general election against other candidates, usually from the same ethnic group,
representing other political parties.82 Nominated thus, it is expected that candidates have
legitimate chances to win elections within their electoral constituency because they hail
from within their constituencies; they know how and where to transmit important
messages within the constituency for maximum effect.
Campaigns generally take the forms of "conscientization tours," campaign rallies,
meetings with party faithful, door-to-door campaigns and posting of campaign flyers and
billboards with electoral promises from candidates.83 Loud music, singing, merriment and

The process is often vulnerable to manipulation at this primary stage. Sometimes, it is the case that the
preferred candidate of the party executive at the national level is not the preferred candidate of the
constituents at the local level. National executives who try to circumvent the process by arbitrarily
imposing their choice of candidate on the members of the constituents risk losing the vote of those
constituents as it happened in Constituency 87 in Pujehun District where an otherwise 'safe' constituency
for the SLPP was carried by the opposition PMDC because the SLPP candidate, Ansu KaiKai was not the
preferred choice of constituents at the primary stage. Following the election, it was revealed that most
constituents who had planned to vote for the SLPP switched their votes to the PMDC and the APC in
protest.
83

1 have described the norm of political campaigns within constituencies. There are a few exceptions of

electoral constituencies inhabited by more than one ethnic group where the competition takes place
between candidates from different ethnic groups.
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dancing often accompany most campaign rallies. Recently, moderated debates have been
added to the repertoire of campaign events. During the months leading up to the
parliamentary and presidential elections of 2007, the British Broadcasting Corporation,
Westminster Foundation for Democracy and civil society groups and non-governmental
organizations conducted three presidential debates and no less than one radio debate each
per constituency in all electoral constituencies across the country.
Conscientization tours, in a sense, are illegal. Usually, they take place before the
National Electoral Commission declares the commencement of the legal campaign
period. Conscientization tours consist of clandestine meetings with constituents around
the electoral constituency, offering gifts and canvassing support all in very hushed tones.
Under the conditions of the 1991 Constitution, no political party or candidate can engage
in such activities before the National Electoral Commission declares the campaign season
open but most political parties violate this law in order to get any advantage they can on
their opponents. Campaign rallies take place following the official declaration of the start
to the campaign period. In order to avoid clashes that have occurred in the past between
opposing parties and candidates, parties are each assigned special days during which they
can organize and come out in open campaign. On such days, no official rallies or
campaign activities of a similar nature should be undertaken by parties that are not
designated to come out that day although they are allowed to continue campaigning in
other ways. While conscientization tours usually take place in an atmosphere of mutual
interest in the coming campaign, campaign rallies are huge public affairs where people
come out to large open venues, preferably soccer fields to listen to the speeches and party
programs of the party campaigning.
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Crowd sizes at campaign rallies are never an accurate indicator of support for
candidates or political parties. Some market women along a popular street in the capital
Freetown, Kroo Town Road, reported to me that they received several different T-shirts
from all the political parties. They confessed that they would attend any political rally
more out of curiosity than a show of support for the party. I interviewed some street boys
during the campaigns leading up to the 2007 elections who told me that the two major
parties, the SLPP, the APC and several other parties have all approached them to recruit
their services to go dancing at rallies and help swell numbers. In return, they were given
money to buy food and promised jobs if the party won. According to the boys, election
season meant good business for them because they felt important once more with all the
politicians trying to win their support. Free food was also available everyday at rallies
organized by different political parties and at the different headquarters of the parties.
They boys were conscious that the politicians might not keep their promises after
elections so they thought the best they could do was make good use of the present by
getting as much as they could from the parties. Such developments are cautionary tales
for those who tend to emphasize the intensity of political campaigns in societies such as
Sierra Leone as an indicator of the intense rivalries that exist between communities in
Africa. Other kinds of campaign events such as door-to-door meetings are personal in
nature and are usually undertaken by foot soldiers hired by the political party or the
candidates. On occasion, the foot soldiers of the party will invite the presidential
candidate for the party or other important figures within the party structure to join them
in a campaign event in their neighborhood.
There is rarely an overt ethnic tone to most campaigns for political office in Sierra
Leone. As Cartwright (1978) points out, given the ethnic composition of Sierra Leone, no
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one group predominates in terms of population size and campaigning using appeals to the
ethnic group is an immediate recipe for inviting other ethnic groups to gang up against
your party. One interesting development that takes place during presidential campaigns is
the amount of turf protection that goes on. For example, during the campaigns for the
2007 presidential elections, there were several reports of the SLPP barring entry of other
political parties, especially the APC, into areas of the country they considered part of
their electoral base. The APC lodged several complaints to the National Electoral
Commission about these "no-go campaign areas" in the South and East of the country. A
point of note in such actions was that the SLPP really did not trust that their alleged
support base would stay in their corner of the ring if other parties approached and
campaigned to them. This distrust gives away the fact that the alleged ethnic bases of
party support are not foregone conclusions.
Conducted thus, recent political campaigns afford constituents the opportunity to
learn about the different choices and to make a decision between those choices. Contrary
to the existing suggestions that voting decisions are a consequence of low information,
the evidence from the case of Sierra Leone points to an atmosphere in which any
messages put out by candidates were amplified both by the improvements in technology
and the dexterity of candidates in knowing where to put those messages. A British
Broadcasting Corporation poll conducted in the country between 2006 and 2007 found
out that over 80 percent of the people had access to radio "and the majority of those with
access reported listening to the radio every day or almost every other day." (BBC World
Service Trust and Search for Common Ground 2007) This finding supports a similar
finding from my survey, which showed that a similar percentage of the respondents cited
radio as the major source of their information and that it was utilized more than family
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and friends, word-of-mouth or "bush radio," alternative sources of information that are
often considered a major source of erroneous information.
In presidential campaigns, the electoral constituency is the entire nation. The
party primary process, just like in the United States, seeks to vet and nominate the
candidate that the party faithful believes has the best chance of winning the presidency,
even though this part of the process is open to much manipulation. In the recent era of
open, contested, multiparty elections, a favorite strategy of political parties is to balance
the ticket through the nomination of candidates from either the two heavily polarized
regions of the country, or from what is believed to be the two most antagonistic political
foes in the country -the Mendes and the Temnes. It is interesting that in the months
leading up to the 1996 elections, after the military National Provisional Ruling Council
(NPRC) lifted the ban on political parties and cleared the way for multiparty elections,
party leaders within the SLPP, which is said to draw most of its political support from the
Mende ethnic group, approached Dr. John Karefa-Smart, a Temne or Loko (depending on
who is talking) as the first choice to head their party ticket as presidential candidate.
Karefa-Smart declined the offer citing that he was once passed over for the position in
1964 following the death of Sir Milton Margai, the country's first leader. Tejan Kabbah,
a Mandingo/Mende, emerged eventually as a replacement for Karefa-Smart. KarefaSmart went on to form his own political party, the United National People's Party
(UNPP). Both candidates met in the runoff elections of 1996 at the helm of their political
parties, which Tejan Kabbah won with the SLPP.84

Interview with Dr. Mohamed Dabo
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Another gap between the evidence and previous explanations is the assumption
that group benefits accruing from the center were equally distributed among all groups
within the community. In order to gain a fuller picture of the distribution of group
benefits and how the support system works for candidates within their local communities
I will borrow from Richard Fenno's work (1977) on how members of the American
Congress function within their congressional district.85
In his seminal work on members of the United States Congress, Fenno argued that
representatives saw their congressional districts in four different circles. The broadest
circle consisted of the geographic district followed by the circle of electoral supporters,
primary supporters and finally, the closest inner circle consisted of the Representative's
family members, close friends and family advisors. Parliamentarians in the Parliament of
Sierra Leone do not necessarily view their constituencies in similar concentric circles as
Fenno conceptualized, but they do have similar circles within which group benefits are
distributed and a support system established along similar lines. In Sierra Leone, the
broadest view of the Member of Parliament's constituency is the entire geographic
constituency. These are the people who elect him or her and who form the legitimate
bases of any claims or demands the MP makes on the central government. The MP asks
for a well project, new school or road in the name of the constituency whether he or she
delivers it to the constituency or not. In the absence of any ideological content to
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Richard F. Fenno, Homestyle: House Members in their Districts (Boston: Little Brown, 1978). The

analogy is not a faulty one because the goal is to describe how elected representatives, in a very broad
sense, represent the represented. Even though much scholarship has portrayed politics in African societies
as different, the essence of representation remains the same. Whether under one party rule or not,
electorates in constituencies in Sierra Leone retained the opportunity to remove their elected representatives
from parliament during elections. See Hayward and Dumbuya again for an elaboration of this point.
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campaigns in Sierra Leone, the MP's constituency is also viewed as his or her electorate,
those who will choose between them and another candidate. The support the electorate
extends to him or her is not given but earned through similar sets of benefits and rewards
system known as "constituency service" in American politics. He or she is expected to
provide benefits to the constituency and the constituency reciprocates or rewards the MP
with their votes.
Some discussions in previous works will have us believe that benefits to the
district are not the significant factor in gaining reelection in the politics of societies such
as Sierra Leone. During my time in the field, I followed activities within the
parliamentary districts of some MPs for several months. I found constituents who
reported to me when the MP from their area visited the constituency from Freetown, how
long he or she stayed and what kinds of activities they undertook while in the
constituency. I drove through the constituency of one MP where I was told he had not
visited the constituency for over three months. During the 2007 elections, the MP in
question lost his seat.86
It could be argued that the next view MPs have of their district is that similarly
conceptualized by Fenno as the smallest circle of the MPs intimates consisting of his or
her close friends and family members. These are his or closest supporters who, most
times, are also his or her primary supporters. It is within this latter circle that most of the
contentiousness of politics in Sierra Leone takes place. Often, one family member or
"ruling house" as they call them will engage in almost fratricidal struggle for one position

In his defense, the MP in question was ailing and could barely walk when I paid a visit to his house in
Freetown. According to him, he had just lost interest in politics and was now concentrating on getting well.
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or another either in parliament or for a chieftaincy position. Often, struggles from one
sphere of the politics within the constituency spills out into another sphere. A prominent
local family that has lost the chieftaincy often tries to win the parliamentary seat for the
constituency so that they are not left out. This is the case, for example, between the
Mansaray family and the Marah family in Kabala Town in the North of the country.
According to Chief Allie Marah, the Marahs are the senior family in the two-chiefdom
headquarter town of Kabala but the Mansarays have recently tried to make claims to that
position by supporting opposing candidates against the Marahs in every election both
local and national.
The group benefits due to communal groups are never evenly distributed, if
distributed at all. The rural districts I visited around the country are the poorest sections
of Sierra Leone. I found a similar pattern in most districts. Often, the finest house in the
major town in the constituency belonged to the MP from the area or to someone within
his family or close friend. Most other people lived in the squalor of the post-war
environment. One of my greatest surprises came when I visited the town of Binkolo, the
hometown of former president Joseph Saidu Momoh, in the north. During Momoh's
administration (1985-1992) rumors abounded about the numerous projects diverted to his
hometown and much of the rest of the country envied the people of Binkolo for
producing such a great son that was bringing so many benefits to their area. To my
chagrin, when I visited Binkolo, I found no evidence of the lavishness that has been
rumored to exist from Momoh's association with the town. He built a guesthouse in the
outskirts of the town with tennis courts and a swimming pool; all were in ruins from
disrepair by the time I visited, but besides the house there was nothing else to show for all
the millions of dollars that Momoh had allegedly stolen from the coffers of Sierra Leone,
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some of which should have gone to benefit his Limba people. Most of the inhabitants of
the town detested the association with President Momoh saying that it was just a bad
name for the town which did not see anything extraordinarily above what most other
areas of the country received during Momoh's administration.
Most scholarship suggests that largesse accrued from the state flows down neatly
to the ethnic community of the elite, but I did not find this to be true in the case of Sierra
Leone. Benefits that tend to filter down to the constituency are the occasional road,
sometimes a school or a local clinic, and similar such amenities. Other benefits like
academic scholarships to study abroad most often end up in the hands of the family or
extended family members of an MP.
Another gap in the scholarship is the assumption of group homogeneity among
ethnic groups where the empirical evidence may suggest otherwise. In Sierra Leone,
Mendes who inhabit the Southeast region and who, it is said, overwhelmingly support the
SLPP do not in reality share the same interests both politically and culturally (ContehMorgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999,79). Culturally, Mendes in the Eastern region are initiates
of the secret Poro society that often serve as the major socializing influence of male
Mendes in that part of the country while the South maintains the Wonde society. There is
much disagreement among Mendes as to which group has the better secret society;
relations are sometimes strained between the two groups of Mendes. In terms of voting
during elections, the assumption that the two groups support the SLPP unequivocally has
not been subjected to empirical verification. It is not unrealistic, therefore, to expect that

A common lamentation in Mendeland that "Mendeman nor lek e kompin." Tanslated, it means a Mende
man does not like his fellow Mende man, or Mendes are not united.
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their interests may lie with different candidates during elections. A history of the
founding of the SLPP does not provide any evidence to indicate that the founding of the
party was partly due to a consensus between these two groups, which it is expected to be
if the SLPP were the "ethnic vehicle" of the Mendes it has been argued to be by Kandeh
(1992) and others.
Yet another shortcoming in previous discussions is that scholars largely portrayed
ethnic communities in societies such as Sierra Leone as societies in which there were no
free riders to collective actions for communal interests. One reality is that there was much
free riding among various communal groups in Sierra Leone during the election period of
2002. What is often assumed to be communal action is really that of the action of a
selected few from among the communities who are personally related to the candidates,
or hired by them to provide "muscle" during elections campaigns as Hayward and
Dumbuya (1983), pointed out.
To probe the previous point further, my survey instrument included a set of
questions which asked respondents what kinds of activities they participated in during the
period leading up to the elections when all the campaigns of the various political parties
were under way. The six activities that were suggested included both conventional and
unconventional forms of political participation namely: 1) whether they merely supported
the party emotionally hoping it won the elections; 2) whether they attended a campaign
rally or some other political event organized by the leaders of the political party they
supported; 3) whether they made a financial contribution to the political party of their
choice; 4) whether they actually voted for the political party; 5) whether they
demonstrated for the party of their choice and 6) whether they got out the vote by trying
to convince others to go out and vote for the political party that they supported.
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I constructed an additive index to measure the levels of mobilization of ethnic
groups across the country out of these measures of support. I categorized taking part in
one or two actions as "low mobilization." Taking part in three to four actions as
"medium" and taking part in five to six actions was categorized as "high mobilization."
The index served to test the expectation that there were no free riders to communal
mobilization and that all ethnic groups are highly mobilized in support of the political
parties they support given assumptions in the extant scholarship. If this expectation has
any veracity, then we will expect that a modal level of mobilization among ethnic groups
will fall into the "high" category and this will occur across and within all ethnic groups.
Table 3.25 below reports the results of this test for the five largest ethnic groups, those
who consider themselves to be just Sierra Leoneans and not part of any ethnic group, and
all other ethnic groups bunched into one category.
Table 3.25 shows differences in the levels of mobilization within and between the
groups shown here. As is evident, the modal category for all groups is in the middle of
the index where respondents reported participating in three to four actions in support of
their political party of choice. The modal category within groups, as well, is in the Middle
category of mobilization. Very respondents fall into the extreme category of high
mobilization. One point that the results in the table above demonstrate is that there were
free riders to various kinds of collective actions in support of political parties and their
representative communal interests and that groups were not similarly mobilized going
into the elections of 2002.

175

Table 3.25
Level of Mobilization of Respondents
Level of Mobilization (%)
Medium

Ethnic Group <of Respondent

Low

High

Mende

73

64

10

Temne

22

61

17

Limba

31

51

18

Krio

23

63

13

Kono

24

48

28

All other ethnic groups

33

49

18

I consider myself just a S/Leonean

18

58

24

Total

25

58

17

N=838
Pearson Chi2 (12) =27.8***

Likelihood Ratio chi2 (12) =27.5***

Gamma = .1323

Cramer's V = .1288

Note: ***P<. 001
Next, I examine the role of President Kabbah in mobilizing the masses into the
political process leading up to the elections.
President Ahmad Teian Kabbah and the 2002 Elections
The final results of the 2002 elections symbolized a watershed development not
only for post-conflict environments, but also how scholarship may come to generally
understand elections in multiethnic societies and their implications for efforts at
democratizing in recent times. As the results show, one candidate, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah
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and his party, the SLPP emerged victorious by garnering support across all ethnic lines
and thus potentially reducing any lingering tensions following the civil war in the
country. It is remarkable that several years on, not a single shot has been fired in the
name of that conflict which engulfed entire communities in the country for over ten
years. It is even more remarkable that in a multiethnic society conducting elections using
the proportional representation electoral system, Kabbah and the SLPP were able to forge
an electoral majority despite the expectation that the PR system typically induces the
emergence of small parties representative of diverse shades of opinion. Thus, an
important question that this electoral outcome raises is why voters of diverse ethnic
groups and local communities cast their votes overwhelmingly for Kabbah and his SLPP
when candidates and political parties considered more representative of their ethnic
groups and communities, given existing theories, were on the same ballot.
To answer this question, it is important to start by taking another look at Kabbah,
his style of leadership and his worldview during his stewardship of the SLPP and Sierra
Leone. Kabbah's role in steering Sierra Leone towards the peaceful outcome of the 2002
elections was not lost on even his political adversaries. An executive member of the
opposition People's Democratic Party told me that Kabbah's calm demeanor, his policy
of inclusiveness and his Muslim faith were all blessings to the nation of Sierra Leone
during the turbulent times of the events leading to the ceasefire and the conduction of
elections. Kabbah, he said, stayed very calm throughout the months of negotiations with
the rebel Revolutionary United Front and because of this many people came to perceive
him as a steady leader, a good captain of the boat of state during stormy weather and so

See Maurice Duverger
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most concluded that he could be trusted at the helm of Sierra Leone for another term. The
opposition figure told me that unlike other political leaders in the country and in Africa,
Kabbah did not have any known enemies that he was sworn to destroy or vice versa. This
made him a likeable national figure and preferable to the others that Kandeh (2003) refer
to as "legion of certified scoundrels."
Regarding his policy of inclusiveness, the opposition figure also told me that
since Kabbah assumed office in 1996, his cabinets were the most inclusive Sierra
Leoneans had ever seen. His appointments for key positions in government included
members of ethnic groups from all across the country. Even the leader of the PDP, the
late Thaimu Bangura, was once a minister in Kabbah's government, the opposition leader
told me. It was hard for voters not to like this kind of man, he added. Thirdly, the
opposition figure concluded that Kabbah's Muslim faith also played a factor in his
electoral victory because many Muslims identified with his religious faith and his title of
"Alhaji," which in the Muslim faith represents a title of respect. Since the religious
majority of Sierra Leoneans are Muslims, they also identified with Kabbah for this
reason. (This latter claim, as we can see from above, is not supported by the analysis of
the data earlier).
Kabbah, a lawyer by profession who was trained in the United Kingdom, returned
to Sierra Leone in 1992 following almost 20 years as an international administrator in the
service of the United Nations. Following his return to Sierra Leone, his first national
appointment was chairman of the National Advisory Council set up by the military junta,
the National Provisional Ruling Council, to advise on constitutional matters in the
country with a view to revisit the 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone. When the NPRC
lifted the ban on political activities in 1995, Kabbah was elected president of Sierra
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Leone in 1996 through an unlikely coalition with Thaimu Bangura, a Temne, who threw
his electoral weight and that of his support base behind Kabbah and the SLPP party that
drew the majority of its support from the supposedly rival Southeastern based ethnic
group of the Mendes.89 With this coalition, Kabbah and the SLPP won the 1996 elections
with almost 60 percent of the votes. Given theories of ethnic voting, it was expected that
Bangura should have thrown his lot with Karefa-Smart the second-runner up that was on
the runoff ballot with Kabbah because, as Van de Walle argues, "less than the expectation
that they will benefit directly from the vote, citizens, [in this case Temnes] may feel that
only a member of their own ethnic group may end up defending the interests of the ethnic
group. If such theories have veracity, why did Temnes crossover to the SLPP and not the
UNPP given the supposed correlation of their interests with the latter?
Following his electoral victory in 1996, Kabbah was ousted in a military coup a
year later on May 25th 1997 and subsequently reinstated in 1998 only to see his
administration threatened with violent overthrow again in 1999 when the RUF invaded
Freetown. Agreeing to negotiate an end to the conflict, Kabbah signed an accord with
rebel forces in Lome Togo in July 1999. The Accord granted amnesty to all rebels and
gave both Foday Sankoh, the head of the RUF and Major Johnny Paul Koroma
unconditional pardons to return to Sierra Leone. Sankoh was offered a position in

A similar occurrence repeated in the 2007 elections albeit with different beneficiaries. Going into the
runoff between the APC and the SLPP party; Ernest Koroma and his APC party which, supposedly draws
most of its support from the Temne people of the Northern region, negotiated an unlikely coalition with
Charles Margai of the PMDC party, a rival party to the SLPP which draws most of its support from Mendes
in the Southeastern region of the country. The APC emerged victorious at the helm of this coalition, which
pitted Mendes against Mendes.
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Kabbah's government as a government minister in charge of the mineral wealth of the
country with a rank of vice president, which he accepted.
This was one of the instances that demonstrated Kabbah's policy of inclusiveness.
He was willing to set aside all political differences, make concessions to opposing
interests in the country and do anything necessary to bring to peace to people of Sierra
Leone just like he had promised them in his swearing-in statement in 1996.
Jimmy Kandeh and some observers have attributed the overwhelming victory of
Kabbah and the SLPP in the elections of 2002 to a referendum on Kabbah's presidency.
One weakness in such claims is that there were other political parties on the ballot
representing different shades of opinion. The other parties and presidential candidates
campaigned across the country making promises about what they will do if elected, just
like Kabbah and the SLPP did. Given the supposed ethnic bases of political parties and
given the electoral promises of each political party, the theoretical expectation is that
other ethnic groups would have failed to realize that their best interest lay in a common
interest of voting for the SLPP because the pull of ethnic commitment to voting for
candidates from one's ethnic group would have been much stronger.
Kabbah launched his bid for a second presidential term in April 2002
campaigning on a message that emphasized food security and the well being of all Sierra
Leoneans. With the war officially declared over four months earlier, Kabbah also
reminded voters of the need to consolidate the peace that the nation had recently
achieved. For this task, he touted his past experience as an international civil servant with
the United Nations. Two years later, his friend in neighboring Liberia, Madam Ellen
Johnson-Sirleaf, cited similar experience to capture the imagination of voters. Wherever
Kabbah campaigned leading to the 2002 elections, he drummed home the message of his
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international experience and the need to consolidate the peace, which he argued he was
the most qualified to do. There were huge crowds welcoming the president at every
campaign stop all across the country. In his appearances, Kabbah preached a message of
national unity and inclusiveness and encouraged Sierra Leoneans to love each other.90
While Kabbah concentrated on these messages and sought to bring everyone on
board towards the center of the state, most of his opponents chose to remind voters of the
economic hardship in the country pinning the blame for such hardship on the incumbent
government. The opposition also highlighted corruption and nepotism in state politics and
tried to remind some voters of how deprived they were relative to other Sierra Leoneans.
This inability to create an inclusive vision for all Sierra Leoneans is more indicative of
the real reason why so many voters from all walks of life and ethnicity crossed those lines
to cast their lot and their future for the next five years with the SLPP and Kabbah. The
facts suggest that in a multiethnic electoral environment, the presidential candidate that
preached a message of inclusiveness triumphed over others who preached messages of
difference.
The role of former President Kabbah in steering Sierra Leone towards the
peaceful events leading up to the elections of 2002 will be the focus of much more
scholarly attention in the years to come as others are likely to engage it as an illustrative
case study of consensus building in a multiethnic West African state.

Some of his exhortations in the lingua franca Krio for Sierra Leoneans to love each other become the
stuff of jokes across the country because he could not correctly pronounce the Krio word "bad at," which
translated literally means "bad heart" or to envy or hate somebody because of their achievements.
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An Ethnic Census or a Vote for Peace, Development and Reconstruction?
The analyses of the data have provided insight into the political behavior of the
mass electorates and elites of political parties in Sierra Leone leading up to the decisive
post-conflict elections of 2002. From the onset of this analysis, the task was determining
if the vote choices of Sierra Leoneans were indicative of a vote for peace, development
and reconstruction or a vote for the respective interests of their ethnic groups? A verdict
supporting any of the positions bears important implications both for scholarship and for
policy. For scholarship, the findings matter in terms of understanding the boundaries that
have been previously set around the understanding of ethnicity and politics in African
societies. For policy, it mattered in view of the fact that the elections were an experiment
by institutional designers to address what they believe were some of the root causes of
the conflict, expressed partly by the reported marginalization of segments of the
population of Sierra Leone. As they stood, the collective results of the 2002 presidential
and parliamentary elections were a proxy variable that served to show whether the peace
achieved through negotiations was acceptable to all, and whether the country was moving
towards greater national consensus and cohesion or whether, as much of the established
scholarship on political behavior in Africa had proposed, it was business as usual during
elections.
As the analyses show, the findings confirm what was evident in the results and
readily address the first concern. Wearied from the war, Sierra Leoneans from all
communities across the country voted for peace in large numbers because they identified
Kabbah and the SLPP as the candidate and the political party that were most likely to
serve their concerns for security following the war and to undertake the imperative task
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of national development and reconstruction. It is less certain if the vote was an ethnic
census. Clearly, the variables for ethnic identity retained statistically significant
relationships with the vote choice than was the case for the peace vote even when
controlling for other factors such as development needs or the political party in question.
This finding suggests that voting for peace, while a particularly strong predictor of who
voted for the SLPP during the elections, was a finding that was not likely to be replicated.
Unsurprisingly, five years later, in the elections of 2007, the major issue on the minds of
voters changed to concerns about corruption in government. The SLPP was found guilty
of fostering corruption and was duly voted out of office.
Further, the analyses suggest that what has previously been perceived as voting
for the APC and the SLPP based on ethnic loyalties to those parties could actually be
outcomes of the coincidences between ethnic identity and patterns of regional communal
settlements across the country dating back to pre-colonial times. As it turns out, in all
national elections up to 2002, no Mende has ever run against a Temne in direct head-tohead contests in parliamentary elections in any constituency across the country or even in
presidential elections. As it turns out, the ideal conditions and the material evidence
necessary to verify claims of communal adherence to patterns of ethnic voting in Sierra
Leone have been nonexistent.
Regional correlations with ethnic identity have necessitated all political parties to
throw up candidates for national elections who have been recruited from within each
electoral constituency, which customarily turn out to be Mende or Temne as the case may
be for most electoral constituencies in the Southeastern and Northern parts of the country.
As the findings suggest, ethnicity has been much more indicative of an identity variable
showing how Sierra Leoneans have cast their ballot but it has not been the reason why
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they have cast their ballots the way they have, given that their ethnic interests alone could
reasonably be served by voting for any of the candidates running for either the APC or
the SLPP within their electoral constituencies. I next turn to an analysis of the Liberia
case.

184

CHAPTER IV
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR AND MOBILIZATION IN POST-CONFLICT LIBERIA
In June 1992 an all-party Task Force, established by the National Council of
Churches of Kenya (the Wanjau Report) to investigate the causes of the clashes,
submitted a report which noted that in many of the affected areas 'tribes, namely
Kalenjin, Kikuyu, Luo, Luhyia, Kisii and Masai had co-existed peacefully and
intermarriedsincepre-independence
days. (Ajulu 1999, 110-135)
Traditionally, democratization in sub-Saharan Africa has been linked to fears of
spiraling ethnic conflict. Colonial powers used tribal organization of traditional
societies as an excuse to delay the granting of independence, authoritarian
African leaders after independence equated multi-party politics with ethnic
conflict in a defence of military regimes and one-party states, and when the third
wave of democratization reached Africa in the early 1990s, many expressed
concern that democratization on the continent would politicize ethnic divisions
and result in ethnic violence. (Bogaards 2007, 168-193)92
Introduction
Following numerous failed attempts at negotiating and sustaining peace
agreements among the various factions that sprouted during the civil war,93 Charles
Taylor's departure from power in 2003 under pressure from the international community
91

Rok Ajulu, "Kenya: The Survival of the Old Order," in Voting for Democracy: Watershed Elections in

Contemporary Anglophone Africa, ed. John Daniel et al. (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1999),
110-135.
92

Matthijs Bogaards, "Electoral Systems, Party Systems and Ethnicity in Africa," in Votes, Money and

Violence: Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa, Matthias Basedau et al. (Sweden:
Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2007), 168-193.
93

Dorina Bekoe lists sixteen failed ceasefire and peace agreements between 1989 and 1996 alone. See

Dorina A. Bekoe, "Toward a Theory of Peace Agreement Implementation: The Case of Liberia," in Rose
Kadende-Kaiser and Paul J. Kaiser, eds, Phases of Conflict in Africa, (Ontario, Canada: de Sitter
Publications, 2005), 114-115.

185

and an unlikely coalition of rival Liberian warring factions finally paved the way to peace
allowing that country to also hold its first truly post-conflict elections in 2005, two years
after Sierra Leone held its elections. The results of those elections contrasted markedly
with those from Sierra Leone and allow us to test the relative strength of dominant
explanations in the literature which have largely maintained that voting in African
societies is an expression of group identity instead of individualistic preferences for the
positions of competing candidates.
Additionally, an empirical examination of the results of the election in Liberia
allows systematic comparison with the Sierra Leone case enabling the first comparative
determination of the salient variables that help explain why voters in Sierra Leone
appeared to reach a consensus by voting overwhelmingly for the SLPP and Ahmed Tejan
Kabbah while voters in Liberia appeared to fail to reach a similar consensus on any
political party or presidential candidate during the first round of their post-conflict
elections. More importantly, the comparison helps to identify the conditions under which
political parties and candidates emerge during post-conflict elections that engender
consensus given identified lines of cleavages in such societies that some scholars have
argued preclude such outcomes (Daniel et al. 2007).
Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to undertake a post-hoc evaluation of the data
from Liberia, as was done with Sierra Leone. As mentioned in the opening chapter to this
dissertation, the contrasting voting outcomes from Liberia and the Sierra Leone are even
more striking given the electoral systems that were employed by institutional designers
for the two elections. We need not revisit the overall theoretical underpinnings of the
dissertation in the opening to this chapter. Nevertheless, it is important to point out,
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however briefly, some of the additional evidentiary gaps between the voting outcomes in
Liberia and some expectations given theories in the existing scholarship.
As with the previous chapter, the analyses, observations and explanations that
follow are based on evidence derived from the following sources: a) a national survey of
a randomly sampled segment of the population of Liberia, N=910; b) interviews with
elites of political parties at the national, regional and local levels; c) interviews with
senior government officials especially those dealing with elections administration at the
national, regional and local levels; d) interviews with local community elders; e) analyses
of published materials including university theses and newspaper reports; f) interviews
with members of civil society movements and staff of international and local nongovernmental organizations across the country; g) and also, insight gained from long
periods of 'soaking and poking' around the country.
In the main, the empirical evidence provides less support for an ethnic census.
Instead, much of the evidence demonstrates that, in the post-war environment, more
Liberians voted for political parties and inspirational individuals such as George Weah
and Madam Johnson-Sirleaf whose candidatures held promise for real changes in their
livelihoods. The evidence suggests further that the fact that so many candidates sprouted
up to contest the elections points more to an electoral field of competent Liberians or, at
least, those who thought they were competent to undertake the imperative tasks of
national development and reconciling Liberia rather than an ethnically splintered country,
as conventional wisdom would suggest.
Prior to the elections of 2005, Liberians experienced what ultimately turned out to
be premature aspirations for lasting peace when they elected Charles Taylor president in
a landslide in 1997, similar to what Sierra Leoneans bestowed on Tejan Kabbah and his
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SLPP party in the post-conflict elections of 2002. Scholars such as Lyons (1999) and
Harris (1999) offered what seemed at the time plausible explanations of the voting
outcome as a desire for peace by the totality of Liberians who reasoned that if Charles
Taylor did not win those elections, he would resort to war and destabilize the entire
country all over again.94 The seeming inevitability and scale of the violence that ensued
in 1999 two years following the election of Taylor belies the logic of such explanations.
One irony is that whereas it was claimed that Liberians voted for Charles Taylor hoping
that as the most belligerent of all the parties to the conflict his victory would grant them a
modicum of relief from war, Sierra Leoneans resisted all such inclinations when faced
with similar choices in the elections of 2002. With the Revolutionary United Front on the
ballot, Sierra Leoneans risked life and limb but the voting pattern that resulted ensured
that the RUF did not win a single seat in parliament.
A remarkable point about the 1997 vote for Taylor is that given the socio-cultural
milieu of various ethnic group identities in Liberia, which much of the scholarship has
emphasized shape the political choices of voters, their congregation towards a locus of
addressing their security needs in electing Taylor as Harris and Lyon posit, suggests a
much more complex and much more calculated decision-making process than what such
voters have been credited with. The fact that the votes for the first truly post-conflict
elections of 2005 took a very divergent turn buttresses this latter point. If we interpose the
logic of the explanations of the voting decisions of the Liberian electorate during the
elections of 1997 on the elections of 2005, are we then to assume that Liberians desired
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peace in 1997 but did not in 2005 since they could not identify a single candidate to
whom they could award a landslide vote?
One analytical challenge is that despite our desire for post-conflict elections to
become turning points for the democratization of societies that have endured conflict, and
in spite of advances in methodology for studying voting behavior, we are yet to
systematically study and understand the political behavior of the electorate during such
elections and, consequently, we just do not yet know what the electorates mean to say
and whether the electoral outcomes are most indicative of a desire for peace or of
persistent cleavages.
Another gap between theoretical explanations and the evidence offered by the
final electoral outcome in Liberia is the fate of Weah who went from the frontrunner
following the first round of voting to losing the second round of elections held on
November 8.95 Within less than a one-month time frame, from October 11 to November
8, the electoral fortunes of Weah changed rather dramatically in a society where voting
preferences are assumed to be fixed. The remarkable note here is that given the
predominant ethnic thesis, why did Weah ultimately lose the second round of the
elections to Johnson-Sirleaf? The switch was dramatic enough such that in counties such
as Nimba and Montserrado that Weah carried during the first round, Johnson-Sirleaf
overturned those leads winning those counties by 77 percent and 55 percent, respectively
(National Elections Commission of Liberia 2005). Harris (2006, 388-389) attributed the
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vote switches to elite bargaining as some elites from those states placed their collective
loyalties behind Johnson-Sirleaf during the intense maneuverings that took place between
the two elections. An interesting point here is that some of the elites from those states
who were credited for delivering the votes to Johnson-Sirleaf were also on the
presidential ballot during the first round but failed to carry their states. Weah also bested
Johnson-Sirleaf in five other states during the first round: Maryland, River Cess, Bong,
Grand Bassa and Grand Cape Mount. He lost all but River Cess and Grand Cape Mount
to Johnson-Sirleaf during the second round of elections. If indeed, it were a question of
communal loyalty to supposed natives of those counties, why did individuals from those
counties who were on the presidential ballot not carry their home counties during the first
round of voting when their people had the chance to vote for them?
Consequently, instead of accepting indiscriminate explanations of group
preference as important influences on the political behavior and mobilization of voters in
Liberia, it is important to undertake an empirical examination of those patterns in order to
understand more fully what voters really intended to say when they cast their ballots for
the different candidates and parties. This chapter of the dissertation undertakes that task
by presenting the results of the analyses of the survey data.
The 2005 Post-Conflict Elections in Liberia
After Charles Taylor was forced out of both the presidency and the political scene
of Liberia, the various parties to the Second Liberian war (1999-2003) which included the
Government of Liberia (GOL), Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
(LURD), the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), and various political
parties signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Accra, Ghana on August 18
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2003 under the auspices of President John Kuffuor of Ghana in his other role as head of
the African Union at that time (Bekoe 2008; Levitt 2005).96 The signing of the agreement
was witnessed by a cross section of members of civil society in Liberia.
Following difficult negotiations lasting over three months, the stakeholders to the
CPA agreed on a two-year transitional government leading to elections in 2005. Article
20, Sections la and lb of the agreement provided that Moses Blah, the vice president to
the deposed Taylor, precede the transitional government but step down on 14th October
2003 and allow the transitional government to assume office. Blah stepped down on the
stipulated date making way for Gyude Bryant, a prominent Liberian businessman, to
assume the executive duties of head of the transitional government. Bryant and other
members of the transitional government would later be accused of gross misappropriation
of public funds (Sawyer 2008, 180). The CPA stipulated that the term of the transitional
government end on the third Monday of January 2006 with the inauguration of the next
elected government of Liberia.
In addition to the establishment of an executive, other institutional arrangements
under the CPA provided for the formation of a legislative assembly, a judiciary, an
electoral commission and several other commissions consisting of members appointed by
the various armed factions, political parties, and Liberian civil society using a pre-agreed
formula (United States Institute of Peace 2003; Sawyer 2008, 179). An interesting
condition imposed by Article 25 (4) of the CPA on the members of the executive
membership of the transitional government including the Chairman Gyude Bryant, his

For a copy of this agreement and its details, see the United States Institute of Peace at
http://www.usip.org/librarv/pa/liberia/liberia 08182003 cpa.html (Accessed December 29, 2008).
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vice chairman, and all the principal cabinet ministers was that they would not run for any
elective office in the elections that were to come in 2005. David Harris argues that this
stipulation proved very strategic later in establishing a political space that was relatively
devoid of any direct undue influence by the membership of the transitional government
(Harris 1999, 376). Amos Sawyer (2008) made a similar observation that the absence of
an overbearing incumbent during the elections in 2005 made for a confident electorate
relishing the opportunity to exercise their free will, for the first time, in electing who shall
rule them.
Except for as yet unsubstantiated allegations and rumors of corruption (Sawyer
2008, 180), the stewardship of Gyude Bryant and the National Transitional Government
of Liberia from 2003 up to their handing over of the reins of government in 2006 was
largely uneventful. Working with a United Nations Force of over 15,000 that was similar
both in mandate and composition to the United Nations Force that had successfully
supervised the peace operations earlier in Sierra Leone, Bryant and the transitional
government oversaw preparations for legislative and presidential elections as agreed upon
in the CPA of 2003. It can be said that Liberia benefited greatly from the roadmap
established by the experience the international community gained in Sierra Leone two
and a half years earlier. This experience included tried and proven steps towards
demobilization and reintegration of former combatants leading to elections. For one,
organizing post-conflict elections of that magnitude in that part of the world was no
longer unfamiliar territory for institutional designers and stakeholders to the peace in
Liberia. But for the number of armed antagonists to the conflict and the absence of an
incumbent on the political scene, the conditions were quite similar and conducive to
replicating what had worked in Sierra Leone.
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Overall, the broader campaign themes that subsumed all tendencies and messages
from the political parties and candidates were the rebuilding, reconciliation and post-war
development of Liberia. All candidates tried to position themselves as the most
competent to carry out these tasks in the eyes of the electorate. In doing so, the campaign
platforms of the various political parties blurred. Harris (2006, 378) comments, "little
separated the parties in terms of their political platforms. Poorly articulated desires for
good governance, development and reconciliation were standard fare."
Most Liberians I interviewed about their recollections of Election Day on October
11 2005 told me it was a joyous occasion for them. Their recollections of the day were
devoid of the fear and intimidation that had overshadowed previous elections in the
country such as those of 1997 in which Taylor got elected, or for those who were old
enough to vote, the questionable elections of 1985 that Samuel Doe supposedly won.
Interestingly, whereas most Sierra Leoneans I interviewed expressed joy at the cessation
of the war that allowed them to pick those who will represent them, Liberians expressed a
sense of apathy with the candidate pool of presidential candidates that I did not detect in
Sierra Leone. Most were glad at the opportunity to vote again but they did not express
optimism that the crop of leadership will be any less corrupt than previous leaderships
whose actions had led them down the road to civil war.
Like Sierra Leone two years earlier, many of the activities leading up to the
elections on October 11 and immediately after went as planned. Again, the process
seemed to have benefited from the previous experience the international community
gained in Sierra Leone. There were few problems. Some raised concerns regarding the
large number of potential voters among Liberian refugees who could not register to vote.
The ballots cast by about 25,000 internally displaced Liberians for members of the
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legislature were also invalidated when they were prevented from casting votes in the
counties in which they had registered. The eligibility of some presidential candidates was
challenged in several court cases. Resolutions were handed down late by the Supreme
Court in favor of some of the candidates whose names were left off the ballot. A
potentially crippling logistical crisis in reprinting ballots to include their names was
averted when they decided not to run in the elections (Harris 2006, 380).
Some stakeholders criticized the timing of the elections around the rainy season
when a huge proportion of roads in Liberia are impassable (Harris 2006, 379). Others
such as the former head of state, Amos Sawyer questioned the pace of the transition from
the signing of the peace agreements to holding elections as too fast and not giving enough
time for the country's electoral body to adequately prepare for the election. It turned out
that these fears were largely unfounded given that the elections went mostly as planned.
Finally, there was the problem of voter awareness. For an electorate that had not
voted in about eight years, or arguably never voted in completely transparent and
violence-free elections, this problem was manifested by the considerable numbers of
voters who could not comprehend the ballot papers they were given to cast (Harris 2006,
381). Some of the younger population had never voted. Regardless of these problems, for
a country recovering from civil war, the elections went quite well as no major incidents
occurred that threatened to derail the overall process.
Frances Johnson-Morris, the chairperson of the National Elections Commission
announced the results of the vote on October 26, 2005. No presidential candidate gained
enough votes, the required 50 percent plus one votes stipulated in the electoral laws, to
claim outright victory. Table 4.1 below reports the details of the results for the election
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for the Liberian National Assembly. As the table shows, no party won enough seats close
to the minimum required in forming a majority in any of the houses in the legislature.
Table 4.1
Results of the 2005 Legislative Elections in Liberia

Political Party/
Coalition
Coalition Transformation Liberia (COTOL)
National Patriotic Party (NPP)
Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)
Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
Liberty Party (LP)
Unity Party (UP)
National Democratic Party Liberia (NDPL)
All Liberia Coalition Party (ALCOP)
National Reformation Party (NRP)
New Deal Movement (NDP)
United Democratic Alliance (UDA)
Independents

Senate

House of
Representatives

Number of Seats
07
04
03
03
03
03
02
01
01

Number of Seats
08
04
05
15
09
08
01
02
01
03
01
07

03

Source: Africa Elections, http://africanelections.tripod.com/lr.html. (Accessed December
29, 2008)
Weah's Congress for Democratic Change won 15 seats, the highest number of
seats in the House of Representatives but could not manage a similar result in the
elections for the Senate where the Party placed third with three seats behind Varney
Sherman's Coalition for the Transformation of Liberia (COTOL) with seven seats and
Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Party with four seats. The Unity Party whose
presidential candidate would eventually win the elections was equally disadvantaged and
rather handicapped by the outcome. With only eight seats in the House of Representatives
and a paltry three seats in the Senate, the UP would need a lot of bargaining and
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cooperation from other political parties in the legislature to get its proposals passed. The
results of the elections for president were equally splintered as those for the legislature.
The elections results in Table 4.2 show the splintered nature of the votes Liberians
cast in their choices for president in the elections of 2005. Ten candidates on the
presidential ballot gained less than one percent each of the national votes cast. Most
could not best Weah, the frontrunner in the first round of elections even in counties from
which they hailed. Weah won 28.3 percent of the votes in the first round leading
Johnson-Sirleaf, who placed second with 20 percent of the votes.

Table 4.2
Results of the 2005 Presidential Elections in Liberia
First Round
Presidential Candidate Political Party

Votes

George Opong Weah

CDC

Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf

Second Round
%

Votes

%

275,265

28.3

327,046

40.6

UP

192,326

19.8

478,526

59.4

Charles Brumskine

LP

135,093

13.9

Winston Tubman

NDPL

89,623

9.2

Varney Sherman

COTOL

76,403

7.8

Roland Massaquoi

NPP

40,361

4.1

Joseph Korto

LERP

31,814

3.3

Alhaji G.V. Kromah

ALCOP

27,141

2.8

Togba-Nah Tipoteh

APD

22,766

2.3

William S. Tubman

RULP

15,115

1.6

John Morlu

UDA

12,068

1.2

Nathaniel Barnes

LDP

9,325

1.0

Margaret Thompson

FAPL

8,418

0.9

Joseph Woah-Tee

LPL

5,948

0.6

Sekou Conneh

PRODEM

5,499

0.6
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Table 4.2 - Continued
First Round

Second Round

Presidential Candidate Political Party

Votes

%

David Farhat

FDP

4,497

05

George Kieh, Jr.

NDM

4,476

0.5

ArmahJallah

NPL

3,837

0.4

Robert Kpoto

ULD

3,825

0.4

George Kiadii

NATVIPOL

3,646

0.4

Samuel R. Divine Sr.

Independent

3,188

0.3

Alfred Reeves

NRP

3,156

0.3

Votes

%

Source: African Elections, http://africanelections.tripod.com/lr.html (accessed December
29, 2008).
Five presidential candidates from Lofa, running on the tickets of five different
political parties, all fared poorly. Roland Massaquoi, one of the presidential candidates
from Lofa and the flag bearer of Charles Taylor's former party, the National Patriotic
Party, performed better than the other candidates from Lofa. But even he could not
manage to poll five percent of the national votes. This fact is even more remarkable given
that the National Patriotic Party had controlled the greater heartland of Liberia during the
war period with thousands of young fighters under its command and in spite of some
residual concerns for Taylor's interference by remote control from outside the country.
Was the diffusion of their votes among so many candidates and political parties
an ethnic census or something else? The Carter Report would later describe the entire
conduct of the elections as an outcome of the "demonstration of strong desire for peace
by Liberians" (Carter Center Report on Liberia 2005). If we accept this conclusion and
compare it to that referenced in the previous chapter by Jimmy Kandeh (2003) on Sierra
Leone, could the voting patterns in two similar societies desiring peace be so divergent
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and yet mean the same thing? Table 4.3 shows political parties that won in each county in
the elections for president, Senate and the House of Representatives.
Table 4.3
Political Party Victories by Counties - Elections of 2005
County

President

Senate

House of Representatives

Bomi

UP*
UP**

NDPL; COTOL

3 Seats: COTOL; NDPL; CDC

Bong

NDPL*
Up**

NPP; Independent 6 Seats: UP; NPP; LP; NPP;

UP*

NRP;UP

3 Seats: NRP; LP; UP

Gbarpolu

CDC; NDM

up**
Grand Bassa

LP*
UP**

Independent; LP

5 Seats: LP; LP; LP; LP; LP

Grand Cape

NPP; NPP

3 Seats: COTOL; COTOL;

Mount

COTOL*
UP**

Grand Gedeh

CDC*

NDPL; COTOL

COTOL

CDC**
Grand Km

CDC*

3 Seats: NDM; Independent;
CDC

COTOL; APD

2 Seats: APD; COTOL

COTOL; ALCOP

4 Seats: LP; ALCOP; ALCOP

CDC**
Lofa

UP*

up**
Margibi

UP*

COTOL
LP; CDC

up**
Maryland

NDPL*

6 Seats: Independent; UP; CDC
NPP; Independent; UP

UP; UP

3 Seats: APD; UP; NPP

CDC; CDC

14 Seats: 9 Seats to CDC; UP

up**
Montserrado

CDC*

up**

Independent; LP;
Independent
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Table 4.3 - Continued
County

President

Senate

House of Representatives

Nimba

CDC*
UP**

Independent;

6 Seats: UP; COTOL; COTOL

LP*

UP; LP

2 Seats: Independent; UP

COTOL; COTOL

3 Seats: CDC; APD; LP

APD; APD

3 Seats: UDA; APD; APD

River Cess

COTOL

NDM; CDC; UP

CDC**
River Gee

CDC*
CDC**

Sinoe

CDC*
CDC**

Source: Compiled from National Election Commission of Liberia. 2005 Election Results.
www.necliberia.org.
*Won the first round of the election for president
**Won the second round of the election for president
Please refer to the list of abbreviations for political parties listed here.
Table 4.3 illustrates further the diffusion of votes among political parties in
Liberia following the elections of 2005. No political party won across the board in any
county in elections for president, Senate or House of Representatives. The closest parties
came to a sweep of the votes in counties were the CDC in Montserrado where the party
won the votes for president, the two senate seats and nine of the fourteen seats in the
House of Representatives. The Liberty Party of Charles Brumskine also swept the House
seats in his native Grand Bassa and Sherman's coalition, COTOL, did the same in his
native county of Grand Cape Mount, winning all three House seats.
Some political parties that were founded by native sons from several counties had
poor showings where, under ethnic census theories, they would be expected to derive
their greatest support. Several examples are evident. Running on the ticket of the New
Deal Movement, George Klay Kieh Jr. a professor of Political Science and the sole
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presidential candidate in the race who hailed from Margibi County lost that county to
Johnson-Sirleaf. The New Deal Movement did not even win a Senate seat or seat in the
House of Representatives for Margibi County, nor did Kieh even place third when the
presidential results for his home county where tabulated. Margaret Tor-Thompson, the
only other female presidential candidate in the race hailed from River Cess County and
ran on the ticket of the Freedom Alliance Party. One would have expected that the
publicity from her being one of the two female aspirants in the race would have translated
into votes in her home county with support from her community but that support did not
materialize. Instead, Brumskine won River Cess in the first round of the elections and
Tor-Thompson did not even place among the first three. Johnson-Sirleaf placed third in
that county. The Freedom Alliance Party also did not win a single seat in the legislature
from River Cess County.
Yet, another example is the case of Joseph Korto, the sole presidential candidate
from Nimba County who ran on the ticket of the Liberia Equal Rights Party. Korto lost
Nimba County in the first round of voting to Weah, albeit narrowly by less than one
percent of the votes. But it was still a telling fact because he was the sole presidential
candidate who hailed from Nimba and the ethnic thesis would have had the people of
Nimba throwing their weight behind him. Also, LERP did not win a single seat in Nimba
for the legislative elections of 2005. Joseph Woah-Tee of the Labor Party of Liberia and
Samuel Divine, an independent presidential candidate, are also cases in point. Woah-Tee,
who hails from Bong, was the sole presidential candidate from that county but during the
first round of the election, he lost the county and did not even place among the first three.
Instead, Winston Tubman of the National Democratic Party of Liberia, an AmericoLiberian who had spent most of his time out of the country, placed first in a county where
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an African-Liberian was running as the sole candidate for president. Divine's case is a
little understandable because he hails from the very populous urban and cosmopolitan
county of Montserrado that includes the capital Monrovia. Any edge he might have had
as a native son of Montserrado was swept aside by the super stardom of Weah and the
appeal of Johnson-Sirleaf who placed first and second, respectively, in the county
following the first round of elections. Given explanations of communal voting in African
societies and the much hailed "big person" of patronage networks rooted in local
communities (Randall 2007; 89-92), the evidence from these cases are contradictory and
even confounding.
Mass Political Behavior in Liberia: Support for Political Parties and Vote Choice During
the 2005 Elections
As in the previous chapter, my aim now is to use appropriate methodology that
has been applied to the study of voting behavior to examine and explain the voting
patterns that emerged following Liberia's post-conflict elections of 2005. In analyzing the
2005 elections, I will start with tests of association between the independent variables and
the dependent variable of vote choice for political parties. Following this step, I utilize
logistic regression with calculated probabilities to analyze the vote choices for political
parties by respondents from various ethnic groups in order to identify any within-group
differences that exist among members of the same ethnic groups.
As in the previous chapter, I will also start here with an examination of the
relationship between ethnic identity and the vote choice, the vote choice being the
political parties and presidential candidates that Liberians supported during the elections
of 2005. Here too I sought to verify the nature of any potential relationships between
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variables reflecting ethnic group identities and political parties and candidates for which
respondents to the surveys voted. The dependent variable "vote choice" and the
explanatory variable "ethnic identity" were similarly measured as in Sierra Leone by
asking respondents to self identify with one of the sixteen ethnic groups in Liberia. Table
4.4 produces results of the test of the hypothesis that there is a statistically significant
relationship between ethnic groups in Liberia and the candidates or political parties for
which they voted during the post-conflict elections of 2005.
Table 4.4
Survey Result: Ethnic Identity and Vote Choice in the
Liberian Legislative Elections of 2005
Political Party
ALCOP

CDC

FAPL

FDP

LAP/
COTOL

LDP

LERP

LINU

LP

LPL

LPP/

Totals

Ethnic
Vote counts among respondents from each ethnic group

Groups
Bassa

-

25

Bella

-

6

1

Dei

5

Gbandi

2

4

-

Gio

-

9

-

10

1

1

24

1

1

7

-

2

3

101

138

Kpelle

1

31

3

10

Krahn

24

4

52

-

Loma

-

21

2

1

6

Mndgo

16

3

-

2

1

-

Mano

-

12

2

3

5

Mende

1

-

Vai

2

8

1

-

Gola
Grebo
Kissi

Kru

Just/Lib -

13

-

Totals

255

1'

Other

21

-

1

1

13

1

14

-

14

1

28

1

13

13

2

50

3

31

5

62

1

31

2

24

1

3

30

1

2

-

-

24

9

.

.

25

146

2

25

5

13

36

202

520

Table 4.4 - Continued
Political Party
NVPL

NDM

NDPL

NPL

NPP

NRP

PDP

RULP

ULD

1

1
1
2

UP

Totals

Ethnic
Groups

Vote counts among respondents of each ethnic group

Bassa

2
1
1
4

1

Bella
Dei
Gbandi
Gio

2
1
_

1
2
_

Gola
Grebo
Kissi
Kpelle
Rrahn
Kru
Loma

1
1
1
2

48
7
2
1

Mndgo
Mano
Mende
Vai
Other
Just/L
Totals

6
10

73

2
6

34

14

27
3
8
7
6
5
15
19
35
5
16
26
7
7
5
6
3
10
226

33
7
10
12
10
11
23
22
109
12
21
31
12
14
5
12
3
19
366

Pearson Chi-Square (357) = 1.637*
Cramer's V =.327***

Lambda =.236***

N=900
Note: ***Significantatp<0.001

With the exception of members of the Bassa ethnic group who awarded threefourths of their vote to the Liberty Party of Brumskine, a leading politician in Liberia
who identifies with Grand Bassa County, the discernable pattern from the table above is
that ethnic groups in Liberia did not display much allegiance to political parties whose
leaders hailed from their counties. Of particular note are the Grebo vote, the Krahn vote,
the Kpelle vote and the Mandingo vote. Data from the table shows that all these groups
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did not ally themselves solely with political parties that identify with their administrative
regions and counties of origin. Rather, their votes were spread almost evenly among the
parties. In the case of the Krahn, one would expect that their votes would have gone in
overwhelming numbers to the National Democratic Party of Liberia, the party founded by
Samuel Doe, the former head of state who hailed from Grand Gedeh, the homeland of the
Krahns. Doe is credited as the individual who single-handedly elevated Krahns from
relative obscurity in the political landscape of Liberia to major administrative positions in
the national government. Instead, the Krahn vote was seen spread across the board with a
sizeable portion going to Weah's Congress for Democratic Change. One pattern from the
figures above is that exceptionally popular personalities such as Weah and Madam
Johnson-Sirleaf benefited the most from the dispersion of the votes as their political
parties received votes across all ethnic groups. This revelation is consistent with the
conclusions reached by Harris, Sawyer and the Carter Report that personalities, more
than political parties, mattered in the elections (Harris 2006, 382; Sawyer 2008, 182;
Carter Report 2005, 12). Statistically, the p-value suggests that the relationships we see
here between the two variables of vote choice for political parties and the ethnic identities
of respondents are statistically significant and the observed pattern is not likely to have
occurred by chance.
Next, I examined the relationship between ethnic groups and the presidential
candidates for whom they voted during the elections of 2005. Table 4.5 reports the result
of the Chi-Square test of association testing the relationship between the choice of
presidential candidate as a dependent variable and the ethnic groups of respondents as the
explanatory variable.
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Table 4.5
Survey Result: Ethnic Identity and Vote Choice in the
Liberian Presidential Elections of 2005
Presidential Candidate
Barnes Brmskne

Conneh

Divine Farhat

Jallah

Sirleaf

Kiadii

Kieh

Korto Kpoto Total

Ethnic
Group

Vote Count

Bassa

-

103

Bella

1

Dei

1

Gbandi
Gio

-

28

1

1

3

1

2

8

-

-

7

1

1

-

-

6

2

Grebo Kissi
Kpelle Krahn Kru
Loma
Mndgo Mano
-

1

4

5

-

Gola

7
12
13
10

1

1

14

2

1

20

-

10

36

1

1

57

6

-

27

-

10

7

-

1

37

1

6

7

1

15

4

-

24

8

4

2

6

I:

3

-

11

2

-

21

14

2

446

4
5

-

Mende

1

Vai
Just/L

-

Totals

4

149

Kromah

Msquoi

Other

134

8

16

231

10

12
16
25

22

38
5
9
3

Presidential Candidate
Morlu

Reeves

Sherman Tipoteh MT-Th

TmanW TmanV Weah

W-Tee

Ethnic
Group

Vote Count

Total

Bassa

2

2

1

26

37

Bella

1

-

6

9

Dei

-

6

-

Gbandi
Gio

2
2

5

Kissi
Kpelle

17

-

1

-

-

2

-

1

1

1
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49

12
11

8

Gola
Grebo

-

4

14

10

1

12

23

1

36

7

9

30

103

Table 4.5 - Continued
Presidential Candidate
Kromah

Msquoi

Morlu

Reeves

Sherman Tipoteh MT-Th

TmanW TmanV Weah

W-Tee

Ethnic
Group

Krahn

Vote Count

-

1

1

2

-

-

-

5

35

Loma

-

Mndgo

16

-

Mano

1

Mende

-

Vai

2

Other
Just/L

-

Totals

18

Kru

1

2
32

5

Total

8

24

-

2

52

1

1

21

35

-

1

-

13

8

1

7

13

1

23

81

253

4

456

1
5

1

-

2

3

2

12

11

61
25
21
20
2
26

Pearson Chi-Square (357) 1.708***
N=904
Cramer';sV = .333 ***

Lambda =24j***

Note: ***Significant at P<0.001; "Mndgo" represents "Mandingo;"
MT-Th= Margaret Thor-Thompson; Msquoi=Roland Massaquoi; Brmskne=Brumskine; TmanW=Winston Tubman;
TmanV= William Tubman; W-Tee=Woah-Tee.

Similar to their votes for political parties, there also did not appear to be any bloc
preferences for presidential candidates reflective of an ethnic census. Just as is the case
with their respective political parties, the CDC and the UP, Weah and Johnson-Sirleaf
emerged as the favorite presidential candidates among all the ethnic groups, even with
ethnic groups such as the Gbandi and Mano from which other presidential candidates on
the ballot hailed. The exception is the Bassa who preferred Brumskine and his Liberty
Party two-to-one against all other candidates including the very popular Weah and
Johnson-Sirleaf.
Why did the electorate vote as they did? In exploring the voting pattern, the
survey instrument employed the same questions as those employed in the surveys on
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Sierra Leone asking respondents why they voted for the particular political party for
which they voted in the elections of 2005. Again, the answer choices were the same as
those for Sierra Leone including: voting for a political party that was most likely to
secure the interests of one's ethnic group against other ethnic groups, voting for a
political party that was most likely to secure the interests of one's region (in the case of
Liberia, counties); voting for a political party that was most likely to secure one's
religious interests; and voting for a political party because it was the party of the "big
person" from one's community or region of the country.97 Additional answer options
reflected a desire to vote for the political party most likely to maintain the peace and a
desire to vote for the political party most likely to effectively undertake postwar
reconciliation and reconstruction and development projects such as building schools,
roads, and clinics. With similar justification, the answer scales were recoded as with the
analysis for Sierra Leone earlier by converting responses into the two categories of
"strongly agree," and "not strongly agree."
Ethnic Identity and Vote Choice
I begin with an examination of the association between a respondent's preference
for a political party and their belief that it was the political party most likely to secure the
interests of their ethnic group. Table 4.6 reports the results of the Chi-Square test of
association.

Please refer to Chapter I for a description of these variables and explanations. I dropped two other
potential explanatory variables that were explored in the surveys, those for "young generation" and "no
reason at all" because, theoretically, their inclusion added the least explanatory value to the study. Their
exclusion was also based on the need to keep the analysis manageable.

207

Table 4.6
Liberian Legislative Elections: Ethnic Identity and Vote Choice
"I voted for them because they
represent the interests of my
Ethnic group" (%)
What political party did you vote
for in the elections for House and
Senate?
ALCOP
CDC
FAPL
FDP
LAP/COTOL
LDP
LERP
LINU/UDA
LP
LPL
LPP/APD
NATVIPOL
NDM
NDPL
NPL
NPP
NRP
PDP
RULP
ULD
UP
Total
Pearson Chi-Square (21) = 128.7***
N=903
Cramer's V = 377***

Not Strongly Agree
48
84
79
100
94
67
50
40
50
100
72
100
100
82
17
80
50
93
100
50
85
77

Strongly Agree
52
16
21
0
6
33
50
60
50
0
28
0
0
18
83
20
50
7
0
50
15
33

Note: ***Significant atpO.OOl
The table shows that at 77 percent, more respondents did not strongly agree with
the statement that they voted for a particular political party because it was the party most
likely to secure the interests of their ethnic group. A discernable pattern is that more
respondents indicated that they voted for comparatively smaller parties such as ALCOP,
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LEMU and NPL because they believed these parties were the parties most likely to secure
the interests of their ethnic group than was the case for parties such as the CDC and UP
that garnered the most votes. The comparatively large Liberty Party led by Brumskine is
an exception. An equal number of respondents who voted for the LP strongly agreed with
the statement that it was the party most likely to secure the interests of their ethnic group
as those who did not strongly agree with the statement. The size of the Chi-Square tells
us that the observed relationship did not occur by chance alone.
Regional Interests and Vote Choice
I turn next to an examination of the relationship between region and the vote
choice. Liberia does not offer much in terms of regional cleavages akin to the divide in
Sierra Leone. According to Clapham (1976), there existed something approaching a
regional divide between tribal groups of the coastal counties such as the Dei in
Montserrado, the Vai in Grand Cape Mount, the Bassa in Grand Bassa and the Kru in
Sinoe, and those of the hinterland such as the Gbandi and Loma of Lofa, and the Krahn
of Grand Gedeh during the 1960s and 1970s when the True Whig Party controlled the
political structures and tended to discriminate in favor of indigenous Liberians from the
coastal regions who were more likely to seek to assimilate into the Americo-Liberian
culture than groups from the hinterland.98

98

For an example of this discrimination, one only needs to look at a distribution of cabinet seats in Liberia

between 1964 and 1973. During that time period, coastal tribal groups received 16 cabinet seats to the two
for groups from the hinterland. In fact, the hinterland only received the two seats in 1973 and had none in
either 1964 or 1968. See Christopher Clapham, Liberia and Sierra Leone: An Essay in Comparative
Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 48
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In the absence of regional consciousness, competition between factions emanating
from counties seemed to have taken over as the geographic loci of political competition.
For example, Gios and Manos from Nimba County, it is argued, are locked in a struggle
with Krahns from neighboring Grand Gedeh such that ethnic groups from a county that
are in opposition to another county are not likely to support or associate with a political
party hailing from the opposing county (Osaghae 1998; Berkeley 2001). Thus, with the
case of Liberia, focus shifted to the mobilizing cues, structures and preferences at the
county level. When the survey asked respondents if seeking regional interests underlay
their preferences for political parties, they were prompted to think of the regional
preferences as their county of origin. Here I sought to verify whether a statistically
significant relationship exists between the political parties for which respondents voted
and their desire to vote for a party because they felt it was the party most likely to present
the exclusive interests of their region of the country, in this case counties. Table 4.7
reports the results of the test.
Table 4.7
Liberian Legislative Elections: Regionalism and Vote Choice
"I voted for them because they
represent the interests of my region" (%)
What political party did you vote
For in the elections for House and
Senate?
ALCOP
CDC
FAPL
FDP
LAP/COTOL
LDP
LEPvP
LINU/UDA
LP

Not Strongly Agree
86
82
93
86
89
67
50
60
82
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Strongly Agree
14
18
7
14
11
33
50
40
18

Table 4.7 - Continued
"I voted for them because they
represent the interests of my region" (%)
What political party did you vote
For in the elections for House and
Senate?
LPL
LPP/APD
NATVIPOL
NDM
NDPL
NPL
NPP
NPvP
PDP
RULP
ULD
UP
Total
N=903
Pearson Chi-Square (21) =29.892
Cramer'sV=. 182

Not Strongly Agree
100
92
86
100
77
33
89
100
93
67
50
79
82

Strongly Agree
0
8
14
0
23
67
11
0
7
33
50
21
18

More respondents above did not strongly agree with the suggestion that they
voted for their choice of political parties in the elections of 2005 because they believed
the parties were most likely to secure the interests of their respective regions (in this case,
counties). An exception to this trend is respondents who voted for the relatively small
political party of the NPL. However, much cannot be made of the relationship observed
here because the p-value for the related Chi-Square is not statistically significant
suggesting that the observed pattern could have materialized by chance alone.
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Religion and Vote Choice
Next, I turned to an examination of potential religious influences on political
behavior at the time of the elections by looking at the relationship between the political
parties for which respondents voted and their desire to vote for the political party most
likely to represent the interests of their religion. Table 4.8 reports the test of association
between the two variables.
Table 4.8 reveals that religion was not a major influence during the elections of
2005. Surprisingly, the majority of respondents who voted for the political parties of all
the presidential candidates who claimed to be guided by a divine vision to run for
president, George Kiadii and the National Vision Party of Liberia, Brumskine and his
Liberty Party, and Alfred Reeves and his National Reformation Party, did not strongly
agree with the statement that religious identity guided their vote choice. Rather, it is the
majority of respondents who voted for Alhaji Kromah's Muslim and Mandingo
dominated ALCOP who indicated that they were guided by religious identity. Perhaps
this reflects the insecurity that Mandingoes felt as Muslims during the civil war when
they were sometimes specifically targeted by NPFL lighters and other factions of the
Liberian civil war who intentionally sought Mandingoes for retaliatory violence
following long-suppressed feelings of animosity from the Doe era. Mandingoes were
believed to be one of the major beneficiaries of Doe's ten-year rule. Kromah once served
as Doe's information minister and Mandingoes were thought to be the recipients of major
government contracts. The value of Chi-Square and the accompanying p-value tells us
that the observed pattern is statistically significant and not likely to have occurred by
chance alone.
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Table 4.8
Liberian Legislative Elections: Religion and Vote Choice
"I voted for them because they represent the interests of my
Religion" (%)
What political party did you vote
for in the elections for House and
Senate?
Not Strongly Agree Strongly Agree
ALCOP
29
71
CDC
79
21
FAPL
93
7
FDP
100
0
LAP/COTOL
100
0
LDP
67
33
LERP
67
33
LINU/UDA
60
40
LP
88
12
LPL
100
0
LPP/APD
100
0
NATVIPOL
86
14
NDM
100
0
NDPL
90
10
NPL
100
0
NPP
94
6
NRP
100
0
PDP
93
7
RULP
100
0
ULD
50
50
UP
85
15
Total
84
16
N=903
Pearson Chi-Square (21) =93.054***
Cramer's V = .321***
Note: ***Significantatp<0.001.
The "Big Person" and Vote Choice
I examined next whether the post-conflict voting pattern in Liberia was influenced
by cues of clientelistic politics. Table 4.9 reports the results of this test.
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Table 4.9
Liberian Legislative Elections: The "Big Person" and Vote Choice
"I voted for them because they are the party of the
"big person" from our area of the country" (%)
What political party did you vote
for in the elections for House and
Senate?
ALCOP
CDC
FAPL
FDP
LAP/COTOL
LDP
LERP
LINU/UDA
LP
LPL
LPP/APD
NATVIPOL
NDM
NDPL
NPL
NPP
NRP
PDP
RULP
ULD
UP
Total

Not Strongly Agree
86
97
93
86
92
67
83
60
93
100
88
100
100
96
67
94
75
93
100
100
98
95

Strongly Agree
14
3
7
14
8
33
17
40
7
0
12
0
0
4
33
6
25
7
0
0
2
5

N=903
Pearson Chi-Square (21) =48.725***
Cramer's V = .232***
Note: ***Significant at pO.OOl
More people did not strongly agree with the statement that they voted for a party
because it was the party of the big person from their part of the country. This trend is
consistent among the votes for all the political parties. The value of Chi-Square and its
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accompanying p-value shows that there is a statistically significant relationship between
the two variables.
Peace and Vote Choice
I next tested for the relationship between the variable for the vote for peace and
the vote choices for political parties. Table 4.10 reports the results.
Table 4.10
Liberian Legislative Elections: Peace and Vote Choice
"I voted for them because they are the party most likely to
unite the country and sustain peace" (%)
What political party did you vote
for in the elections for House and
Senate?
Not Strongly Agree Strongly Agree
ALCOP
~~f9
81
CDC
12
88
FAPL
14
86
FDP
29
71
LAP/COTOL
6
94
LDP
0
100
LERP
0
100
LINU/UDA
20
80
LP
12
88
LPL
0
100
LPP/APD
4
96
NATVIPOL
14
86
NDM
20
80
NDPL
11
89
NPL
0
100
NRP
0
100
PDP
21
79
RULP
0
100
ULD
0
100
UP
16
84
Total
13
87
N=903
Pearson Chi-Square (21) = 21.262
Cramer's V =. 153
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More respondents, 87 percent, strongly agreed with the statement that they voted
for a political party because it was the party most likely to unite the country and sustain
peace following the civil war. This finding is explainable given that peace appeared to be
a valence issue on which the electorate of Liberia did not waver going into the elections.
However, the test statistic is not significant suggesting that this finding was likely due to
chance than anything else. While the issue of peace preoccupied the minds of all
Liberians during this time, one suggestion is that peace will not indefinitely remain the
paramount issue.
Economic Development/Reconstruction and Vote Choice
The final test of association tested the relationship between political parties for
which respondents voted and their desire to vote for the party that was most likely to
develop the country by undertaking infrastructural and other development projects. Table
4.11 reports the results of this test.
Table 4.11
Legislative Elections: Economic Development/Reconstruction and Vote Choice
"I voted for them because they are the party most likely to
develop the country by building roads, clinics and bringing
electricity to the whole country" (%)
What political party did you vote
for in the elections for House and
Senate?
Not Strongly Agree Strongly Agree
ALCOP
43
57
CDC
23
77
FAPL
36
64
FDP
14
86
LAP/COTOL
14
86
LDP
0
100
LERP
33
67
LINU/UDA
60
40
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Table 4 . 1 1 - Continued
"I voted for them because they are the party most likely to
develop the country by building roads, clinics and bringing
electricity to the whole country" (%)
What political party did you vote
for in the elections for House and
Senate?
Not Strongly Agree Strongly Agree
82
LP
18
100
LPL
0
88
NATVIPOL
12
90
NDM
10
84
NDPL
16
67
NPL
33
86
NPP
14
100
NRP
0
100
PDP
0
67
RULP
33
100
ULD
0
77
UP
23
79
Total
21
N=903
Pearson Chi-Square (21) = 31.827
Cramer's V = . 188
Table 4.11 shows that 79 percent of the respondents strongly agreed with the
statement that they voted for the political party they believed was most likely to
undertake development projects in Liberia such as rebuilding roads, hospitals and schools
following the civil. However, this finding is not statistically significant and it is likely
that the expression we see here happened by chance alone.
Having explored these relationships using measures of association, I next turned
attention to identifying the most salient variables that factored into the decision-making
of Liberians during the 2005 elections and help explain why they cast their votes the way
they did.
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Explaining the Vote Choice of Liberians in the 2005 Elections
Approaching this task, I selected the three political parties that polled the highest
number of votes during the first round of the elections of 2005 (CDC, UP, and the LP) for
inclusion in order to keep the analysis manageable. I recoded the vote for each of these
political parties into binary variables out of the variable that captured the choices of
political parties for which respondents voted such that voting for a particular party or not
was a binary outcome (voted for a party=l/did not vote for a party =0). I derived three
variables out of this step to represent votes for the CDC, UP and the LP and these became
the dependent variables that were included in the logistic regression models to estimate
vote choice. I used similar tests to explore the vote choice for three other political parties
that I do not report here because their inclusion does not add substantial explanatory
value to the study beyond that derived from the analyses of the votes for the three parties.
The parties are LAP/COTOL, the NDPL, and the NPP. The NDPL is the party created by
Doe and they were in power at the onset of the civil war. Varney Sherman's party
LAP/COTOL placed fifth in the polls and Taylor's party, the NPP placed sixth.
I estimated each model of vote choice for political parties separately initially
including all variables described earlier in Chapter I which, it has been argued, affect
voting behavior in African societies. In initial tests, variables that were shown to be either
collinear with other variables or the observations for which showed no variance in
predicting the outcome or not predicting it were dropped by STATA and the models were
estimated over again. After obtaining the results I calculated the predicted probabilities of
voting for political parties in each model and report the results as well the tables. The
independent variables in each model include: 1) the variables, described previously in the
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tests of association, which proffered reasons to the respondents why they voted for a
political party (ethnic identity; peace; regional interests; development/reconstruction,
religious interests and the "big person"); 2) nine of the sixteen ethnic groups in Liberia.
The criteria for inclusion of ethnic groups were: the largest ethnic groups and groups
from which presidential candidates or other heads of political parties hailed. Based on
these criteria, the Kpelle were included as the largest ethnic group in the country and the
rest (Bassa, Kru, Gola, Loma, Mano, Grebo, Krahn and Vai) as the ethnic groups that
predominate in the counties from which the presidential candidates or the heads of the
political parties hailed. 3) The third criterion included residency in the counties that are
considered home to the presidential candidates or heads of political parties that were on
the ballot.
Explaining the Vote for the Congress for Democratic Change
I begin by reporting, in Table 4.12, tests of a logistic regression model that was
estimated to determine the likelihood that a randomly selected respondent; therefore, a
voter in Liberia, voted for Weah's CDC political party as a result of their agreements
with the explanatory variables described previously. Given assumptions in the literature,
there are reasons to expect here that variables for ethnic interest, being Kru and residency
in Sinoe County will have a significant impact on the CDC vote because Weah is a Kru
whose county of birth is Sinoe and members of these groups will be more likely to vote
for the party of their fellow Kru from Sinoe county in order to advance the interests of
their ethnic group.
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Table 4.12
Voting for the CDC: Results of Logistic Regression with Logged Odds
Variables

CDC Vote

Ethnic Interest

. 59***
026)
.30
(.26)
.13
(.25)
-.06
(.22)
.68***
(.24)
-.63
(.42)
j 47***
(.47)
1.47***
(.47)
.37*
(.18)
.89
(.66)
-.24
(.43)
-.22
(.24)
-.55*
(.26)
1.63***
(.27)
.25
(.49)
2.78
(1.66)
-1.48***
(.30)
900
124.71***
-474.111
.12

% Change in Odds
_

Peace Vote
Regional Interest
Development Interest
Religious Interest
Big Person
Sinoe County
Bomi County
Montserrado County
Grand Gedeh County
Vai
Kpelle
Bassa
Kru
Gola
Krahn
Constant
N=
LRchi2(16)
Log Likelihood
Pseudo R2

36
13
-6
97
-46
333
334
44
144
-22
-20
-42
413
28
150

Note: *P<0.05. **P<0.01. ***P<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
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The result shows that the following explanatory variables increased the odds of
voting for the CDC: religious interest; the vote for peace; regional interest; residence in
Sinoe, Bomi, Grand Gedeh and Montserrado counties; and being Kru, Gola and Krahn.
Variables for ethnic interest, big person, development and reconstruction, being Vai,
Kpelle and Bassa reduced the odds of voting for the CDC. The result suggests that being
Kru and residency in Sinoe county, the ethnic group to which Weah belongs and the
county from which he hails, are significant predictors of the vote for the CDC. This
provides some support for identity-based thesis of voting but this finding should be
contrasted with the one that shows that the variable for ethnic interests lowered the odds
of voting for the CDC suggesting that while certain identity groups may have voted for
the CDC, voting with the desire to vote for a political party that would secure the
exclusive interests of an ethnic group was not a major explanatory variable in this model.
Further, we learn from the results that residency in Bomi, Grand Gedeh and Montserrado
counties and being Krahn also increased the odds of voting for the CDC. The three
counties and the Krahn ethnic group are not directly affiliated with the CDC but these
variables also increased the odds of voting for the party suggesting that the CDC drew
votes from other areas and demographic groups of Liberia other than those from which
one could expect them to exclusively draw votes given Weah's ethnicity as the founder of
the party.
I reran the model using fewer variables. The variables in the second test were
those offering reasons to respondents why they voted for a particular party for which they
did, a variable indicating whether a respondent voted for Weah or not as the presidential
candidate of the CDC party, and identity variables such as identifying oneself as Kru, the
ethnic group from which Weah hails, indicating residence in Sinoe County, the home of
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Weah. The new result showed that only the variable for development interests and that
for voting for George Weah were statistically significant but the variable for development
did not increase the odds that a respondent voted for the CDC party, only the variable for
voting for Weah in the presidential elections did.
Explaining the Vote for the Unity Party
Next, I report the results of the test of the model, in Table 4.13, that I employed to
estimate the odds of voting for the Unity Party. The UP ultimately won the presidential
but not the legislative elections. One expectation here is that belonging to a Kru or Gola
ethnic group or identifying Bong county as their county of birth will significantly
increase the odds that a respondent voted for the Unity Party because of Johnson-Sirleaf,
the presidential flag bearer of that party. Even though many in the Liberian public
associated her with the Americo-Liberian/Congo elite of the coastal regions of the
country Johnson-Sirleaf took every opportunity to identify with the Gola and Kru ethnic
groups and on every occasion she associated her lineage with Bong County (Sawyer
2008). We should also expect that respondents whose votes were guided by the desire for
development would significantly increase the odds that they voted for the Unity Party
because Madam Johnson-Sirleaf s candidacy was touted by her supporters as the most
capable individual to undertake postwar reconstruction among the presidential candidate
field. Whether that message was the one that most resonated with voters remains to be
seen.
The variables that significantly increased the odds of vote choice for the Unity
Party were residence in Lofa, Montserrado, Bong and Nimba Counties; being Gola, Kru,
Loma, Kissi and Mano ethnicity and the regional, development and the religious interest
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Table 4.13
Voting for the UP: Results of Logistic Regression with Logged Odds
Variables

UP Vote

Ethnic Interest
Peace Vote
Regional Interest
Development Interest
Religious Interest
Big Man
Kpelle
Kru
Gola
Vai
Kissi
Loma
Grebo
Mano
Bong
Bomi
Montserrado
Lofa
Nimba
Constant

% Change in Odds
-54

026)
-.01
(.24)
.47
(.24)
.08
(.21)
.01
(.26)
-1.24*
(.56)
-.01
(.31)
.06
(.32)
.73
(.58)
-.08
(.48)
1.30***
(.39)
.68*
(.30)
.81*
(.36)
.47
(.33)
.49
(.39)
-1.87
(1.06)
7g***
(.22)
1 72***
(.39)
1.21***
(.31)
-1 8Q***
(.35)
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-1
60
8
1
-71
-1
6
107
-8
270
98
126
59
63
-84
119
457
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Table4.13-Continued
N=900
LRchi2(19) =
Log Likelihood =
Pseudo R2 =

99.40***
-457.50
JU)

Note: *P<0.05. **P<0.01. ***P<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
variables. Strongly agreeing with the ethnic interest statement significantly decreased the
odds that a respondent voted for the UP. As seen from the results, variables such as being
Gola or being Km and residency in Bong County had the expected effects in increasing
the odds of voting for the UP. However, some of the largest increases in odds of voting
for the UP are visible with the variables for residency in Lofa and Nimba counties and
being Kissi, the ethnic group of Joseph Boakai, Johnson-Sirleaf s running mate in the
elections. This suggests that members of the Kissi ethnic community, who hail mostly
from Lofa County, supported their fellow Kissi elite. However, to put this finding into
perspective, we also note that variables for counties such as Nimba and Montserrado and
ethnic groups such as the Loma and Grebo registered increased odds of voting for the UP
even though there are no direct affiliations between the party and those counties and
ethnic groups. It should be noted that the capital city of Monrovia is in Montserrado
County. As such, most of the political parties that did relatively well in the elections
appear to have drawn some fair amount of support from the very urban Montserrado
County.
I retested the model, this time using only the reasons suggested to respondents for
why they voted for a particular party and five variables that indicated whether a
respondent identified with the Kru and Gola ethnic groups, the ethnic groups to which
Johnson-Sirleaf claims ancestry, and whether the respondent declared residency in Lofa
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and Bong Counties, the counties of origin of Johnson-Sirleaf and her running mate and
finally, whether a respondent voted for Johnson-Sirleaf or not in the presidential
elections. The results of the new model showed that three variables were significant in
predicting the likelihood that a respondent voted for the Unity Party. The variables were
those for "big person," a vote cast for Johnson-Sirleaf and residency in Lofa County. Of
the three, the variable for "big person" showed a negative relationship with the dependent
variable of voting for the UP, reducing the likelihood that a respondent who strongly
agreed with the statement that they voted for a political party because it was the party of
the big person from their part of the country. The variables for voting for Johnson-Sirleaf
and residency in Lofa County were also statistically significant.
Explaining the Vote for the Liberty Party
The Liberty Party polled the third highest votes in the elections of 2005. Here we
expect that factors such as belonging to the Bassa ethnic group or residing in Grand
Bassa County would significantly increase the odds that a respondent voted for the
Liberty Party because Brumskine, the presidential flag bearer of that party is the most
recognized elite in Liberian politics who claims ancestry from among the Bassa people of
Grand Bassa County. Also, the Liberty Party ticket was the only ticket that ran a
presidential candidate and vice-presidential candidate from the same county and ethnic
group in Brumskine and his running mate Amelia Ward. Other expectations are that the
variable for big person, religious interests and that for seeking regional interests would
also have statistically significant effects on the vote for the Liberty Party, since
Brumskine is also viewed by many as the chief patron of the Bassa People (Sawyer
2008). Table 4.14 reports the results of the test of the model.
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Table 4.14
Voting for the LP: Results of Logistic Regression with Logged Odds
Variables

LP Vote

% Change in Odds

Ethnic Interest

1.26***
(.29)
-.39
(.36)
-.82*
(.33)
-.04
(.32)
-.44
(.37)
.03
(.50)
-.01
(.40)
3 23***
(.29)
.08
(.51)
-.42
(1.05)
.10
(1.07)
.40
(.78)
. 92***
C26)
.56
(1.23)
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Peace Vote
Regional Interest
Development Interest
Religious Interest
Big Man
Kpelle
Bassa
Kru
Gola
Krahn
Sinoe
Montserrado
Grand Gedeh County
N=900
LRchi2(14) =
Log Likelihood =
Pseudo R2 =

-32
-56
-4
-35
3
-1
2,188
9
-34
11
50
-60
76

274.71***
-261.64
.34

Note: *P<0.05. ***P<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
The variables that significantly increased the odds of a respondent voting for the
Liberty Party are ethnic interests, Bassa ethnicity and residency in Grand Gedeh and
Sinoe counties. As expected, the odds of voting for the LP increased significantly with
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Bassa respondents. The odds of voting for the Liberty Party also increased for those
respondents who strongly agreed with the statement that they voted for a political party
because they desired to protect the interests of their ethnic group. More than the votes for
the CDC and the UP, the results indicate that voting for the Liberty Party was motivated
by a significant ethnic voting bloc among the Bassas displaying allegiance to one of their
own in the candidacy of Brumskine. Even though the variables for the big person and
regional interests did not significantly increase the odds of voting for the LP in this
model, that for the Bassa ethnic group did and this finding is consistent with earlier
findings from the measures of association and provides support ethnic voting theses.
As mentioned previously, I tested similar models of vote choice for the three
political parties that placed fourth, fifth and sixth. While findings from those models do
not add explanatory value to the thesis, it is useful to discuss briefly one pattern that was
evident in the results. It emerged that the big person was a significant explanatory
variable predicting vote choice LAP/COTOL and not the NPP or the NDPL. Winston
Tubman of the NDPL was out of Liberia for over two decades prior to the elections and it
is not inconceivable that the voters may have seen him as an outsider instead of a chief
patron of his home county of Maryland. In the case of the NPP, it is plausible that instead
of Massaquoi, the presidential candidate of the party going into the elections, those who
voted for that party were still making a psychological association between the party and
Charles Taylor, the larger-than-life warlord who founded the NPP. In the case of
LAP/COTOL, it appears that voters where making the connections between Sherman's
overwhelming presence as the chief patron of his political coalition and their votes for the
party.
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Exploring the Vote Choices of Liberians: Results of Logistic Regressions with CLARIFY
Examining within-group voting patterns is another way of exploring the
theoretical role of any influences ethnic identities may have on the political behavior and
mobilization patterns of Liberians in the post-conflict environment. The important
question is whether there are any within-group differences of a statistically significant
nature between members of the various ethnic groups in Liberia and their preferences for
political parties.
In this portion of the dissertation I estimated logistic regression models of the
votes for the CDC, UP and the LP. The independent variables in each of the models
include the variables examined earlier in addition to interaction terms between ethnic
identities and agreement with the variables of interest. Each test was followed by an
additional test to determine within group differences using CLARIFY in order to
highlight the probabilities of voting for a political party by respondents from the same
ethnic group.
I estimated three separate models of the vote for each political party as dependent
variables when predicted by the independent variables described earlier. For example, the
first model estimated the probability that a respondent voted for the CDC if that
respondent was Kpelle, Kru, Bassa or any one of the ethnic groups and if they agreed or
disagreed with the statement that the political party for which they voted was the party
most likely to secure the interests of their ethnic group. A second model of the vote for
the same political party tested the probability that respondents belonging to the same
ethnic groups voted for the party if they agreed or disagreed with another reason for their
vote with which they are presented, and so forth.
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As in the previous chapter, the models test a number of assumptions about the
vote choice for political parties by members of the same ethnic groups. First, given
theoretical arguments in the dominant literature regarding the homogeneity of ethnic
preferences, it is expected that there are no differences in the probabilities of voting for a
political party by members of the same ethnic group. Secondly, it is expected that the
ethnic groups from which presidential candidates hailed will show higher probabilities of
voting for the political party of their ethnic kin than other ethnic groups. Thirdly, if as
suggested in the literature, that citizens are more likely to vote for individuals from their
ethnic group than other ethnic groups, then we should expect that the variable for seeking
ethnic interests will show the highest probabilities that a respondent voted for a political
party than other issues included in the models as independent variables.
One caveat is in order. In the estimation of the models for each political party, it
was prudent to include only the ethnic groups that theoretically made the most sense in
predicting the vote for that political party given the pattern established in Table 4.5.
Nevertheless, in order to establish some contrast I also included variables for one or in
some cases two or more ethnic groups to see how they compared with the variables that
were expected to predict vote choice for a specific party. For example, we note from
Table 4.5 that Bassas were less likely to vote for the CDC and the UP and more likely to
vote for the LP but I included the variable for that ethnic group in the specification of the
models for vote choice for the CDC and the UP to see how they compared with other
groups who were more likely to vote for those parties, and vice versa. However, STATA
rejected the inclusion of variables for some ethnic groups because of collinearity or
because those variables predicted failure or success perfectly in vote choice for a political
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party. Therefore it is possible that the tables will not contain the same explanatory
variables for all the political parties.
Ethnic Identity. Table 4.15 presents the results of three models testing vote
choices for the political parties as the dependent variables if respondents did not strongly
agree or strongly agreed with the statement that they voted for political party because
they desired their vote to go to a political party was more likely to secure the interests of
their ethnic group when controlling for ethnic identities and interaction terms between
those identities and ethnic interests.
Table 4.15
2005 Legislative Elections: Ethnic Interests and Vote Choice
Explanatory
Variables
Ethnic Interest
Kru
Bassa
Kpelle
Krahn
Gola

CDC
Vote
-.64*
(.31)
I Q9***
(.28)
-.33
(.27)
-.46*
(.24)
1.07**
(.35)
-

Loma
Grebo

-

Kissi

-

EthnKru

1 9**
(.68)
-1.1
(.65)
-.81
(1.1)

EthnBas
EthnKpe

UP
Vote
-64
(.36)
-.20
(.33)
-.27
(.29)
-.24
(.24)

LP
Vote
-1.2
(.74)
2 i***
(.30)
-.04

-

-

-.59
(.57)
.31
(.32)
.09
(.35)
.85*
(.40)
-1.29
(1.1)
-.70
(.61)
-.98
(1.1)

-
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.43
(.51)
-

3 5***
(.83)
1.1
(1.3)

Table4.15-Continued
Explanatory
Variables
EthnKra

CDC
Vote
.84
(1.0)

EthnGol
EthnLom
EthnGre
EthnKis
Constant
N
LR chi2
Log Likelihood
Pseudo R2

-.86***
(.11)
900
(9)106.35***
-483.29
.10

UP
Vote
2.14
(1.6)
2.2***
(.82)
.08
(1.2)
2.3
(1.2)
. 92***
(.14)
900
(15)63.97***
-475.21
.07

LP
Vote

1.1
(1.4)

900
(7) 280.20***
-258.90
.35

Notes: *Significant at p< 0.05, **Significant at p<0.01, ***Significant at pO.OOl.
Standard errors are in parentheses. (9), (15) and (7) are degrees of freedom for the
likelihood ratio of each Chi Square. Models are results of binary logit regressions in
STATA using CLARIFY. EthnKpe, EthnBas, EthnKru, EthnGol, EthnLom, EthnGre,
EthnKra and EthnKis are interaction terms.
The results show that variables for the Kru, Bassa and Kissi ethnic groups were
statistically significant explanatory variables of the CDC, the LP and the UP respectively,
the political parties for which members of these groups are expected to vote under ethnic
census theses given their leadership. However, the result also shows that Krahn ethnicity
is a statistically significant explanatory variable of the CDC even though there is no
readily evident ethnic connection between the leadership of that political party and
members of that group.
Next, I report the calculated probabilities of voting for the three political parties,
in Table 4.16, given membership in the ethnic groups included in the analyses.
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Table 4.16
Effects on the Probability of voting for the CDC, UP and LP:
Ethnic Interests and Ethnic Groups
Ethnic

CDC Vote

Group
Kpelle
Bassa
Kru
Gola
Loma
Grebo
Krahn
Kissi

UP Vote

LP Vote

Strongly Agree/Not Strongly Agree
!b~9

21

X)9

24

X)9

!()7

(.09)

(.03)

(.08)

(.04)

(.08)

(.02)

.05

.24

.08

.24

.85

.36

(.03)

(.04)

(.03)

(.04)

(.04)

(.05)

.80

.56

.07

.25

(.09)

(.06)

(.07)

(.05)

_

_

.50

.20

(.26)

(.09)

.71

.35

.12

.11

(.13)

(.07)

(.11)

(.04)

.25

.31

(.18)

(.07)

.80

.48

(.15)

(.09)

_

_

_
.58

.55

(.19)

(.08)

_

Note : Standard errors in parentheses. P <. 001
The table reveals differences and, in some cases, consensus among members of
the same ethnic groups in their vote choices given their position on the vote for ethnic
interests. One pattern from these results lends support to ethnic census theories that have
argued that support for political parties exists along ethnic lines. To cite one example, the
highest mean predicted probabilities of voting for the LP and the CDC lie with the Bassa
and the Kru, the ethnic groups from which the respective leaderships of the two political
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parties hail. It is also evident that the predicted probability of members of the Kissi ethnic
group to vote for the UP is very high, lending additional support to ethnic census thesis
given that the running mate to Johnson-Sirleaf, Joseph Boakai hails from the Kissi.
However, it is also evident from the results in the table that significant differences
exist between members of the same ethnic who strongly agreed with the statement with
which they were presented and those who did not strongly agree with the same statement
and the probabilities of their vote choices for the political parties associated with their
ethnic groups. In the case of the Bassa, there is .49 difference between members of that
group and their vote choice for the LP. There is a .32 difference between Kissis who
strongly agreed with the statement and those that did not strongly agree with the
statement. All of these suggest that members of the same ethnic groups may not have
homogenous preferences in their support for various political parties.
The Peace Vote. Next, I examined the peace vote. Here I tested the probability of
voting for the three political parties if the respondent did not strongly agree or strongly
agreed with the statement that the political party for which they voted was the party most
likely to secure the peace in Liberia and undertake the imperative task of reconciliation
following the brutal civil war. Table 4.17 reports the result of the test.
The results show that the peace vote is a statistically significant explanatory
variable in the vote choice for the UP but not the other two political parties. When
controlling for the peace vote, the results show that the variable for the Bassa ethnic
group is still a statistically significant explanatory variable of vote choice for the LP but
that for Km is no longer a statistically significant explanatory variable for the CDC.
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Table 4.17
2005 Legislative Elections: Peace and Vote Choice
Explanatory
Variables
Peace Vote
Kpelle
Bassa
Kru

CDC
Vote
.24
(.34)
-1.7
(1.1)
-.90
(.82)
1.1
(.56)

Gola
Loma
Grebo
Krahn

-.64
(.84)
.97
(1.4)
.28
(1.2)

Kissi
PcvtKpe
PcvtBas
PcvtKru

1.6
(1.1)
.36
(.86)
.79
(.63)

PcvtGol
PcvtKis
1.2
(1.2)
PctvtLom
1.4
(.90)
.12
PctvtGre
(1.5)
_ 97**
Constant
031)
N
900
LRChi2
(13) 100.54***
-486.20
Log Likelihood
Pseudo R2
.11
Table 4.17- Continued
PcvtKra

UP
Vote
.26*
(.38)
-.82
(.83)
-.26
(.73)
.36
(.60)
1.1
(1.5)
1.5*
(.68)
1.1
(1.5)
.44
(1.3)
2.2
(1.3)
.48
(.87)
-.58
(.78)
-1.1
(.70)
-1.8
(1.6)
-1.3
(1.3)
-1.8
(1.4)
-1.08
(.75)
-1.2
(1.5)
(.35)
900
(11)111.87***
-480.53
.11
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LP
Vote
.45
(.76)
.51
(1.3)
3 9***
(.91)
.33
(1.3)
2.1*
(.98)

2.1
(1.4)
-.45
(1.3)
-.81
(.95)
-.27
(1.4)
-2.8
(1.2)
-2.1
(1.2)
_3 2***
(.72)
900
(11)236.19***
-280.90
.30

Notes: *Significant at p< 0.05, "Significant at p<0.01, ***Significant at pO.OOl.
Standard errors are in parentheses. (13), (17) and (11) are degrees of freedom for the
likelihood ratio of each Chi Square. Models are results of binary logit regressions in
STATA using CLARIFY. PcvtKpe, PcvtBas, PcvtKru, PcvtGol, PcvtLom, PcvtGre,
PcvtKra, and PcvtKis are interaction terms.
Next, in Table 4.18,1 report the calculated probabilities of voting for the three
political parties given ethnic identity and peace interests.

Table 4.18
Effects on the Probability of Voting for the CDC, the UP, and the LP:
Peace Vote and Ethnic Group
Ethnic
Group

CDC Vote

Kpelle

.20

.09

.23

.14

.07

.09

(.03)

(.03)

(.09)

.16

(.09)
.22

(.02)

.15

(.09)
.16

.65

(.03)

(.10)

(.03)

(.11)

.58
(.04)

(.11)

.66

.53

.16

.33

.07

.08

(.06)

(.10)

(.05)

(.11)

(.04)

(.08)

-

-

.19
(.08)

.51

-

-

.07
(.04)

.27
(.13)

.04
(.05)

.29
(.19)

Bassa
Kru
Gola
Loma
Grebo
Krahn
Kissi

UP Vote
Strongly Agree/Not Strongly Agree

(.26)

.38

.19

.38

(.07)

(.11)

(.07)

.48
(.07)

.49
(.26)

.29
(.06)

(.26)

.57

.38

.11

36

(.08)

(.23)

(.05)

(.22)

.51
(.09)

.70
(.20)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. P <. 001
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LP Vote

.57
(.14)
.51

The table shows that when controlling for the peace vote, the votes for the three
parties were much splintered. The predicted probabilities of voting are higher for parties
if respondents strongly agreed with the statement that their desired vote was for the
political party they felt was most likely to secure the peace. However, there are some
noticeable exceptions to this tendency. It could be inferred from the above that in some
instances, members of the Bassa, Grebo, Loma, Km, Kissi and Gola ethnic groups cast
ballots for a political party even when they did not believe that it was the party most
likely to secure the peace in Liberia. Of particular note are the Kissi, Grebo and Loma
votes for the UP, and the Bassa vote for the LP. The data suggests that more members of
the Kru ethnic group voted for the party of one of their own even when they did not
believe that it was the party most likely to secure the peace in Liberia. The results
demonstrate further that there was greater heterogeneity in the votes for the UP and the
CDC than was the case for the LP suggesting that the latter drew votes from a fairly fixed
constituency than the loose coalition of voters that propelled the CDC and the UP to the
first and second place, respectively, in the elections.
Regionalism and Vote Choice
Next I examined if, and how, attempting to seek regional interests factored into
the decision-making of Liberians during the elections of 2005. Here I tested the
probability of voting for a political party if the respondent intended to cast a ballot for a
party because she or he believed it was the party most likely to secure the interests of
their region of the country.
The expectation here is that, if concerns for seeking regional interests factored
into the decision making of Liberians during the elections of 2005, then we should expect
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that this variable maintains a statistically significant effect on the dependent variable of
vote choice for the political parties across all the models. Table 4.19 presents the results
of the test.
Table 4.19
2005 Elections: Regionalism and Vote Choice
Explanatory
Variables
Regional Interests
Kpelle
Bassa
Kru
Gola
Kissi
Krahn
Vai
Loma
Grebo
RegnKpe
RegnBas
RegnKru
RegnGol
RegnKra
RegnVai
RegnLom

CDC
Vote
-.42
(.33)
-.11
(.26)
-.65*
(.30)

UP
Vote
.47
(.28)
-.28
(.25)
. 09**
(•30)
-.20
(.34)
-.58
(.57)
.10**
(.37)
-1.3*
(.55)
-.70
(.47)
.47
(.33)
-.09
(.40)
-1.0
(.71)
.05
(.53)
-1.8*
(.84)
1.0
(1.5)
.73
(1.3)

i 2***

(.31)
.81
(.46)
-.10
(.45)
i

<***

(.36)
-.08
(.46)
.60
(.34)
1.0**
(.37)
-1.3
(1.0)
.63
(.59)

2 o**
(.69)
.79
(1.5)
-1.1
(1.3)
.69
(1.3)
-.17
(.68)
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LP
Vote
-1.7*
(.75)
.03
(.42)
T Q*#*

(.32)
.18
(.53)
-.45
(1.0)
.09
(.78)
.42
(.59)
-.04
(.65)
-1.2
(1.0)
1.8*
(.83)

-

-

.25
(.62)

1.9*
(.92)

Table 4.19-Continued
Explanatory
Variables
RegnGre

CDC
Vote
.27
(.64)

Constant

_j 2***

LP
Vote

N
LRchi2

(.16)
900
(18)114.99***

UP
Vote
.28
(.68)
_ 92***
(-15)
900
(17)54.34***

-2.6***
(.26)
900
(11)244.17

Log Likelihood

-478.97

-480.03

-276.92

Pseudo R2

.10

.9

.31

Notes: *Significant at p< 0.05, **Significant at p<0.01, ***Significant at pO.001.
Standard errors are in parentheses. (18), (17) and (11) are degrees of freedom for the
likelihood ratio of each Chi Square. Models are results of binary logit regressions in
STATA using CLARIFY. RegnKpe, RegnBas, RegnKru, RegnGol, RegnLom, RegnGre,
RegnKra, and RegnVai are interaction terms.
Seeking regional interests does not appear to have been a significant factor in
predicting votes for the political parties included in the models above. The results in the
table show that the only statistically significant coefficient for regional interests is the one
for the LP vote but it carries the negative sign suggesting that seeking regional interests
may not have factored into the vote for the LP when controlling for the variables for
ethnic groups in the model. However, the coefficients for the Bassa ethnic group is
statistically significant in the model for the LP suggesting that when controlling for the
regional interests variable, Bassas are still a significant explanatory variable of votes for
the LP, the party of an elite from their ethnic group.
The results further show that the variables for the Kru and Krahn ethnic groups
are also statistically significant explanatory variables in the model exploring the vote for
the CDC party, suggesting that members of these two ethnic groups were likely to desire
their vote to go to a political party that is protective of their regional interests. This
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finding raises a question about how much members of the Krahn ethnic group bought into
one of the campaign messages of Weah after he allegedly expressed gratitude to the. late
Doe, a Krahn, at his graveside in Grand Gedeh and thanked him posthumously for
sponsoring the early part of his career in football. It is unlikely that there is any other
explanation for the Krahn support for the CDC evident above when controlling for the
vote for a political party that will secure regional interests given that Weah is not from
Grand Gedeh, the home county of the Krahn ethnic group. The results of the tests of
CLARIFY will help to throw additional light on the voting patterns observed in the table
above.
The output reveals that in the cases of the probability of vote choice for some
political parties, the modal category for respondents from groups such as the Km, Gola,
Grebo and Loma lies with those who strongly agreed with the statement that they desired
their vote to go to a political party that secured the interests of their regions. We see this
tendency in the example of the probability of voting for the CDC if a respondent is Kru,
However, the results also reveal that members of other groups such as the Krahn did not
strongly agree with the statement but they still voted for the CDC in more numbers than
those who strongly agreed with the statement (Table 4.20).
In the case of the Bassa vote for the LP, we see that there is no difference in the
predicted probability of voting for the LP if the respondent strongly agreed with the
statement or did not strongly agree with the statement. Given that some of these
categories favor the respective parties that are headed by members of their ethnic groups,
the pattern suggests that seeking the interests of their various regions factored somewhat
into the decision-making of voters from these groups as they went to the polls. However,
the output also reveals significant differences both within and between groups as they
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voted in the elections and given their intent to vote for a party that would best represent
the interests of their region. For example, even though the modal category of the
predicted probabilities of vote choice for the UP by respondents from the Grebo and
Loma ethnic groups lie with those who did not strongly agree with the statement, it is
evident that nearly half of the members of the same ethnic groups did not strongly with
the statement.
Table 4.20
Effects on the Probability of Voting for the CDC, the UP and the LP:
Regional Interest by Ethnic Group
Ethnic
Group
Kpelle
Bassa
Kru
Gola
Kissi
Krahn
Vai
Loma
Grebo

CDC Vote
UP Vote
Strong;ly Agree/Not Strongly Agree
.22
.16
.23
.07
(.07) (.03)
(.08) (.04)
.17
.14
.22
.14
(.06) (.03)
(.06) (.03)
.84
.52
.09
.25
(.07) (.06)
(.07) (.06)
.49
.41
.52
.20
(.26) (.10)
(.27) (.08)
.16
.23
.62
.51
(.07) (.08)
(.09) (.08)
.28
.59
.32
.11
(.20) (.08)
(.20) (.05)
.32
.23
.26
.18
(.22) (.08)
(.10) (.06)
.26
.36
.57
.39
(.11) (.07)
(.13) (.07)
.43
.46
.44
.27
(.13) (.08)
(.14) (.07)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; P <. 001
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LP Vote
.02
(.01)
.60
(.07)
.02
(.02)
.01
(.03)
.02
(.02)
.03
(.03)

.07
(.02)
.59
(.04)
.09
(.04)
.06
(.07)
.09
(.06)
.11
(.05)

.10
(.08)
.01
(.01)

.08
(.04)
.03
(.03)

Development/Reconstruction and Vote Choice
Next, I examined how Liberians voted given consideration for reconstruction and
development. Like the vote for peace, the vote for development is a pragmatic decision
that required Sociotropic calculations and an assessment beyond considerations for the
interests of the narrow confines of one's ethnic community since postwar reconstruction
of Liberia entailed benefits to the country as a whole.
To what extent where Liberians thinking about national development as opposed
to voting to merely seek the interests of their ethnic groups? If a concern for rebuilding
Liberia was a significant factor in the decision making of the electorate then we can
expect that this variable will show a statistically significant impact on the vote choices for
political parties. Table 4.21 reports the results of the test.
Table 4.21
2005 Elections: Development/Reconstruction and Vote Choice
Explanatory
Variables
Development/Reconstruction
Kpelle
Bassa
Km
Krahn
Vai
Loma
Grebo

CDC
Vote
-.65*
(.32)
-.86
(.56)
-1.9*
(.78)
1.3**
(.47)
.67
(.86)
-.94
(1.1)
-.72
(.62)
.67
(.69)
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UP
Vote
.22
(.33)
-.10
(.68)
-.18
(.55)
.06
(.51)
-.49
(1.1)

LP
Vote
.90
(.62)
.26
(1.1)
4 J***
(.71)

-

-

1.3*
(.54)
1.1
(.70)

1.4
(.95)

Table 4.21-Continued
Explanatory
Variables
Kissi

CDC
Vote

DevKpe

.78
(.63)
1.6
(.83)
.52
(.57)
.09
(.94)
1.1
(1.2)
1.7*
(.72)
.50
(.28)

DevBas
DevKru
DevKra
DevVai
DevLom
DevGre
DevKis

-

Constant

-.67*
(.28)
900
(15)102.57***
-485.18
.10

N
LRchi2
Log Likelihood
Pseudo R2

UP
Vote
1.1
(1.0)
.77
(.72)
-.68
(.61)
-.87
(.65)
-.72
(1.3)

LP
Vote
2.5
(1.3)
-.21
(1.2)
-1.4
(.76)

-

-

-1.0
(.64)
-1.4
(.80)

-.10
(1.1)

-3.2
(1.7)
_j j * * *
-3.6***
(.30)
(.59)
900
900
(15)49.73*** (9)236.29***
-482.33
-280.86
.9
.30

-

Notes: *Significant at p< 0.05, **Significant at p<0.01, ***Significant at pO.OOl.
Standard errors are in parentheses. (15), (15) and (9) are degrees of freedom for the
likelihood ratio of each Chi Square. Models are results of binary logit regressions in
STATA using CLARIFY. DevKpe, DevLom, DevGre, DevVai, DevKra, DevKru,
DevKis, and DevBas are interaction terms.
The results show that the variable for development and reconstruction was not a
statistically significant explanatory variable in the models of vote choice for the three
political parties that polled the most votes following the elections. In the case of the
CDC, the variable for development and reconstruction is statistically significant but has
the negative sign suggesting that those who did not strongly agree with the statement
were less likely to vote for the CDC. When controlling for ethnic group identity, the
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data suggests that for members of some ethnic groups such as the Bassa, Kru, and Loma,
the political party headed by someone from their groups were also the parties they
deemed most likely to undertake the task of rebuilding postwar Liberia. Respectively, the
coefficients for these ethnic groups show when controlling for the variable for
development and reconstruction, the variables were a statistically significant factor in
predicting the vote for all three parties. One suggestion here is that voting for other
reasons seemed to have outweighed the consideration to vote for a party hoping it was
more likely than other parties to implement development programs for reconstructing
postwar Liberia. The results of the predicted probabilities of voting for the parties given
the variables for ethnic identity, reported in Table 4.22, should help to shed more light on
this voting pattern.
Table 4.22
Effects on the Probability of Voting for the CDC, the UP and the LP:
Development by Ethnic Group
Ethnic
Group
"Kpefie
Bassa
Kru
Loma
Kissi
Grebo
Krahn
Vai

CDC Vote
20
(.04)
16
(.03)
.61
(.07)
.41
(.07)
_

A9
(.08)
.09
(.06)
.64
(.08)
.22
(.09)
_

.47
(.07)
.57
(.08)
.25
(-08)

.50
(.14)
.50
(.18)
.21
(-17)

UP Vote
Strongly Agree/Not Strongly Agree
25
A2
(.04) (.07)
.15
.23
(.03) (.08)
.16
.27
(.05) (.08)
.36
.55
(.07) (.11)
.55
.50
(.09) (.21)
.25
.50
(.07) (.15)
.12
.22
(.05) (.16)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; P <. 001
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LP Vote
7)7
(.02)
.57
(.04)

M
(.01)
.68
(.09)

.10
(.06)
.05
(.06)

.12
(.08)
.28
(.20)

The results show that with their votes for the UP, more members of the Grebo,
Loma, and Km ethnic groups seemed to have voted for that party even when they did not
strongly agree with the statement that the political party for which they voted was the one
most likely to undertake the tasks of postwar reconstruction and development.
It is evident also from the results that much difference does not exist between the
predicted probabilities of voting for the political parties given considerations for the
variable for development and reconstruction. Unlike previous models, we note here that
significant differences do not exist between Krus, for example, who did not strongly
agree with the statement and those who strongly agreed with the statement and their
respective votes for the CDC. This is also the case with the Bassa votes for the LP and it
suggests that members of some ethnic groups were more united on some issues than
others. We also note that when some members of ethnic groups voted for other political
parties with which they are not otherwise affiliated such as the Loma and Grebo votes for
the UP, more of them did not strongly agree with the same statement. This finding
provides support for the suggestion from the previous table that for members of these
groups, the development variable was not the most important factor in their decision to
vote for one party over others.
Religion and Vote Choice
The next variable I looked at was the religion variable - the extent to which
religious allegiances factored into the decision-making of voters during the 2005
elections.
Table 4.23 reports the results of the probability of voting for a political party
given the preferences of respondents on the vote for religious interests. The results in the
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table show that the variable for religion was not a factor in predicting the votes for all
three political parties. This finding suggests that seeking religious interests was not
significant among the series of considerations that may have factored into the decisions
of Liberians going into the elections of 2005. A number of candidates including
Brumskine and Harry Sherman of LAP/COTOL preached overtly religious message
implying that their runs at the presidency were informed by divine inspiration. In
predicting the vote for the LP, the coefficient for the religion variable has a negative sign
suggesting that consideration for this variable had the opposite effect on those voters who
may have cast ballots for the LP." The results also show that when controlling for
religious interests, the coefficients for ethnic groups such as the Km and the Bassa were
still statistically significant explanatory variables in predicting the respective votes for the
CDC and the UP, the parties for which we would have expected those ethnic groups to
vote given ethnic census theories of voting.
Table 4.23
2005 Legislative Elections: Religion and Vote Choice
Explanatory
Variables
Religious Interest
Kpelle
Bassa
Kru

CDC
Vote
.46
(.36)
-.10
(.27)
-.36
(.29)
i

«***

(.32)

99

UP
Vote
-.82*
(.40)
-.56*
(.25)
_j 2***

(.29)
-.59
(.36)

LP
Vote
-2.0
(1.03)
-.18
(.43)
2 o***
(.31)
.20
(53)

A similar model of vote choice for LAP/COTOL that I do not report here shows that the religion variable

was not a statistically significant explanatory variable predicting the vote for that political party.
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Table 4.23 - Continued
Explanatory
Variables
Gola
Kissi
Krahn
Vai
Loma
Grebo
RlgnKpe
RlgnBas
RlgnKru
RlgnGol
RlgnKra
RlgnVai
RlgnLom
RlgnGre

CDC
Vote
.10*
(.47)
-.04
(.46)
j 7***

(.37)
.07
(.46)
.75*
(.35)
1 2**
(.38)
.07
(.94)
-1.0
(.86)
.96
(.67)
-.09
(1.5)
-1.9
(1.3)
.12
(1.3)
-.78
(.76)
-.30
(.73)

Constant

_j 3 * * *

N
LRchi2
Log Likelihood
Pseudo R2

(.18)
900
(18) 110.00***
-481.47
.10

UP
Vote
-.81
(.57)
.86*
(.37)
-1.5**
(.55)
-.83
(.47)
.26
(.33)
-.30
(.40)
.27
(1.2)
2.0**
(.66)
.30
(.75)
2.3
(1.6)
1.9
(1.3)

LP
Vote
-.47
(1.1)
-.22
(.78)
.40
(.59)
-.12
(.65)
-1.0
(1.0)
3.0
(1.5)
1.9
(1.1)

-

-

1.2
(.73)
1.2
(.78)
. 59***
(•15)
900
(17) 55.99***
-479.20
.12

3.40**
(1.4)
-2.6***
(26)
900
(12)242.74***
-277.63
.30

Notes: *Significant at p< 0.05, **Significant at pO.Ol, ***Significant at p<0.001.
Standard errors are in parentheses. (18), (17) and (12) are degrees of freedom for the
likelihood ratio of each Chi Square. Models are results of binary logit regressions in
STATA using CLARIFY. RelgKpe, RelgBas, RelgKru, RelgGol, RelgLom, RelgGre,
RelgKra, and RelgVai are interaction terms.
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Next, in Table 4.24 I present the CLARIFY outputs for this voting pattern noting
the predicted probabilities of vote choice for a political party by respondents given their
religious interests.
Table 4.24
Effects on the Probability of Voting for the CDC, the UP and the LP:
Religious Interest on Ethnic Group
Ethnic
Group
Kpelle
Bassa
Km
Gola
Loma
Kissi
Grebo
Krahn
Vai

CDC Vote
.31
(.16)
.11
(.08)
.82
(.07)
.49
(.26)
.30
(.11)
.29
(.11)
.50
(.13)
.29
(.20)
.37
(.23)

.19
(-03)
.16
(.03)
.52
(.06)
.41
(.10)
.36
(.07)
.21
(.07)
.46
(.08)
.59
(.08)
.23
(.08)

LP Vote
UP Vote
Strongly Agree/Not Strongly Agree
.18
.22
.20
.06
(.15) (.03)
(.16) (.02)
.34
.14
.57
.59
(.10) (.03)
(.10) (.04)
.16
.22
.02
.09
(.07) (.06)
(.02) (.04)
.49
.19
.02
.07
(.26) (.08)
(.03) (.07)
.51
.40
.23
.07
(.12) (.07)
(.11) (.05)
.35
.54
.02
.07
(.11) (.08)
(.03) (.05)
.37
.28
.01
.04
(.12) (.07)
(.02) (.04)
.30
.11
.03
.11
(.20) (.05)
(.03) (.05)
.10
.19
(.05) (.07)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; P <. 001
The table shows that the probability of vote choice for the CDC was significantly
higher for Krus who strongly agreed with the statement agreed with the statement that
they voted for a political party because they believed it was the party most likely to
secure the interests of their religion. This is the highest mean value for all ethnic groups,
as revealed by the results. There are no significant differences between most of the other
ethnic groups such as the Bassa vote for the UP. A few more Gola who agreed with the
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statement in question voted for the CDC, but they also voted for the Unity Party by a
similar margin at .49. Other noteworthy trends from the result include the differences
between Krahns and their vote for the CDC, and that between the Gola and their vote for
the UP. The Loma vote for the UP is also worth mentioning. It is interesting that more
Loma who strongly agreed with the statement voted for the UP even though that political
party did not explicitly espouse a religious ideology going into the elections.
The "Big Person" and Vote Choice
The last explanatory variable I examined is that of the effects of the "big person"
on vote choice. The variable represents political clientelism and explored the extent to
which voting in the 2005 elections was influenced by resilient modes of political
transaction structured by patronage links between the mass electorates and political elites.
Table 4.25 reports the results of the tests.
Table 4.25
2005 Legislative Elections: "Big Person" and Vote Choice
Explanatory
Variables
Big Person
Kpelle
Bassa
Kru
Gola
Kissi
Krahn

CDC
Vote
-1.9**
(.75)
-.22
(.25)
-.53*
(.27)
I g***
(.28)
.83
(.44)
-.19
(.45)
1.6***
(.36)

UP
Vote
-1.8*
(.74)
-.52*
(.24)

LP
Vote
-.67
(1.0)
.05
(42)

_ CO***

3 i***

(•26)
-.58
(.31)
-.58
(.52)
97**
(.37)
-1.2*
(.50)

(.31)
-.14
(.58)
-.40
(1.1)
-.05
(.78)
.51
(.59)
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Table 4.25 -Continued
Vai

.02
(.43)
.52
(.31)

Loma

i

Grebo

i***

(.32)
BgmnKpe

-

BgmnBas
BgmnKru

3.5**
(1.3)

Constant

_j j * * *

N
LRchi2
Log Likelihood
Pseudo R2

(.16)
900
(11)111.87***
-480.53
.10

-.77
(.47)
.45
(.30)
-.12
(-34)
1.9
(1.3)
1.1
(1.3)
_ 75***
(-14)
900
(18) 109.61***
-481.66
.10

.51
(.50)
-1.2
(1.0)
-

1.3
(1.2)
1.6
(1.6)
_2 7***
(.26)
900
(11)234.89***
-281.55
.29

Notes: *Significant at p< 0.05, **Significant at pO.Ol, ***Significant at p<0.001.
Standard errors are in parentheses. Models are results of binary logit regressions in
STATA using CLARIFY. BgmnKpe, BgmnBas, BgmnKru, BgmnLom, BgmnKra and
BgmnVai are interaction terms.
The results show that the variable for the big person carries the negative sign and
is statistically significant in the models predicting votes for the CDC and the UP, the two
parties that won the highest votes following the elections in 2005. This finding is
understandable given that whereas the candidacies of other contenders in the race such as
Brumskine and Sherman were primarily identified with their respective localities of
Grand Bassa County and Grand Cape Mount County, those of Weah and Johnson-Sirleaf
were seen as groundswell, populist movements with which Liberians from all works of
life identified. The coefficients for respondents from the Bassa ethnic group is also
significant in predicting the vote for the Liberty Party suggesting that when controlling
for the big person variable, Brumskine's candidacy was perceived somewhat as a
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patronage vehicle. However, we should note also the statistically significant coefficient
for the Km vote for the CDC, which suggests that among Krus, Weah's candidacy was
also perceived somewhat as some form of protection of Kru interests.
Next, in Table 4.26,1 report the results of the CLARIFY tests which show the
predicted probabilities of voting among and between respondents of the various ethnic
groups given their preference on the vote for the party of the big person.
Table 4.26
Effects on the Probability of Voting for the CDC, the UP and the LP:
"Big Person" on Ethnic Groups
Ethnic
Group
Kpelle
Bassa
Kru
Gola
Loma
Kissi
Grebo
Krahn
Vai

CDC Vote
.05
(.04)
.03
(.03)
.83
(.14)
.12
(.10)
.09
(.07)
.5
(.05)
.14
(.10)
.20
(.12)
.06
(.05)

.20
(.03)
.16
(.03)
.60
(.06)
.42
(.10)
.35
(.06)
.21
(.07)
.47
(.07)
.59
(.07)
.24
(.08)

UP Vote
Strongly Agree/Not!strongly Agree
.29
.22
(.20) (.03)
.13
.17
(.12) (.03)
.05
.21
(.04) (.05)
.06
.22
(.06) (.09)
.13
.43
(.09) (.06)
.20
.56
(.12) (.08)
.08
.30
(.06) (.07)
.03
.14
(.03) (.05)
.05
.19
(.05) (.07)

LP Vote
.05
(.06)
.71
(.12)
.17
(.14)
.05
(.08)
.08
(.08)
.05
(.07)
.02
(.04)
.08
(.08)

.07
(.02)
.58
(.04)
.06
(.03)
.07
(.07)
.11
(.04)
.07
(.05)
.03
(.03)
.11
(.05)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; P <. 001
For members of the Kru and Bassa ethnic groups, the highest mean predicted
probabilities of vote choice lies with the CDC and the LP, the respective political parties
of the big person from their ethnic groups in Weah and Brumskine. Almost all of the
250

remaining highest predicted probabilities of vote choice for the respective parties lie with
members of those ethnic groups who did not strongly agree with the statement that they
desired their vote to go the political party of the big person from their part of the country.
Of particular note; two examples of groups that did not seem to have been looking for a
political patron are the Grebo and Loma votes for the CDC and the UP.
In summary, the analyses have, in the main, shown that various ethnic groups in
Liberia did not express homogenous preferences in their vote choices for political parties
and all groups did not seek a purely ethnic vote by supporting only the political parties of
elites from their communities. Voters from groups such as the Kpelle, the largest ethnic
group in Liberia, spread their electoral support among several political parties and more
importantly, they provided various reasons for doing so as revealed by the data. Other
findings from the data do not provide much support for previous assertions that African
electorates will vote largely for elites from their ethnic groups even if such elites may be
less competent for political office than elites from other ethnic groups. As shown by the
data, the CDC and the UP drew broad support from the electorate across Liberia, even
from among ethnic groups such as the Krahn to which other political parties such as the
NDPL could stake a greater claim.
Elite Political Behavior: Getting out the Vote. Who Did What. Where and Why?
In this section I explore the role of the elites of political parties in producing the
voting outcomes that we saw in Liberia by examining the various campaigns to mobilize
the electorate during the time of the 2005 elections.
A major difference between the institutional arrangements for the elections in
Sierra Leone and those that were held in Liberia was the adoption of a simple majority
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electoral system for Liberia whereas institutional designers had opted for a proportional
representation system in Sierra Leone.100
Some were skeptical about aspects of the arrangements for the elections
questioning the neutrality of the members of the transitional government and accusing the
executive Chairman Gyude Bryant and others of unfair support for some members of the
presidential candidate field.101 Others raised concerns about the scheduling of the
elections on the date specified arguing the proximity to the rainy season would hinder
voting and put some electorates in some constituencies at a disadvantage because of the
potential difficulty in reaching and educating them about the voting process and the
electoral choices available to them.102 Another argument raised fears that the difficult
conditions would also create logistical nightmares in organizing the elections by
discouraging many from voting (Harris 2006). However, all such fears where later to
prove unfounded as the difficult terrain did little to discourage presidential, senatorial and

Some observers point out that the PR system was employed in Sierra Leone because of the challenges of
registering both internally displaced members of the population as well as refugees in neighboring Guinea.
However, this point is questionable given that similar conditions entailed in Liberia at the time of
registration for the elections of 2005.
101

See the special edition of Africa Week October 2004, pg. 8 for the article "Tipoteh Criticises Bryant" in

which veteran Liberian politician Dr. Togba Nah Tipoteh makes the allegation that National Transitional
Government of Liberia Chairman Gyude Bryant had maintained support for Varney Sherman, his former
legal adviser despite provisions in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that stipulated the neutrality of the
membership of the transitional government in the elections proceedings.
102

Dr. John Scott Goffa, a former presidential candidate who ran as an independent in the presidential

elections of 1985 made one such observation in an interview to the Liberian Analyst Newspaper. See
"Former Aspirant Against "Hasty Elections," Liberia Analyst, Wednesday, September 14, 2005.
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house candidates from taking their campaigns to the farthest flung regions of the country,
or voters from voting on Election Day.103
This section of the chapter analyzes the behavior of political elites in Liberia
illustrating how the leaderships of the various political parties mobilized voters to the
polls during the campaigns for the elections of 2005. In order not to make the analyses
unwieldy, the discussion centers on the actions of the leaderships of only three of the
myriad of political parties in Liberia that contested the presidential and legislative
elections of 2005 - the Unity Party, the Congress for Democratic Change and the Liberty
Party. The logic of focusing on only these parties is that as the three highest vote getters
following the first round of the elections on October 11, a discussion of the campaign
strategies they employed is more likely to offer a useful insight into what elites said or
did to mobilize Liberians in 2005 than a discussion of most of the other parties among the
30 or so registered political parties in the country during the period in question. Also,
besides emerging as the victorious party from the presidential elections, the UP is among
the very few political parties in Liberia that have been in existence since the pre-civil war
days and is more likely than other parties to have cultivated a dedicated support base
among the Liberian electorate -it is important to know how it mobilizes that support
base. The case of the CDC exemplifies an emergent political party that managed to
capture the imagination of a vast proportion of the electorate in a rather short period
following its founding. The LP represents a political party that is mostly identified with

According to the Carter Center Elections Report on Liberia, the total number of candidates approved by
the National Election Commission of Liberia was 762. This number included 22 candidates for president,
22 for Vice President, 205 for Senate seats, and 513 candidates for the House of Representatives. See the
Carter Center 2005. "Final Report on the 2005 Liberia Elections." (Atlanta, Georgia: Carter Center), p.13.
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one ethnic group (the Bassa) and the cultivation of a sectional interest in the religious
vote that the leader of the party, Brumskine, so diligently courted. Together, the actions
of the leaderships and memberships of these parties provide variation and a useful
contrast that is critical to the analytical goal of this section in seeking to understand the
political behavior of political elites and how they mobilized voters to the polls especially
given their electoral fates following the elections of 2005.104
Twenty-two presidential candidates successfully navigated the registration
process and were placed on the ballot for the elections of October 11. As mentioned
earlier in this chapter, six presidential aspirants were rejected on various legal
technicalities but two of the six had their rejection overturned by the Supreme Court of
Liberia on appeal (Carter Center 2005, 13; Harris 2006; Sawyer 2008). However, the
decision came a little late for the two aspirants to be reasonably included on the already
printed ballots without creating substantial cost overruns to the NEC or disruptions to the
entire system. Both aspirants discontinued their bids for the presidency.105 Table 4.27
below provides information on the presidential candidates who were on the ballot for the
October 11 election including their political parties and the administrative counties from
which they hail.

For this section, I am deeply indebted to the management, editorial boards and other members of staff of
several newspapers in Liberia including The Liberian Analyst and The Daily Observer, for granting me
access to their archives, which contained material on all the campaigns and documented neatly, all the daily
goings-on in the months leading up to and following the elections of 2005.1 am also grateful for their
patience in enduring countless hours of probing and other impromptu requests I made to them.
105

1 met Marcus Jones, one of the two aspirants that were initially disqualified. A popular lawyer with an

office in downtown Monrovia, I asked him why he discontinued his bid for the presidency. He told me that
he did it for "the good of Liberia and that was simply it." When I pressed him further, he refused to provide
me with any additional details of his unsuccessful bid for the presidency.
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Table 4.27
County of Origin and Political Party of Presidential Candidates
in the 2005 Presidential Election
Presidential Candidate

County of Origin

Political Party

Barnes, Nathaniel

Maryland

Liberia Destiny Party

Brumskine, Charles

Grand Bassa

Liberty Party

Conneh, Sekou

Lofa

Progress Democratic Party

Divine, Samuel

Montserrado

Independent Candidate

Farhat, David

Grand Bassa

Free Democratic Party

Jallah, Armah

Gbarpolu

National Party of Liberia

Johnson-Sirleaf

Bomi

Unity Party

Kiadii, George

Grand Cape Mount

Kieh, George

Margibi

New Deal Movement

Korto, Joseph

Nimba

Liberia Equal Rights Party

Kpoto, Robert

Lofa

Union of Liberian Democrats

Kromah, Alhaji

Lofa

All Liberia Coalition Party

Massaquoi, Roland

Lofa

National Patriotic Party

Morlu, John

Lofa

United Democratic Alliance

Reeves, Alfred

Gbarpolu

National Reformation Party

Sherman, Varney

Grand Cape Mount

Coalition for Transformation Liberia

Tipoteh, Togba Nah

Sinoe

Alliance for Peace and Democracy

Tor-Thompson, Margaret

River Cess

Freedom Alliance Party of Liberia

Tubman, Winston

Maryland

National Democratic Party of Liberia

Tubman, William V.S.

Maryland

Reformed United Liberia Party

Weah, George

Sinoe

Congress for Democratic Change

Woah-Tee, Joseph

Bong

National Vision Party of Liberia

Labor Party of Liberia

Source: Amos Sawyer, "Emerging Patterns in Liberia's Post-Conflict Politics:
Observations from the 2005 Elections," African Affairs, 107 (2008): 182. Reproduced
with Permission of Copyright Owners.
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The presidential candidates hailed from 13 of Liberia's 15 administrative
counties. Only River Gee and Grand Km counties did not produce presidential
candidates, as it appears. Lofa County produced the most number of presidential
candidates with five candidates on the ballot including two, Sekou Conneh and Alhaji
Kromah, who are both Mandingoes. An interesting question arising from this fact is that
given the assumed homogeneity of ethnic preferences, why did two candidates from the
same county who are expected, under existing theories, to draw from the same ethnic
constituency run on different tickets? Given scholarship about the communal bases of
party formation in sub-Saharan Africa (Bogaards 2007, 168-193; Salih 2003), an
intriguing observation, also, is the five individuals who vied for the presidency from Lofa
County alone. It is also interesting that the Tubman cousins from Maryland both vied for
the presidency of Liberia on the tickets of different political parties instead of pooling
their resources together as would be expected under traditional explanations of elite
political behavior in African societies.
Another point of note is the significant mergers that appeared to take place
between political parties taking part in the elections whereas a similar picture of mergers
between political parties did not emerge in Sierra Leone. While there were twenty-two
presidential candidates on the ballot including one independent candidate Samuel
Raymond Divine, there was effectively half of that number in political parties on the
ballot for seats in the Senate and the House of Representatives. Political parties such as
the Coalition for the Transformation of Liberia (COTOL), the Alliance for Peace and
Democracy (APD) and the United Democratic Alliance (UDA) consisted of several other
political parties. For the legislative elections, COTOL was the result of a merger between
four parties: Liberian Action Party, Liberia Unification Party, People's Democratic Party
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of Liberia, and the resurrect True Whig Party. APD consisted of a merger between two
parties: the Liberian People's Party and the United People's Party. The UDA consisted of
three other political parties: the Liberia National Union, Liberia Education and
Development Party, and the Reformation Alliance Party.
Observing the elections of 2005, Amos Sawyer noted a number of tendencies that
surrounded these mergers some of which became the major issues of the political
campaigns for the executive office and legislative seats (Sawyer 2008, 186-191).
According to Sawyer, one of the earliest tendencies of political elites working together
around the time of the campaigns was the emergence of a "heritage movement" bent on
preventing the ascendance of any candidate of Americo-Liberian or Congo heritage to the
presidency. The group consisted of a loose collection of African-Liberians who,
according to Sawyer, were also motivated by preventing the emergence of any
presidential candidate to the political fore who could be revenge-seeking and
uncommitted to the reconciliation the group believed was necessary for Liberians.
However, the heritage movement was not cohesive enough to articulate a single position
or even throw their weight behind a single presidential candidate. The group disintegrated
even before the first votes were cast and its membership threw their splintered weights
behind different candidates, notably Weah and Togba-Nah Tipoteh (Sawyer 2008, 187).
Another tendency around the time of the campaigns was the emergence of a
women's empowerment movement known as the 50-50 Movement. With two female
presidential candidates, Margaret Tor-Thompson and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf on the ballot,
one of whom will eventually win the presidency, various women's groups mounted a
serious campaign arguing that women had borne the brunt of the war and given the
previous years of bad governance and mismanagement under men, it was time to give
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women a chance (Sawyer 2008, 187). According to Sawyer, while the amalgamation of
women's movements under this umbrella did not officially endorse the candidacy of
Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, from their actions it was implicit whom their support went to.106
One of the most transmittable messages of the campaigns was Weah's populist
message of representing the common Liberian. On campaign stop after campaign stop,
Weah cited his humble origins from the slums of Monrovia to an international soccer
star. Defending his limited formal education, Weah argued that the educated people of
Liberia were the culprits of all the troubles that had befallen Liberia over the years. His
supporters cited his unwavering support for the Liberian national soccer team during the
most trying times of the country and his relative inexperience in politics as a positive sign
of someone who was untainted by all the allegations of corruption or association with the
civil war, which tainted some of the other candidates in the race (Sawyer 2008).
On the other hand, supporters of Johnson-Sirleaf criticized Weah for his lack of a
formal education. His newness to politics was also used against him and argued as a lack
of the requisite experience to tackle the massive problems of post-war Liberia. JohnsonSirleaf s supporters cited her international administrative experience with the World
Bank and other international organizations, her graduate degree from Harvard University
and her long years of opposition to various oppressive regimes as the requisite credentials
of whom Liberia needed at that moment in time. Equally so, detractors of Johnson-
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In a reaction to a story in the Liberian Analyst newspaper of October 26,2005 titled "Gender Ministry

Turns UP's Campaign Ground," some women, including former Liberian head of state Ruth Perry, the
education minister Dr. D. Evelyn Kandakai, female governors, female religious leaders and other elite
women, who claimed to be the representative voice of the women of Liberia reaffirmed their collective
endorsement of Mrs. Johnson-Sirleaf s candidacy as the women of Liberian and not as any sectional
interest. See "Liberian Women React to Analyst Story," Friday, October 28*, 2005.
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Sirleaf hinted her past involvement with Charles Taylor in triggering the civil war, her
service with the corrupt administration of William Tolbert in the 1970s and her
questionable heritage as potential setbacks to her candidacy. According to Sawyer,
Johnson-Sirleaf took great pains to counter the latter allegation making sure to refer to
her Gola and Kru heritages at every campaign opportunity including the inauguration
following her election (Sawyer 2008, 187).
As the campaign for president heated up, this distinction between the educated
and experienced candidacy of Johnson-Sirleaf and the uneducated but populist persona of
Weah would become the major divisive theme of the entire elections especially as the
two went into the runoff elections in November.
Quite a few presidential candidates invoked religion during the campaigns
referring to a divine inspiration that compelled them to seek the presidency of Liberia.
Among this group, the most pronounced was the campaign of Brumskine (Sawyer 2008,
189). At the head of his Liberty Party, Brumskine mounted a major campaign on this
message of fundamental Christianity helped by a grassroots evangelical Baptist
foundation, which operated throughout the Bassa heartland of central Liberia. Other
candidates such as Sherman of COTOL and Kiadii of the National Vision Party of
Liberia similarly invoked divine inspiration for their candidacies but according to
Sawyer, none of these were more prominent than Brumskine's effort.
The last two tendencies surrounding the campaigns that Sawyer (2008, 189)
observed were those who were motivated by finishing what he calls "unfinished
struggles" from the past and those bent on a transformation of Liberia from what it was
previously. The former group consisted of those who yearned for the deposed oligarchy
of the pre-war years and those who were strongly opposed to that oligarchy and
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everything that it stood for. Those who opposed the old oligarchy considered themselves
progressive forces in Liberian society. According to Sawyer, one of the issues that the
two groups disagreed over leading up to the 2005 elections was the proposed mandate of
a truth and reconciliation commission following the elections and the proposed payment
of reparations to those who had been victims of state violence against protesters in the
1970s.107
The second schism among those resuming unfinished struggles was that between
former supporters of Doe and those who were former supporters of Taylor. According to
Sawyer, this struggle was played out between members of the Gio and Mano ethnic
groups on one hand who supported pro-Taylor forces, and his former National Patriotic
Party now headed by Massaquoi going into the elections and Krahn and Mandingo ethnic
groups on the other hand who supported pro-Doe forces such as the National Democratic
Party of Liberia now ironically headed by Tubman of Americo-Liberia heritage and a
direct descendant of the oligarchy Doe had deposed about 25 years earlier (Sawyer 2008,
190; Harris 2006, 384). Weah tried to stride the margins of both groups and perhaps paid
for it in the runoff elections when potential Gio and Mano voters in Nimba realigned with
Johnson-Sirleaf following reports that Weah had promised jobs to Krahn elites in Grand
Gedeh if he won the election (Harris 2006, 389).
Finally, there was the movement of new reformers who were the new
progressives. This very informal group consisted of Liberian professionals, civil society
107

In 2007 I was in Monrovia when one of the leaders of the protest movements of the 1970s, Gabriel

Bacchus Matthews passed away. His funeral on September 29, 2007 was well attended. The funeral
procession brought traffic in most of central Monrovia to a dead halt for the better part of the day, perhaps a
testament to his popularity. The late Matthews threw is his tremendous populist political weight behind
George Weah and the CDC during the elections.
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groups and intelligentsia who perceived Johnson-Sirleaf s candidacy as the best option
for Liberia given her education, professional background and receptivity to contrary
points of view. In other words, Johnson-Sirleaf did not outwardly exhibit any dictatorial
tendencies (Sawyer 2008, 190).
An estimated 35 percent of the almost 1.3 million Liberians who registered to
vote in the elections of 2005 lived in Montserrado County, which includes the capital
Monrovia and its immediate environs such as the bustling suburban community of
Paynesville to the south. According to Dr. Charles Clarke, chairman of the Unity Party,
going into the elections, one challenge for his party was to design and disseminate a
campaign message that sufficiently addressed the needs of urban voters while also
remaining cognizant of the scattered but substantial votes to be won in rural areas
countrywide, even in the remotest parts of the country.108
Another challenge was to tailor a message that sufficiently addressed the needs of
all Liberians while remaining particularly sensitive to the unique concerns of young
Liberians in the 18-35 years bracket who accounted for over 35 percent of the registered
voters for the 2005 elections and who had borne the brunt of the war either as exploited
fighters or victims of the violence perpetrated by others. As such, one major thrust of the
campaign message from the Unity Party focused on engaging marginalized youths in
postwar reconstruction of Liberia. Another thrust focused on the promised delivery of
important services and infrastructure such as electricity and pipe-borne water to all
Liberians in urban and rural areas. The UP further underlined the international credentials

"We are the Unity Party," he told me. "We strive to get everyone on board our party wagon."
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of their presidential flag bearer, Johnson-Sirleaf, as the requisite experience to undertake
the imperative task of reuniting and rebuilding Liberia in the postwar period.
Other parties were not outdone in promising postwar reconstruction of Liberia
and reengaging marginalized youth. For example, as the major thrust of their campaign
messages, the CDC touted the relative youth of Weah, their presidential flag bearer, and
his dedication to address the problems of Liberia. The CDC pledged in their National
Platform to
strongly support and put in place a comprehensive reconciliation plan for former
combatants and other war-affected youths, and people as a significant component
of Liberia's post-war reconstruction agenda. The CDC proposes the establishment
of a National Reconciliation and Healing Program (NRHP) as a means of
mainstreaming war-affected youths and children into society by providing
academic, vocational and other career-developing opportunities for them. 09
The official campaign period for the elections commenced on August 15 though
many observers pointed out that all political parties started clandestine campaigns to
canvass votes several months prior to the official date.110 Like Sierra Leone, the chief
means of campaigning were the mass outdoor rallies usually attended by any number of
people between a few hundred to several thousand depending on the popularity of the
political party, the candidate or the location of the rally.111 Other means of campaigning

Congress for Democratic Change, 2005. National Platform (Monrovia, Liberia), p2.
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Charles Brumskine is alleged to have declared his intention to run again for the presidency and started

elements of his campaign as far back as 2003 when Charles Taylor was still the incumbent president.
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Most political rallies held in the capital of Monrovia can be expected to draw audiences in their

thousands whereas only a handful of people might attend a rally in some counties given the political party
or candidate. Mass rallies are often colorful events accompanied by loud singing and dancing to campaign
jingles often punctuated by screams of party slogans. Those who are heavy partisans or who can afford to,
wear t-shirts emblazoned with the pictures of the standard bearers of the party holding the rally or other
party symbol. Those who cannot afford the party attire or who are not heavy partisans appear in their
regular dress.
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included the door-to-door canvassing of potential voters, recorded audio messages for
dissemination through various radio channels across the country and posting flyers and
handbills of party candidates across the country. Each political party over-utilized one
form or the other campaign tool given their campaign war chest for the elections, the
location or the source of the vote they may be trying to canvass. Some like, the CDC and
Weah, who had his own radio station, were able to reach wider audiences across Liberia
with their campaign messages.
The first opportunity for the presidential aspirants to pitch their messages to a
broad-base audience came in the form of a presidential debate that was organized by the
National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute and the Press Union
of Liberia on Thursday September 15, 2005 at the Centennial Pavilion in Monrovia. The
eagerly anticipated occasion was attended by eleven of the twenty-two presidential
candidates running in the elections. The event was said to be remarkable more for the
conspicuous absence of Weah, one of the leading contenders for the presidency than for
the elaboration of any party program or campaign platform that was outside the lines of
promising to reunify Liberians and develop the country following the war. Notable
contenders in the presidential candidate field such as Johnson-Sirleaf, Brumskine and
Sherman of COTOL all followed this line in their contributions to the debate.112
Unlike Sierra Leone, there is no constitutional stipulation in Liberia that parties
establish a presence in all administrative districts of the country. Given that there was no
such requirement, it is not surprising that the elections observation team from the Carter

U2

A full coverage of this debate is in the archives of the Analyst newspaper. See Liberia Analyst, 2005.

"Presidential Debate: Cunning Politicians, Ignorant Audience, Sentiments Overtake Maturity." Friday,
September 16, 2005.
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Center noted that "party organization is centralized within Monrovia" and most campaign
activity was focused in the capital" (Carter Center Report 2005, 40). Where campaigns
branched out into rural counties, the highlights of such efforts were the visit of the
presidential candidate and other top brass of a particular political party to a county to
address a mass rally or other party function or meeting. Besides, Montserrado, parties
tended to concentrate their efforts in Lofa, Bong, Nimba and Grand Bassa Counties, other
areas with high voting population density. The discussions of the campaigns of the
selected political parties below provide illustrative pictures of how elites sought to
mobilize voters to vote for them around the elections of 2005.
George Opong Weah, the CDC and the Campaign for Votes During the Elections
of2005
Weah and his running mate, the veteran politician Rudolph Johnson an ethnic
Gbandi from Lofa County, launched their official campaign for the highest office in
Liberia from the CDC headquarters in Congo Town, along Tubman Boulevard in
Monrovia on August 15, 2005.
According to Samuel D. Tweah Jr., the former chairman of the CDC in the United
States and one of the party's founding members, the CDC inspired a following that cut
through the spectrum of Liberian citizenry. At the top of the layer, the party attracted
members of the Liberian intelligentsia and professional class who were tired of the "usual
politics" from so-called political leaders who had spent a lifetime in Liberian politics
without any tangible benefits to show for it. These leaders had failed to deliver the
economic and political progress for which Liberians yearned and their failures had
allowed the excesses of past dictatorial regimes resulting in the fourteen-year civil war.
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The candidacy of Weah was therefore a welcomed freshness to the Liberian political
scene that inspired this class, Tweah explained.
At the other end of the spectrum, Tweah explained that the candidacy of Weah
and the formation of the CDC also appealed greatly to the masses of downtrodden
Liberian youth who had endured years of unimaginable hardship brought on by the civil
war. Weah's humble beginnings from one of the lower class neighborhoods on the
outskirts of Monrovia and ascendance to an international soccer star struck an admirable
chord with this class who saw in Weah several shades of themselves and what they could
become given good fortune. Since Weah had never directly participated in Liberian
politics before but had undertaken various charitable ventures across the country and
sponsored the Liberian soccer team to attend various international tournaments at a time
when the country could not afford to pay salaries to even key government functionaries;
he was also seen as the most philanthropic Liberian in recent times, someone who
genuinely cared about the problems Liberians faced.113
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Weah was not without detractors who, at various times in the campaign and more so during the runoff

harped on his lack of formal education as serious limitations on his bid to assume the presidency of Liberia.
Groups such as the Movement for Political Reform in Liberia (MOP) declared that they possessed evidence
showing Weah was a 4th grade dropout instead of a high school dropout and challenged him to prove
otherwise. Notable individuals in Liberia who were in opposition to Weah's candidacy, such as Jay Mike
David, the Operational Manager of the Associated Companies of Liberia, also made their opposition to
Weah's candidacy felt. In one pronouncement, David warned that Liberia risked becoming a future
"Zimbabwe" if Weah is elected President in reference to the dictatorship of Robert Mugabe. See the
Analyst, 2005. "Resist Weah for Presidency: To Avoid Future Disgrace." Perhaps one of the even more
remarkable criticisms of Weah's presidential bid came from Jonathan Sogbie, a former teammate of
Weah's in the national soccer team. Sogbie disagreed with all the praises that had been heaped on Weah as
a patriot for sponsoring the national soccer team in a time of need during the war when funds were
seemingly unavailable for participation in international soccer tournaments. Sogbie alleged that Weah
always asked for refunds of his money from the state of Liberia and that even though it took time to process
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These two sentiments were the thrust of the CDC campaign machinery and the
messages it produced. Earlier, we saw that members of the Km ethnic group were also
drawn to the candidacy of Weah and the CDC party in larger numbers than other ethnic
groups but I could not identify any overt efforts to court members of this group as an
ethnic base for the party; neither was there any such efforts made according to other
executive members of the party that I interviewed. The overwhelming identification of
the Kru ethnic group with the CDC was more explainable by the reasons members of the
intelligentsia and marginalized youth gave for their support of the party's cause than it
was by any sense of an ethnic bloc preference for Weah simply because he was a son of
the soil.
For most of the campaign, Weah and other party elites the CDC delivered
messages to the Liberian public and electorate that were broad-based, portraying the
party and the candidacy of Weah as an innovative presence in the politics of Liberia that
would undertake the imperative task of postwar reconstruction. The key words of the
campaign were "peace and stability." Weah promised crowds, everywhere he went,
programs that concerned ordinary Liberians struggling to recover from the war such as
access to education. He promised to stamp out illiteracy in Liberia if elected and to create
a peaceful environment for Liberian refugees and others displaced by the war to return to
contribute to the rebuilding efforts.

those payments, Weah always received any money he had spent on the team. Sogbie alleged further that
Weah had dictatorial tendencies as team captain of the Lone Stars and would make instant enemies of
anyone who dared to oppose his suggestions at meetings. However, any credibility that Sogbie might have
had in making his allegations were undermined by his open declaration of support for Madam JohnsonSirleaf s candidacy. See the Liberian Analyst, 2005. "Boye Charles Reveals More on Weah: Pledges
Support for Ellen," Thursday, September 15 2005, for more details of Sogbie's allegations against Weah.
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According to Tweah, had they (the entire campaign machinery of the CDC) stuck
entirely with such chords, Weah would have emerged victorious at the end of the runoff
elections in November of 2005. Indeed, it was such messages and his populist appeal of
bringing all Liberians onboard that got him the votes and put him in front of the
presidential race following the first round of the elections. What factors derailed the CDC
campaign train and caused Weah's defeat in the runoff? According to several executive
members of the party who told me in confidence, it was partly Weah's ill-advised and
hasty decision to draw on elements of ethnic sentiments around the time of the closing
stages of the campaigns that may have occasioned the flight by many potential supporters
and votes to Madam Sirleaf s camp during the runoff elections.
On the occasion in question, Weah is said to have visited the village of Tuzon in
Grand Gedeh County, the birthplace of Doe where he declared his gratitude to Doe for
supporting him early in his football career. According to Harris (2006, 389), Weah
promised to repay the debt he owed to the son of Grand Gedeh by appointing people from
the county, ostensibly members of the Krahn ethnic group and therefore Doe's people, to
his cabinet if elected president. Up to that point, his campaign machinery was running
efficiently and even though he was gradually being outpaced in campaign funding by the
revitalized Johnson-Sirleaf and Unity Party campaign machinery, he still maintained the
substantial and influential core of loyal following among the youth who needed little
convincing to stay in his camp. It is important to note that Johnson-Sirleaf did not even
place second in the votes in Nimba following the first round of the elections. However,
come the second round, it is argued that Weah's declarations in Grand Gedeh cost him
the votes in the more populous Nimba when the news of his actions in Grand Gedeh
earlier, was relayed by his political opponents to the people of Nimba. The revelation is
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said to have caused an about-face turn in Nimba votes catapulting Johnson-Sirleaf to the
top of the votes in that county (Harris 2006, 389).
This development is another cautionary tale regarding the potential effects of
ethnic sentiments on the political behavior of electorates in Africa. With a populist tone
to his messages, Weah was successful in motivating thousands of supporters to support
his political cause whereas his supposedly tactical switch to invoke ethnic sentiments in
Grand Gedeh County achieved nothing else but alienate potential voters in neighboring
Nimba County, a development that probably cost him the election.
Earlier on in Weah's campaign for the presidency, it became evident that he did
not possess the oratorical skills to convey his messages successfully to large crowds at
mass rallies but he was still able to pull in the largest crowds of the entire campaign
period.114 However, it is a difficult task to decipher if his mere presence at such rallies did
more to pull in adoring crowds who wanted to see the international soccer star than being
drawn to listen to his electoral promises of rebuilding Liberia. Given his limited
education, Weah could not directly take control of the crafting and dissemination of his
campaign messages, especially those that should be tailored to fit the aspirations and
needs of electorates in counties across Liberia and in the deepest rural areas. He therefore
needed strong local campaign machineries in counties across the country but if there were
few areas in which the CDC campaign machinery was vulnerable, this was one of them.
As was the case with the electoral support for nearly all of the other political parties,
outside of Monrovia, hardly any avowed adherents of the CDC paid any campaign

In one show of support, thousands of partisans of the CDC are said to have intertwined arms standing
along the length of Tubman Boulevard in central Monrovia, a distance of more than several miles.
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contributions to the party. The loyalty of such members, it appears was limited to
attending party functions such as rallies and meetings and professing verbal support for
the party than by campaign contributions that are often a feature of support for political
parties in advanced democracies. Most of the executive membership of the party that I
interviewed admitted that the party was a new organization that could not be expected to
have sunk its roots deep into the countryside, as yet, given its recent founding and the
time the elections were held. As a consequence, the CDC lacked the kind of grassroots
support that the Liberty Party and Brumskine, for example, cultivated across the Bassa
heartland that was the LP's stronghold.
To compensate for this apparent weakness, the CDC relied on the star power of
Weah to grace every major campaign occasion across the country as well as his money to
fund every major party activity. Local party organizations were rather weak or nonexistent. Most candidates for legislative seats adopted the party name more as a brand
name and probably to ride the good fortune of Weah's celebrity than in any professed
belief in the political ideology of the CDC. Without providing details in depth, the party
issued a ten-point national platform promising what it will do for peace and unity,
education, economic management and liberalization, accountability and transparency,
social justice and equality, infrastructure and transport development, healthcare, social
security and environmental responsibility, agriculture, forestry, mining and food security,
national security and defense, and international cooperation or foreign policy if their
presidential candidate won the presidency. It was never clear from this, what candidates
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would do at the local level or how these promises would translate into concrete benefits
for local communities.115
Executive members of the party admitted that these were all weaknesses that they
will work to address going forward because they were aware that most one-man parties
do not outlive the support of their most influential membership. In the end, Weah could
not be everywhere at the same time to inspire crowds and towards the tail end of the
campaign this fact became evident with several no-shows at several scheduled campaign
events across the country.
The remarkable feature about the emergence of the CDC and Weah as major
players in the political field of Liberia was the relatively short time in which the party
was founded but rose to become the major opposition party in Liberia. The CDC is,
arguably, an urban party with a political leadership that had never dabbled in politics
before. Most of that political leadership had, in fact, spent the greater portion of the years
leading up to the elections outside of Liberia. Given that traditional explanations of
political behavior in African societies attach much credence to the mobilization of
electorates through the heightening of communal sentiments, especially those tied to
ethnic identities, it is a telling contradiction that the success of the CDC could best be
explained in urban terms and to the appeal of a candidate, that except for one occasion,
hardly ever drew on ethnic sentiments and instead relied on a populist and inclusive
message of bringing all Liberians together regardless of ethnic identity. I shall move on
next to examine the campaign of the Unity Party for the elections of 2005.

See the National Platform of the Congress for Democratic Change Party. CDC, 2005. National Platform
(Monrovia, Liberia: Congress for Democratic Change)
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Madam Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and Unity Party Campaign During the Elections of
2005
The veteran Liberian politician, the late Dr. Edward Kesselly, founded the Unity
Party in 1984 to challenge the former Liberian military dictator Doe in his efforts to
civilianize his regime through presidential and legislative elections inl985. Thus, the UP
is one of the few political parties that have occupied the political space in Liberia for over
two decades and understandably undergone "process of institutionalization" given their
long presence.116 As such, it was reasonable to expect that if any party had cultivated a
following that would stand it in good stead in any free and fair multiparty elections in
Liberia, the Unity Party would be that party given its enduring presence on the political
landscape. It should, therefore, not be too much of a surprise that the party eventually
emerged victorious from the elections of 2005. What needs to be addressed is how the UP
managed to turn it political fortune and that of its flag bearer around after initially losing
ground to the newly organized CDC.
The Unity Party settled upon Johnson-Sirleaf, a senior Liberian citizen of mixed
heritage who claimed Bomi County as her county of origin and Joseph Boakai Nyuma, an
ethnic Kissi who claimed Lofa County as his county of origin.117 Weah's running mate,
Rudolph Johnson, also hailed from Lofa. Whereas it could be argued that Weah and the
CDC drew support from marginalized youths and a section of the Liberian intelligentsia

See Samuel P. Huntington, 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press). Amos Sawyer makes a similar point in his article on the emerging patterns of political
competition in Liberia following the 2005 elections. Please refer to the footnote, which follows.
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Madam Johnson-Sirleaf s paternal ancestry included German heritage and her maternal ancestry were of

Gola and Kru origins. See Amos Sawyer, "Emerging Patterns in Liberia's Post-Conflict Politics:
Observations from the 2005 Elections," African Affairs, 107,427 (2008), p. 187.
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who yearned to see political aspirants of a different mold; it could be argued that the UP
drew its support primarily from women and the section of the Liberian intelligentsia and
professional class who preferred an experienced hand to steer the affairs of state in the
country following the war.
On Friday September 25, 2005, the Unity Party unveiled its party program and the
official profiles of its two standard bearers, Johnson-Sirleaf and Nyuma at Monrovia City
Hall to a mammoth audience of Liberians from all works of life, international and local
press, members of the diplomatic corps, and government officials (Liberian Analyst
2005). The central message of the party to all Liberians was the realization of a vision of
a "unified, prosperous and stable Liberia" under its administration. In the pursuit of this
vision, the UP proposed a thirteen-point agenda including four priority areas. The party
promised to do the following if elected: sustain peace and national security, heal the
nation's wounds, restore Liberia's pride and dignity, secure a brighter future for Liberian
youth, provide educational opportunities for all, revive and strengthen the economy,
reform health delivery services, reduce poverty and sufferings of the people of Liberia,
and secure a clean and healthy environment. The four priority areas included the
following: ensure good governance and practice systems, revitalize basic economic
infrastructure, revitalize transport and road networks, improve information and
communication. In the words of Johnson-Sirleaf, the UP pledged to do all of this and
"return to the rule of law and respect for all Liberians irrespective of tribe, religion,
gender, age, disability, and social standing."1™

From the Unity Party Manifesto and statement delivered by Madam Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf on Friday
September 25,2005. Pp. 1-3.
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The UP was one of the few parties that matched Weah and the CDC's campaign
war chest and towards the runoff, even came to surpass the CDC in spending.119 Also, the
UP had an advantage over the CDC given its long history and was, as such better
organized at mobilizing grassroots support across counties and rural Liberia. The party
also seemed to have benefited from its old campaign machinery from its electoral run for
the 1997 elections, when its standard bearer Johnson-Sirleaf placed second to Charles
Taylor, and brought this experience to bear, as well, across the country.
In spite of her age, Johnson-Sirleaf proved to be as able and energetic a
campaigner as any other presidential candidate in the field. Often mounted atop an open
wagon, she brought her long political experience to bear when articulating the issues at
campaign rallies. Her mastery of the economic and political issues facing Liberia made
her a better orator than Weah when she outlined to campaign crowds the problems that
Liberia faced and what she will do, if elected to tackle those problems.120 Her running
mate, Nyuma, was also an able campaigner adept at stirring crowds at rallies across the
country - a quality which perhaps explains why the party settled upon him as their vice
standard bearer.

"'According to David Harris, during the runoff, Madam Johnson-Sirleaf and the UP had enough funds to
hire a helicopter to take them on campaign trips to the remotest parts of the country in order to canvass
votes whereas Weah's campaign was restricted to the roads. See Harris (2006, 390), Liberia 2005: An
Unusual Post-Conflict Election. The Liberian Analyst newspaper also reported that at some point, the CDC
had cause to fire the entire CDC office in Bong County over proven accusations of pilfering from the CDC
campaign fund intended for that county. See the Liberian Analyst (2005), "Weah Popularity Soars: Rural
Liberians Swarm CDC Rallies, Teahjay and others Add More Impetus."
120

1 listened to a tape that a friend played for me in which George Weah unsuccessfully tried to pronounce

a three-syllable word in an interview. I could not help laughing. The friend then rhetorically asked me how
they could let someone like that become president of Liberia and potentially embarrass their country at an
international meeting.
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The Achilles heel in Johnson-Sirleaf s campaign efforts to mobilize the Liberian
electorate was the almost successful attempt by her opponents to associate her with
almost twenty years of dirty politics in Liberia. Some made the allegation that shadows of
corruption had never been far from her when she served as government finance minister
in the 1970s. Others tied her to Taylor's invasion of Liberia claiming that she was one of
the initial sponsors of the rebellion.121 Perhaps, even more potentially debilitating, others
questioned her ancestry and identity accusing her of foreign ancestry and therefore
unqualified for the office of President of Liberia. One aspect of this latter accusation
questioning her identity was to tie her to the more than one century of repressive rule by
the True Whig Party in Liberia by labeling her an Americo-Liberian or Congo. As
mentioned earlier, Sawyer (2008, 187) points out that she took great pains to explain her
ancestry at every campaign stop making sure to enlighten listeners about her Gola and
Kru grandmothers who raised her. She even made a similar reference to this heritage
when she was on safe ground in her inaugural speech following her electoral victory.

121

Tom Woewiyu, the former defense minister in Charles Taylor's defunct NPFL was particularly adamant

in alleging ties between Madam Johnson-Sirleaf and the former rebel organization. Several supporters of
Madam Johnson-Sirleaf sprang to her defense on the matter challenging Woewiyu to produce the evidence
in support of his accusation. In one dramatic rejoinder, Austin Clarke, the former deputy defense minister
in the same NPFL who succeeded Woewiyu as defense minister held a press conference in Sinkor,
Monrovia to debunk the allegations by his former boss. Clarke conceded that Madam Johnson-Sirleaf was
part of the formation of the NPFL because everyone was frustrated with the Doe regime at the time and
wanted to get rid of it but that she backed away from the movement when she saw that the movement had
metamorphosed into a brutal rebel movement under Charles Taylor. See the Liberian Analyst, 2005.
"Former NPFL General Defends Ellen: Takes Issue with Woewiyu," for this story. Another group, the
Liberians For Ellen (LIFE) also demonstrated their support for Madam Johnson-Sirleaf by damning
Woewiyu for his allegations but the latter group refused to ask him to produce the evidence saying that
Woewiyu had already demonstrated that he was not a credible individual.
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Like the CDC, the UP also ran a centralizing campaign bringing everyone on
board towards a theme of reconstructing Liberia for all Liberians. In an interview at the
Party's headquarters in downtown Monrovia, the chairman of the party, Dr. Clarke told
me that theirs was an inclusive campaign intended to put all hands on deck to undertake
the task of postwar reconstruction. As such, the party did not identify with any sectional
interests but firmly touted the requisite experience of its flag bearer at every campaign
event. When asked to put his finger on the one thing that he thinks clinched victory for
his party, Dr. Clarke responded that it was the perceived "competence" of their standard
bearer, Madam Johnson-Sirleaf that emboldened the majority of the electorate to place
their collective faith in the stewardship of the UP in Liberia for the next six years. In the
next section, I will discuss the campaign of the Liberty Party to serve as a contrast to the
centralizing campaigns that were ran by the first two contenders of the presidency during
the 2005 elections. Unlike the first two campaigns, the LP made deliberate efforts to
court a specific voting bloc among the Liberian electorate. The manner in which the LP
mobilized voters to vote for the party serves to illustrate why and how some campaigns
are sometimes perceived as ethnic vehicles.
Charles Walker Brumskine, the Liberty Party and the Campaign for Votes in the
Elections of 2005
Even though several party functionaries that I interviewed claimed otherwise, the
Liberty Party did not run a centralizing campaign for the presidential and legislative
elections of 2005. All other evidence, party programs, endorsements of electoral support,
some pronouncements of the leadership of the party, and even the geographical focus of
the campaign machinery of the party arguably points to the fact that the LP overly or
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deliberately courted electoral support from sectional interests of the electorate in the
forms of the Christian evangelical vote and the Bassa vote.
Brumskine, a charismatic lawyer who once served in the Taylor-led NPFL
government both as legal representative of the rebel movement and later as president pro
tempore of the Senate following the elections of 1997 (Harris 2006, 382), claimed ethnic
Bassa ancestry from Grand Bassa County, even though he was associated with the former
Americo-Liberian hegemony. Amelia Angeline Ward, his running mate, was also ethnic
Bassa who claimed Grand Bassa County as her county of origin. As such, the standard
bearers of the LP were the only team of president and vice president who both came from
the same county and belonged to the same ethnic group.
In a presidential candidate field were all the other parties made a calculated effort
to balance their ticket by diversifying their leadership to include a presidential candidates
and running mates who were either from different counties or belonged to different ethnic
groups, it is striking that the elites of the Liberty Party settled upon this particular team of
Brumskine and Ward.
On Thursday September 22, 2005, Brumskine formally launched the party
platform of the Liberty Party at the Antoinette Tubman Stadium in Monrovia titled
"Contract with the Liberian People." Brumskine argued that unlike other political parties,
theirs was not a party manifesto but a contract with the electorate of Liberia, which they
hoped to fulfill in order to gain reelection after six years. According to an editorial in the
Analyst newspaper of September 23, 2005, the LP's programs for Liberia were one of the
most thoughtful and well-articulated of the party programs on offer during the elections
of 2005 and in the words of the writer, "if implemented to the fullest in the event of the
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victory of the party in next month's legislative and presidential elections, Liberia would
be well on the way to peace, stability, and economic growth" (The Analyst 2005).
The thrust of the LP's platform consisted of a three-pronged program of recovery,
reformation and reconciliation. In delivering the party's programs, Brumskine promised
the recovery and rebuilding of Liberia in order to promote the general welfare of the
Liberian people. He also promised that the LP would reform the basic laws and
traditional practices to ensure justice, security, and socio-economic growth of the society,
if elected. The third prong consisted of the reconciliation of the population to ensure
domestic peace and tranquility. Springing forth from these, Brumskine promised free
education for all Liberians following three years of Liberty Party rule. In other to enhance
interethnic cultural understanding among students, Brumskine proposed that students
from Monrovia, for example, would be sent to Lofa county and vice versa and students
with an "A" average or "B+" average would be granted scholarships to attend the
University of Liberia.
Even more innovative, Brumskine promised a social security system in Liberia
upon getting elected in which "no old woman or man would go to bed hungry," and in
which the unemployed would be provided for until they could get their feet back on the
ground. In a country emerging from a fourteen-year civil war with unemployment as high
as 85 percent, Brumskine's message should have played out well to the ears of the
thousands of unemployed Liberian youth; but why was this not the case?
Perhaps, it is the other aspects of Brumskine's campaign messages that cost him
valuable votes and bought him a third-place finish in the electoral contest of 2005. In a
country where about 60 percent of the population consider themselves non-Christian,
Brumskine may have misguidedly placed too much emphasis on courting a religious vote
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that may not have existed in sufficient numbers to guarantee him election to the
Executive Mansion of Liberia. Underlying his campaign theme was a religious undertone
of "remaking Liberia under the rule of law by God's command." Through such
pronouncements, Brumskine sold himself to sections of the electorate as a deeply devout
Christian on a mission to save Liberia. While this message may have played well to the
section of the Liberian electorate that professed Christianity as their faith, the thrust of
such pronouncements excluded numerous other potential Muslim or non-Christian voters.
Indeed, Brumskine received endorsements from groups such as the "Prophetic Call to
Ministers," and a congregation of religious leaders consisting of over 500 pastors who
met to formally declare their support for his candidacy.122 It is doubtful whether he
received such similar endorsements from any Muslim groups in the country. I asked an
executive member of the Liberty Party why their standard bearer insisted on courting an
evangelical Christian vote during the campaigns and his response was that it was the
sincere belief of their candidate that postwar Liberia needed salvation given the horrors
of the war and Brumskine's efforts in that direction was in pursuit of that mission of
instilling the love of God in the hearts of all Liberians, in spite of the political
implications or consequences.
Another campaign message from the Liberty Party that may have appealed to a
limited audience is the focus on land reforms in Liberia. While not potentially as
alienating as the religious message, addressing the land issue appealed most to members
of Brumskine's Bassa ethnic group who had been victims of the greatest land
dispossessions in Liberia by rubber companies and other commercial firms. In several

See Liberian Analyst Newspaper, 2005. "Christian Churches Endorse Brumskine."
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campaign stops, Brumskine cited, as an example, the case of the Liberian Agricultural
Company and accused them of evicting farmers from their lands without just
compensation in order to plant trees. In addition to the collective memory of the war, the
land dispossessions struck some of the most sensitive political nerves in Bassaland and
may have served to ossify support for Brumskine's candidacy even though such messages
may have been less appealing to the peoples of other counties who had no similar
experience of land dispossessions. It is little wonder that we saw such huge support for
the LP by ethnic Bassas in previous sections of this chapter of the dissertation.
In the end, while several other aspects the Liberty Party's election party platform
had crosscutting appeal for Liberians and was one of the most coherent of the proposed
party programs that were disseminated to the electorate during the elections of 2005,
Brumskine's candidacy and the populist element to some of the proposals of his party
could not match those of Johnson-Sirleaf and Weah's all-centralizing platforms and
candidacies. He received a comparatively decent thirteen percent of the total votes cast
but this figure was far below that gained by Weah and Johnson-Sirleaf that propelled the
latter two into the runoff elections of November 8.1 next move on to discuss the
campaigns for the runoff elections with a particular focus on understanding how JohnsonSirleaf managed to upend Weah as the frontrunner following the first round of voting.
The CDC and the UP Campaigns for Votes in the Runoff Election of
November 8, 2005
It was during the campaigns for the runoff elections of November 8, 2005 that the
differences between the professional and life experiences of Johnson-Sirleaf and Weah,
came to the fore as the major focus of both camps in an increasingly acrimonious
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competition for votes heading to the polls. While the CDC camp tried to chip away at
Johnson-Sirleaf s assumed credibility and experiences as a highly educated international
banker and former international bureaucrat by accusing her of ignominious associations
with the NPFL, the civil war and even the defunct True Whig Party hegemony that
suppressed indigenous Liberians for so long, the UP camp hammered Weah for his low
education and lack of administrative experience of any kind. Together, the two issues,
Weah's education and Johnson-Sirleaf s past populated the national discourse on the
future of Liberia during the time of the runoffs, more than any other issue(s).
Following the announcement of the final results of the October 11 elections by the
chairperson of NEC, negotiations and maneuverings began in earnest as elites bargained
for advantageous positions in the post-electoral picture that was emerging. In the
arithmetic of most observers, Weah and his CDC party were well positioned to clinch the
runoff given how well he had performed in the first round of the elections and given the
sometimes-wild rumors that were emerging from the camps of various parties. In one
such calculation, it was claimed that the leaderships of eight out of the 22 political parties
that contested the first round of the elections had declared their support for George Weah
and the CDC following the announcement of the results from October 11. In the
calculation, the analyst listed Sherman and his multiparty coalition of COTOL as
declaring for the CDC, potentially bringing with them the 8 percent of votes that COTOL
won in the first round. Other leaderships that were said to have crossed over to the CDC
included the ULD, the NRP, the UDA, PRODEM, the Labor Party, and the NPL; all
polled less than one percent of the national votes each following the first round of voting
(Analyst 2005).

280

In a counter move, Johnson-Sirleaf and the UP also sought and received
endorsements from several parties heading to the runoff election. The Liberia Equal
Rights Party of Dr. Joseph Korto pledged their support to the UP, as did the National
Party of Liberia, the People's Democratic Party of Liberia, the Liberia Education
Development Party, and the Labor Party of Dr. Joseph Woah Tee. Several executive
members of Sherman's COTOL/LAP coalition, including the former chairman, Willard
Russell, broke ranks with the leadership of the COTOL alliance to pitch tents with the
Unity Party. In all, about twelve political parties sided with the UP although many still
considered the scales tipped in the favor of Weah up to that point (Analyst 2005). Given
the pledged support from these sources and in view of the almost 29 percent of votes he
had already secured in the first round as the frontrunner, why did Weah ultimately lose
the elections to Madam Johnson-Sirleaf? Several developments during the course of the
campaigns may offer some answers to this question and may also provide a cautionary
note for traditional explanations that have assumed mechanical ethnic linkages between
elites of political parties and the mass electorates during elections in Africa. These
developments at both the party and county levels may help explain why Weah ultimately
lost the runoff elections.
In one of the most interesting and striking developments of the runoff period, the
leaderships of some of the political parties declared for Weah's camp, while it was
reported that the mass membership of those parties, in some cases, failed to follow those
leaders into supporting the CDC and instead declared for Johnson-Sirleaf. Even among
the elites of political parties, splits on whom to support were not infrequent. For example,
while Sherman, the head of the COTOL coalition of parties, declared support for Weah's
camp in a dramatic statement, on that same day, the youth wing of one of the influential
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blocs of his multiparty coalition, the LUP/COTOL, declared for Johnson-Sirleaf. The
women's wing of the same bloc of the alliance also pitched tents with the UP candidate.
Bishop Alfred Reeves of the National Reformation Party of Liberia (NRPL) is also
reported to have broken ranks with other executive members of his party including the
main financial backer Martin Sheriff who had all declared support for Weah, by urging
supporters of his party to "vote for a candidate of their choice." Brumskine, the candidate
who placed third following the first round of voting also, rather conspicuously, failed to
endorse any of the two candidates in the runoff elections and instead encouraged his
supporters to vote their conscience leaving over 13 percent of potential Liberty Party
votes up for grabs.
In another dramatic development reported in the Analyst newspaper of October
28, 2005, some senators and representatives, recently elected on the CDC ticket pledged
their support for Johnson-Sirleaf and the UP (Analyst 2005). Supporters of the CDC
cause mounted efforts to stem such defections to the UP camp and increase support for
their party. Mysterious leaflets with potentially damaging ethnic implications for
Johnson-Sirleaf appeared on the streets of Monrovia. Printed on the letterhead of a
Masonic fraternity, the letter purportedly was written by Johnson-Sirleaf to Amos Sawyer
with a list of potential cabinet nominees should the UP clinch the runoff election. All the
potential cabinet nominees listed in the letter were of Americo-Liberian or Congo
descent. A similar list of potential cabinet nominees by the CDC also appeared bearing
the names of influential individuals in Liberian society -all of indigenous descent, who
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will serve with Weah, should he get elected.

Both efforts were attempts to inject ethnic

sentiments into a political contest that had been remarkable by the noticeable absence of
such sentiments during the first round of voting in October.
At the county level, the cases of Grand Gedeh and Nimba County illustrate well
the questionable bases of ethnic and regional support for political parties as assumed in
most of the existing literature. Attempts by some eminent sons of the soils and elites of
political parties hailing from those counties to mobilize their people in support of one
party or the other failed woefully to materialize into votes and instead resulted in
controversies that are well worth mentioning here. In Grand Gedeh, an eminent son of the
soil from the county, Boi Bleaju Boi an assistant finance minister in the government
chided his contemporaries for what he referred to as their erroneous assumption that
Grand Gedeh held a "political contract" with the National Democratic Party of Liberia, or
any other political party for that matter, because the late Doe, the founder of the NDPL
hailed from the county. In remarks to the Liberian press regarding allegations by NDPL
executive members that the people of Grand Gedeh had betrayed "their party," Boi had
this to say:
At no time did the people of Grand Gedeh enter into a political agreement that
binds them to attach their interest to a particular political party that contested the
October 11, 2005 presidential and legislative elections. (Analyst 2005)
Mr. Boi continued further to remark that it was unfortunate that many Liberians continue
to hold the notion that the NDPL belongs to the people of Grand Gedeh County but that

See "UP Intercepts Damaging Leaflets: Call on Liberians Not to Waiver," The Analyst newspaper.
Friday October 28, 2005.
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the NDPL was not an ethnic Krahn party as "widely misconstrued by many people in
several quarters of Liberia."
Nimba County experienced a similar division among the elites of political parties
who hailed from the county. Prince Johnson, a former warlord who had recently won one
of the two Senate seats from Nimba made a somewhat unilateral declaration of support
for Weah's presidential bid in the runoff. Other elites from the county rebuffed Johnson's
declaration labeling it "an absurd political misadventure." In a release to the Analyst
newspaper titled "Don't Sell our County for Pennies," a United States based citizens'
group from Nimba had this to say:
to begin with, Nimba County, like the rest of Liberia, has never been a monolithic
political setting where all the people blindly follow the whims of a leader and
therefore, Prince Johnson's attempt to mislead the people of Nimba County is an
absurd political misadventure .... (Analyst 2005)
The statement continued further to condemn Prince Johnson for not first consulting with
the people of Nimba before declaring his support and the promise of the support of the
rest of Nimba for Weah and the CDC. The citizens' group continued further in the
statement to offer an endorsement of their own.
Having scrupulously scrutinized the solid records of the two presidential
candidates, we have no doubt that Mrs. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf has the requisite
experience, qualifications, competence, capacity, orientation and above all else,
the COMMITMENT to lead Liberia from the quagmire that we now find
ourselves in and stabilize the country for posterity. We are therefore calling on the
people of Nimba County in particular and the Liberian people in general to vote
for Mrs. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf in the runoff election of November 8, 2005 in best
interest of the nation. ... (Analyst 2005)
As far as the official pronouncements of the candidates went, both stayed on
message underlining previous promises with additional details of what they will do if
elected. On one campaign trip to Buchanan in Grand Bassa County, Johnson-Sirleaf
roused crowds with her interpretation of what the Unity Party stood for. According to her,
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UNITY was an acronym in which U stood for unity; N stood for national development; I
for integrity; T for tolerance and transparency; and Y for youth development. She
promised the cheering crowd that achieving these will be her guiding focus if they were
to elect her and the Unity Party to form the next government. Johnson-Sirleaf and her
supporters played up her international experience everywhere they campaigned and filled
the airwaves with stories about her remarkable achievements in serving several
international bodies such as the United Nations Development Program. Some of her
supporters, such as Reginald Goodridge, a former information minister in Taylor's
government decried potential detractors of Johnson-Sirleaf who, he said, were
downplaying education for the purpose of justifying the alleged shortcomings of their
presidential candidate, Weah. Goodridge said that he was
disturbed by anti-education and ethnic messages coming from the camp of the
Congress for Democratic Change when Liberians are calling for reconciliation
and unification and stressing the importance of education for every youth as a
means of rebuilding Liberia. (Analyst October 2005)
Cyril Allen, a former chairman of Charles Taylor's NPP joined Goodridge in
supporting Johnson-Sirleaf as did Jewel Howard-Taylor, the ex-wife of the former
warlord. Professional women of Liberia including the Minister of Gender Affairs at the
time, Varbah Gayflor, held another meeting and reaffirmed their support for JohnsonSirleaf and the Unity Party following that meeting. So did over 200 influential traditional
women from all across rural Liberia. Johnson-Sirleaf invited Weah to a debate to discuss
publicly the issues facing Liberians heading into the polls on November 8 2005 so that
the electorate would obtain a clear idea of the position of each candidate. The National
Democratic Institute and other international organizations also tried in vain to get the two
candidates together for a debate.
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Weah embarked upon a ten-day road trip across Liberia as part of his campaign
for the runoff election. Shifting focus a little from other issues such as increasing the
literacy rate, Weah promised rapid economic development for Liberia if elected. In one
of his campaign stops in Buchanan, Grand Bassa County, he promised to create business
opportunities for small business owners in Liberia as well as attract foreign investments
and the proper management of revenue accruing to Liberia from its vast natural resource
deposits (Analyst 2005). In addressing the issue of corruption that many pointed to as one
of the root causes of the civil war, Weah pledged to have zero tolerance for corruption
and to punish any civil servants found guilty of the act. He also urged Liberians to
reconcile for the sake of peace arguing that genuine peace cannot be achieved without
reconciliation.
The results of the voting on November 8 showed how successful the various
campaigns, endorsements and other efforts of the elites of political parties were in
mobilizing voters to the polls for the runoff election. There were quite a few dramatic
turnarounds as referred to earlier such as the ones in Nimba and Montserrado counties
where Johnson-Sirleaf overturned all the odds to wrest those counties and their
substantial votes away from Weah, who had won them following the first round. Weah
won six counties during the first round, far more than any other presidential candidate
including Johnson-Sirleaf, who only managed to win four counties on October 11.
Although Weah held on to five of the six counties he had won following the first round of
voting on October 11, that feat paled in comparison to Johnson-Sirleaf s final tally of 10
counties for a total of 59.4 percent of the vote. Table 4.28 illustrates these shifts in
electoral fortunes between the two rounds of voting.
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Table 4.28
Electoral Wins by County October 11 and November 8: Presidential Candidate
County
Bomi

October 11
Presidential Candidate
Johnson-Sirleaf

November 8
Presidential Candidate
Johnson-Sirleaf

Bong

Tubman, W.

Johnson-Sirleaf

Gbarpolu

Johnson-Sirleaf

Johnson-Sirleaf

Grand Bassa

Brumskine

Johnson-Sirleaf

Grand Cape Mt.

Sherman, H.

Johnson-Sirleaf

Grand Gedeh

Weah

Weah

Grand Kru

Weah

Weah

Lofa

Johnson-Sirleaf

Johnson-Sirleaf

Margibi

Johnson-Sirleaf

Johnson-Sirleaf

Maryland

Tubman, W.

Johnson-Sirleaf

Montserrado

Weah

Johnson-Sirleaf

Nimba

Weah

Johnson-Sirleaf

River Cess

Brumskine

Weah

River Gee

Weah

Weah

Sinoe

Weah

Weah

Voter Turnout

74.9 %

61%

The survey instrument included a set of questions which asked voters who voted
in the runoff election if the presidential candidate for whom they voted in the election of
November 8 was the same candidate for whom they had voted during the first round of
the elections. 32 percent of the respondents indicated that during the first round of the
presidential elections, they did not vote for the presidential candidate for whom they
voted in the runoff elections. 48 percent of the respondents indicated that they did not
switch votes between presidential candidates while the rest of the responses fell into the

287

missing data category or those who could not recall if they had switched votes or not. The
follow-up question asked those who had switched votes between the two elections why
they chose to vote for a different candidate during the runoff election than the one for
whom they had previously voted. The responses are reported in Table 4.29.
Table 4.29
Why Did Respondent Switch Votes?
Response

Percent

First Round Choice No Longer on Ballot

21 %

Was told by elders how to vote

7%

Candidate is from same ethnic group

.3%

Candidate is most competent to rule Liberia

13%

Respondent did not switch vote

58%

Total

100%

N

910
The responses suggest that those who switched votes between presidential

candidates were less influenced by pressure from the elders or elites of political parties to
which they belonged than by the opinion they had formed of the requisite competence of
the candidate to undertake postwar reconstruction and reconciliation in Liberia, the issues
that dominated the national discourse in Liberia at the time. Even far less so were
considerations of ethnic affiliation with the candidate with less than one percent of
respondents suggesting that as a reason why they switched their votes.
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Next, I broke this down further to highlight the ethnic spread of the responses
across the categories for respondents who switched their votes as well as those who did
not between both rounds of election. Table 4.30 reports the result.
Table 4.30
Ethnic Groups and Reasons for Vote Choice in the Runoff Election
Ethnic
Group

Initial Choice
Absent

Elders
Prompt

Ethnic
Interest

Competent
Candidate

Did Not
Switch Vote

Bassa

17

8

0

23

53

Bella

21

0

0

29

50

Dei

50

0

0

5

45

3

24

0

24

38

Gio

22

17

0

0

61

Gola

29

0

0

8

63

Grebo

12

2

0

8

78

Kissi

7

7

0

3

83

Kpelle

38

9

1

16

37

Krahn

13

5

0

13

69

9

5

1

7

78

Loma

11

2

0

5

78

Mandingo

39

12

0

15

35

Mano

25

6

0

4

65

Mende

14

0

0

14

71

Vai

24

9

0

36

30

Others

21

7

0

14

59

Total

21

7

13

58

Gbandi

Kru

.3

N=713
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The table shows that among respondents who switched their votes, the influential
reasons why they cast a ballot for another candidate in the runoff elections appear to be
because their initial choice was no longer on the ballot or the felt that the candidate was
most competent for the job. Comparatively far less number of respondents declared that
their vote choice in the runoff was determined by a prompt from their elders or because
the candidate was most likely to secure the interests of their ethnic group. However, we
should note that the two candidates in the runoff are affiliated with only the Kru and Gola
ethnic groups. For those two groups, we note that most members did not switch their
votes from one candidate to the other between the two elections. There are some minor
variations in the numbers. It seems as if members of the Gbandi and Gio ethnic groups
were more likely to be influenced by prompts from the elders of their ethnic group than
others.
The final results of the election on November 8 suggest that Johnson-Sirleaf s
sustained message of possessing the requisite capacity and commitment to undertake the
imperative task of rebuilding Liberia following the war played out better in the ears of the
electorate than any other efforts or tactics that were employed by elites of political parties
to mobilize voters to their various camps; in view of the fact that those messages
constituted the thrust of her campaign machinery for the runoff election.
An Ethnic Census or a Vote for Peace, Development and Reconstruction?
The empirical evidence from this chapter has offered more support for the claim
that most Liberians went to the polls on October 11 and November 8, 2005 intent on
voting for a presidential candidate who would consolidate and sustain the peace by
building upon the preceding two years of relative peace they had experienced under the
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National Transitional Government. Even though there were twenty-two presidential
candidates on the ballot and over twenty political parties who all received votes in
varying numbers, the evidence further suggests that this fact points less to an ethnic
census, as could be hypothesized from existing explanations of voting behavior in
African societies, than to a qualified crop of elites who all felt they possessed the
requisite skills to undertake the imperative tasks of postwar reconstruction.
The survey results contradict theories that have maintained that political behavior
in African societies is, in the main, identity driven as well as elite centered. The evidence
included several cases where elites, such as the former warlord Prince Johnson of Nimba
County, made the call and attempted to mobilize segments of the Liberian population but
failed to do so, with those segments adopting a completely different stance. An important
distinction could therefore be made between elites on the basis of credibility. Credible
elites are successful in mobilizing the electorate if they have, in the past, established their
credibility by providing the material needs of the people. If on the other hand such
provisions have not been made, the less tangible element of identity alone does not
suffice in serving as a mobilizing factor. This is inconsistent with most identity theories
that have assumed elite driven processes because of the strong attachments that
electorates are said to have to the ethnic communities from which they hail.
Notably, the majority of respondents did not report voting for candidates or
political parties on the bases of identity or regional interests alone. Rather, the results
show that tangible development interests such as the postwar reconstruction of Liberia,
the provision of electricity, the construction of roads, hospitals and clinics were
paramount in the minds of voters and also constituted statistically significant
relationships with the dependent variables of vote choice and support for political parties.
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The findings are also less consistent with ethnic census theories given that several
counties produced quite a few presidential candidates who were on the ticket of different
political parties and who had running mates from different ethnic groups who also hailed
from different counties. Some were even from the same ethnic group but ran different
campaigns, effectively handicapping them from using any kind of ethnic insinuation to
attract or mobilize voters given the inherent contradictions in such messages. Tubman
from Maryland County and his cousin both ran on the tickets of different political parties
that had supposed electoral bases in other counties. Interestingly, Tubman headed the
NDPL party going into the elections. As the political party founded by the man who
overthrew the Americo-Liberian oligarchy of which he was a direct beneficiary, it is least
expected, given ethnic census theories, that he would have led the NDPL into elections.
Furthermore, it is least expected that the NDPL should have failed to attract votes in
Grand Gedeh County, the ancestral home of the late Doe who founded the party.
This and the other findings provide less support for an ethnic census in spite of
the splintering of votes following the elections. Much of the evidence points to votes that
were intended to place the most competent individuals into office out of the large pile of
political elites who were clamoring for votes. The next chapter presents the results of
several focus group discussions and explores this point further through the comparative
examination of the role of ethnicity in the post conflict elections in Sierra Leone and
Liberia.
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CHAPTER V
WHAT ROLE FOR ETHNICITY? POLITICAL BEHAVIOR AND MOBILIZATION
IN POST-CONFLICT LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE
This is the second key claim about the nature of African politics: that voters seek
access to state resources by allocating their electoral support to members of their
own ethnic groups, who they assume will be more likely than noncoethnics to
redistribute those resources to them. Meanwhile, candidates, recognizing this,
couch their appeals in ethnic terms. Ethnicity thus assumes a position of
prominence in election campaigns in Africa not because voters are atavistic or
tradition-bound but because, in a context where the goal is to capture resources
from the state, and where politicians woo supporters by promising to channel
resources to them, ethnicity provides a cue that helps voters distinguish promises
that are credible from promises that are not. (Posner 2005)124
In addition to class differences, the postindependence political behavior of
African ethnic groups reveals a persistence of internal or subethnic schisms along
the lines of clan, age-set, geographical, and sometimes gender differences.
(Chazan et al 1999)'25

Introduction
This chapter undertakes a direct comparison of the two cases of Liberia and Sierra
Leone through an analysis of the aggregated results from the focus group discussions that
were held to discuss the results of the surveys obtained in each country. In doing so, the
focus group sessions served to validate the findings of the surveys through open-ended
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discussions which gave participants the opportunity to express their opinions about the
findings and, more importantly, the reasoning behind those opinions.
One of the most repeated observations in the literature on political behavior in
Africa is that ethnic identity and considerations for securing communal interests at the
expense of other regions or broader national interests underlie the voting calculus and are
the prime indicators of how electorates vote. Yet we have seen how members of various
ethnic groups in Sierra Leone broke ranks with their groups to vote for Kabbah who
emerged president following the elections of 2002. We have also seen how elites in
Liberia, such as Winston Tubman, mobilized electorates from counties other than the one
from which they hailed. Thus, during the post-conflict elections in both Sierra Leone and
Liberia, voting preferences were not visibly predicated upon considerations for ethnic
identity and communal preferences alone.
Conversely, as shown in Chapters III and IV, electorates from some groups such
as the Km and Vai in Liberia and the Mende and Temne in Sierra Leone displayed
marked preferences for political parties associated with elites from their respective ethnic
groups or local communities. In the case of the Mende and Temne, the distinguishing
characteristic is that they constitute the two largest ethnic groups in Sierra Leone whereas
the Kru and Vai are quite small in numbers in comparison to other ethnic groups in
Liberia. In Chapter IV, we saw how Vais voted in significant numbers for COTOL, the
coalition headed by Harry Sherman, the prominent lawyer from Grand Cape Mount
County, the traditional home of Vais. On the other hand, Chapter III on Sierra Leone
revealed that Fullahs voted for the SLPP in obvious disregard for the National
Democratic Alliance headed by Amadu Jalloh, a Fullah. In effect then, some ethnic
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groups tended to display overwhelming support for one political party or preferred the
candidacy of some individual who hailed from their ethnic group while others did not.
In this sense then, all ethnic groups do not display homogenous preferences in
voting behavior. But this should not confuse an important point about the role of ethnicity
in the political behavior and mobilization of electorates in the two cases. For example, in
one sense of ethnic belongingness, seen as the ability to speak the same language as the
audience with which elites intended to communicate at rallies, party meetings and other
gatherings, ethnicity provided a vital tool for imparting important campaign messages to
thousands in specific communes. The ability to back up the communicative utility of the
ethnic identity as language common to a particular area with tangible evidence of good
deeds in the local community offered an additional tool for elites as they sought to recruit
voters.
Given the variations in the tendency of different ethnic groups to show support for
political parties ostensibly affiliated with their local communities and given also the
ability of elites such as Tubman of Liberia and Kabbah of Sierra Leone to mobilize
members of communities with whom they may not necessarily speak the same language,
it is important to ask then what groups, in the case of each country, were more likely to
display homogenous support for the leadership of some political parties and why? Why
did members of the Fullah ethnic group fail to throw their collective weight behind the
NDA party and the candidacy of their Fullah brother Amadu Jalloh? How did Winston
Tubman mobilize the following of the NDPL party to which he could not otherwise make
an undisputed claim of solidarity with any communal cause that membership may have,
given his Americo-Liberian heritage?
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This chapter seeks to answer these and related questions following the
examination of the data gathered from each country. The primary means of data
collection for the purpose of validating the preceding findings was through the focus
group discussions held in both countries. The total number of participants in the sessions
for each country was 48 broken down into 12 participants per each session held in each
geographical area of each country. The participants in each session ranged in age from 18
to the mid-seventies and were respectively recruited in each country with regard to
membership in the voting eligible population. Staffs of CENTAL and Campaign for
Good Governance were instructed to recruit only those individuals who they could verify
were not involved in heavily partisan activities in their various localities and who did not
hold membership in interest groups affiliated with political parties. Other criteria for
recruitment into the focus group sample were dictated by the need to reflect the regional
spread of ethnic groups and the respective proportions of gender, religion and ethnic
demographic in each region. The final groups that were assembled included men and
women, individuals who had attained various levels of education, the employed and
unemployed, and individuals who occupied various socio-economic strata in their
respective societies. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 provide a summary of the characteristics of the
participants in the focus group sessions in each country.
In all the sessions, I endeavored to steer the discussions around three important
themes, namely: the nature and content of campaign messages, how groups manifested
their interest in politics and the determination of regional support or preference for parties
and candidates. Additionally, the discussions in Liberia touched on the nature of Charles
Taylor's electoral victory in the 1997 elections.

296

Table 5.1
Characteristics of the Focus Group Participants in Sierra Leone (N=48)
Characteristic
Religion:
Christian
Muslim
Other Faith
Region:
East
North
South
West
Age Groups:
18-34
35-50
Over 50
Gender:
Women
Men
Level of Education:
Illiterate
Primary
Higher Education (Beyond High School/Some College/College Grad)
Ethnic Groups:
Mende
Temne
Limba
Kono
Krio
Other
Employment Status:
Unemployed
Employed/Self Employed
Residence:
Urban
Rural
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Number
18
25
5
12
12
12
12
20
18
10
22
26
18
16
14
12
12
5
5
7
7
18
30
12
36

Table 5.2
Characteristics of the Focus Group Participants in Liberia (N=48)
Characteristic
Religion:
Christian
Muslim
Other Faith
Region:
Central/West
East
North
South
Age Groups:
18-34
35-50
Over 50
Gender:
Women
Men
Level of Education:
Illiterate
Primary
Higher Education (Beyond High School/Some College/College Grad)
Ethnic Groups:
Kpelle
Bassa
Kru
Gola
Loma
Krahn
Vai
Mano
Other
Employment Status:
Unemployed
Employed/Self Employed
Residence:
Urban
Rural
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Number
30
12
6
12
12
12
12
10
26
12
23
25
7
22
19
8
8
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
15
33
27
21

Identities. Communities, and Post-Conflict Political Behavior in Liberia and Sierra
Leone: Findings from the Focus Group Discussions
A plausible explanation that could be derived from literature regarding the role of
ethnicity in the political behavior and mobilization of voters in Liberia and Sierra Leone
is that following the devastation of whole communities that accompanied both civil wars,
political parties were likely to draw on communal sentiments and since these were often
closely knitted with other ties such^as ethnic kinship, they would become the foundations
for the reorganization of political life in both countries. Given such interpretations, it is
reasonable to expect that elites of political parties would play the ethnic card at each
available turn and all sections of the electorates would be equally inclined to pay heed to
such calls given the homogeneity of ethnic preferences and the struggle over scarce
resources to rebuild following the war.
The findings from the survey research on both countries presented in Chapters III
and IV show that some notable schisms existed among several political parties,
particularly in the case of Liberia. During the runoff, elites of several political parties
such as COTOL not only went their separate ways in endorsing various candidates, but
also asked their supporters to "vote their conscience." Charles Brumskine of the Liberty
Party of Liberia famously refused to endorse any particular candidate and he similarly
exhorted his supporters to vote their conscience.
Thus, I asked participants in the focus group sessions how they felt voters made
decisions about what political parties or elites to support during elections. One of the
answer options from the survey question in the general survey was repeated to
participants in the focus group sessions. The response option prompted them to indicate
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their agreement or disagreement with the statement that "They are the party representing
the interests of my ethnic group." From the responses received to this question, 60
percent of the participants in the focus group sessions in Sierra Leone suggested that 90
percent of Sierra Leoneans would strongly disagree with this suggestion. 35 percent
suggested that Sierra Leoneans would strongly agree with this suggestion and the rest
were distributed among the midrange response options.
In the case of Liberia, 67 percent of the participants in the focus group sessions
suggested that 40 percent of Liberians would strongly disagree with the suggestion that
considerations for their ethnic group could be the prime motivating factor for supporting
parties or candidates during elections. Thirty-three percent of the respondents suggested
that 55 percent of Liberians would agree with the statement, while the rest of the
respondents were unsure of how Liberians would respond.
In both cases, the responses from the focus group sessions do not offer conclusive
evidence to show that the respondents believed that ethnicity was the major factor
motivating political behavior or informing patterns of mobilization into the politics of
Sierra Leone and Liberia. However, this is less true for the case of Liberia than it is for
Sierra Leone given that over half the respondents in the focus groups sessions believed
that only 40 percent of Liberians would have strongly disagreed with the statement
suggested in the surveys.
Following each response in the focus group sessions, I then introduced the actual
figures from the surveys and encouraged discussions on the outcomes revealed. In the
case of Liberia, the responses to the question on the surveys showed that 23 percent of
Liberians strongly agreed with the statement that they supported a candidate or followed
a political party because it was the party that was more likely than others to champion the
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interests of their ethnic group, while about 12 percent agreed with the same statement. 50
percent strongly disagreed with the statement and another 12 percent disagreed with the
statement.
I then probed for explanations that would explain the differences in the response
options given from what they, the respondents, had suggested. Some respondents told me
that considerations for seeking ethnic interests have never been a major concern for most
Liberians when seeking what political party to support because they are aware that all
politicians are greedy and not likely to deliver on any promise of channeling material
benefits to their counties. If anything, Liberians have been more inclined to follow
politicians, such as Bacchus Matthews and others, who championed broad-based issues
such as organizing the rice riots of 1979 that eventually toppled the Tolbert
administration. In some sessions, respondents told me that since politics in Liberia had
never been the open, democratic affair that is practiced in some Western countries, there
had never really been an opportunity for Liberians to play out their ethnic differences in
terms of allocating support to political parties on the bases of ethnic identity. If anything,
"we will see from now onwards, how things play out," one respondent told me, in
reference to the expectation that future elections will be held in a much freer environment
following the conclusion of the war. In reference to why the votes in Liberia were
diffused among so many political parties, another respondent offered this explanation:
people were faced with diverse choices, and that prominent politicians had failed
over the years to develop the country and had been obsessed with corruption and
enriching themselves. Frustrated over the latter, experimenting with any lessimportant but seeming credible candidate was the best way forward.
Turning to Sierra Leone, I revealed to participants of the focus group sessions,
following their responses, that 11 percent of Sierra Leoneans strongly agreed with the
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statement that considerations for securing ethnic interests were a major factor in
determining their support for political parties while 73 percent strongly disagreed with
the statement and about seven percent agreed with the suggestion while another seven
percent disagreed. Opening discussions around this point, some participants made an
interesting point that ethnicity was only a factor in the mobilization of Sierra Leoneans if
it was thought to bring an immediate benefit. I probed for what this benefit was or were,
as the case may be, and the examples offered included support for military regimes in the
past by groups who felt that such regimes offered the potential for their members to
receive lucrative government contracts, scholarships for their children to study overseas
or high administrative positions. References were made to two military coups of the past:
the National Provisional Ruling Council regime of 1992 and the Armed Forces Ruling
Council junta of 1997. The latter was cited for receiving substantial support from Limbas
while the former was cited for being largely a Mende affair.
One interesting point about these examples is that they are all drawn from the
context of nondemocratic political regimes and the limited contestation in the public
arena that such regimes offered. It is necessary, perhaps, to point out some contradictions
in the two military coups that were cited as examples of the cases of motivation for ethnic
mobilization when a group expected direct benefits from undertaking such action. The
NPRC coup of 1992 that many of the respondents deemed a Mende affair was headed by
a Krio military officer, Captain Valentine Strasser who served as head of state for two
years before being overthrown himself in a subsequent in-house coup that was
supposedly led by a Mende officer, Captain Julius Maada Bio. Other influential officers
in that military junta were also either Limba, such as Karefa Kargbo or Temne, such as
Idriss Kamara who was sent to serve as regional head of a Mende province in the south.
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The contradictions abound. In the case of the AFRC coup of 1997 that was largely
deemed a Limba affair, it is noteworthy to point out that a Corporal Gborie who was from
the Kono ethnic group first announced the coup on the radio. Other influential players in
the AFRC coup such as Alex Tamba Brima were also of non-Limba extraction. Thus,
even though the coup was largely credited to Johnny Paul Koroma, a Limba, as chief
organizer, it consisted of members of other ethnic groups rendering the claim that it was
an occasion for championing the interests of Limbas unsupportable.
Another way to determine the role of ethnicity or communal preferences in
guiding political behavior and mobilization in the post-conflict political contests in
Liberia and Sierra Leone is to examine discourses around the respective campaigns by
key elites and how these resonated with various sections of the electorate. We saw in both
Chapters III and IV that candidates such as Kabbah or Johnson-Sirleaf who concentrated
their messages on centralizing national issues of peace and post-war development fared
better and eventually won the respective elections. Others, who promised to address
specific communal grievances as a large part of their message, such as Brumskine
promised to do for the case of the Bassa in Liberia, fared less well. Thus, I asked
participants of the focus group sessions in both countries to describe the major thrust of
messages they have heard at any political gathering they attended around the time leading
up to the respective elections and what message seemed to make the most profound
impression on them and why.
Drawing from a content analysis of the responses gathered from the participants,
words or combination of words such as "peace and reconciliation," "national
development," "equal opportunity," "development and change," "good roads, electricity,
water, schools, wells," "no corruption" seemed to have predominated the discourse
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around this time and also seemed to have gained the most traction with the respondents.
"Tribalism," "regionalism," "sectionalism," "nepotism," were less frequently mentioned
as constituting parts of the discourse and where these where mentioned, they were
mentioned in the context of eliminating them as candidates identified them as vices,
vowing not to engage in them if elected to office.
The follow-up question probed to determine how the different messages resonated
with them. Here several patterns emerged from the responses. Participants in rural
communities in both countries were more likely to mention that promises of roads, wells
and the provision of material benefits such as the supply of electricity made the most
difference in determining what candidate they liked or supported going into the elections.
On the other hand, residents of urban areas in both countries who took part in the sessions
were more likely to indicate that promises of eliminating corruption, tribalism, or
regionalism, for examples, were more important to them in determining what candidates
they liked or supported.
These responses are telling. If ethnicity or tribalism is the major attribute of
political behavior and political mobilization in less-developed societies because of
competing communal preferences, it is paradoxical that it is participants from urban areas
who revealed that they were more interested in messages that promised to eliminate
regionalism and tribalism. One would otherwise expect that it should have been
participants of rural areas who would have been more impressed by such messages given
the competing communal interests between different regions whereas urban areas tend to
be melting pots for diverse groups.
Why were urban participants of the focus group sessions more likely to indicate
that they were impressed with campaign messages promising to do away with tribalism,
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regionalism or corruption than rural respondents? What do these responses suggest about
the role of ethnicity in the political behavior of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans in the postconflict environment? A related point that I probed was to determine what type of
candidate, opposition or incumbent, the participants felt was more likely to preach a
particular brand of message. It appeared that, for the case of Sierra Leone, opposition
candidates were more likely to campaign on promises of eliminating regionalism,
tribalism or corruption than candidates from the incumbent SLPP party. In fact, it was
these vices that the opposition accused the ruling party of following the conclusion of the
war. Thus, the insistence on regionalism or tribalism was intended to create a "we" versus
"them" milieu in which most voters would feel left out of the gains that accrued from one
group being in power and subsequently support change. Bratton and Van de Walle's
(1997) finding that the opposition tends to do well in urban areas during elections in
Africa may be instructive here, as a similar pattern seemed to have played out during the
elections of 2002. This pattern is less clear for Liberia where there was no incumbent
party in office running in the elections of 2005.
I also introduced findings from the national surveys regarding respective Mende
and Temne support for the SLPP and the APC in Sierra Leone and the Kru and Vai
support in Liberia for the CDC and COTOL to stimulate discussions around variations
among group mobilization for political parties or candidates during elections. In Sierra
Leone, Mendes and Temnes constitute over 60 percent of the population and are the two
largest ethnic groups in the country. On the other hand, as a percentage of the population
of Liberia, Vais and Krus together constitute less than ten percent of the population.
Thus, what size of ethnic group is more likely to display a homogenous preference for
someone from their group? In other words, is mobilization into politics along ethnic lines
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a characteristic of small groups or large groups? I threw this question to the participants
and ask them to identify what groups in each country are more likely to support only
someone from their ethnic group for political office.
A lively discussion opened up around this point during all the sessions in Sierra
Leone and I was offered varying answers. In northern Sierra Leone, participants typically
pointed out that it is the Mendes of southeastern Sierra Leone who were more likely to
mobilize into politics along ethnic lines and prefer candidates drawn from their regions.
When I posed the same question in southeastern Sierra Leone, participants told me
northerners or members of ethnic groups from northern Sierra Leone were the more
tribalistic and more likely to support only candidates from their region. Members of the
two groups also revealed that their co-ethnics would eagerly vote for a candidate from
another ethnic group and against someone of their own. Some pointed to the example of
the elections of 1996 when Thaimu Bangura, a Temne and a northerner, of the People's
Democratic Party threw his political weight behind Kabbah and the SLPP thus tipping
victory to Mendes at a time when the scales were evenly balanced with a party that was
led by one of their own Temne brothers, John Karefa Smart. The interesting point is that
each group denied being tribalistic themselves and instead pointed to another group
accusing them of the tendency to give political support only to members of their ethnic
group.
Another interesting point that emerged from the discussions around the same
point is that participants from the Mende and Temne ethnic groups felt that their
members were not united and were therefore incapable of offering any cohesive political
front at the national level. Some added that it was for this reason that the Limbas and
Korankos, much smaller ethnic groups in size, have emerged as the dominant forces in
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the politics of Sierra Leone. For their part, participants of the sessions who were Limbas
lamented their small numbers pointing out this factor ruled out any possibility for them to
become power players at the ballot box in Sierra Leone; an advantage that they said
belonged to members of the two larger ethnic groups of Temnes and Mendes.
Two interesting patterns emerged from this aspect of the discussions. First,
participants from each group felt their group did not have the advantage in political
mobilization in the country. Such advantage, they pointed out, lay with other ethnic
groups. Secondly, it emerged from the discussions that there were imagined or real
schisms within each of the two largest ethnic groups, a factor that may not otherwise be
accounted for if one were to consider only the aggregation of voting outcomes from the
two regions inhabited by the two groups.
Turning over to the discussions around this point in Liberia, after I threw the
question out to the participants, there were near-unanimous affirmations by participants
of non-Mandingo and Americo-Liberian extraction that Mandingos and members of the
Americo-Liberian community were more likely than other groups to "stick to their own"
by supporting only candidates or political parties affiliated with their respective ethnic
groups. Some drew upon the disproportionate influence of both groups in the commerce
and politics of the country in the pre-war days as an example of the effects of the "clan
mentality" of these groups. Unfortunately, the only Mandingo participant I was able to
include in the sessions refused to comment on these points but he pointed out that
because of their small numbers, their existence as a group, especially as Muslims within a
predominantly Christian or non-Muslim society was constantly threatened and as such
there was need for close collaboration and bonding among their membership as a survival
strategy. The participant pointed out further that the war years brought Mandingos even
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closer because Gio and Mano fighting groups targeted them for extermination following
accusations of corruption and mismanagement under the Doe regime. Had they not
bonded together, Mandingos would nearly have been exterminated or driven out of
Liberia during the civil war, the participant concluded.
Mandingos, however, were not without their own collective action problems.
According to the Mandingo participant, Alhaji Kromah and Shekou Conneh, two of the
most prominent Mandingo elites in Liberia in recent years, fielded separate political
parties going into the elections of 2005, and asked "is that the action of a united group?"
Participants who were Americo-Liberians pointed out that their group has had its fair
share of collective action dilemmas over the years and that the accusations that they were
more likely to support candidates or parties from their groups were more untrue than not.
Some pointed out that inter-group marriages had in fact, made it almost nearly impossible
to determine who an Americo-Liberian was in recent times as many former indigenous
Liberians have since integrated into their ranks.
With regard to mobilization into the politics of Liberia, they told me that I only
had to look at the composition of the 50 or more political parties that sprang up around
the campaigns for the elections of 2005 to get a glimpse of the political behavior of
Americo-Liberians. Nearly all of the 22 political parties that made it to the ballot list for
the elections were comprised of Americo-Liberians or those affiliated with their group.
The higher levels of education that Americo-Liberians have reached, when compared to
other groups in Liberia, put them in high demand for recruitment by political parties
nationwide in Liberia. This latter point drew a number of disagreements from other
participants who pointed out that elites from their groups were equally spread out among
several political parties and that this was not because of any superior or inferior education
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but only the greed of such elites. In an interesting comparison with Sierra Leone,
members of the largest ethnic group in Liberia, the Kpelle who constitute about 21
percent of the total population, also lamented the disunity within their group that they say
has rendered them irrelevant in the political dispensation of Liberia. Since the demise of
Gabriel Kpolle and his Liberian Unification Party, no other elite has emerged to mobilize
Kpelles into politics in a meaningful way that will yield benefits to the group, some of the
participants from the Kpelle ethnic group lamented.
It is harder to interpret what these latter revelations from the sessions mean for
understanding the role of ethnicity in the political behavior of Liberians and Sierra
Leoneans in the post-conflict environment since most participants declined to
acknowledge or even address the views that members of other ethnic groups held about
their group. One thing is clear though in both countries, participants from ethnic groups
that were larger in size than other ethnic groups were more likely to report disunity and
disorganization among their groups than participants from smaller ethnic groups. In one
sense, this finding is consistent with collective action theories about group behavior such
as those advanced by Olson (1965) that it is more difficult for large groups to organize
for public goods than is the case for smaller groups. Thus, more than an acceptance of the
uniform homogeneity of group preferences, the sizes of ethnic groups may also hold
another key to our understanding of how groups mobilize into politics in Africa.
Finally, I used the focus group discussions in each country to accumulate and
evaluate opinions on three very important issues that were central to the research
concerns of this study. For Sierra Leone, I wanted to gauge the opinion of the mass
electorate regarding the election of President Kabbah in the elections of 2002 with over
70 percent of the votes. For Liberia, two questions constituted part of the core of the
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sessions. The first concern was to find out why Madam Johnson-Sirleaf ultimately
emerged as the winner of the runoff elections after she had trailed in the first round of the
elections. The second concern was to gauge opinion on why Liberia voted Charles Taylor
president in the elections of 1997.
For Sierra Leone, the question I asked was "why did President Kabbah, as the
presidential candidate for the SLPP, gain over 70 percent of the votes cast nationwide in
the 2002 elections? The responses I received to this question did not vary across regions.
Participants typically told me of a perception among the electorate that Kabbah was most
qualified to undertake the task of national development and consolidating the peace
following the conclusion of the war under his watch. Only a few respondents referred to
some form of identity, his faith as Muslim, as having played a role in gaining him the
votes of the electorate. For illustrative purposes I will highlight, verbatim, four of these
responses below:
Response 1: "President Kabbah won over 70 % of the total votes cast because of
the belief that he helped end the war and that he should be given another chance to
develop the country both economically and infrastructurally given the turbulence of his
first tenure (1996-2002)."
Response 2: "It is because he is believed to have restored peace in the country
from its decade long civil war. Also he introduced a system of free education for external
examination classes i.e. N.P.S.E., BECE, WASSCE. The north which is believed to be
the stronghold of the A.P.C. he introduced free primary and girl child education project,
school feeding program."
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Response 3: "Because he proved to be politically inclined and showed a kind of
political tolerance by bringing experienced politicians from all regions of the country
onboard, which eventually paved the way for the creation of peace."
Response 4: "(1) He was a Muslim, so majority Muslims especially the elders
voted for him. (2) Since he was a former UN worker, people thought he will not
embezzle the country's coffer. (3) As a northerner leading the S.L.P.P, he was seen as a
kind of unifier thus breaking the north-south divide."
Turning over to Liberia, I asked participants during the sessions: "why do you
think Madam Johnson-Sirleaf ultimately emerged as the winner of the presidential runoff elections in 2005? As a follow up to the preceding, why did George Weah ultimately
lose the run-off elections even though he was the frontrunner after the first round of
voting?" Below are four examples of the responses I received, also reproduced verbatim:
Response 1: "I think Madam Johnson Sirleaf ultimately emerged as winner of the
presidential run-off elections in 2005 because of her educational competence and threat
of Liberia being left in isolation by the international community if she wasn't elected."
Response 2: "Madam Sirleaf won because many people thought twice about her
experience and maturity as being relevant to post-war reconstruction as oppose to George
Weah's ignorance, inexperience and shallow education which could not match up to
beating post-war challenges."
Response 3: "Madam Johnson Sirleaf won the election because she has the
education and experience. Unlike George Weah who has no experience and the necessary
education to have lead more or less than three million person after the state have
collapsed."
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Response 4: "After the first runner-up, people began to weigh the lesser of the
two evils. Regardless of ethnic affiliations etc. The people were looking for the most
capable to do the task and George Weah was not capable. Especially where he had not
earned a high school diploma, he was beyond. Ellen had the political will and a long
history of power struggle, the credential was there. The people want what they taught was
best for Mama Liberia."
I also asked participants in Liberia this question, "to the best of your recollection,
why did Liberia vote Charles Taylor President in 1997 instead of the other candidates?
Some examples of the kind of responses I received are also reproduced verbatim below:
Response 1: "In my best recollection, Liberia voted Charles Taylor president in
1997 because he had controlled much of the country's resources and it was believed he
could use the income to bring about development he had the largest fighting forces and
he could guarantee peace & stability."
Response 2: "Liberians voted for former President Taylor in that they did not
want war again. They felt that if Taylor lost the elections, he would come back and
fight."
Response 3: "They voted Taylor because he -Taylor -was seen as the strongest
candidate who could deal with the post-war problems more effectively than the rest of the
candidates. Also, many people were carried by the perception that said "he who spoiled it
can better fix it."
Response 4: "Many Liberians voted Taylor president because of fear that the
conflict would renew if he did not win. Another reason but less prominent was that
people believed in his capable leadership and because he destroyed he should rebuild."
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Conspicuously absent from these responses from both countries are such
references as so and so won the elections because one ethnic group or community of
people from one area threw their collective votes behind that candidate or his or her
political party. In two societies where voting preferences are assumed to be dictated by
ethnic identities and where such preferences are largely homogenous, it is remarkable
that some of the qualities that the participants suggested made a difference in the
elections in question were the educational credentials of candidates, perceptions of their
tolerance for other groups and standing in the international community. Rather than any
homogenous support from one or more ethnic groups, both Kabbah and Johnson-Sirleaf
were perceived as tolerant and displayed these qualities going into the elections.
Conclusion
This chapter has shown that several explanations of political behavior and
mobilization in the literature on politics in Africa do not capture what transpired in
Liberia and Sierra Leone during the times of their respective post-conflict elections.
Perhaps as an encouraging sign of things to come, and certainly a hopeful sign of postconflict democratization, the focus group sessions helped to validate most of the findings
from the surveys. Encapsulated in one sentence, the finding is that emerging from the
most traumatic periods yet in their histories, ethnic affiliations or considerations for
securing communal interests mattered little to the voters as they sought to vote into office
someone they deemed as competent to improve the conditions in their lives.
Most participants indicated that ethnic affiliations and communal interests did not
primarily dictate political behavior. Rather, their opinions helped to confirm what the
findings from the surveys had suggested. The strategic calculations of voters were
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underpinned more by perceptions of competence and for presidential candidates -among
other things -international credibility than by a strategic logic of voting someone into
office because of a sense of ethnic belongingness.
Finally, the findings also demonstrate an important point about winning elections
in a multiethnic society. In a contest with multiple parties seeking to gain vote shares
from a diverse electorate, one would expect that candidates or political parties that sought
to strengthen their support base by preaching exclusive messages of ethnic belongingness
stood the better chance of winning such elections, not those who try to appeal to several
groups and, thus, risk alienating the support of even their own group members. It is
interesting that on each occasion, it is one of the candidates who preached the most
centralizing messages, especially for the presidential elections, that won the elections not
the candidate or candidates that insist on pointing out how one group is different from
others.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
What role did ethnicity play in the political mobilization of Liberians and Sierra
Leoneans during their respective post-conflict elections? Existing explanations of politics
in Africa have held that ethnic interests are the locus of political behavior in African
societies because voters do not trust elites from other ethnic groups to deliver electoral
promises and elites, cognizant of this point, couch their electoral appeals in ethnic terms.
One expectation from such explanations is that ethnic groups sought the singular interests
of their respective communities during the elections in question. Yet, in spite of such
propositions, voters in both countries displayed noticeable preferences for political
parties and candidates other than those typically associated with their ethnic groups. Also,
elites of political parties from various ethnic groups in both countries joined others in
diverse, crosscutting alliances and patterns that do not provide clear support for ethnic
interests or other identity interest-based voting thesis.
Thus, in this dissertation, I have sought to empirically question the role of ethnic
identity in the political behavior of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans by investigating how
elites of various political parties contesting the immediate post-conflict elections
mobilized voters to the polls and win votes and how, in turn, the various cues transmitted
to them by candidates and political parties seeking to recruit their support in anticipation
of the voting decisions influenced voters.
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This chapter summarizes the general findings of the study for this dissertation and
presents the overall implications of these findings for discussions on democratization,
post-conflict and peace studies, and ethnicity and politics in Africa. The final section of
the chapter concludes this dissertation by pointing out the limitations of the findings,
offering some suggestions for future research and the implications of the findings for
policy.
Exploring political behavior in multiethnic societies such as Sierra Leone and
Liberia presents several challenges. One such challenge lies in interpreting the subtle
cues that are employed by those who sometimes utilize indigenous customary practices
that are peculiar to certain communities as political tools such that a mere handshake may
have more symbolism attached to it than any overt declarations of rallying an ethnic vote.
Emerging from war, Sierra Leone and Liberia are particularly appropriate cases
for understanding the role of ethnicity and other competing influences on the political
behavior of both elites and electorates in African politics because the human security
needs of an immediate postwar environment might have heightened ethnic sentiments
which, it is argued, guarantee the provision of material benefits through ethnic elites.
Specifically, I investigated why following the two civil wars voters in Sierra
Leone concentrated their votes around one political party, the Sierra Leone People's
Party and its presidential candidate, Kabbah during the elections of 2002, whereas voters
in Liberia diffused their votes among several political parties and presidential candidates
following their elections of 2005. A related and equally important task was to understand
why Weah lost the runoff elections to Johnson-Sirleaf after winning the most votes in the
presidential elections of October 11.1 then used these interrelated questions to address
the major question of the dissertation.
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To explore the differing outcomes, I developed several explanatory models of
vote choice that established the vote for various political parties running in the respective
elections as dependent variables. The independent variables in the models included the
dominant factors in the literature on political behavior and voting in African countries,
factors such as ethnicity, regional interests, religious interests, and influences of the "big
person" from local communities. In addition to the preceding, I included two variables,
the peace vote and the vote for development and reconstruction, which I intuitively felt,
did more to explain vote choice.
The results of the tests of the various models and my other findings from the
exploration of political behavior in the two countries are varied, but one consistent
finding is that ethnic identity did not play the expected role in the calculations of both
voters and elites of political parties in the events that transpired during the time of the
respective post-conflict elections.
For electorates, variables for ethnic identities show how voters voted during the
respective elections but such variables did not explain why voters voted for the parties
and candidates for which they did during the respective elections. Here, I drew a
distinction between ethnicity as an identity variable and an issue variable. As an identity
variable, ethnicity points to a structural variable that identifies how members of the
electorate voted for a particular political party from a given area, whereas as an issue
variable ethnicity represents the choice voters made in voting for a particular political
party. The latter captured those who made a conscious decision intending their vote to
pursue a benefit that was restricted to the interests of their ethnic group. As an issue
variable, ethnicity failed to reach statistical significance in several models that tested vote
choice in both countries.
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For elites, a better case could be made for the communicative utility of ethnicity
as a campaign tool for the canvassing of voters during the respective elections than a
primary foundation of political mobilization. With high levels of illiteracy in both
countries, even the respective lingua franca of Liberian English for Liberia and Krio for
Sierra Leone is sometimes inadequate when significant segments of the population intend
to communicate with each other. Indigenous languages are often the only means through
which political elites convey their campaign messages and electoral promises directly to
potential voters at campaign rallies and other gatherings or through interpreters. The
ability to speak a language indigenous to a geographical area is, thus, a huge advantage
because of the feeling of affinity it creates with local people. Beyond that, it was less
clear that ethnicity served the purpose of a mobilization mechanism given the need to
create voting majorities that may sometimes consist of two or more ethnic groups.
Evidence from content analysis of the proposed party programs of several political parties
in both countries and newspaper and other accounts of party rallies did not yield any
specific references to the mobilization of an ethnic group or groups as a means of gaining
political power or the use of particular language as a campaign tool to woo voters during
the respective elections. In one exception, Charles Brumskine's presidential candidacy in
Liberia was heavily associated with the Bassa ethnic group although local discourse
repeatedly cast him as being of non-indigenous extraction.
Thus, the hypothesized relationships between ethnic identity and vote choice was
unsupported and the empirical evidence demonstrates that neither elites of political
parties nor voters made concerted efforts to secure the exclusive interests of their ethnic
groups at the expense of other ethnic groups by largely conducting identity-centered
campaigns for votes or voting for ethnic interests. Table 6.1 and 6.2 summarize these
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findings about the hypothesized relationships between the various explanatory variables
and vote choice for Sierra Leone and Liberia, respectively.
Table 6.1
Summary of Findings for Sierra Leone
Hypotheses

Finding(s)

1 .Ethnicity and Vote
Choice

Supported in part. Political parties
gained major vote shares among
some ethnic groups. Most voters did
not vote for ethnic interests. Elites
did not run identity-centered
campaigns
Ethnic identity is a statistically
significant explanatory variable of
vote choice

2. Regionalism and
Vote Choice

Supported in part. Support for some
parties strong in regions traditionally
identified as their electoral base.
SLPP won its base and some more.
APC did not dominate its electoral
base like the SLPP
Region shows weak significance in
explaining vote choice
No support. No statistically
significant differences between
religious groups and vote choice
Religion not a statistically significant
explanatory variable of vote choice
Supported in part. Statistically
significant explanatory variable in
some but not all tests of vote choice
Significant in predicting votes for the
SLPP but not the APC
Supported. Statistically significant
predictor of vote choice for political
parties across all ethnic groups

3. Religion and Vote
Choice

4. The "big person" and
Vote Choice

5. Peace and Vote
Choice

6. Development
Reconstruction and
Vote Choice

Supported in part. Mixed effect on
vote choice across models. Not a
statistically significant predictor of
the votes for the SLPP. Has a
negative relationship with vote
choice for the SLPP
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Data and Evidence
Tests of models of vote choice
employing survey data.
Weak-to-non reference or
emphases on ethnicity
following content analysis of
campaign literature,
newspaper accounts from
2002, transcripts of interviews
with elites and focus group
findings.
Tests of models of vote choice
using survey data
Raw results from the elections
of 2002
Elite interviews

Tests of models of vote choice
using survey data
Elite interviews
Survey data
Elite Interviews

Survey data
Elite interviews
Content analyses of newspaper
reports and other documentary
evidence from 2002
Survey data
Elite interviews
Content analysis of newspaper
reports and other documentary
evidence

Table 6.2
Summary of Findings for Liberia
Hypotheses
1 .Ethnicity and Vote
Choice

2. Regionalism and
Vote
Choice

3. The "big person" and
Vote Choice

4. Religion and Vote
Choice

5. Peace and Vote
Choice

6.Development/Reconst
ruction and Vote
Choice

Finding(s)
Members of the Bassa and Kru ethnic
group were more likely to vote for the
UP and the CDC, the respective
political parties associated with the
elites from their respective ethnic
groups. However, the ethnic interest
variable suggests that voters did not
make the voting decision on ethnic
bases. Evidence of other ethnic
groups such as the Loma, Grebo and
several others voting for political
parties that did not have their ethnic
elites on board. Voter crossovers
during runoff
Mixed results but largely
unsupported. Evidence of a Grand
Bassa vote for the LP and the Sinoe
vote for the CDC but other counties
such as Grand Gedeh voted for
Weah's CDC in spite of other Krahn
elites on the ballot with other political
parties
Not significant in predicting votes for
the CDC and the UP, the two
frontrunners in following the
elections. Produces a different effect
in the LP model.
Rather weak support even for
Brumskine who had preached a
religious message of divine
inspiration to run for the presidency.
Appeared to play a role in the vote for
the CDC. Absence of religious
tension between the major parties
Weak support. Appeared to play a
role in the vote for the UP. Produced
expected coefficients but not
statistically significant across most
models of vote choice
Supported in part but not a
statistically significant variable in
most models of vote choice. Like the
peace vote, not likely to repeat
indefinitely
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Data and Evidence
Tests of models of vote choice
employing survey data.
Analyses of Liberian
newspapers and focus group
findings
Focus group discussions

Elite interviews and tests of
models of vote choice using
survey data

Survey data, Elite Interviews
and Results from focus group
sessions
Tests of models of vote choice
using survey data.
Elite Interviews, content
analysis of newspaper
accounts
Survey data
Elite interviews
Content analysis of newspaper
reports and other documentary
evidence
Survey data
Elite interviews
Content Analysis of
newspaper reports and other
documentary evidence

In Sierra Leone, opposition political parties and candidates campaigned to the
electorate using messages that accused the incumbent SLPP government of
incompetence, corruption, tribalism, nepotism and failure to address the massive
unemployment among urban youths following the civil war. It was a strategy that bore
little fruit given the margin of votes between all opposition parties and the SLPP. For
their part, the incumbent SLPP party campaigned on a theme of having earned the right to
undertake the consolidation of the peace and the rebuilding of the national infrastructure
following their successful negotiation of the peace deal with rebel forces. Tejan Kabbah,
the incumbent presidential flag bearer of the SLPP, emerged from the campaigns as a
centripetal figure in the emerging political landscape of postwar Sierra Leone because
throughout his campaign for re-election he preached a message of unity, not division or
the underscoring of ethnic differences, encouraging everyone to get onboard the
proverbial national train. This proved to be a winning message in addition to perceptions
of his experience and competence among the electorate given his long tenure with the
United Nations.
For the case of Liberia, in the absence of an incumbent political party or
presidential candidate under provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2003
that barred key members of the transitional council from seeking reelection, the electoral
field was open for anyone with the resources and the inclination to mount a political
campaign. This institutional arrangement had a significant effect on both the strategy
adopted by all parties during the campaigns and the final results. Given the perceived
opportunity in the absence of an incumbent, over 40 political parties displayed their
ambition to run candidates in the elections of 2005, out of which 22 qualified to be placed
on the ballot on October 11. In their campaigns, each political party staked a claim of
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possessing the requisite capacity, motivation and, in some cases, divine inspiration to
undertake the task of postwar reconstruction of Liberia. Madam Johnson-Sirleaf emerged
the eventual winner of the elections mainly because she touted her experience as a former
international civil servant with the World Bank and other organizations. By so doing, she
ran a campaign similar to Tejan Kabbah's in Sierra Leone three years earlier. The profiles
and strategies of both Johnson-Sirleaf and Kabbah suggest that, for the presidential
elections, international managerial experience and the perception that a candidate has
earned the respect of the international community did more to sway voters than
expectations that the candidate for whom they would vote is one who was more likely to
channel exclusive benefits to ethnic communities or cater to some other narrow interest
such as regional development.
How do the findings address the central concern of this dissertation? Ethnic
identity played little role in candidate recruitment and the campaigns by elites in Liberia
given the diversity of the presidential field as political parties sought to recruit candidates
that would "balance" their party tickets and showing before the electorate. Several
examples illustrate this point. Members of the Kpelle ethnic group, numerically the
largest ethnic group in Liberia with 21 percent of the population, were a particularly
popular choice for running mate and accounted for the vice presidential candidate on four
separate party tickets. Other combinations on party tickets illustrated the point further. A
Gola with part German heritage, Johnson-Sirleaf chose Joseph Boakai, a Kissi from Lofa
County as her running mate. David Farhat, a Bassa from Grand Bassa County also chose
a Kissi from Lofa County in the person of Saah Gbollie on the ticket of the Free
Democratic Party. George Weah, a Kru from Sinoe County chose Rudolph Johnson a
Gbandi from Lofa County. Only Charles Brumskine of the Liberty Party ran with another
322

candidate for the vice presidency who hailed from the same ethnic group and county as
he did. In view of the fact that no ethnic group in Liberia commands the numerical
majority of 50 percent plus 1 needed to win at the ballot box, it would have been
politically suicidal for most parties to adopt a strategy of ethnic mobilization. The
evidence shows that they did not.
For the parliamentary elections in Sierra Leone, given important correlations
between ethnic identity and region of residence, parties essentially recruited from the
same pool of candidates within a constituency or district because doing otherwise by
running a candidate who was not from an area was a sure recipe for failure.126 Political
parties in Liberia essentially followed the same rule, recruiting candidates to run for the
legislative seats from their respective counties of origin. Given such diversity among the
presidential party tickets and given the nature of the recruitment of candidates for
parliamentary and legislative elections, it is hard to find evidence to support claims of
ethnic mobilization of the mass electorates by elites of political parties during the time of
the respective post conflict elections. With evidence of five different presidential
candidates from the Temne ethnic group alone and none at all from most of the other
ethnic groups including the Mendes (who were only half represented in the candidacy of
the Kabbah) the ethnic mobilization thesis is unsupportable.
For voters, the results of the tests of the models show that several of the
explanatory variables found little or no traction among this group. Further, where much
of the scholarship had presented pictures of homogenous preferences for parties and
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The difference between this form of candidate recruitment and ethnic cues is that candidates represent

opposition parties in regions that are not typically associated with their political party. Most ethnic theses
assume that this form of candidate recruitment is virtually nonexistent.
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candidates by ethnic groups, such that all Mendes, for example, were assumed to prefer
the SLPP for the same reasons or all Krus voted for Weah because he is a Km son of the
soil, the evidence from the two cases provided little support for such claims. Instead, the
results of the tests of CLARIFY showed that there were statistically significant
differences between the means of the preferences of voters who voted for the same
parties given various cues for voting for those parties suggesting that all voters from the
same ethnic group do not vote for parties for the same reasons.
For two societies emerging from civil conflict, concern for the conduct of politics
status quo ante was a constant fear overshadowing the proceedings. This was the case
especially because most analysts attributed the descent of both countries into conflict to
the political culture that had been woven in the past by self-seeking elites (Abdullah
2004; Richards 1996). Part of that political culture was the sometimes violent events
surrounding elections as unscrupulous elites mobilized thugs to disrupt entire
communities in the names of ethnic groups engaged in mostly imagined competitions for
the resources of the state. In order to strengthen confidence among all interested parties
that the two countries will continue their march towards democratization, the elections
needed to demonstrate critical breaks with such pasts and the evidence suggests that they
did. For one, the electorate in both countries did not vote for former rebel forces that had
morphed into political parties and by so doing ensured that the most belligerent forces of
the past had no stake in future proceedings. Neither the RUF of Foday Sankoh nor the
NPP of Charles Taylor gained any meaningful votes from the respective elections.
Equally so, in the respective victories of Kabbah and Johnson-Sirleaf, Sierra
Leoneans and Liberians offered archetypes of the kinds of leaders for which countries
emerging from conflict may yearn. As pointed out earlier, both presidential candidates
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shared the distinct qualities of having served with reputable international organizations
with credentials that included the trust of other leaders in the international community.
Their election into office suggests that when post conflict elections are conducted in an
atmosphere devoid of intimidation or violence, as the two elections were largely
conducted, cross-cutting national issues such as the reconstruction of the national
infrastructure or the sustainability of the peace may matter more to voters than narrow
cues such as concerns for the preservation of ethnic interests or the residual effects of
regional loyalties.
What factors explain the differing voting outcomes in which voters in Sierra
Leone concentrated their votes around one political party, the SLPP and its presidential
candidate whereas voters in Liberia diffused their votes among several political parties in
contradiction to expectations under the respective electoral systems in place? In the main,
this study found that a combination of two factors contributed to the respective outcomes.
Respectively, it was the conscious choices made by voters and the institutional structures
in place in the two countries. In the case of Sierra Leone voters made a conscious effort
to avoid former belligerents and corrupt politicians so that political parties such as the
RUFP, PLP or the APC that included candidates who fit either bill failed to attract the
imagination of the largest cross section of the electorate. Voters in Liberia similarly
avoided political parties that included individuals deemed as perpetrators of the conflict
but the institutional landscape that barred key members of the transitional government
also meant that there was no one on the ballot with proven record of recent governance
such as was the case with the SLPP. As a result, they were more amenable to giving
several political parties and candidates the chance to rebuild Liberia except those parties
that included former warlords such as Alhaji Koroma's ALCOP or Shekou Conneh's
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PRODEM. The results of the elections provide evidence of the inclinations of voters as
such parties received less than one percent of the votes cast.
The concept of an ethnic census that first appeared in the arguments of Horowitz
(1985) and related explanations in the existing scholarship on political behavior in Africa
stressed the tendency of ethnic groups to concentrate their electoral support behind
political parties associated with the respective elites from their ethnic communities. Such
. arguments are, to some extent, helpful in capturing the tendency of members of the Bassa
ethnic group, for example, to reward the Liberty Party of Charles Brumskine with the
majority of their votes. Nonetheless they are limited by the inherent assumption that
support by ethnic communities for elites of political parties associated with their ethnic
groups is a knee-jerk reaction to an identity stimulus that motivated voters to vote for
parties and candidates so that their ethnic communities will not lose in a zero-sum
competition with other groups. This study has shown that ethnic cohesion is the exception
rather than the norm among various groups such that the feeling of ethnic belongingness
required to produce a collective vote for ethnic parties was absent in the electoral
dynamic of both countries. Further, elite unity, another assumed precondition of ethnic
mobilization thesis was also lacking. Evidence showed that ethnic groups such as Temnes
produced the leadership of five different political parties in Sierra Leone during the
elections of 2002. In Liberia, the presidential tickets of the various political parties
offered an assortment of combinations of various ethnic groups, as mentioned earlier.
Thus, with such diversity among the political parties, the ingredients required for a
concerted effort that will produce electoral results indicative of an ethnic census were
lacking.
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This study has also shown that a sufficient amount of individual choice remained
among the respective electorates such that voting for political parties was not merely
expressions of group preference. The results of the test of CLARIFY demonstrated that
there were significant differences between members of the same ethnic groups among the
range of voting cues with which they were presented. Group preference is crucial to
theses of ethnic mobilization because such explanations are usually advanced with
reference to traditional cultural practices in African societies in which decisions, it is
argued, are made in the collective.
In the main, the research for this dissertation failed to find much role for ethnicity
and the deleterious effects of such sentiments in the political behavior and mobilization
of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans following their respective post conflict elections.
As discussed previously in several sections of the dissertation, one plausible
explanation for the discrepancy between my findings and existing explanations is the
methodological approach that is employed. Much of the existing scholarship drew
evidence from aggregated data and used such data to infer individual preferences in vote
choice. This is rather unfortunate because as compelling as the arguments derived from
such studies are, they fail to capture the heterogeneity of group preferences among ethnic
groups and their utility in explaining political behavior is further undermined by the
ecological fallacy they commit in using aggregate data to make inferences about
individual level motivation as Mattes and Gouws (1998) pointed out. The empirical
strategy that I employed was sensitive to such limitations and made corrections by asking
respondents why they voted for the candidates and parties for which they did. This
approach guarded against correlations between regional voting patterns and ethnic
settlements, particularly in the case of Sierra Leone, that would have led us to
327

erroneously believe that voters from specific ethnic groups voted merely to protect the
interests of their respective ethnic groups.
Contributions of This Dissertation
This dissertation contributes to discussions on a number of subjects in the
scholarship of comparative politics such as democratization in Africa, peace and conflict
studies as well as ethnicity and political behavior in Africa. I discuss each of these, in
turn, below.
Scholarship on Democratization
By explicating the processes through which Liberians and Sierra Leoneans
organized and mobilized into politics around their respective post conflict elections, this
study sheds light on the process of democratization in two countries that returned from
the brink of virtual disintegration. As most countries in Africa experienced abertura
beginning around the late eighties and early nineties with the demise of one-party
regimes and the institution of multiparty constitutions, Liberia and Sierra Leone went the
opposite direction descending into the worst form of strife known to states. Emerging
years later from their respective crises, it was important that their experiences are
documented and added to the collective experiences of democratization on the African
continent. This study seeks to provide such a contribution and by so doing impart some of
the experiences of the two countries for the benefit of other countries, such as the Congo,
that are still seeking solutions to their conflicts.
One of the most influential viewpoints in the scholarship on democratization in
sub-Saharan Africa cautions that the optimism which accompanied multiparty elections
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on the continent was likely to be tempered by the somber reality of disastrous interethnic
conflicts as multiparty elections could provide renewed grounds for mobilization into
politics along ethnic lines and other cleavages of identity. Crawford Young captures such
viewpoints well.
Skeptics have advanced two main arguments challenging the therapeutic value of
democratization for African states. First, they charge that competitive
multiparytism and open elections necessarily bring regional, ethnic, religious, and
racial identities into play intensifying disintegrative pressures on fragile states
without contributing to either stability or legitimacy... (Young 1999, 73)127
Such viewpoints were underpinned by the fatalistic assumption that electorates in
African societies as well as elites of political parties are always motivated by the need to
secure their ethnic interests from national processes, at the expense of other ethnic
groups. This study casts sufficient doubt on such assumptions as it shows that electorates
and elites of political parties in both Liberia and Sierra Leone were not primarily
motivated by the need to secure the exclusive interests of their ethnic communities during
the respective elections but rather, by all-encompassing needs to sustain the peace and
undertake postwar reconstruction and national development.
Further, the empirical evidence from the study demonstrates that the assumed
homogeneity of ethnic preferences was largely erroneous as electorates were divided over
a number of cues informing the vote choices in both countries. As well, elites of various
ethnic groups did not display much unity with members of their own ethnic groups as
some joined members of other ethnic groups to form competing political parties.
127

See Crawford Young, "Africa: An Interim Balance Sheet," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds,

Democratization in Africa, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 63-82.
This article is reproduced under the title "The Third Wave of Democratization in Africa: Ambiguities and
Contradictions," in Richard Joseph, ed, State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa, (Boulder and London:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 3-14.
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The evidence from this study also suggests that the apprehension over the threat
of ethnic mobilization emanating from multiparty elections was derived from the existing
scholarship's focus on older voting patterns when much of the continent was in the grip
of authoritarian one-party regimes and elections appeared to show support for various
elites by their ethnic communities and voting was frequently accompanied by violence.
Elections under one-party authoritarian regimes masked much of what the actual voting
preferences of voters were as elections were frequently rigged in favor of electing
handpicked candidates from various communities as symbolic representation of ethnic
diversity in the respective national debates. This study suggests that when elections are
conducted in an atmosphere devoid of the intimidation under one-party regimes, politics
in Africa need not primarily be about identity interests. Real opportunity exists for
electorates to think of themselves as parts of the larger political community of the state
rather than as mere ethnic communities.
As referenced earlier, one of the major limitations of existing studies on
democratization in Africa was the methodological focus on aggregated polling returns
following elections to make inferences about how members of various ethnic groups
vote. This methodological shortcoming distorted the true preferences of voters. As
pointed out in this dissertation, when approached in aggregate terms, data on post conflict
elections will almost always fail to discover motivation and will in all likelihood illustrate
patterns of existing cleavages of a regional nature especially if there are correlations
between regional settlement patterns and ethnic communities. Potentially, the electoral
system agreed upon by institutional designers and parties to the conflict will further
throw existing differences into stark relief as the PR system did for the case of Sierra
Leone even when electorates from all across the country prioritized peace, development
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and reconstruction over all other interests. This dissertation has shown that to capture
individual preferences for the vote choice, it is almost always necessary to survey the
population and aggregate the findings.
The strategy I employed in the current study, which not only looked at individual
voters but also asked them why they voted for the parties for which they voted during the
elections is an important improvement over such limitations. Going forward, the adoption
of a similar strategy by future scholarship should serve to enhance knowledge of
democratization on the continent and the kinds of choices that electorates in Africa make.
Scholarship on Post Conflict and Peace Studies
This study contributes also to the related literature on post-conflict societies and
peace studies. One of the budding debates in these related literatures is whether electoral
outcomes following civil wars are indicative of a desire for peace by the citizens of such
societies or largely reflective of residual animosities from the conflict that are sometimes
along the cleavage of ethnic and other identities. Scholars have largely assumed that
electoral landslides such as the one Taylor gained following the Liberian elections of
1997 are the voting patterns that are most indicative of a peace vote. The analyses have
shown that an empirical determination of either an electoral census or a peace vote is not
improbable from the same outcome. Citizens desirous of peace may identify one
candidate or political party as they did in Sierra Leone or they may buy into the messages
of peace transmitted by several candidates and consequently spread their votes in
producing results that will make the final outcome appear like an electorate that lacked a
consensus. Thus, one important determination is not the pattern of vote spread across the
electorate but the intent of voters.
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Another concern in peace studies and the related literature on post conflict
societies is what Jarstad and Sisk (2008) and others refer to as the "democratizationpeacebuilding dilemma."128 For peacekeepers and institutional designers, following
conflict, this dilemma is underscored by the inherent contradictions between the
simultaneous need to introduce competitive multiparty elections as definitive conclusions
to peace processes while at the same time emphasizing consensus, cooperation and
moderation among the parties as warranted under peacebuilding. By implication,
elections are competitive processes that involve competition between rival groups
whereas peacebuilding may involve striking compromises and sometimes ignoring
constitutional stipulations in order to accommodate all parties. How are mediators to deal
with such challenges? The current study has shown that democratization and
peacebuilding need not be at variance during peace processes. What needs to be firmly
established are the rules of the game and how they apply to all parties. In both cases of
Liberia and Sierra Leone, the presence of robust peacekeeping troops with clear mandates
to enforce the rules of the game which were made clear to all parties ensured adherence
even when there was ample opportunity for potential spoilers to complain about the
process and derail the proceedings. The case of Liberia underscores this point, where
some presidential candidates were initially disqualified but later reinstated by a ruling
from the Supreme Court of Liberia when it was almost impossible to include them on the
ballot without incurring substantial cost overruns. In the absence of a firm mandate from

See Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk, eds, From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). For an illustration of this dilemma, see especially Anna
K. Jarstad's contribution "Dilemmas of war-to-democracy transitions: theories and concepts," pp: 17-36.
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the UN Peacekeeping force to oversee the elections process, the disqualified aspirants
could have raised enough trouble to threaten or even derail the peace process.
Lastly, mediators of most conflicts in Africa often struggle to design institutional
instruments such as constitutions and electoral systems that are not only acceptable to all
parties to the conflict but also to all ethnic groups in the area of conflict. The
understandable sense of such decisions is the assumption that ethnic groups are in an
antagonistic relationship with other groups with little or no room for consensus or
cooperation. This dissertation shows that the capacity to coexist peacefully is sometimes
present in areas of conflict and that institutional designers may need not waste valuable
time on finding suitable instruments for managing the post conflict environment. Rather,
what they may need to concentrate on is finding ways to enhance such local capacities for
conflict management as exist on the ground by complementing those capacities or
relationships with appropriate institutions.
Scholarship on Ethnicity and Politics in Africa
The prevalent conclusion in the literature on ethnicity and politics in Africa makes
several assumptions about the nature of ethnic identity and the political behavior of
ethnic groups. One assumption regards the resilience of ethnic interests in African
politics as exemplified by Glickman's conclusion that
African politics remains severely divided by ethnic conflict. Quite apart from the
dramatic events of Rwanda or Sudan or Liberia, where mass murder is enmeshed
in perceived differences in ethnic identity, the political space provided by
openings toward democracy in less than a decade remains an arena where policy
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debate competes unequally with ethnic appeals, ethnic parties, and ethnically
based support for candidates (Glickman, 1998).129
Another assumption regards a consciousness of group identity among co-ethnics
and cohesiveness in pursuing group benefits. The empirical evidence obtained from
studying the behavior of the ethnic groups in Sierra Leone and Liberia contradicts such
assumptions. In Sierra Leone, for example, members of the Temne ethnic group who
dominate the northern portion of the country accounted for the presidential candidacy of
five different political parties going into the elections of 2002. If group consciousness and
cohesiveness was a given, the assumed rationality would have had Temnes uniting
behind a single presidential candidate and presenting a united political front which could
have maximized their chances of winning an electoral contest. Additional evidence
springs from the survey data. Some respondents did not vote for the expected political
parties for which they would have voted in an ethnic headcount.
The political behavior of ethnic groups in Liberia is even more convoluted. In a
sensitive election following a traumatic national event such as the civil war, elites from
various ethnic groups chose to run as presidential candidates or vice presidential
candidates of diverse political parties in contradiction to mobilizing along assumed lines
of ethnic cleavage. Where is the ethnic cohesiveness when most ethnic groups in Liberia
voted for political parties other than the one headed by elites from their ethnic
communities?

See Harvey Glickman, "Ethnicity, Elections, and Constitutional Democracy in Africa," in Timothy D.
Sisk and Andrew Reynolds, eds, Elections and Conflict Management in Africa, (Washington D.C.: United
States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 37-54.
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Thus, one major implication of the findings of this study for the literature on
ethnicity and politics in Africa is that mobilization into politics on the continent is not
always along ethnic lines. Indeed, some discussions in the democratization literature in
Africa acknowledge the "third wave" movements that consisted of a diverse array of
elites from various ethnic groups in a concerted effort to remove authoritarian regimes.
Another contribution to studies of ethnicity and political behavior in African
politics is the demonstrable distinction between ethnicity as an identity variable and an
issue variable. Existing explanations do not make this distinction and what one finds on
occasion in such analyses are mixing-up of the two when the true intent is to show why
one group voted for a political party or candidate. This is rather unfortunate because in
most of the literature on African politics, the resulting obfuscation reflects negatively on
the portrayal of ethnic groups as self-seeking, unintelligent voters with less commitment
to the state as a political community.
Limitations of the Findings
One of the most important considerations in any study of comparative politics is
the generalizibility of our findings. How can we incorporate the lessons that are
empirically obtained from a particular set of cases to aid our scholarly understanding of a
more general set? In the current instance, what does studying how Liberians and Sierra
Leoneans mobilized into politics following their respective civil wars contribute to our
understanding of political behavior in other post-conflict societies in Africa?
As I pointed out in Chapter I, any comparative exercise on Africa has its
shortcomings because the continent contains some of the most diverse groups in the
world. Comparing post-conflict political behavior has additional limitations because the
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dynamics of conflicts may be different. As an example, the conflict in Liberia started in
1989 because Charles Taylor and his fellow insurgents accused Doe of tyranny over the
people of Liberia and sought to remove him by force. The ensuing conflict was fought
along multifarious lines, which had subsequent effects on the post conflict electoral
dynamics. Instead of residual animosities from the years of conflict, we saw a variety and
number of electoral alliances along unexpected lines. Conversely, the conflict in the Ivory
Coast started in 2002 as a civil war between the northern and southern regions of the
country. Northern groups accused the south, which contains the capital Abidjan, of
discrimination against northern groups after the candidacy of Alassane Ouattara was
annulled by the Supreme Court on the grounds that he was not authentically Ivorian.
Ouattara, a Muslim presidential candidate from the north, had already served the country
as prime minister several years earlier. Thus, the evidence accrued from this study and
the accompanying lesson may have limited applicability to post-conflict societies
elsewhere. Nevertheless, the insight gained on political behavior in the two countries is
meaningful and the empirical demonstration that ethnic groups in Liberia and Sierra
Leone do not maintain homogenous preferences is valid and carries the potential to
generate hypotheses for studies of the political behavior of other ethnic groups elsewhere
in Africa.
Another limitation of the findings of this study stems from the cross-sectional
nature of the research methodology. Liberians and Sierra Leoneans voted mostly for
peace and development during their respective post conflict elections in question but it is
unlikely that they will always vote in a similar manner for the same issues. In any case, as
the conflict years recede in the collective memories of the citizenry in both countries, the
issue of peace is likely to be muted. Thus, the findings of the current study are likely to
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provide a snapshot into political behavior around the post conflict period only and may
not be representative of political behavior at other times. Indeed, during the subsequent
elections of 2007 in Sierra Leone, which I witnessed firsthand, the major issue for voters
turned into corruption in government. The SLPP, which years previously was hailed by
the electorate for securing the peace, was found guilty of corruption and other vices in
government and duly voted out of office.
Yet another related consideration for the generalizibility of the findings of this
study to other cases of political behavior is the factor of war and the fact that the two
cases are post-conflict countries. Post-conflict societies tend to have a heightened sense
of security needs such as maintaining the peace than one will typically find in societies
that have not experienced recent conflict. This awareness tends to shape behavior and
arguably helps to produce the kinds of pragmatic decision-making that was evident
among both elites and masses in the two cases.
National discourses in Sierra Leone and Liberia during the time of my study
where distinctly shaped by memories of the recent war. This factor was evident in
everyday conversation where people talked about events in terms of two broad time
periods - before the war and after the war. One could make the case that the memory of
war in both cases was in itself an explanatory variable that could help one to understand
the kinds of outcomes that this study sought to understand. Thus, it is plausible that the
behaviors I observed and reported in the present study were distinctly shaped by a sense
of urgency among the electorate in a bid to avoid decisions that could have a deleterious
effect on the immediate post-conflict environment and the recent peace. Societies that are
yet to experience the level of suffering that Sierra Leoneans and Liberians experienced
may not easily identify consensus candidates on national issues in the pragmatic manner
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in which most Sierra Leoneans and Liberians did. It is possible that electoral politics in
such societies are still the ethnic affairs that have been described in other studies. Thus,
the recent wars in both countries may have unduly influenced the current findings,
thereby limiting generalizibility.
Directions for Future Research
Studies of post conflict political behavior in Africa are still at an early stage with
regards to data collection, methodology, conceptual development and theory building. It
is only recently that the international community and other stakeholders managed to find
ways to resolve most of the conflicts that raged on the continent since the independence
period of the sixties. There still remains much to be studied about the political behavior
of Africans and more importantly, about their mobilization into politics following periods
of conflict. Lessons learned from such ventures may serve to mitigate the chances of
repeating the unfortunate mistakes of the past; this study makes a contribution to this
imperative task.
Future studies could expand the methodological approach employed here by
conducting more extensive surveys of all strata of the demography of post conflict
societies. While ambitious, it is not infeasible because sufficient technological
development has taken place on the continent that could facilitate such a venture. Cell
phone usage is now common in both urban and rural communities across Africa and the
reach of radio and roads extensive.
Much grey area still remains around our understanding of the interactions within
ethnic groups and how such interactions are influenced by and affect the external
environment with other ethnic groups. The current study makes a contribution by
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empirically demonstrating that significant differences of opinion exist among members of
the same ethnic groups using the examples from Liberia and Sierra Leone. These
differences are important for understanding the mitigation of conflict because of the
suggestion that all members of all ethnic groups may not always be in concert in
instituting violent action against other groups. This finding challenges future studies that
significant empirical verification is expected should they want to make inferences about
the behavior of ethnic groups in conflict across the continent.
The scholarship needs additional and more localized data on ethnicity and
political behavior in African politics. Future studies may also want to consider carefully
the issue of measurement. We need to identify ways to measure ethnic identity on a
consistent basis. Current approaches are unclear and the step I took in the study for this
dissertation to allow self-identification with ethnic communities is a first step towards the
rigidity necessary in identifying and measuring membership in ethnic groups.
Implications for Policy
The findings of this study offer several interrelated suggestions for policy
regarding conflict prevention, institutional design for managing post conflict societies
and overseeing democratic reform in African societies. First, there is often a vigorous
debate over the suitability of proportional representation versus plurality electoral
systems for African societies based on the assumption that such societies are divided
along a range of identity cleavages that influence political behavior. The PR system is
argued to have the advantage because it allows greater representativeness and inclusivity
in national legislatures (Reynolds 1995, Sisk and Reynolds 1998, Southall 1999 and
others). This study suggests that the type of electoral system employed during elections
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may matter little for achieving the outcome of representation in African legislatures. The
post conflict elections were conducted in Sierra Leone using the PR system but voters
from diverse ethnic and other identity backgrounds voted in a manner that showed a
concentration of votes around a preferred political party and presidential candidate in
spite of the presence of other political parties and presidential candidates on the ballot
who could be considered more representative of their various identity interests. In
Liberia, the opposite effect was much evident.
Quite different electoral systems were employed in the two countries but one
common factor between them was the presence of UN troops on the ground with
respective mandates of robust enforcement of the peace among all parties. This suggests
that the problem of violence in African politics assumed to emanate from identity
cleavages may, in actuality, be a law and order problem. Where the intervention forces in
both countries upheld law and order, the elections were conducted peacefully, elites
abided by the law peacefully exhorting their followers to get out and vote, and electorates
displayed quite remarkable choices given assumed differences among ethnic and other
identity interests. The policy suggestion here is to provide and deploy strong elections
monitoring teams across Africa during elections to enforce the rules of the game among
parties. However, I am cognizant of the fact that the international community may not
always have the resources or the collective will to oversee all elections using the kinds of
forces deployed in Sierra Leone and Liberia in 2002 and 2005, respectively. This takes
us to the next interrelated policy implication.
In the absence of the resources or the collective will to deploy elections
monitoring forces across elections in Africa, the international system may instead work to
strengthen both the institutional mandate and the operational reach of the International
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Criminal Court system so that those who threaten collective violence during elections do
so under the threat of prosecution by the Court wherever they are in the world. Charles
Taylor's trial in the Hague, the trials of some members of the Revolutionary United Front
in Sierra Leone as well as Civil Defence Forces in that country and the trial and
conviction of other perpetrators of violence across Africa in recent times, has
demonstrated to all would-be leaders who carry out violence in the name of particular
groups that they are not likely to do so with impunity any longer. This has sent a real
message across the continent: the international court system works! To cite a few
examples, the leadership in Sudan may continue to scoff at the current UN indictment
against them or members of the notorious Lord's Resistance Army operating in Uganda
from across the border in Sudan may continue to evade the law, but recent history shows
that they may very well be reined in and this will most certainly strengthen the message
that the people of Africa are no longer expendable in the name of political differences.
All too often in the past, the erroneous message that has been transmitted by
political leaders is that they have the mandate of the people on whose behalf they pretend
to act. Violence between rival party supporters during elections campaigns is all too often
interpreted as conflict between various ethnic groups because such ethnic groups are
assumed to be the bases of support for political parties. This study has unearthed
sufficient empirical evidence to throw doubt on such portrayals. The dominant form of
interaction among and between ethnic groups across Africa is peaceful. Violence carried
out by predatory elites in the name of identity differences is mere banditry especially
when the mode of recruitment for such collective violence is forced conscription or the
use of money and drugs to influence and use susceptible young men as thugs. Real
struggles for survival by rival groups do not require forced conscriptions. Thus, as an
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early warning system, instigators of electoral violence in the name of ethnic differences
during elections in Africa should be identified before the onset of conflict and warned
about the potential consequences of their actions. According to Laakso (2007),
organizations and institutions such as the civil society groups, human rights groups, the
media and non-governmental organizations have commenced action in this direction
during recent elections around Africa. They must be encouraged by all possible means to
continue discourse around this area.
These are not frivolous recommendations. I lived a good portion of my young
adult life during a time of civil war and great suffering in Sierra Leone. In the past three
years, I returned to Sierra Leone and Liberia and spent a great deal of time as a researcher
on the ground studying the aftermath of the conflict that nearly caused the disintegration
of the two states. While collecting my data, I strove to emotionally distance myself from
the study so that my personal experiences do not cloud my judgment but rather enhance it
given my intimate knowledge of my surroundings. The conclusions I have reached from
the study dispute much conventional wisdom in studies of African politics about the role
of ethnic identity in political behavior but they are conclusions that I reached following
detailed observations and careful, rigorous study. As the dialectical process of furthering
knowledge continues, additional research by others may support, dispute or even do away
with some or all of my findings. Whatever the case may be, I hope that my work would
have contributed to the scholarship on African politics and caused us to rethink some
accepted ideas in that scholarship.
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Table B.l
Descriptive Profile of the Liberia Sample***
Demographic Category
(Ethnic Groups):
Bassa
Bella
Dei
Gbandi
Gio
Gola
Grebo
Kissi
Kpelle
Krahn
Km
Loma
Mandingo
Mano
Mende
Vai
Other (include Americo-Liberian)
(Gender):
Female
Male
*(Literacy):
Illiterate (cannot read or write)
Literate
* (Age):
18-34yrs
35-70
71 and over
(Residence by County):
Bomi
Bong
Gbarpolu
Grand Bassa
Grand Cape Mount
Grand Gedeh
Grand Km
Lofa
Margibi

% of Sample

% of Population

19
2
2
3
5
3
6
4
18
5
9
7
4
6
.8
4
5

16
<2
<2
3
8
3
8
3
21
4
7
6
2
7
<1
3
4

51
49

51
49

22
78

42
58

57
42
3
2
10
2
6
4
4
2
8
6

3
12
2
7
3
3
2
6
8
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Table B.l - Continued
Demographic Category

% of Sample

Maryland
Montserrado
Nimba
River Cess
River Gee
Sinoe
(Religion):
Christian
Muslim
Other
N=910
Actual Population:

2
36
13
1
2
2

4
32
13
2
2
3

79
10
10

40
20
40

% of Population

***Notes: Due to rounding some totals may go above 100. (Literacy) The World Bank,
the United Nations Development Program and other development agencies calculate the
literacy rate of a country by the number of people age 15 over who can read and write in
a country. The figures obtained by the sample include only those over the age of 18 who
are members of the voting eligible population. As such, a direct comparison with the
actual population was impractical. (Age) For the age distribution, comparable figures
could not be obtained for the actual population; the survey expert at CENTAL set the
figures to be obtained in the sample based on previous studies the organization conducted
for other development agencies. It is estimated that about 44 percent of the population of
Liberia is under the age of 14.
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Table B.2
Descriptive
Demographic Category
(Ethnic Groups):
Fullah
Gallinas
Gola
Kissi
Kono
Koranko
Krio
Limba
Loko
Mandingo
Mende
Sherbro
Soso
Temne
Vai
Yalunka
Other
(Gender):
Female
Male
* (Literacy):
Illiterate (cannot read or write)
Literate
*(Age):
18-34 yrs
35-70
71 and over
(Residence by District):
Bo
Bombali
Bonthe
Kailahun
Kambia
Kenema
Koinadugu
Kono
Moyamba
Port Loko
Pujehun
Tonkolili
Western Area

; of the Sierra Leone Sample
% of Sample

% of Population

1
.1
.3
1
9
2
4
6
.6
2
32
6
1
25
.3
.3
9

3
.3
.1
2
4
4
8
6
.2
2
31
3
2
30
.3
.4
4

40
60

52
48

21
79

65
35

47
52
2

6
7
8
8
5
8
6
8
6
7
8
8
16

9
8
3
7
5
10
5
7
5
9
5
7
19
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Table B.2 - Continued
Demographic Category
(Residence by Region):
East
South
North
West
(Religion):
Christian
Muslim
Other

%of Sample

% of Population

23
28
33
16

24
22
35
19

43
55
2

30
65
5

***Notes: Due to rounding some totals may go above 100. (Literacy) The World Bank,
the United Nations Development Program and other development agencies calculate the
literacy rate of a country by the number of people age 15 over who can read and write in
a country. The figures obtained by the sample include only those over the age of 18 who
are members of the voting eligible population. As such, a direct comparison with the
actual population was impractical. (Age) For the age distribution, comparable figures
could not be obtained for the actual population. Like Liberia, Sierra Leone also has a
young population with about 45 percent of the population under the age of 14.
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Survey Instruments
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Copy of Sierra Leone Mass Electorate Questionnaire
Survey of Post-Conflict Political Behavior in Sierra Leone:
Questionnaire
Instructions to the interviewer: It is VERY IMPORTANT that you read out the
following statement to the respondent before proceeding. If the respondent consents to
the interview, proceed to administer the survey to them. If they refuse to be interviewed,
ask them the reason for refusing to be interviewed and code accordingly. BUT PLEASE
REMEMBER that respondents who refuse to be interviewed DO NOT have to give you a
reason why they refuse to be interviewed.

Statement of informed consent: Good day! My name is
. I am from the Campaign for Good Governance here in
Sierra Leone [please offer the contact address of CGG here]. We, CGG, are conducting
the following interview on behalf of Mr. Fodei Batty who is working on a study for his
Ph.D. dissertation at Western Michigan University in the United States. Mr. Batty wants
to study the views of Sierra Leoneans regarding the parties that they voted for during the
elections of 2002 and what parties Sierra Leoneans support at present. We are not from
the government authorities nor do we represent any political parties or political interests
in Sierra Leone or elsewhere. The answers you provide us will be confidential. They will
be put together with 1,000 other Sierra Leoneans we are interviewing to get an overall
picture of vote choice and support for political parties in the country. It will be impossible
to pick you out from what you say, so please feel free to tell us what you think. This
interview will not take long. There is no penalty for refusing to participate. If, you
consent to be interviewed but change your mind during the course of the interview,
please say so immediately and we will immediately terminate the interview and all your
answers up to that point will be discarded.
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Do you fully understand your rights to freely speak your mind during the interview and to
terminate the interview at any point if you so wish? Yes

Do you wish to proceed? Yes

No

No

Item A. If "No" to the previous question, why do you refuse to be interviewed? [To the
Interviewer, if respondent refused to be interviewed, ask them the reason they refused to
be interviewed but do not press them for an answer. Code accordingly and move on to
find another respondent. ]
1.1 don't talk to strangers. 2.1 don't believe that my responses will be kept secret; I fear
intimidation or retaliation for my answers. 3.1 don't trust myself to provide the right
responses.
4.1 don't have the time to sit for an interview.
6. Refused to answer. 7. Other reason

5.1 just don't want to be interviewed.
9. Missing Data
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Part 1: Demographic Information (1)
Name of town or village interview is being conducted in:
Name of Administrative District:
Geographic Region of the Country [north, south, west, east]:
Gender of Respondent:
1. Female
2. Male
Item 1. Can you tell us your age? [Interviewer: If the respondent cannot tell his or her
exact age, please use a recollection of key historical events to estimate their age cohort.
For example, did they witness the independence celebrations? Code appropriately
deferring to the age offered by the respondent.]
1=18-25 yrs
2=25-29 yrs
3=30-34 yrs
4=35-39 yrs
5=40-50 yrs
6=51-60 yrs
7=61-70 yrs
8=71 yrs and over
9=missing data.
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Part 2: Support for Political Parties and Vote Choice
To the Interviewer. In this section you will talk about some events that happened about
four years ago. Some of the details may or may not have been lost on the respondents.
Please let the respondent know that they should feel very comfortable to ask to skip
questions that they cannot recall answers to or that they feel uncomfortable answering.
Thank you.
Item 2. Did you vote in the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2002?
1.
2.
3.
4.
9.

Yes, I voted in the elections of 2002
No, I did not vote in the elections of 2002
Cannot recall if I voted in the elections of 2002
Refused to answer
Missing Data

Item 3. If "yes" to the previous question, what candidate did you vote for, for president,
in the elections of 2002?
1. Mr. Ernest Bai Koroma
2. Mr. Raymond Bamidele Thompson
3. Dr. Raymond S. Kamara
4. Mrs. Zainab Hawa Bangura
5. Lt. Col (Rtd) Johnny Paul Koroma
6. Dr. Alimamy Pallo Bangura
7. Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabba
8. Dr. John Karefa-Smart
9. Mr. Andrew Turay
10. Other
99. Missing Data
Item 4. If "yes" to Item 2, what political party did you vote for in the parliamentary
elections? [Interviewer, Do not read options out to the respondent. Please code from
responses]
1. All People's Congress Party (APC)
2. Grand Alliance Party (GAP)
3. Movement for Progress (MOP)
4. National Democratic Alliance (NDA)
5. People's Democratic Party (PDP-Sorbeh)
6. Peace and Liberation Party (PLP)
7. Revolutionary United Front Party (RUFP)
8. Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP)
9. United National People's Party (UNPP)
10. Young People's Party (YPP)
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11. Other
99. Missing Data
Item 5. Did you support the political party in any other way, if so how? [Interviewer:
clarify the question as "how do you show that you support this party? " Have you done
any one of the following activities for this or any other political party? Ask this question
only if the response to the previous Item was "yes, " if not, skip to the next Item. More
than one response is appropriate for this item].
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
9.

I did not support them in any other way.
Demonstrated [l=Yes; 0=No]
Attended a political rally hosted by this political party [l=Yes; 0=No]
Made financial donations to this particular political party [l=Yes; 0=No]
I voted for them [l=Yes; 0=No]
I support them emotionally, hoping they win elections.
Other form of support
Refused to answer
Missing Data

Item 6. Did this or any other political party contact you to vote for them or support them
by other means during the elections of 2002?
1. Yes I was contacted by this political party to vote for them or support them during
the elections of 2002
2. No, another political party contacted me to vote for them or support them during
the elections of 2002. Name different political party here
3. No political party contacted me to vote for them or support them during the
elections of 2002
4. I cannot recall if any political party contacted me during the elections of 2002
5. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data
Item 7. Do you feel "very close," "somewhat close" or "not very close" to the political
party you voted for in the parliamentary elections of 2002?
1.
2.
3.
7.
9.

Very Close
Somewhat Close
Not very Close
Refused to answer
Missing Data

Item 8. Why did you vote for this particular political party in the parliamentary elections
of 2002? [Interviewer, initially, do not prompt. Code from responses. However, if
respondent is unsure, gently prod using the following choices. Ask them by reading out
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the following response options to them, "You voted for this particular party
because...?"] More than one response is appropriate.
A. They are the party representing the interests of my ethnic group
[l=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]
B. They are the party that will best unite the country and sustain peace
[l=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]
C. They are the party representing the interests of my region [l=strongly
agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]
D. They are the party that are most likely to develop the country by building
roads, clinics and bringing electricity to the whole country [l=strongly
agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]
E. They are the party that represents the interests of my religion [ l=strongly
agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]
F. They are the party of the young generation [l=strongly agree; 2=agree;
3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]
G. I don't have any reason, I just voted for them [l=strongly agree; 2=agree;
3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]
H. They are the party of the "big person," national personality or most
important politician from our area [l=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree;
4=strongly disagree.]
I. Other
J. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data
Item 9. [Interviewer, if respondent selected option Bfor Item 8; then ask them this
question. If not, move on to the next Item]. If the elections of 2002 were not a postconflict election and peace was not an issue that was important to you, would you have
still voted for this party that you voted for?
1.
2.
3.
9.

Yes
No
Refused to answer
Missing Data

Item 10. When you vote, what matters to you most, the political party itself or the leader
of the party?
1.
2.
3.
9.

The political party matters to me more than the leader of the party
The leader of the party matters to me more than political party itself
Refused to answer
Missing Data
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Item 11. In your opinion, were the last presidential and parliamentary elections free and
fair?
1.
2.
3.
4.
9.

Yes, the last elections were free and fair
No, the last elections were not free and fair
I don' t know/cannot tell
Refused to answer
Missing Data

Item 12. [Interviewer: Ask this question only if answer to Item 11 was "No. "J Why do
you say the last elections were not free and fair? This is an open-ended response. Don't
Code.

Item 13. Did you accept the outcome of the last elections?
1. Yes, I accepted the outcome of the last elections
2. No, I did not accept the outcome of the last elections
3. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data
Item 14. [Interviewer: ask this question only if response to Item 13 is "No. " This is an
open-ended response] If you did not accept the outcome of the last election, is there
anything you plan to do about it? What are you most likely to do to ensure a fair outcome
next election?

Item 15. [Interviewer: ask this question only if response to Item 11 is "No "J. Do you
think anything can and should be done to ensure a fair outcome next time?
1. Yes, something can be done to ensure the elections are free and fair next time
2. No, nothing can be done to ensure that the elections are free and fair next time
3. I don't know what can be done to ensure that the elections are free and fair next
time
4. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data
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Item 16. [Interviewer: If answer is "yes " to Item 15 then probe respondent some more
and ask the following, if not, skip to the next item] what is that thing you feel should be
done next time to ensure a fair outcome? This is an open-ended response.

Item 17. Besides the political party that you voted for in the parliamentary elections of
2002, is there any other political party that was like a second choice for you?
[Interviewer, prompt respondent along the lines "what could be a substitute political
party if the political party you first selected were not around, or did not exist? Do not
read options out to respondent, please code from response].
1. All People's Congress Party (APC)
2. Citizens United for Peace and Progress (CUPP)
3. Democratic Centre Party (DCP)
4. Grand Alliance Party (GAP)
5. Movement for Progress (MOP)
6. National Alliance Democratic Party (NADP)
7. National Council of Sierra Leone (NCSL)
8. National Democratic Alliance (NDA)
9. National People's Party (NPP)
10. National Unity Movement (NUM)
11. National Unity Party (NUP)
12. People's Democratic Party (PDP-Sorbeh)
13. Peace and Liberation Party (PLP)
14. People's National Convention (PNC)
15. People's Progressive Party (PPP)
16. Revolutionary United Front Party (RUFP)
17. Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP)
18. Sierra Leone Independence Movement (SLPEVI)
19. Social Democratic Party (SDP)
20. United National People's Party (UNPP)
21. United Progressive Party
22. Young People's Party (YPP)
23. No, I do not feel close to any other political party
99. Missing Data
Item 18. Why is this second party your party of choice following your first choice?
[Interviewer: If respondent selects a second choice of political party, ask them this
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question but do not prompt, code from responses. If they do not have a second choice of
political party, skip to the next Item..]
A. They also represent the interests of my ethnic group [l=strongly agree;
2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]
B. They also represent the interests of my region [l=strongly agree; 2=agree;
3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]
C. They have the second best proposals for bringing economic development
to Sierra Leone [l=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly
disagree.]
D. They are the second party that is most likely to bring peace to Sierra
Leone [l=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]
E. Other reason:
F. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data
Transition [to the interviewer]: Now we are going to move on and talk about your
opinions on various issues today. I am going to ask you questions about how you feel
about those issues today.
Item 19. There are so many personalities/national figures, call them big names or "big
persons," in Sierra Leone politics today. I am going to name several of them, some of
whom were also candidates in the last elections. Please let me know how close you feel
to any one of them. [Interviewer: More than one response is appropriate for this Item.]
A. Mr. Ernest Bai Koroma. l=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close;
9=no response
B. Mr. Raymond Bamidele Thompson. l=very close; 2=somewhat close;
3=not close; 9=no response
C. Dr. Raymond S. Kamara. l=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close;
9=no response
D. Mrs. Zainab Hawa Bangura. l=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not
close; 9=no response
E. Lt. Col. (Rtd) Johnny Paul Koroma. l=very close; 2=somewhat close;
3=not close; 9=no response
F. Dr. Alimamy Pallo Bangura. l=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not
close; 9=no response
G. Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabba. l=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not
close; 9=no response
H. Dr. John Karefa-Smart. l=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close;
9=no response
I. Mr. Andrew Turay. l=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no
response
J. Other. Please name
l=very close; 2=somewhat close;
3=not close; 9=no response
99. Missing data
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Item 20. Why do you feel close to this particular personality/national figure or "big
person?" in Sierra Leonean politics today and not to the others listed? [Interviewer: if the
respondent indicates that they feel close to more than one "big person, "please rephrase
the question and ask them why do they feel close to the names they have listed and not
others. Do not prompt for answers. This is an open-ended response question. Do not
Code.]

Item 21. How likely are you today to vote for someone from a different ethnic group if
you think that individual is the right person for the job?
1.
2.
3.
4.
9.

Highly likely
Likely
Unlikely
Very unlikely
Missing Data

Item 22. Have you heard of the word "democracy" before?
0=No
l=Yes
9=Missing Data.

Item 23. If "yes," what, if anything, does the word 'democracy" mean to you?
[Interviewer: do not prompt. Accept up to three responses and ask respondents to list
responses in order of importance. Rank order the responses below accordingly. From
l=most important; 2=very important; 3=important.] If "no," skip this Item and move
on to Item 28.

1.
2.
3.
9. Missing Data.
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Item 24. Which of these statements is closest to your own opinion? [Interviewer: Read
out statements. Only one option to be chosen.]
1. Statement A: For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we
have.
2. Statement B: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be
preferable.
3. A democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.
4. I don't have an answer
9. Missing Data

Item 25. In your opinion how democratic is Sierra Leone today? [Readout options.
Accept only one option]
1.
2.
3.
4.

Not very democratic
Somewhat democratic
Highly democratic
Do not understand this question/do not understand what degree of "democracy
exists in Sierra Leone
9. Missing Data

Item 26. How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Sierra Leone? Are you:
[Interviewer: Read out options. Only one option to be chosen.]
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
9.

Sierra Leone is not a democracy
Not at all satisfied
Not very satisfied
Fairly satisfied
Very satisfied
Missing Data

Item 27. In your opinion, how likely is it that Sierra Leone will remain a democratic
country?
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
9.

Sierra Leone is not a democracy [Do not read.]
Not at all likely
Not very likely
Likely
Very likely
Don't know [Do not read.]
Missing Response
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Item 28. What do you think are the most important problems or issues facing Sierra
Leone today? [Interviewer: rank order responses from "l=the most important problems
or issues facing Sierra Leone today is ... " down through the least important issue. Allow
up to five responses.]
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6. Sierra Leone is just fine. There are no important problems or issues facing the country.
7. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data
Item 29. What are the most important problems or issues facing YOU today?
[Interviewer: again, rank order responses from "l=the most important problems or
issues facing me today is ... " down through the least important problem or issue. Allow
up to five responses.]
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data
Item 30. What political party or political parties do you think can best resolve the
problems and issues facing you today that you have just mentioned? [Interviewer: do not
prompt, code from responses].
1.
2.
3.
4. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data
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Item 31. Can you recall if that is the reason why you voted for this party in the
parliamentary elections of 2002? [Interviewer: do not prompt for answers, code from
responses]
1. Yes, that is the reason
2. No, I did not vote for them to resolve the problems and issues facing me, I voted
for them just because they are the party of my ethnic group
3. No, at the time I voted for another political party. Which one
4. I did not vote in the parliamentary elections of 2002
5. Cannot recall
6. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data
Item 32. In general, how do rate your living conditions compared to those of other Sierra
Leoneans? [Interviewer: Please read out response options.]
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
9.

Much worse
Worse
Same
Better
Much Better
Don't Know
Missing data.

Item 33. What tribe do you consider yourself to be a part of? [Interviewer, prompt if
necessary: You know, your ethnic or cultural group or the group that you most identify
with. Do NOT read options. Code from response] In other words, what are you? Are
you a:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Fula=l
Gallinas=2
Gola=3
Kissi=4
Kono=5
Koranko=6
Krim=7
Krio or Creole=8
Kru=9

10. Limba=10
ll.Loko=ll
12. Mandingo=12
13. Mende=13
14. Sherbro or Bullom=14
15. Soso=15
16. Temne=16
17.Vai=17
18. Yalunka=18
19. Other [specify]

20. I consider myself just a Sierra Leonean and not part of any particular tribe or
ethnic group
99. Missing Data
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Item 34. Why do you consider yourself a part of this PARTICULAR tribe or ethnic
group and not any other tribe or ethnic group? [Interviewer: this is an open-ended
response]

Item 35. Think about the condition of

[Fill in the respondent's Ethnic

group in the blank space.] If respondent did not identify any group on Item 33, or if they
chose "20=1 consider myself just a Sierra Leonean and not part of any particular tribe or
ethnic group, then mark "7=Not Applicable, " and move on to the next Item.
A. Are their economic conditions worse, the same as or better than other
groups in this country? 5=Much worse; 4=Worse; 3=same; 2=better;
l=much better; 7=not applicable; 8=Don't know/can't tell; 9=Missing
Data.
B. Do they have less, the same, or more influence in politics than other
groups in this country? 5=much less; 4=less; 3=same; 2=more; l=much
more; 7=not applicable; 8=don't know/can't tell; 9=Missing Data.

Item 36. Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Sierra Leonean and
being a

[Enter respondent's ethnic group in the blank space]. Which of the

following statements best expresses your feelings? If respondent did not identify any
group on Item 33, or if they chose "20=1 consider myself just a Sierra Leonean and not
part of any particular tribe or ethnic group, " or "99=Missing Data, " then mark "7=Not
Applicable, " and move on to the next Item.

1. I feel only
[Insert Respondent's Ethnic group].
2. I feel more
[Insert Respondent's ethnic group] than Sierra
Leonean.
3. I feel equally Sierra Leonean and
[Insert Respondent's ethnic
group]
364

4. I feel more Sierra Leonean than
group]
5. I feel only Sierra Leonean.
7. Not Applicable

[Insert Respondent's ethnic

9. Missing Data

Item 37. Let's turn to your views on your fellow citizens. Generally speaking, would you
say that most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing with
people?

0. You must be very careful
1. Most people can be trusted
9. Missing Data

Item 38. How much do you trust each of the following types of people? [Interviewer: if
question is unclear, prompt gently saying "during business transactions or interpersonal
relationships, or living in the same neighborhood, street or apartment complex, for
example."

A. Your relatives. 0=Not at all; l=Just a little; 2=1 trust them somewhat; 3=1
trust them a lot; 9=Missing Data.
B. Your neighbors. 0=Not at all; l=Just a little; 2=1 trust them somewhat; 3=1
trust them a lot; 9=Missing Data.
C. People from your own ethnic group [or tribe]. 0=Not at all; l=Just a little;
2=1 trust them somewhat; 3=1 trust them a lot; 9=Missing Data
D. Sierra Leoneans from other ethnic groups. 0=Not at all; l=Just a little; 2=1
trust them somewhat; 3=1 trust them a lot; 9=Missing Data
E. Foreign citizens that you know of living in this country 0=Not at all;
l=Just a little; 2=1 trust them somewhat; 3=1 trust them a lot; 9=Missing
Data
Item 39. How often are

s [Enter Respondent's ethnic group in the blank

space] treated unfairly by the government? If respondent did not identify any group on
Item 33, or if they chose "20=1 consider myself just a Sierra Leonean and not part of any
particular tribe or ethnic group, then mark "7=Not Applicable, " and move on to the next
item.
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0.
1.
2.
3.
7.
9.

Never
Sometimes
Often
Always
Not Applicable
Missing Data

Item 40. Let's talk for a moment about the kind of society we would like to have in
Sierra Leone. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose
statement A or Statement B. [Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion. Do you agree or
agree very strongly?]

Statement A. As citizens, we should be more active in questioning the actions
of our leaders. l=agree very strongly with A; 2=agree with A.
Statement B. In our country these days, we should show more respect for
authority. 3=agree with B; 4=agree strongly with B; 5=agree
with neither; 9=Missing Data

Item 41. Let's talk about some expectations of leadership in this country today. Which of
the following statements is closest to your view? Choose statement A or Statement B.
[Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion. Do you agree or agree very strongly?]

Statement A. Since our leaders represent everyone, they should not favor their
own family or group. l=agree very strongly with A; 2=agree with A.
Statement B. Once in office, leaders are obliged to help their home community.
3=agree With B; 4=agree strongly with B; 5=agree with neither;
9=no response.

Item 42. Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people voluntarily join or
attend. For each one, could you tell me how likely you are to join that particular group
with individuals from other ethnic groups? [Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion.
Are you very likely, likely, unlikely or very unlikely?]
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A. A religious group (e.g. church, mosque). l=very likely; 2=likely;
3=unlikely; 4=very unlikely; 9=Missing Data.
B. A trade union or farmers association. l=very likely; 2=likely; 3=unlikely;
4=very unlikely; 9=Missing Data.
C. A professional or business association. l=very likely; 2=likely;
3=unlikely; 4=very unlikely; 9=Missing Data.
D. A political party. l=very likely; 2=likely; 3=unlikely; 4=very unlikely;
9=Missing Data.
E. A community development, neighborhood association or self-help
association. l=very likely; 2=likely; 3=unlikely; 4=very unlikely;
9=Missing Data.
Item 43. During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following
persons about some important problem or to give them your views? [Readout options].
A. A local government councilor. 0=Never; l=only once; 2=a few times;
3=often; 9=no response.
B. A member of the national parliament. 0=Never; l=only once; 2=a few
times; 3=often; 9=no response.
C. An official of a government ministry. 0=Never; l=only once; 2=a few
times; 3=often; 9=no response.
D. A political party official. 0=Never; l=only once; 2=a few times; 3=often;
9=no response.
E. A religious leader. 0=Never; l=only once; 2=a few times; 3=often; 9=no
response.
F. A traditional ruler. 0=Never; l=only once; 2=a few times; 3=often; 9=no
response.
G. Some other influential person (prompt if necessary: you know, someone
with more money or power than you who can speak on your behalf.)
0=Never; l=only once; 2=a few times; 3=often; 9=no response.
9. Missing Data
Item 44. Think of the last time you contacted any of the above leaders. Was the main
reason to: [Read out options. If respondent answered "0=Never" for all parts of Item 43,
i.e. they NEVER contacted any leader, circle code "7=Not applicable" for this Item.]
1. Tell them about your own personal problems?
2. Tell them about a community or public problem?
3. Give them your view on some political issue?
4. Something else? Do you mind telling us?
367

7. Not applicable, i.e., did not contact any leader
9. Missing Data.

Item 45. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A
or Statement B. [Interviewer: probe for the strength of opinion. Do you agree or agree
very strongly?]

Statement A: We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and
honest

elections. l=agree very strongly with A; 2=agree with A.

Statement B: Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other
methods for choosing this country's leaders.3=agree with B; 4=agree very strongly with
B; 5=Agree with neither; 9=missing response.

Item 46. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A
or Statement B. [Interviewer: probe for the strength of opinion. Do you agree or agree
very strongly?]

Statement A: Political Parties create division and confusion; it is therefore unnecessary to
have many political parties in Sierra Leone. l=agree very strongly with A; 2=agree with
A.

Statement B: Many political parties are needed to make sure that Sierra Leoneans have
real choices in who governs them. 3=agree with B; 4=agree very strongly with B;
5=Agree with neither; 9=Missing Data.
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Item 47. What political party will you vote for in the next elections? [Interviewer: do not
prompt. Code from responses.]. What political party would you like to see win the next
general elections?
1.1 will vote for the

in the next elections.

2.1 have not made a decision yet about what political party to vote for in the next
elections.
3.1 do not intend to vote in the next elections.
9. Missing Data

Item 48. [If response to Item 47 is "I, " ask this question, if not skip to the next Item.]
Why will you vote for this particular political party in the next elections and not any
other?
1. They are the party of my tribe or ethnic group [l=agree very strongly; 2=agree;
3=disagree; 4=disagree very strongly]
2. They are the party that are most competent to run the country [l=agree very
strongly; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=disagree very strongly]
3. Other. (Please Indicate)
[l=agree very strongly;
2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=disagree very strongly]
4. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data

Item 49. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A
or Statement B. [Interviewer: probe for strength of opinion. Do you agree or agree very
strongly?]
Statement A: It is important to obey the government in power no matter whom you voted
for. l=agree very strongly with A; 2=agree with A.
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Statement B: It is not necessary to obey the laws of a government that I did not vote for.
3=agree with B; 4=agree very strongly with B; 5=Agree with neither; 9=missing
response.
Item 50. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A
or Statement B.
Statement A: It is better to find lawful solutions to problems even if it takes longer.
l=agree very strongly with A; 2=agree with A
Statement B: It is sometimes better to ignore the law and solve problems immediately
using other means. 3=agree with B; 4=agree very strongly with B; 5=Agree with neither;
9=missing data.
Item 51. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A
or Statement B.
Statement A: The use of violence is never justified in Sierra Leone politics today. l=agree
very strongly with A; 2=agree with A
Statement B: In Sierra Leone, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a
just cause. 3=agree with B; 4=agree very strongly with B; 5=Agree with neither;
9=missing response
Item 52. In this country, how often: [Please read out options]
A. Do people have to be careful about what they say about politics?
3=always; 2=often; l=rarely; 0=never; 9=no response.
B. Does competition between political parties lead to violent conflict?
3=always; 2=often; l=rarely; 0=never; 9=no response.
C. Are people treated equally under the law? 3=always; 2=often; l=rarely;
0=never; 9=no response.
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Item 53. Now let's speak about the performance of the present government of this
country. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the
following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say? [Interviewer: Please probe for
strength of opinion.]

A. Managing the economy. l=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well;
9=no response
B. Creating jobs. l=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no
response
C. Keeping prices stable. l=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well;
9=no response
D. Narrowing gaps between rich and poor. l=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly
well; 4=very well; 9=no response
E. Reducing crime. l=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no
response
F. Improving basic health services. l=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well;
4=very well; 9=no response
G. Addressing educational needs. l=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well;
4=very well; 9=no response
H. Delivering household water. l=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very
well; 9=no response
I. Ensuring everyone has enough to eat. l=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well;
4=very well; 9=no response
J. Fighting corruption in government. l=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well;
4=very well; 9=no response
K. Uniting the country following the civil war. l=very badly; 2=fairly badly;
3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response
L. Combating HIV/AIDS. l=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well;
9=no response
M. Solving other problems that you know of besides those listed here. l=very badly;
2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response
9. Missing Data

Item 54. [Interviewer: Depending on the region this particular interview in question is
taking place; ask the interviewee this question with reference to the regions where the
interview is evidently not taking place. For example, if you are in the eastern region of
the country, as the respondent about travel to the western, southern, or northern region.]
Have you ever traveled to the

y

regions of this country?
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1. Yes
2. No
3. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data
Item 55. [If answer to Item 54 is "yes, " ask this question; if not skip to the next Item.]
How often do you travel to other regions of the country?
1. Very often (more than twice a year)
2. Often (at least twice a year)
3. Hardly ever (have visited once or twice but hardly ever leave my region)
4. Never
9. Missing Data
Item 56. Did you join any armed faction during the civil war?
0.
1.
2.
9.

No
Yes
Refused to answer this question.
Missing Data

Item 57. If "yes" to the previous Item, then ask this Item. If "no," then skip and move on
to the next Item. What armed faction did you join during the civil war? [Interviewer:
Please read out response options and code accordingly.']

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
9.

The Sierra Leone Military Force
The Revolutionary United Front
The Civil Defense Forces in the East - Kamajor
The Civil Defense Forces in the North - Kapras and Tamaborohs
Other. Please name
Missing Data

372

Item 58. If respondent indicated an armed faction that they fought with during the civil
war, ask them; why did you fight with this particular faction and not others during the
civil war? [This is an open-ended response. Will code later.]

Part 3. Demographic Information (2)
Item 59. What is your main occupation? What is the major source of the income you
depend upon to survive? (If currently unemployed, retired, or disabled, what was the
respondent's last main occupation?) [Do not read options out to the respondent. Please
code from responses.]
Agrarian
1.
Subsistence farmer (produces only for home consumption).
2.
Peasant Farmer (produces both for own consumption and some surplus
produce for sale).
3.
Commercial Farmer (produces mainly for sale).
4.
Farm Worker
Worker
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Fisherman
Trader/Hawker/Vendor
Miner (diamond, gold, rutile)
Domestic Worker/Maid/House help
Armed Services/Police/Security Personnel
Artisan/skilled manual worker in the formal sector
Artisan/skilled manual worker in the formal sector
Clerical Worker
Unskilled manual worker in the formal sector
Unskilled manual worker in the informal sector

Professional
15.
Businessperson (works in company for others)
16.
Businessperson (owns small business of less than 10 employees)
17.
Businessperson (owns large business of 10 or more employees)
18.
Professional worker (e.g., doctor, lawyer, accountant, nurse, engineer etc).
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19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
Other
25.
26.
27.
28.
99.

Supervisors/Foreman
Teacher
Government Worker
Retail worker
Works for a local nongovernmental organization
Works for an international nongovernmental organization
Student
Housewife/Works in the Household
Other (specify):
Unemployed
Missing Data

Item 60. [Education I] what is your highest level of education?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Illiterate (cannot both read or write)
Primary school education only
Up to secondary school education but did not continue after secondary school
Technical College/Teachers College
University education [University of Sierra Leone; Njala University or other]
Received Higher Education in a Western Country. Please list country here

7. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data
Item 61. What is the respondent's social class? [Interviewer deduces the respondent's
social class with reference to responses to Item 59 above]
1. Peasant [please include in this class: small agricultural producers producing
largely for their own consumption, subsistence farmers, peasant farmers]
2. Proletariat [please include in this class: wage earners, landless rural laborers, urban
laborers in industry, mining, transport, farm worker, domestic worker/maid/house
help, clerical worker].
3. Informal sector entrepreneurs or lumpenproletariat [please include in this class:
both licensed and illegal street vendors, money changers/lenders and petty thieves,
the homeless living in the cities].
4. Petty bourgeoisie [please include in this class: teachers, lower ranks of the military
and police services, lower ranks of public service, small traders]
5. Traditional rulers [please include in this class: clan heads, chiefs, paramount
chiefs, emirs, monarchs]
6. Commercial bourgeoisie [please include in this class: commercial farmers,
businesspersons owning large businesses of 10 or more employees, and land
owners]
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7. Bureaucratic bourgeoisie [please include in this class: government ministers,
higher rank bureaucrats and senior military and police officers, largely urbanbased].
8. Other [specify]:
9. Don't know/ could not deduce:

Item 62. What is your religion, if any?
1. Christian [Interviewer: Please Include in this category all Protestants
(mainstream and Evangelical Pentecostals); Catholics; Jehovah's Witnesses;
Seventh Day Adventists; and African Independent Churches.']
2. Muslim [Interviewer: Please include in this category all sects-Sunni, Shiite etc.]
3. Traditional African religions
4. I do not have a religion
5. Other [specify]:
9. No response
Item 63. Which of these things do you personally own or have access to in your home?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Radio
Television
Book, you know, a reading book
Bicycle
Motorcycle
Motor vehicle/car
A Cell phone
Do not own any of these
Missing Data

Item 64. How often do you get news from the following sources? [Interviewer: Please
readout options and code appropriately.]

A. Radio. 4=Everyday; 3=A few times a week; 2=A few times a month; l=Less than once
a month;
0=Never; 9=No response

B. Television. 4=Everyday; 3=A few times a week; 2=A few times a month; l=Less than
once a month; 0=Never; 9=No response

375

C. Newspapers. 4=Everyday; 3=A few times a week; 2=A few times a month; l=Less
than once a month; 0=Never; 9=No response
D. Other. Please state. 4=Everyday; 3=A few times a week; 2=A few times a month;
l=Less than once a month; 0=Never; 9=No response
Item 65. How interested are you in public affairs? [Interviewer: Prompt if necessary: You
Know, in politics and government?']
1.
2.
3.
4.
9.

Very Interested
Somewhat Interested
Not very interested
Not at all interested
No Response

Item 66. Which of the following statements about the U.N. Special Court for War Crimes
in Sierra Leone is closest to your view. Choose statement A or statement B.
Statement A: The Special Court is doing a necessary and important job of prosecuting and
bringing to justice those responsible for war crimes in Sierra Leone. l=agree very
strongly with A; 2=agree with A.
Statement B: The Special Court is unnecessary. Their work is not important in bringing
justice to Sierra Leoneans responsible for war crimes. 3=agree with B; 4=agree very
strongly with B; 5=Agree with neither; 9=missing Data
We want to thank you for taking the time to respond to these questions for us. Your
answers have been very helpful. The results of this study will be available in a few
months, are you interested in seeing the final results of the study? [Interviewer: if
respondent is interested in seeing the result of this study, please give them my contact
address.]
End Interview
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To the Interviewer: Please do not forget to complete the following sections..
Item 67: What proportion of the questions do you feel the respondent had difficulty
answering?
0. None
1. Few
2. Some
3. Most
4. All
Item 68. Which questions did the respondents have trouble answering? [Identify up to
ten.]
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Item 69. What was the respondent's attitude towards you during the interview?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.

Was she or he... l=friendly; 2=in between; 3=hostile?
Was she or he... 1 interested; 2=in between; 3=bored?
Was she or he... 1 cooperative; 2=in between; 3=uncooperative?
Was she or he... l=patient; 2=in between; 3=impatient?
Was he or she... l=at ease; 2=in between; 3=suspicious?
Was he or she... l=honest; 2=in between; 3=misleading?

Item 70. Do you have any other comments on the interview? For example, did anything
else significant happen during the interview?
0. No
1. Yes. Please
Explain
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Copy of Liberia Electorate Questionnaire

Survey of Post-Conflict Political Behavior in Liberia
Questionnaire
Instructions to the interviewer: It is VERY IMPORTANT that you read out the
following statement to the respondent before proceeding. If the respondent consents to
the interview, proceed to administer the survey to them. If they refuse to be interviewed,
ask them the reason for refusing to be interviewed and code accordingly. BUT PLEASE
REMEMBER that respondents who refuse to be interviewed DO NOT have to give you a
reason why they refuse to be interviewed.
Statement of informed consent: Good day! My name is
. I am from the Center for Accountability and
Transparency here in Liberia [please offer the contact address of CENTAL here]. We,
CENTAL, are conducting the following interview on behalf of Mr. Fodei Batty who is
working on a study for his Ph.D. dissertation at Western Michigan University in the
United States. Mr. Batty wants to study the views of Liberians regarding the parties that
they voted for during the elections of 2005 and what parties Liberians support at present.
We are not from the government authorities nor do we represent any political parties or
political interests in Liberia or elsewhere. The answers you provide us will be
confidential. They will be put together with 1,000 other Liberians we are interviewing to
get an overall picture of vote choice and support for political parties in the country. It will
be impossible to pick you out from what you say, so please feel free to tell us what you
think. This interview will not take long. There is no penalty for refusing to participate. If,
you consent to be interviewed but change your mind during the course of the interview,
please say so immediately and we will immediately terminate the interview and all your
answers up to that point will be discarded.
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Do you folly understand your rights to freely speak your mind during the interview and to
terminate the interview at any point if you so wish? Yes

Do you wish to proceed? Yes

No

No

Item A. If "No" to the previous question, why do you refuse to be interviewed? [To the
Interviewer, if respondent refused to be interviewed, ask them the reason they refused to
be interviewed but do not press them for an answer. Code accordingly and move on to
find another respondent.]
1.1 don't talk to strangers. 2.1 don't believe that my responses will be kept secret; I fear
intimidation or retaliation for my answers. 3.1 don't trust myself to provide the right
responses.
4.1 don't have the time to sit for an interview.
6. Refused to answer. 7. Other reason

5.1 just don't want to be interviewed.
9. No response
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Part 1: Demographic Information (1)

Name of town or village interview is being conducted in:
Name of Administrative County:
Geographic Region of the Country [north, south, west, east]:
Gender of Respondent:
1. Female
2. Male
Item 1. Can you tell us your age? [Interviewer: If the respondent cannot tell his or her
exact age, please use a recollection of key historical events to estimate their age cohort.
For example, did they witness the transition from Tubman to Tolbert? Code
appropriately deferring to the age offered by the respondent.]

1=18-25 yrs
2=25-29 yrs
3=30-34 yrs
4=35-39 yrs
5=40-50 yrs
6=51-60 yrs
7=61-70 yrs
8=71-80 yrs
9=missing data.
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Part 2: Support for Political Parties and Vote Choice
In this section we will talk about some events that happened last year, during the
elections of 2005. Some of the details may or may not have been lost on the respondents.
Please let the respondent know that they should feel very comfortable to ask to skip
questions that they cannot recall answers to or that they feel uncomfortable answering.
Thank you.
Item 2. Did you vote in the presidential and National Assembly elections of 2005?
1.
2.
3.
4.
9.

Yes, I voted in the elections of 2005
No, did not vote in the elections of 2005
Cannot recall if I voted in the elections of 2005
Refused to answer
Missing Data

Item 3. If "yes" to the previous question, whom did you vote for, for president, in the
elections of 2005?
1. Mr. Milton Nathaniel Barnes.
2. Charles Walker Brumskine.
3. Mr. Sekou Damate Conneh.
4. Mr. Samuel Raymond Divine Sr.
5. Mr. David M. Farhat.
6. Mr. Armah Zolu Jallah.
7. Madam Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf.
8. Mr. George Momodu Kiadii.
9. Mr. George Klay Kieh, Jr.
10. Mr. Joseph D.Z. Korto.
11. Mr. Robert Momo Kpoto.
12. Mr. Alhaji G.V. Kromah.
13. Mr. Roland Chris Yarkpah Massaquoi.
14. Mr. John Sembe Morlu.
15. Bishop Alfred Garpee Reeves.
16. Mr. Harry Varney Gboto-Nambi Sherman.
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17. Mr. Togba-Nah Tipoteh.
18. Mrs. Margaret J. Tor-Thompson.
19. Mr. Winston A. Tubman.
20. Mr. William Vacanarat Shadrach Tubman.
21. Mr. George Manneh Weah.
22. Mr. Joseph Mamadee Woah-Tee.
99. Missing Data
Item 4. If "yes" to Item 2, what party did you vote for in the elections for the legislature
(National Assembly) in 2005?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

All Liberia Coalition Party (ALCOP)
Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
Freedom Alliance Party of Liberia (FAPL)
Freedom Democratic Party (FDP)
Liberian Action Party/ Coalition for the Transformation of Liberia
(LAP/COTOL)
6. Liberian Destiny Party (LDP)
7. Liberia Equal Rights Party (LERP)
8. Liberia National Union/United Democratic Alliance (LINU/UDA)
9. Liberty Party (LP)
10. Labor Party of Liberia (LPL)
11. Liberian People's Party/Alliance for Peace and Democracy (LPP/APD)
12. National Vision Party of Liberia (NATVIPOL)
13. New Deal Movement (NDM)
14. National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
15. National Party of Liberia (NPL)
16. National Patriotic Party (NPP)
17. National Reformation Party (NRP)
18. Progressive Democratic Party (PRODEM)
19. Reformed United Liberian Party (RULP)
20. Samuel Raymond Divine, Sr. (Independent)
21. Union of Liberian Democrats (ULD)
22. Unity Party (UP)
99. Missing Data
Item 5. Did you support the political party in any other way, if so how? [Interviewer:
clarify the question as "how do you show that you support this party? " Have you done
any one of the following activities for this or any other political party? More than one
response is appropriate for this item}.
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A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
9.

No, I did not support them in any other way
Demonstrated [l=Yes; 0=No]
Attended a political rally hosted by this political party [l=Yes; 0=No]
Made financial donations to this particular political party [l=Yes; 0=No]
I voted for them [l=Yes; 0=No]
I support them emotionally, hoping they win elections.
Other form of support
Refused to answer
Missing Data

Item 6. Did this or any other political party contact you to vote for them or support them
by other means during the elections of 2005?
1. Yes I was contacted by this political party to vote for them or support them
during the elections of 2005
2. No, another political party contacted me to vote or support them during the
elections of 2005. Name different political party here
3. No political party contacted me to vote or support them during the elections of
2005
4. I cannot recall if any political party contacted me during the elections of 2005
5. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data

Item 7. Do you feel "very close," "somewhat close" or "not very close" to the political
party you voted for in the legislative elections of 2005?

1.
2.
3.
4.
9.

Very Close
Somewhat Close
Not very Close
Refused to answer
Missing Data

Item 8. Why did you vote for this particular political party in the legislative elections of
2005? [Interviewer, initially, do not prompt. Code from responses. However, if
respondent is unsure, gently prod using the following choices. Ask them by reading out
the following response options to them, "You voted for this particular party
because...?"] More than one response is appropriate.
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A. They are the party representing the interests of my ethnic group
[l=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]
B. They are the party that will best unite the country and sustain peace
[l=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]
C. The are the party representing the interests of my region [l=strongly
agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]
D. The are the party that are most likely to develop the country by building
roads, clinics and bringing electricity to the whole country [l=strongly
agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]
E. They are the party that represents the interests of my religion [l=strongly
agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]
F. They are the party of the young generation [l=strongly agree; 2=agree;
3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]
G. I don't have any reason, I just voted for them [l=strongly agree; 2=agree;
3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]
H. They are the party of the "big person," national personality or most
important politician from our area or county [l=strongly agree; 2=agree;
3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]
I. Other
J. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data

Item 9. [Interviewer, if respondent selected option Bfor Item 8, then ask them this
question. If not, move on to the next Item.] If the elections of 2005 were not a postconflict election and peace was not an issue, would you have still voted for this party that
you voted for?
1.
2.
3.
9.

Yes
No
Refused to answer
Missing Data

Item 10. When you vote, what matters to you most, the political party itself or the leader
of the party?
1.
2.
3.
9.

The political party matters to me more than the leader of the party
The leader of the party matters to me more than the political party itself
Refused to answer
Missing Data

Item 11. In your opinion, where the last presidential and National Assembly elections
free and fair?
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1.
2.
3.
4.
9.

Yes, the last elections were free and fair
No, the last elections were not free and fair
I don' t know/cannot tell
Refused to answer
Missing Data

Item 12. [Interviewer: Ask this question only if answer to Item 11 was "No."] Why do
you say the last elections were not free and fair? This is an open-ended response. Please
do not code.

Item 13. Did you accept the outcome of the last elections for president and National
Assembly?

1.
2.
3.
9.

Yes, I accepted the outcome of the last elections
No, I did not accept the outcome of the last elections
Refused to answer
Missing Data

Item 14. [Interviewer: ask this question only if response to Item 13 is "No. " This is an
open-ended response] If you did not accept the outcome of the last election, is there
anything you plan to do about it? What are you most likely to do to ensure a fair outcome
next election?

Item 15. Do you think anything can and should be done to ensure a fair outcome next
time?
1. Yes, something can be done to ensure the elections are free and fair next time
2. No, nothing can be done to ensure that the elections are free and fair next time
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3. I don't know what can be done to ensure that the elections are free and fair next
time
4. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data
Item 16. [Interviewer: If answer is "yes " to Item 15 then probe respondent some more
and ask the following} "What is that thing you feel should be done next time to ensure a
fair outcome?" This is an open-ended response question. If answer to Item 15 was "No "
then please skip to the next item.]

Item 17. Besides the political party that you voted for in the elections for National
Assembly in 2005, is there any other political party that you feel close to? [Interviewer,
prompt respondent along the lines "what could be a substitute political party if the
political party you first selected were not around, or did not exist? Do not read options
out to respondent, please code from response].
1. All Liberia Coalition Party (ALCOP)
2. Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
3. Freedom Alliance Party of Liberia (FAPL)
4. Freedom Democratic Party (FDP)
5. Liberian Action Party/ Coalition for the Transformation of Liberia (LAP/COTOL)
6. Liberian Destiny Party (LDP)
7. Liberia Equal Rights Party (LERP)
8. Liberia National Union/United Democratic Alliance (LINU/UDA)
9. Liberty Party (LP)
10. Labor Party of Liberia (LPL)
11. Liberian People's Party/Alliance for Peace and Democracy (LPP/APD)
12. National Vision Party of Liberia (NATVIPOL)
13. New Deal Movement (NDM)
14. National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
15. National Party of Liberia (NPL)
16. National Patriotic Party (NPP)
17. National Reformation Party (NRP)
18. Progressive Democratic Party (PRODEM)
19. Reformed United Liberian Party (RULP)
20. Samuel Raymond Divine, Sr. (Independent)
21. Union of Liberian Democrats (ULD)
22. Unity Party (UP)
386

23. No, I do not feel close to any other political party
99. Missing Data

Item 18. Why is this second party your party of choice following your first choice?
[Interviewer: If respondent selects a second choice of political party, ask them this
question but do not prompt code from responses. If they do not have a second choice of
political party, skip to the next Item.]
A. They also represent the interests of my ethnic group [l=strongly agree;
2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree]
B. They also represent the interests of my region [l=strongly agree; 2=agree;
3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree]
C. They have the second best proposals for bringing economic development
to Liberia [l=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree]
D. They are the second party that is most likely to bring peace to Liberia
[l=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree]
E. Other reason:
F. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data
Transition [To the interviewer]: Now we are going to move on and talk about your
opinions on various issues today. I am going to ask you questions about how you feel
about these issues today.

Item 19. There are so many personalities/national figures, call them big names or "big
persons," in Liberian politics today. I am going to name several of them, some of whom
were also candidates in the last elections. Please let me know how close you feel to any
one of them. [Interviewer: More than one response is appropriate for this Item.]
A. Mr. Milton Nathaniel Barnes. l=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not
close; 9=no response
B. Mr. Charles Walker Brumskine. l=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not
close; 9=no response
C. Mr. Sekou Damate Conneh. l=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not
close; 9=no response
D. Mr. Samuel Raymond Divine Sr. l=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not
close; 9=no response
E. Mr. David M. Farhat. l=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close;
9=no response
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F.
G.
H.
I.
J.
K.
L.
M.
N.
O.
P.
Q.
R.
S.
T.
U.
V.
W.

Mr. Armah Zolu Jallah. l=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close;
9=no response
Madam Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. l=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not
close; 9=no response
Mr. George Momodu Kiadii. l=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not
close; 9=no response
Mr. George Klay Kieh, Jr. l=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close;
9=no response.
Mr. Joseph D.Z. Korto. 1-very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close;
9=no response
Mr. Robert Momo Kpoto. l=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close;
9=no response
Mr. Alhaji G.V. Kromah. l=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close;
9=no response
Mr. Roland Chris Yarkpah Massaquoi. l=very close; 2=somewhat close;
3=not close; 9=no response.
Mr. John Sembe Morlu. l=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close;
9=no response
Bishop Alfred Garpee Reeves. l=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not
close; 9=no response.
Mr. Harry Varney Gboto-Nambi Sherman. l=very close; 2=somewhat
close; 3=not close; 9=no response.
Mr. Togba-Nah Tipoteh. l=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close;
9=no response.
Mrs. Margaret J. Tor-Thompson. l=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not
close; 9=no response.
Mr. Winston A. Tubman. l=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close;
9=no response.
Mr. William Vacanarat Shadrach Tubman. l=very close; 2=somewhat
close; 3=not close; 9=no response.
Mr. George Manneh Weah. l=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not
close; 9=no response.
Mr. Joseph Mamadee Woah-Tee. l=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not
close; 9=no response.
Other. Please name
l=very close; 2=somewhat close;
3=not close; 9=no response

Item 20. Why do you feel close to this particular personality/national figure or "big
person?" in Liberian politics and not to the others listed? [Interviewer: if the respondent
indicates that they feel close to more than one "big person, "please rephrase the question
and ask them why do they feel close to the names they have listed and not others. Do not
prompt for answers. This is an open-ended response. Will Code later.]
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1.
2. Don't know/cannot say
9. Missing Data
Item 21. How likely is it today that you can cast a vote for someone from a different
ethnic group if you feel that person is the right person for the job?
1.
2.
3.
4.
9.

Highly likely
Likely
Unlikely
Very unlikely
No response

Item 22. Have you heard of the word "democracy" before?
0=No
l=Yes
9=No Response.
Item 23. If "yes" to Item 22, what, if anything, does the word 'democracy" mean to you?
[Interviewer: do not prompt. Accept up to three responses and ask respondents to list
responses in order of importance. Rank order the responses below accordingly. From
l=most important; 2=very important; 3=important.] If answer to Item 23 was "no,"
skip the following Items and move on to Item 28.
1.
2.
3.
9. Missing Data.
Item 24. Which of these statements is closest to your own opinion? [Interviewer: Read
out statements. Only one option to be chosen.]
1. Statement A: For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government
we have.
2. Statement B: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be
preferable.
3. A democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.
4. I don't have an answer
9. Missing Data
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Item 25. In your opinion how democratic is Liberia today? [Read out options. Accept
only one option]
1.
2.
3.
4.

Not very democratic
Somewhat democratic
Highly democratic
Do not understand this question/do not understand what degree of
"democracy" exists in Liberia
9. Missing Data

Item 26. How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Liberia? Are you:
[Interviewer: Read out options. Only one option to be chosen.]
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
9.

Liberia is not a democracy
Not at all satisfied
Not very satisfied
Fairly satisfied
Very satisfied
Missing Data

Item 27. In your opinion, how likely is it that Liberia will remain a democratic country?

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
9.

Liberia is not a democracy [Do not read.]
Not at all likely
Not very likely
Likely
Very likely
Don't know [Do not read.]
Missing data

Item 28. What do you think are the most important problems or issues facing Liberia
today? [Interviewer: rank order responses from "l=the most important problems or
issues facing Liberia today are ..." down through the least important issue. Allow up to
five responses.]

1.
2.
3.
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4.
5.
6. Liberia is just fine. There are no important problems or issues facing the country.
7. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data

Item 29. What are the most important problems or issues facing YOU today?
[Interviewer: again, rank order responses from "l=the most important problems or
issues facing me today are ... " down through the least important problem or issue. Allow
up to five responses.]

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6. Refused to answer
9. Missing data

Item 30. What political party or political parties do you think can best resolve the
problems and issues facing you today that you have just mentioned? [Interviewer: do not
prompt, code from responses].
1.
2.
3.
4. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data

Item 31. Can you recall if that is the reason why you voted for this party in the National
Assembly elections of 2005? [Interviewer: do not prompt for answers, code from
responses]
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1. Yes, that is the reason
2. No, I did not vote for them to resolve the problems and issues facing me, I voted
for them just because they are the party of my ethnic group
3. No, at the time I voted for another political party. Which one
4. I did not vote in the elections of 2005
5. Refused to answer
9. Missing data

Item 32. In general, how do rate your living conditions compared to those of other
Liberians? [Interviewer: Please read out response options.]

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
9.

Much worse
Worse
Same
Better
Much Better
Don't Know
Missing Data.

Item 33. What tribe do you consider yourself to be a part of? [Interviewer; prompt if
necessary: You know, your ethnic or cultural group or the group that you most identify
with. Do NOT read options. Code from response]
10. Krim=10
ll.Kru=ll
12. Loma=12
13. Mandingo=13
14. Mano=14
15. Mende=15
16. Vai=16
17. Other=17 [Specify
]
18. Refused to answer=l 8
19. I consider myself just a Liberian and not part of any particular tribe or ethnic
group
99. Missing Data

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Bassa=l
Bella=2
Dei=3
Gbandi=4
Gio=5
Gola=6
Grebo=7
Kissi=8
Kpelle=9

392

Item 34. Why do you consider yourself a part of this PARTICULAR tribe or ethnic
group and not any other tribe or ethnic group? [Interviewer: this is an open-ended
response]

Item 35. Think about the condition of

[Fill in the respondent's ethnic

group in the blank space.] If respondent did not identify any group on Item 33, or if they
chose "20=1 consider myself just a Liberian and not part of any particular tribe or ethnic
group, " or "99=missing data, " then mark " 7=Not Applicable, " and move on to the next
Item.
A. Are their economic conditions worse, the same as or better than other
groups in this country? 5=Much worse; 4=Worse; 3=same; 2=better;
l=much better; 7=not applicable; 8=Don't know/can't tell; 9=No
response.
B. Do they have less, the same, or more influence in politics than other
groups in this country? 5=much less; 4=less; 3=same; 2=more; l=much
more; 7=not applicable; 8=don't know/can't tell; 9=no response.
Item 36. Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Liberian and being
a

[Enter respondent's ethnic group in the blank space]. Which of the

following statements best expresses your feelings? If respondent did not identify any
group on Item 33, or if they chose "20=1 consider myself just a Liberian and not part of
any particular tribe or ethnic group, " or "99=Missing Data, " then mark "7=Not
Applicable, " and move on to the next Item.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
7.

I feel only
[Insert Respondent's Ethnic group].
I feel more
[Insert Respondent's ethnic group] than Liberian.
I feel equally Liberian and
[Insert Respondent's ethnic group]
I feel more Liberian than
[Insert Respondent's ethnic group]
I feel only Liberian.
Not Applicable

9. Missing Data
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Item 37. Let's turn to your views on your fellow citizens. Generally speaking, would you
say that most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing with
people?
1. You must be very careful
2. Most people can be trusted
9. Missing Data
Item 38. How much do you trust each of the following types of people?
A. Your relatives. 0=Not at all; l=Just a little; 2=1 trust them somewhat; 3=1
trust them a lot; 9=Missing response.
B. Your neighbors. 0=Not at all; l=Just a little; 2=1 trust them somewhat; 3=1
trust them a lot; 9=Missing response.
C. People from your own ethnic group [or tribe]. 0=Not at all; l=Just a little;
2=1 trust them somewhat; 3=1 trust them a lot; 9=Missing response
D. Liberians from other ethnic groups. 0=Not at all; l=Just a little; 2=1 trust
them somewhat; 3=1 trust them a lot; 9=Missing response
E. Foreign citizens that you know of living in this country 0=Not at all;
l=Just a little; 2=1 trust them somewhat; 3=1 trust them a lot; 9=Missing
response
9. Missing Data
Item 39. How often are

s [Enter Respondent's ethnic group in the blank

space] treated unfairly by the government? If respondent did not identify any group on
Item 33, or if they chose "20=1 consider myself just a Liberians and not part of any
particular tribe or ethnic group, " or "99=No response, " then mark " 7=Not Applicable, "
and move on to the next Item.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
9.

Never
Sometimes
Often
Always
Not Applicable
Missing Data

Item 40. Let's talk for a moment about the kind of society we would like to have in this
country. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose statement A
or Statement B. [Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion. Do you agree or agree very
strongly?]
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Statement A. As citizens, we should be more active in questioning the actions
of our leaders. l=agree very strongly with A; 2=agree with A.
Statement B. In our country these days, we should show more respect for
authority.
3=agree with B; 4=agree strongly with B; 5=agree with neither;
9=no response.
Item 41. Let's talk about some expectations of leadership in this country today. Which of
the following statements is closest to your view? Choose statement A or Statement B.
[Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion. Do you agree or agree very strongly?]
Statement A. Since our leaders represent everyone, they should not favor their
own family or group. l=agree very strongly with A; 2=agree with A.
Statement B. Once in office, leaders are obliged to help their home community.
3=agree with B; 4=agree strongly with B; 5=agree with neither; 9=no response.
Item 42. Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people voluntarily join or
attend. For each one, could you tell me how likely you are to join that particular group
with individuals from other ethnic groups? [Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion.
Are you very likely, likely, unlikely or very unlikely?]
A. A religious group (e.g. church, mosque). l=very likely; 2=likely;
3=unlikely; 4=very unlikely; 9=no response.
B. A trade union or farmers association. l=very likely; 2=likely; 3=unlikely;
4=very unlikely; 9=no response.
C. A professional or business association. l=very likely; 2=likely;
3=unlikely; 4=very unlikely; 9=no response.
D. A political party. l=very likely; 2=likely; 3=unlikely; 4=very unlikely;
9=no response.
E. A community development, neighborhood association or self-help
association. l=very likely; 2=likely; 3=unlikely; 4=very unlikely; 9=no
response.
9. Missing Data

Item 43. During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following
persons about some important problem or to give them your views? [Read out options].
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A. A local government councilor. 0=Never; l=only once; 2=a few times;
3=often; 9=no response.
B. A member of the national Senate or House. 0=Never; l=only once; 2=a
few times; 3=often; 9=no response.
C. An official of a government ministry. 0=Never; l=only once; 2=a few
times; 3=often; 9=no response.
D. A political party official. 0=Never; l=only once; 2=a few times; 3=often;
9=no response.
E. A religious leader. 0=Never; l=only once; 2=a few times; 3=often; 9=no
response.
F. A traditional ruler. 0=Never; l=only once; 2=a few times; 3=often; 9=no
response.
G. Some other influential person (prompt if necessary: you know, someone
with more money or power than you who can speak on your behalf.)
0=Never; l=only once; 2=a few times; 3=often; 9=no response.
Item 44. Think of the last time you contacted any of the above leaders. Was the main
reason to: [Read out options. If respondent answered "0=Never"for all parts of Item 55,
i.e. they NEVER contacted any leader, circle code "7=Not applicable" for this Item.]
1. Tell them about your own personal problems?
2. Tell them about a community or public problem?
3. Give them your view on some political issue?
4. Something else? Do you mind telling us?
7. Not applicable, i.e., did not contact any leader
9. Missing Data.
Item 45. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A
or Statement B. [Interviewer: probe for the strength of opinion. Do you agree or agree
very strongly?]
Statement A: We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and
honest elections. l=agree very strongly with A; 2=agree with A.
Statement B: Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other
methods for choosing this country's leaders.3=agree with B; 4=agree very strongly with
B; 5=Agree with neither; 9=missing response.
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Item 46. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A
or Statement B. [Interviewer: probe for the strength of opinion. Do you agree or agree
very strongly?]

Statement A: Political Parties create division and confusion; it is therefore unnecessary to
have many political parties in Liberia. l=agree very strongly with A; 2=agree with A.

Statement B: Many political parties are needed to make sure that Liberians have real
choices in who governs them. 3=agree with B; 4=agree very strongly with B; 5=Agree
with neither; 9=missing response.
Item 47. What political party will you vote for in the next elections? [Interviewer: do not
prompt. Code from responses.]
1.1 will vote for the

in the next elections.

2.1 have not made a decision yet about what political party to vote for in the next
elections.
3.1 do not intend to vote in the next elections.
9. No response
Item 48. [If response to Item 47 is "I, " ask this question, if not skip to the next Item.]
Why will you vote for this particular political party in the next elections and not any
other?
1. They are the party of my tribe or ethnic group [l=agree very strongly;
2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=disagree very strongly]
2. They are the party that are most competent to run the country [l=agree
very strongly; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=disagree very strongly]
3. Other. (Please Indicate)
[l=agree very strongly;
2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=disagree very strongly]
4. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data
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Item 49. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A
or Statement B. [Interviewer: probe for strength of opinion. Do you agree or agree very
strongly?]

Statement A: It is important to obey the government in power no matter whom you voted
for. l=agree very strongly with A; 2=agree with A.

Statement B: It is not necessary to obey the laws of a government that I did not vote for.
3=agree with B; 4=agree very strongly with B; 5=Agree with neither; 9=missing
response.

Item 50. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A
or Statement B.

Statement A: It is better to find lawful solutions to problems even if it takes longer.
l=agree very strongly with A; 2=agree with A

Statement B: It is sometimes better to ignore the law and solve problems immediately
using other means. 3=agree with B; 4=agree very strongly with B; 5=Agree with neither;
9=missing response.

Item 51. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A
or Statement B.

Statement A: The use of violence is never justified in Liberian politics today. l=agree
very strongly with A; 2=agree with A

Statement B: In this country, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just
cause. 3=agree with B; 4=agree very strongly with B; 5=Agree with neither; 9=missing
response
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Item 52. In this country, how often: [Please read out options]
A. Do people have to be careful about what they say about politics?
3=always; 2=often; l=rarely; 0=never; 9=no response.
B. Does competition between political parties lead to violent conflict?
3=always; 2=often; l=rarely; 0=never; 9=no response.
C. Are people treated equally under the law? 3=always; 2=often; l=rarely;
0=never; 9=no response.
Item 53. Now let's speak about the performance of the present government of this
country. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the
following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say? [Interviewer: Please probe for
strength of opinion.]
a. Managing the economy. l=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly
well; 4=very well; 9=no response
b. Creating jobs. l=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very
well; 9=no response
c. Keeping prices stable. l=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well;
4=very well; 9=no response
d. Narrowing gaps between rich and poor. l=very badly; 2=fairly
badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response
e. Reducing crime. l=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well;
4=very well; 9=no response
f. Improving basic health services. l=very badly; 2=fairly badly;
3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response
g. Addressing educational needs. l=very badly; 2=fairly badly;
3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response
h. Delivering household water. l=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly
well; 4=very well; 9=no response
i. Ensuring everyone has enough to eat. l=very badly; 2=fairly
badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response
j . Fighting corruption in government. l=very badly; 2=fairly badly;
3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response
k. Uniting the country following the civil war. l=very badly; 2=fairly
badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response
1. Combating HIV/AIDS. l=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly
well; 4=very well; 9=no response
m. Solving other problems that you know of besides those listed here.
l=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no
response
Item 54. [Interviewer: Depending on the region this particular interview in question is
taking place; ask the interviewee this question with reference to the regions where the
interview is evidently not taking place. For example, if you are in the eastern region of
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the country, ask the respondent about travel to the western, southern, or northern
region.] Have you ever traveled to the

regions of this

country?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Refused to answer
9. No answer
Item 55. [If answer to Item 54 is "yes, " ask this question; if not skip to the next Item.]
How often do you travel to other regions of the country?
1. Very often (more than twice a year)
2. Often (at least twice a year)
3. Hardly ever (have visited once or twice but hardly ever leave my region)
4. Never
9. Missing Data
Item 56. Did you join any armed faction during the civil war?
1.
2.
3.
9.

No
Yes
Refused to answer this question.
No response

Item 57. If "yes" to the previous Item, then ask this Item. If "no," then skip and move on
to the next Item. What armed faction did you join during the civil war? [Interviewer:
Please readout response options and code accordingly.]
1. Armed Forces of Liberia -AFL
2. Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia -INPFL of Prince Johnson
3. Liberia Peace Council
4. National Patriotic Front of Liberia -NPFL
5. United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia-J: ULIMO J
6. United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia-K: ULEVIO K
7. I did not join any armed faction during the civil war
9. Missing Data.
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Item 58. If respondent indicated an armed faction that they fought for during the civil
war, ask them; why did you join this particular faction and not others during the civil
war? [This is an open-ended response. Will code later.]

Part 3. Demographic Information (2)
Item 59. What is your main occupation? What is the major source of the income you
depend upon to survive? (If currently unemployed, retired, or disabled, what was the
respondent's last main occupation?) [Do not read options out to the respondent. Please
code from responses.]
Agrarian
1. Subsistence farmer (produces only for home consumption).
2. Peasant Farmer (produces both for own consumption and some surplus
produce for sale).
3. Commercial Farmer (produces mainly for sale).
4. Farm Worker
Worker
5. Fisherman
6. Trader/Hawker/Vendor
7. Miner (diamond, gold, rutile)
8. Domestic Worker/Maid/House help
9. Armed Services/Police/Security Personnel
10. Artisan/skilled manual worker in the formal sector
11. Artisan/skilled manual worker in the formal sector
12. Clerical Worker
13. Unskilled manual worker in the formal sector
14. Unskilled manual worker in the informal sector
Professional
15. Businessperson (works in company for others)
16. Businessperson (owns small business of less than 10 employees)
17. Businessperson (owns large business of 10 or more employees)
18. Professional worker (e.g., doctor, lawyer, accountant, nurse, engineer etc).
19. Supervisors/Foreman
20. Teacher
401

21. Government Worker
22. Retail worker
23. Works for a local nongovernmental organization
24. Works for an international nongovernmental organization
Other
25. Student
26. Housewife/Works in the Household
27. Other (specify):
28. Unemployed
99. Don't know (Did not respond)
Item 60. [Education] what is your highest level of education?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Illiterate (cannot both read or write)
High School education only
Up to secondary school education but did not continue after
Technical College/Teachers College
University education [University of Liberia; Cuttington University]
Received higher education in a Western country. Please list country
here
.
7. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data
Item 61. What is the respondent's social class? [Interviewer deduces the respondent's
social class with reference to responses to Item 6 above]
1. 1.Peasant [please include in this class: small agricultural producers producing
largely for their own consumption, subsistence farmers, peasant farmers].
2. Proletariat [please include in this class: wage earners, landless rural laborers,
urban laborers in industry, mining, transport, farm worker, domestic
worker/maid/house help, clerical worker].
3. Informal sector entrepreneurs or lumpenproletariat [please include in this class:
both licensed and illegal street vendors, money changers/lenders and petty
thieves, the homeless living in the cities].
4. Petty bourgeoisie [please include in this class: teachers, lower ranks of the
military and police services, lower ranks of public service, small traders]
5. Traditional rulers [please include in this class: clan heads, chiefs, paramount
chiefs, emirs, monarchs]
6. Commercial bourgeoisie [please include in this class: commercial farmers,
businesspersons owning large businesses of 10 or more employees, and land
owners]
7. Bureaucratic bourgeoisie [please include in this class: government ministers,
higher rank bureaucrats and senior military and police officers, largely urbanbased].
8. Other [specify]:
9. Don't know/ could not deduce:
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Item 62. What is your religion, if any?
1. Christian [Interviewer: Please Include in this category all Protestants
(mainstream and Evangelical Pentecostals); Catholics; Jehovah's Witnesses;
Seventh Day Adventists; and African Independent Churches.]
2. Muslim [Interviewer: Please include in this category all sects-Sunni, Shiite
etc.]
3. Traditional African religions
4. I do not have a religion
5. Other [specify
]
9. Missing Data

Item 63. Which of these things do you personally own or have access to in your home?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Radio
Television
Book, you know, a reading book
Bicycle
Motorcycle
Motor vehicle/car
Cell phone
Do not own any of these
Missing Data

Item 64. How often do you get news from the following sources? [Interviewer: Please
read out options and code appropriately.]
A. Radio. 4=Everyday; 3=A few times a week; 2=A few times a month; l=Less than once
a month;
0=Never; 9=No response
B. Television. 4=Everyday; 3=A few times a week; 2=A few times a month; l=Less than
once a month; 0=Never; 9=No response
C. Newspapers. 4=Everyday; 3=A few times a week; 2=A few times a month; l=Less
than once a month; CNNever; 9=No response
D. Other. Please state.

4=Everyday; 3=A few times a week; 2=A few

times a month; l=Less than once a month; 0=Never; 9=No response
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Item 65. How interested are you in public affairs? [Interviewer: Prompt if necessary: You
Know, in politics and government?]
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Very Interested
Somewhat Interested
Not very interested
Not at all interested
Missing Data

Here, we are going to move on talk about the second round of presidential elections in
December of 2005. Some of the details may or may not have been lost on the
respondents. Please let the respondent know that they should feel very comfortable to ask
to skip questions that they cannot recall answers to. Thank you!
Item 66. Did you vote in the runoff elections for President between George Weah and
Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf?
1.
2.
3.
4.
9.

Yes, I voted in the runoff elections
No, I did not vote in the runoff elections
I cannot remember whether I voted in the runoff elections
Refused to answer
Missing Data

Item 67. [Interviewer: If the answer is "yes, " then ask this next question.] Who did you
vote for in the runoff elections for president?
1.
2.
3.
4.
9.

Voted for George Weah
Voted for Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf
Cannot recall who I voted for
Refused to answer
Missing Data

Item 68. Was this the same individual that you voted for president during the first round
of presidential elections?
1.
2.
3.
4.
9.

Yes, this was who I voted for in the first round of elections
No, I did not vote for this individual during the first round of elections
I cannot recall
Refused to answer
Missing Data
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Item 69. If answer to Item 68 is "No," why did you switch your vote to this individual?
1. My initial choice on the first round was no longer on the ballot
2. I was told by the elders of my political Party to vote for this choice of candidate in
the runoff
3. This candidate is from my ethnic group
4. This is candidate is most competent to bring Liberia out of the current crises
5. Refused to answer
6. No Response

Item 70. What do you think of the indictment of Charles Taylor by the U.N. Special
Court for Sierra Leone? [This is an open-ended question. Please allow the respondent to
tell you what they think].

We want to thank you for taking the time to respond to these questions for us. The
results of this study will be available in a few months time, are you interested in
seeing the final results of the study? [Interviewer: if respondent is interested in
seeing the result of this study, please give them my contact address.]

End Interview

To the Interviewer: Please do not forget to complete the following sections..
Item 71: What proportion of the questions do you feel the respondent had difficulty
answering?
0. None
1. Few
2. Some
3. Most
4. All
Item 72. Which questions did the respondents have trouble answering? [Identify up to
three.]
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1.
2.
3.

Item 73. What was the respondent's attitude towards you during the interview?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.

Was she or he..
Was she or he..
Was she or he..
Was she or he..
Was he or she..
Was he or she..

l=friendly; 2=in between; 3=hostile?
1 interested; 2=in between; 3=bored?
1 cooperative; 2=in between; 3=uncooperative?
l=patient; 2=in between; 3=impatient?
l=at ease; 2=in between; 3=suspicious?
l=honest; 2=in between; 3=misleading?

Item 74. Do you have any other comments on the interview? For example, did anything
else significant happen during the interview?
2. No
3. Yes. Please
Explain
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